Regulating the genetic supermarket: Preimplantation genetic testing, parental choice and the harm principle by Gavaghan, Colin
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
 
Theses Digitisation: 
https://www.gla.ac.uk/myglasgow/research/enlighten/theses/digitisation/ 
This is a digitised version of the original print thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge 
 
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, 
title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten: Theses 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
research-enlighten@glasgow.ac.uk 
Regulating the Genetic Supermarket: Preimplantation Genetic Testing, 
Parental Choice and the Harm Principle
Colin Gavaghan, LL.B. (Hons.)
Submitted in fulfilment of the degree of Ph.D. in the University of
Glasgow
2004
ProQuest Number: 10390946
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The qua lity  of this reproduction  is d e p e n d e n t upon the qua lity  of the copy subm itted.
In the unlikely e ve n t that the au tho r did not send a co m p le te  m anuscrip t 
and there are missing pages, these will be no ted . Also, if m ateria l had to be rem oved,
a no te  will ind ica te  the de le tion .
uest
ProQuest 10390946
Published by ProQuest LLO (2017). C opyrigh t of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected aga inst unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C o de
M icroform  Edition © ProQuest LLO.
ProQuest LLO.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 4 81 06 - 1346
/GlasgowUNIVERSITYIWARY;
Abstract
In 1974, in one o f the most intriguing footnotes in the history o f political theory, Robert 
Nozick postulated the existence o f a Genetic Supermarket, a state o f affairs in which 
prospective parents would be able to choose -  to whatever extent technology allowed -  the 
genetic characteristics o f their children. The closing decades o f the Twentieth Century saw 
this thought experiment become a possibility, with developments in reproductive and 
genetic technologies allowing ex utero embiyos to be tested for the presence o f certain 
genetic traits before a decision as to which to implant. However, as technological 
obstacles to the unfettered choice envisaged by Nozick have disappeared, they have been 
replaced by regulatory barriers.
In this thesis, I examine the merits of a laissez faire approach to parental choice of 
offspring characteristics. Specifically, I consider the case for largely unrestricted access to 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis (POD), the technology that currently offers most 
possibilities in this regard, and which has been the subject o f most discussion and 
controversy. My examination is considered predominantly with the interests o f the various 
parties who might be affected by such choices, and in particular, with the prospect of harm 
to any of them. In Chapter 2, I argue that if our concern is with the avoidance of harm, we 
should acknowledge that curtailing the range o f choices open to prospective parents results 
in a harm to them. Hence, any such restrictions much be justified by reference to the risk 
o f a greater harm which such restrictions will plausibly avoid.
In Chapter 3, I examine the purported harms that could be inflicted upon either those 
potential future children who would have been born but for their parents’ use o f POD, or to 
the more tangible class of children who are in fact born as a result. With regard to the 
former, I argue that the attribution of interests (an essential prerequisite o f harms) to 
merely potential beings is incoherent. Those children who are in fact born, however, are 
likely to be bearers o f interests, and can therefore be the subjects o f harm. Furthermore, I 
acknowledge that their unique origins, or the parental motives underlying them, could 
indeed see them faced with harms from which children born in more orthodox ways may 
be spared. However, it is my contention -  a contention strongly influenced by the work of 
Derek Parfit -  that such harms are likely to be outweighed by the benefits o f existence, 
rendering it impossible to say o f such children that they are harmed on balance.
In Chapter 4, I consider the possibility of harms being occasioned to other parties, 
specifically, existing disabled persons and those who are denied access to the Genetic 
Supermarket due to lack o f financial means. With regard to the former, I suggest that 
while harms -  both subjective and objective -  cannot lightly be discounted, a laissez faire 
approach which sees the state adopt a position of neutrality with regard to the selection of 
traits may diminish rather than exacerbate these. Likewise, considerations o f justice create 
unease about the prospect o f a Genetic Supermarket accessible only by the wealthy. This, 
however, forces us to confront wider questions about undeserved advantage, and leads me 
to ask whether the Genetic Supemiarket approach would be any more unjust than the status 
quo.
In my final chapter, I look critically at the decisions arrived at thus far by the various 
bodies charged with regulating access to PGD. In particular, the provisions o f the Human 
Fertilisation & Embryology Act 1990, and the decisions o f the Human Fertilisation & 
Embryology Authority which it established, are scrutinised. It is my contention that the 
decisions o f the latter are sometimes inconsistent and difficult to reconcile with the ethical 
principles that they purport to uphold. In particular, they lack a coherent notion o f harm, 
or of the duties that we owe to future persons.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
References to revolutions are fast attaining the status o f cliché in the field of 
bioethics. Certainly, the literature is already replete with references to revolutions, o f 
the sexual,’ reproductive,^ genetic,^ and information varieties. Whether the use of 
this term is always appropriate, or whether its impact is in fact being diluted by over 
use, is something o f a moot point. What is beyond dispute is that developments in 
the fields of science and technology have radically altered the lives o f a significant 
number of people, and seem destined to affect many more.
These changes have taken a variety o f forms, but if they are linked by any common 
thread, it is perhaps that they have all resulted in ever greater degrees o f control being 
placed in human hands. Whatever one’s view as to the extent to which these 
‘revolutions’ should be welcomed, what cannot be denied is that they have 
introduced a degree o f choice into areas o f life which previously lay entirely outwith 
human control.
The word ‘choice’ is not used here in a value-laden sense; its introduction into these 
areas is not, at this point, being depicted as something to be welcomed or regretted. 
As will be seen, there are those who would contend that there are certain matters 
which should, for a variety o f reasons, not be subject to human control. Nor is any 
assumption being made as to the question of which particular humans exercise this 
choice. It may be that, in certain areas, the net result o f the ‘revolutions’ has been to 
narrow rather than expand the range o f choices available to the majority, while 
increasing the amount o f power collected in the hands o f an elite. Nonetheless, what 
cannot be denied is that much of what was previously determined by chance, or God, 
or natural selection, depending upon one’s perspective, is now decided upon by 
human beings.
' See Smith, Patricia. ‘The M etamorphosis o f  M otherhood’, in Joan C Callahan, ed. Reproduction, Ethics, 
an d  the Law: F em inist P erspectives, Indiana University Press, 1995, at p. 110 for one exam ple.
 ^ Singer, Peter, and W ells, Diane, The R eproductive Revolution, Oxford University Press, 1994, and 
Chadwick, Ruth, ‘H aving Children: Introduction’ from her collection Ethics, R eproduction  an d  G enetic  
Control, Routledge, 1990, are just two out o f  literally hundreds o f  exam ples o f  works which have used o f  this 
term.
 ^ E.g., Callahan, Daniel, ‘The genetic revolution,’ H astings Lom> Journal (1994) v .45, 1435-1526.
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This thesis is concerned with an area where reproductive and genetic technologies 
interact to present a set o f choices which have never before been available to 
humankind; choices about what kind o f people will comprise the generations which 
succeed us. Advances in understanding of the role o f genetics in shaping human 
characteristics, together with developments o f genetic screening techniques, have 
given rise to a situation wherein predictions can be made, often with substantial 
degrees of accuracy, about the characteristics of persons who are not yet in existence. 
Genetic testing'’ o f embryos, or even o f the gametes which will combine to create 
embryos, can reveal information about the life expectancy, health, sex, appearance, 
and even behavioural traits o f the persons which those embryos could become.
Occurring in tandem with this, developments in reproductive technologies, 
particularly in vitro fertilisation (IVF) techniques, have given rise to situations 
wherein human embryos can be created in a laboratory environment, and stored there 
until such time as the prospective mother wishes them to be implanted. Since, as will 
be explained presently, IVF invariably involves the creation o f several embryos, 
choices will arise as to which o f these ‘rival’ embryos will be implanted in the uterus 
of a prospective mother. When combined with the genetic screening technologies 
alluded to above, the possibility exists for Preimplanation Genetic Diagnosis 
(referred to hereafter as PGD), whereby the prospective mother and/or some other 
paidy or parties, may make the decision whether to implant any o f the embryos, and if 
so which ones, in the light o f a considerable amount o f knowledge about their genetic 
composition.
It is the choices created and the questions posed by the techniques o f PGD with 
which this thesis is concerned. That such choices provide the potential for ethical 
controversy hardly needs to be said. However, an intriguing question which 
frequently arises in discussions about controversial technological innovations is 
whether the problems which they present are in fact entirely novel, or whether it is
Throughout this thesis, I use the term ‘genetic testing’ in preference to ‘genetic diagnosis’ . Although the 
rejected term is more com m on in the literature, it may be seen to carry connotations ill suited to the context in 
which I will use it; in particular, ‘diagnosis’ may be thought to imply that the trait in question is in som e sense 
pathological, which w ill in many cases be to beg the question, and in others (such as sex  selection) be 
manifestly inappropriate. N onetheless, the acronym PGD will be retained, in v iew  o f  its familiarity and 
ubiquity in the literature.
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the case that they merely reframe old questions in a new context. Is it perhaps the 
case, it is asked, that while the details change, the fundamental issues remain the 
same?
Many of the questions with which this thesis deals are far from being wholly new. 
On the contrary, questions regarding what makes a life valuable, whether life can 
ever be said to be worse than non-existence, and what (if any) duties are owed to 
future generations have intrigued writers for many years, and have received many 
more detailed considerations than they will receive here. More specifically, 
philosophers and science fiction authors, together with groups with decidedly more 
sinister agendas, have in the past considered the implications o f being able to 
determine the nature o f future persons.
What has changed in more recent times is quite simply that the questions have 
emerged from the realm of the purely hypothetical. The aforementioned 
‘revolutions’ in scientific understanding, in technological applications o f that 
understanding, and in social attitudes have seen the answers to these questions 
assume a degree o f practical significance unknown at any previous time. Questions 
which were previously no more than admittedly fascinating thought experiments have 
become practical dilemmas in need o f very real answers. ‘For the first time in human 
history,’ one observer has noted, ‘the future existence o f humanity as such has 
become a matter o f choice’  ^ while expressing the view that ‘[b]y providing us with 
the knowledge and ability to control the timing o f pregnancies, modern science has 
endowed our generation with an unprecedented power o f deciding ... the identity of 
people in a far from trivial sense.
The objective o f this thesis is to consider some of these questions in the light o f one 
particular ethical concern, a concern that will be explained in Chapter 2, and will be 
expounded upon in considerably more detail as this work progresses. For the 
moment, the major questions which will be addressed should perhaps be stated.
 ^ David Heyd, G enethics, University o f  L os A ngeles Press, 1992, at p .8. 
* Ibid, at p. 10.
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Robert Nozick, in what is surely one o f the most intriguing footnotes in modern 
philosophical writing, referred in Anarchy, State and Utopia to the notion of a 
‘genetic supermarket.’  ^ In keeping with the central arguments o f that text, his 
suggestion here was that choices about what sort o f people there should be  ^ should 
be left in the hands o f private individuals, and should not be determined or restricted 
by the state. This free market in genetic screening would meet ‘the individual 
specifications (within certain moral limits) of prospective parents,’  ^ and would 
possess ‘the great virtue that involves no centralized decision fixing the future human 
type(s).’’°
The technological means actually to shape or alter the genetic attributes o f specific 
future children, such as gene therapy, remain largely within the realms o f the 
hypothetical.”  But the advent o f PGD o f in vitro embryos has, practically speaking, 
brought Nozick’s dream somewhat closer. The technique was ‘developed in the 
1980s ... primarily in response to requests for help from people at risk o f passing on 
a serious genetic disorder to their children.’’^  It involves the removal o f  one or more 
cells (biastomeres) from embryos generated in vitro, at about the 8-cell stage (usually 
around the third day after fertilisation).”  The DNA from the biopsied cells is then 
amplified, originally by the technique o f Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR),”  but in 
more recent times by Fluorescent In Situ Hybridization (FISH),”  and examined 
before any decision will be made as to which o f the various ‘candidate’ embryos to
 ^ Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, a n d  U topia  (Basil Blackwell, 1986 edition), at p.3 15n.
* To slightly paraphrase Jonathan G lover’s title.
 ^N ozick , Anarchy, State, an d  U topia, op cit.
'H d.
" Although som atic gene therapy has been performed with som e measure o f  success in a few  cases; see N ils  
Holtug, ‘Altering Humans - The Case For and Against Human Gene Therapy’ C am bridge Q uarterly o f  
H ealthcare Ethics (1997) 6, pp .157-174.
Human Genetics Com m ission, C hoosing the fu ture: genetics a n d  reproductive decision  m aking, July 2004, 
at paragraph 3.14 .
‘Preimplantation G enetic A nalysis’, Robert A. Kaufmann, et al, The Journal o f  R eproductive M edicine  
(1992) 37(5);428-436, at p.428.
For a straightforward account o f  how PCR works, see  Philip Kitcher’s The L ives to C om e, Allen Lane The 
Penguin Press, 1996, at p. 160.
Karen Sermon, André Van Steirteghem, Inge Liebaers. ‘Preimplantation genetic diagnosis’, The Lancet 
(2004); 363(9421): 1633-1641, at p l6 3 3 ; Dagan W ells, ‘Advances in preimplantation genetic diagnosis’, 
European Journal o f  O bstetrics & G ynaecology a n d  R eproductive B iology  (2004); V ol. 115, Supplement 1 : 
S97-S101
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implant.”  As the Human Genetics Commission explains, in the United Kingdom, 
‘PGD is currently being offered for three major categories o f disease including:
• to determine the sex o f the embryo with the aim of avoiding sex-linked 
disorders such as Duchenne muscular dystrophy;
• to identify embryos with single gene disorders such as cystic fibrosis;
• and to identify embryos with chromosomal disorders, where a technique called 
fluorescence in situ hybridisation (FISH) can be used to identify or confirm 
abnormal chromosomal rearrangements.’”
At present, twelve centres in the UK are licensed to carry out PGD. Between 2001 
and 2004, the technique is believed to have brought about 45 live births in the UK,”  
while it has been claimed that over a thousand PGD births have occurred 
worldwide.”
The most straightforward, and common, type o f test has involved ascertaining the sex 
of the embryo.^’’ Certain genetic disorders are X-linked, meaning that they are only 
inherited by male offspring; a technique which ensured that only female embryos 
were implanted would similarly ensure that the unwanted condition was not passed 
on to the next generation.^’ The pre-implantation diagnosis o f single-gene defects and 
chromosomal disorders has, however, also been successfully accomplished.^^
Quite evidently, PGD is only an option to those who have undergone IVF, or some 
other means o f assisted conception which results in a number o f embryos being 
located ex utero. The present difficulties in achieving successful pregnancies 
following IVF have led some commentators to the conclusion that demand for PGD 
will, at least in the short term, be limited to those who already know they are at risk 
o f passing on some genetic disorder, together with those who would be making use
’H d .
Human Genetics Com m ission, C hoosing the future: genetics an d  reproductive decision  making, July 2004, 
at paragraph 3.16.
Ibid, at paragraph 3 .14.
John A. Robertson, ‘PGD; N ew  ethical challenges’ Nature R eview s Genetics (2003); 4(1): 6
Hanson, C., Hamberger, L., & Janson, P.O. ‘Is Any Form o f  Gender Selection Ethical?’ Journal o f  A ssis ted  
R eproduction a n d  G enetics {2QQ2)\ 19: 4 3 1 -4 3 2 .
O f course, the ability to implant only embryos o f  the desired sex eould be utilised for ‘non-therapeutic’ 
purposes. This highly controversial possibility w ill be considered in due course.
Asangla A c, ‘Preimplantation genetic diagnosis o f  inherited disease’, Indian Journal o f  E xperim ental 
B iology  (1996) 34 :1177-1182 , and Hanson and Hamberger, op cit.
f:i-japiei- 1
of reproductive technologies in any event.^^ Nonetheless, the distinct possibility 
exists that, as the success rate o f techniques such as IVF improves, and the range of 
genetic conditions for which screening is possible continues to expand, so too will 
the demand for this technology.
In essence, the contention which I seek to explore could be summarised thus: that 
there is no need, or indeed justification, for restrictions to be placed upon unfettered 
access to such a Genetic Supermarket in order to prevent any actual or likely harm 
that such access would cause. Phrasing the contention in this manner demonstrates 
immediately some o f the self-imposed limitations o f this inquiry. It is not my 
intention to consider the notion o f the Genetic Supermarket from every conceivable 
ethical perspective, nor to attempt to address every possible ethical concern to which 
such an entity might be thought to give rise. Rather, the far more modest scope of 
this thesis is to consider the question o f harm; whether the Genetic Supermarket is 
likely to prove harmful, who precisely are the likely victims o f that harm, whether 
and how that harm can be offset against likely benefits deriving from the 
Supermarket, and -  at least as important as any o f these other questions -  how the 
law presently does, and prospectively should, respond to the possibility o f harm 
deriving from it.
That the possibility o f harm is a weighty concern in any evaluation o f such an 
enterprise might be regarded as sufficiently self-evident as to obviate the need for 
further justification. Nonetheless, one o f the first tasks undertaken in Chapter 2 will 
be to show that the language o f harm is a common feature not only o f bioethical 
discussions o f PGD, but also o f approaches adopted by the legislature and regulatory 
bodies to such questions. It will, I suspect, become apparent that the notion o f harm 
has not always been invoked with any great conceptual clarity within such 
evaluations, nor has it been applied with any great consistency.^'’ It is, nonetheless, 
almost a ubiquitous element within any such discussions.
Jiaen Liu, et ai, ‘Cystic fibrosis, Duchenne muscular dystrophy and preimplantation genetic diagnosis’. 
Human R eproduction U pdate  1996, 2 (6 );5 3 1-539.
See in particular the com parison between Section 13(5) o f  the Human Fertilisation & Em bryology Act 
1990, and the attitude o f  the Court o f  Appeal to the ‘wrongful life’ action in M ackay, considered in Chapter 3, 
and also the contrasting reactions o f  the Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority to the respective 
attempts o f  the two fam ilies who sought to use PGD to select a donor sibling.
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In much the same way, it might be considered that ‘harm’ is a sufficiently clear 
concept as to need little by way of further definition or clarification. It is a concept 
familiar to legal scholars from the realms o f tort/delict, while in lay parlance the term 
is commonly employed as a synonym for ‘hurt’ or ‘damage’.W h i l e  in common use 
the term serves us well enough without ftirther definitional efforts, though, the 
application o f the concept o f harm to the area o f PGD requires a more precise 
understanding. Is it, we must consider, possible to harm a being that does not yet 
exist? Or one which lacks even basic awareness? Can someone be harmed by being 
born into adverse circumstances, if the alternative was never to be born at all? 
Perhaps most puzzling o f all, is it meaningful to speak o f a choice as ‘harmful’ even 
when we cannot point to an individual who is rendered worse off as a consequence?
Answering these questions is necessary if we are to address the central contention of 
this thesis, and this invariably requires grappling at close quarters with the meaning 
of harm, a task that will be undertaken in Chapter 2. Yet while this is necessary to 
evaluate that contention, it is not, I submit, sufficient. For the contention asks not 
only whether any harm is likely to result from a Genetic Supermarket approach to 
PGD, but whether such harm is sufficient to justify, or even require, regulation. A 
view that any harm, however trivial, should be prevented by law is not only likely to 
strike most readers as an overreaction, but furthermore, is rendered untenable by the 
realisation that the imposition o f legal restraints may itself constitute a harm. As 
Chapter 2 will explain, in such circumstances, the harm inherent in legal restraint 
gives rise to a presumption against such restraint, i.e. a rule that restraint is justified 
only where it will avoid harm of a certain (predicted) magnitude.
Having considered what is meant by harm in Chapter 2, in Chapter 3 I will consider 
the question as to which parties could be meaningfully considered as the potential 
subjects o f harmful actions. A number o f candidates will be considered, some of 
which will be looked at in more detail in subsequent chapters. One o f the primary 
objectives of this chapter, however, will be to consider whether several groups of 
purported interests which are regularly referred to are in fact valid objects o f ethical
Chapter' !
concern; indeed, in some cases, the question must be addressed as to whether such 
‘interests’ are not entirely illusory. An example o f such a category o f purported 
interests, I will argue, are those sometimes attributed to those potential children who 
might have been born but for the existence of the Genetic Supermarket.
A different, and more tangible problem arises in relation to those children who are in 
fact born as a result o f their parents’ choices. Such children have been suggested to 
be at risk from numerous possible harms, but broadly speaking, these can be divided 
into two classes: those deriving from the very fact of being the product o f such a 
decision, and those deriving from specific decisions determining the genetic traits 
they possess. As to the former, it may be thought that a child o f the Genetic 
Supermarket -  what the media often erroneously though memorably refer to as 
‘designer babies’ -  will be burdened with unfair parental expectations, or that he or 
she will feel less in control o f his or her life than other children. With regard to the 
latter category o f expectations, this relates to those (presumaby rare) situations where 
parents make ‘harmful choices’, a possibility rendered more plausible by the efforts 
employed by a Canadian couple to ensure the birth of a genetically deaf child.
These various child-centred concerns differ both in terms of how likely they are to 
materialise and in how grave the consequences would be should they do so. 
However, I will argue in Chapter 3 that both can be answered in terms o f a harm- 
centred, person-affecting approach that places emphasis on the range o f alternatives 
available to these children. My arguments here will be influenced by the well-known 
(though often rejected) thought experiments of Derek Parfit. His Non-Identity 
Problem gave rise to counter-intuitive conclusions about, inter alia, family planning, 
young teenaged mothers and our responsibilities to future generations. Its application 
to the realm of genetic choices renders inevitable conclusions that are likely to be no 
less difficult for some readers to accept.
Chapter 3 will also address some o f the challenges to the Non-Identity Problem 
(which I attempt to fashion into a less negatively perceived Non-Identity Principle), 
before concluding with a brief consideration o f some even more counter-intuitive
I will argue in Chapter 2 that both o f  these lay uses are problematic as definitions, the former being too
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outcomes which, 1 suggest, must result were this principle to applied with absolute 
consistency to its logical conclusions.
Central to the case in favour o f the Genetic Supermarket is the assumption that, 
whatever other consequences follow from it, the freedom to avail themselves o f it 
constitutes an important interest o f the prospective parents. Is this, though, an 
assumption that we can readily make? For decades, the technolologies that allowed 
prenatal screening, and the counselling that preceded them, have been subject to 
criticism from feminist commentators and others less than convinced that the 
purported extension o f choice which such technologies bring is in fact an accurate 
reflection o f the reality. For writers like Barbara Katz Rothman, concern must be 
paid to the possibility that the manner in which such ‘options’ are presented -  indeed, 
the very fact that they are offered -  can create an environment o f ‘coerced 
voluntariness’, which sees the choices available to potential parents -  and potential 
mothers in particular -  reduced rather than expanded. If there is validity in this 
claim, then rather than the interests o f the potential parents tilting the balance in 
favour o f a Genetic Supermarket, those interests would constitute a reason (though 
not necessarily a persuasive one) to regulate or curtail it.
In my concluding chapter, I will evaluate some of the claims that the availability of 
PGD restricts rather than expands the range of choices available to potential parents, 
and in particular, to potential mothers. In doing so, however, it is important to bear 
in mind that the focus o f this thesis is not only on whether harm results from 
unregulated genetic choice, but ultimately on whether stricter legal regulation is 
likely to improve matters. Even if it is shown that the development o f PGD 
technology has made the position o f potential parents worse rather than better, it does 
not automatically follow that closing o f access to it now that it is known to exist is 
the right course for the law to adopt. The latter part o f Chapter 6, then, will be given 
over to a consideration o f what, if anything, could be done to maximise parental 
autonomy.
restrictive, the latter to w ide.
(Chapier .1
My (predictably contentious) claim in Chapter 3 is that, in almost all circurnstances, 
the child of the Genetic Supermarket does not sustain harm, or at least does not 
sustain a balance o f harm over benefit, even where the choices his or her parents 
made were o f the nature that many would consider damaging (such as genetic 
deafness). This conclusion derives from the realisation that, for this particular child, 
the alternative to life with these particular obstacles was no life at all; the implicit 
assumption here is that, with a few rare exceptions, life in these circumstances is 
better, for the child living it, than no life at all. Perhaps the most widespread 
concerns about free access to PGD are, however, somewhat less specific than those 
considered in Chapter 3. It is, for example, argued by many the actual choices which 
parents will in practice make will harm certain sections o f society. This concern 
arises from the strong suspicion harboured by many that, given a choice o f 
characteristics, the vast majority would select from a fairly narrow grouping, 
resulting in those who do not conform to these standards coming to be viewed as in 
some way ‘defective.’ Most commonly, this concern arises with regard to that large 
and disparate grouping labelled by our society as ‘the disabled.’
Laura M. Purdy, for example, writes o f the notion that there is a possibility ‘that if we 
attempt to avoid the birth o f children with disease or disability, we will harm those 
who already e x i s t . T h i s  harm may take a variety o f forms. ‘At the most practical 
level,’ Purdy writes, ‘some believe that acting so as to avoid such births will lead us 
to reduce the social resources now allocated to the disabled. At a more theoretical 
level, the judgement that life is better without such problems is taken as an insult to 
those now facing them .’^^
I propose in this chapter that the suggested harms to existing disabled people may be 
divided, loosely, into two varieties, which I refer to as ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ 
harms. While the former would, were they to materialise, derive from certain 
measurable trends that would flow from the Genetic Supermarket, the latter depend 
upon certain attitudes and perceptions shared fairly widely within what some writers 
refer to as the ‘disability rights community’. Since they are so conceptually distinct, it
Ib id ,a tp .312 .
Id.
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may come as no surprise to discover that I adopt a different response towards, and 
conclusion about, these respective categories. Thus, while any writer seeking to 
defend the Genetic Supermarket hypothesis must demonstrate that the ‘objective’ 
harms will not come about, the ‘subjective’ harms have, to an extent, already 
occurred, insofar as certain disabled people already feel offended, hurt or devalued by 
the existence o f PGD, or some of the uses to which it is put.
While not disputing that such sentiments do indeed amount to harms, my approach 
will be, first, to consider whether they are, in fact, always fairly attributed to the 
availability o f PGD, and secondly, to ask how best the law might act so as to 
minimise such harms. In particular, I consider the possibility that the best means of 
addressing these ‘expressivistic concerns’ would be by adopting a less rather than 
more restrictive approach to PGD.
The broad category o f third parties thought to be at risk of harm from the laissez faire 
approach of the Genetic Supermarket is not, however, confined to those opposed to 
PGD. Rather, there also exists a credible case for the belief that certain parties have 
interests that could be negatively affected by the choice of potential parents not to use 
this technology. The contention that parents are subject to an ethical obligation to 
retain from ‘burdening’ the public purse with ill or disabled children is not as 
commonly encountered in academic bioethical literature as the ‘expressivisf type 
concerns, but it nonetheless is an argument that we might expect to hear advanced 
with increasing frequently as the possibilities offered by this technology became 
more widely known. In this section, I will consider whether it is coherent to speak in 
terms of such a duty, what form it may take, and whether it may be thought to 
outweigh the potential parents’ own interests in having the child o f their choice.
Finally, this chapter will address what is perhaps the most abstract o f all the potential 
harms considered in this thesis; the harm inherent in, or derived from, the unjust 
consequences o f the laissez faire approach. The brevity of this section should make it 
immediately clear that it is by no means a thorough consideration o f the various 
conceptions o f justice that may be thought to be touched upon by the Genetic 
Supermarket. Such an evaluation would, I concede, require at least one dedicated
11
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thesis to itself. Instead, I confine my discussion to a fairly brief consideration o f the 
sorts of objections that are commonly levied, together with a few observations based 
upon my understanding o f one influential approach to questions o f justice and the 
distribution o f natural talents and burdens, that proposed by John Rawls. Does a 
Rawlsian concept o f distributive justice, I enquire, lead inevitably to the conclusion 
that the Genetic Supermarket is unfair? And if so, how best do we respond to that ‘ 
unfairness? Are there, perhaps, alternatives to legal restriction that are less 
burdensome or more effective at redistributing unchosen traits, or at least the 
undeserved benefits and burdens that accompany them?
In Chapter 5, my final substantive chapter, I turn to the question o f how, in practice, 
the regulation o f PGD has evolved in the UK, and in particular, the extent to which it 
has followed or departed from the laissez faire path. In an attempt to illustrate the 
ethical thinking that has underpinned the approach o f the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (HFEA), the body charged with dispensing the licences 
necessary for the carrying out o f PGD, and hence, effectively, the doormen of the 
Genetic Supermarket. I consider in depth, by way of illustration, two particular 
applications for licences to carry out PGD, respectively, those from the Hashmi and 
the Whitaker families. Despite their ostensibly analogous nature, the two applications 
met with diametrically opposing responses (at least until the HFEA’s very recent 
volte face in respect o f Whitaker-like cases). Scrutiny o f these cases, I will suggest, 
offers valuable insight into the concerns and considerations that lie behind the 
HFEA’s decisions, and ultimately, casts a degree o f doubt upon the coherence and 
consistency o f those decisions.
Î2
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Chapter 2 A Harm-Based Approach
The question at the heart o f this thesis, then, asks whether a ‘free market’ in PGD is 
likely to result in any harm. As I sought to make clear in the Introduction, it is by no 
means my contention that the question o f harm is the only question worth asking in 
relation to this technology. Yet there are, I would suggest, valid reasons for 
undertaking a scrutiny o f PGD through this particular ethical lens.
As I will endeavour to demonstrate in this chapter, ethical theories that either have 
harm at their core, or that pay some significant attention to the notion o f  harm, form 
part of a lengthy and honoured tradition in Anglo-American legal theory, stretching 
back to John Stuart Mill (and beyond). More recent theoretical works may have 
rejected the monistic approach o f Mill and his successors, which saw harm as 
perhaps the only justification for state intervention with private choices, but even 
those pluralist writers frequently count the avoidance o f harm as an important ethical 
consideration, albeit one among several.
At least as important as the prevalence o f the notion o f harm in bioethical and 
jurisprudential literature is the prominent place it occupies in those very decisions 
that have permitted, prohibited or restricted access to the Genetic Supermarket. Both 
the statutory provisions governing reproductive technologies, and the body set up to 
oversee its enforcement, have made repeated and significant use o f  the notion, 
although as I will argue, in the case o f the latter, not always with great conceptual 
clarity or consistency. For both o f these reasons, then, I submit that consideration of 
the potential harmful consequences o f PGD is a valid undertaking.
In the remaining part o f this chapter, I intend to explore the notion o f harm in greater 
depth, distinguishing different senses in which the concept is used, and in particular 
examining the interest-based notion o f harm brought to prominence by Joel Feinberg.
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2,1 Why harm?
While it may be that few judges, politicians or members of regulatory bodies are 
overt adherents to the Harm Principle (explained later in this chapter), it is clear that 
the concept o f harm occupies an important role in the decisions which have in 
practice regulated decisions about the creation o f new lives. Perhaps most obviously, 
this can be seen in the legislation which governs reproductive technologies and use o f 
embryos, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, Section 13(5) o f which 
stipulates that
A woman shall not be provided with treatment services unless 
account has been taken o f the welfare of any child who may be 
born as a result o f the treatment (including the need o f that child 
for a father), and o f any other child who may be affected by the 
birth.’
While ‘welfare’ is not synonymous with ‘harm’, it is perhaps difficult to conceive of
any calculation o f welfare that does not take account o f harm, even as it sets out to
balance these against potential benefits. This contention is lent support by the
interpretation o f  ‘welfare’ adopted by the Human Fertilisation & Embryology
Authority, and its Ethics Committee (the latter o f which is considered in more detail
in Chapter 5). In its most recent Code o f Practice, the FIFE A made clear and specific
reference to the risk o f harm to the child as a possible reason for denying access to
reproductive technologies:
Those seeking treatment are entitled to a fair assessment.
Treatment centres are expected to conduct the assessment with 
skill and care, and have regard to the wishes and sensitivities of 
all those involved. This assessment is expected to take into 
account the following factors relating to patients:
... (v) the risk o f harm to children including
(a) inherited disorders or transmissible disease
(b) multiple births
(c) problems arising during pregnancy
(d) neglect or abuse
(e) the effect o f a new baby or babies upon any existing child 
o f the family.^
‘ This subsection is at present the subject o f  a public consultation by the HFEA; see  
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/AboutH FEA/H FEAPolicy/ReviewoftheW elfareoftheChildPrincipie.
 ^Human Fertilisation & Em bryology Authority, Code o f  Practice, 6"’ Edition, 2003 , available at 
http://www.hfea.gov.ulî/HFEAPublications/CodeofPractice/Code% 20of% 20Practice% 20Sixth% 20Edition% 2 
0-% 20final.pdf, accessed 13.7.04.
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As I will argue in Chapter 5, the HFEA’s use o f the concept o f harm is far from 
unproblematic, but it is clear that it is a concept that features prominently in its 
reasoning. The most recent evidence -  for the Authority’s concern with harm, and 
perhaps also for its confusion over the concept -  can be found in its decision to 
license PGD for those who wish to use it only for ‘tissue typing’. The specifics of 
those decisions will be considered in Chapter 5, but for the time being it is sufficient 
to note that the Authority’s Press Release couched its change o f policy in the 
language o f one particular conception o f harm - ‘harm as damage’ - its initial 
unwillingness to permit this use being attributed to ‘a concern about a potential risk 
of damaging the embryo.’^
It is interesting to note that, at the time of the Authority’s initial decision about tissue 
typing, no significance was attached, either by the Authority itself or its Ethics 
Committee whose advice (on this matter) it ignored, o f any such danger arising from 
the procedure itself. However, the Ethics Committee’s approach was, once again, 
clearly informed by considerations o f welfare, o f which an evaluation o f potential 
harm clearly played an important part:
the Ethics Committee had in fact identified the ‘putative child’s 
actual moral, psychological, social and physical welfare’ as an 
issue o f great significance.'’
Its Report considered both a fairly traditional formulation o f the 
‘welfare principle’, asking ‘whether the outcome of the 
technique adversely shifts the balance of benefit and harm’.^
There is evidence, also, that consideration o f harm informs Parliamentary debates 
surrounding reproductive and genetic technologies, and PGD in particular. A very 
recent series o f interviews conducted by the House o f Commons Science & 
Technology Committee provides some evidence that concerns about harm remain a 
prominent consideration o f the Committee’s deliberations, as the following questions 
asked by members o f the Committee suggest:
 ^ ‘HFEA agrees to extend policy on tissue typing’, 21 June 2004, at 
http://ww w.hfea.gov.uk/PressO ffice/Archive/1090427358, view ed 26 July 2004.
" Ethics Committee o f  the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, E thical Issues in the C reation and  
Selection o f  P reim plantation  E m bryos to P roduce Tissue D onors, 22  Novem ber 2001 , at paragraph 3.2.
 ^ Ibid, at paragraph 2.14.
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If a proper social research study found that gender selection 
caused no harm, would you support it?'^
Would you support it [sex selection] if it was found there was no 
harm caused?^
May I ask what evidence there is in the scientific literature that 
there is harm to donor conceived children from not being able to 
trace their genetic parent?^
In your evidence you do mention that you feel gender selection 
inflicts no harm on the child, family or society. If there were any 
research which indicated that this was not the case, would it 
change your views?^
While the views and concerns o f the Select Committee are not necessarily reflective 
of those of the wider legislature, it would perhaps be surprising if  they were entirely 
divorced from them.
Although not directly related to the legislative or regulatory processes, the views of 
major professional and other prestigious bodies on such matters display a concern 
with potential harmful consequences. In its submission to the Select Committee on 
the subject o f tissue typing, the British Medical Association noted as a ‘key concern 
... the possibility o f psychological harm resulting to the child who would be selected 
and born to be a donor’, though it also aclcnowledged that ‘these hypothetical risks of 
harm needed to be balanced against other harms, primarily the real harm to the
6 Question asked by Robert K ey during Oral Evidence Taken before the Science and Technology  
Committee, on W ednesday 23 .June 2004, at http://www.publications.parIiament.uk/cgi- 
bin/ukparChl?DB=ukparl& STEM M ER=en& W ORDS=fertilis+harm +& COLOUR=Red& STYLE=s& URL=/ 
pa/cm 200304/cm seleet/cm sctech/uc599-ii/uc59902.htm #m uscat_highlighter__first_m atch, view ed Sunday, 18 
July 2004.
H d.
® Question asked by Evan Harris during Oral Evidence Taken before the Science and Technology  
Committee, on W ednesday 23 June 2004, at http://www.publications.parliament.ul{/cgi- 
bin/ukparl_hl?DB=ukparl& STEM M ER=en& W ORDS=fertilis+harm +& COLOUR=Red& STYLE=s& URL=/ 
pa/cm200304/cm select/cm sctech/uc599-ii/uc59902.htm #m uscat__highlighter_first_m atch, view ed Sunday, 18 
July 2004.
 ^Question asked by Geraldine Smith, recorded in M inutes o f  Evidence Taken B efore Science and 
Technology Committee, W ednesday 30 June 2004 , at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi- 
bin/ukparl__hl?DB=ukparl&STEMM ER=en&W ORDS=fertilis+harm+&COLOUR=Red&STYLE=s&URL=/ 
pa/cm 200304/cm select/cm sctech/uc599-iii/uc59902.htm #m uscat_highlighter_first__m atch. Viewed: Sunday,
18 July 2004.
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sibling who would suffer or die without this treatment.’”  In addition, the Royal
Society of Edinburgh considered the potentially pivotal effect o f evidence o f harm to
the embryo if PGD were employed:
It is not clear, however, on what basis there should be 
restrictions o f PGD to only serious clinical conditions, although 
there may be practical reasons for wishing to do so. If there are 
clinical reasons for undertaking PGD at all— and given that the 
consultation document itself notes in paragraph 26 that few 
people are likely to choose it— there appears to be little logic in 
limiting its use to certain conditions. O f course, this balance 
might change if  it became clear that PGD caused significant 
harm in large numbers o f cases. The balance would then perhaps 
shift towards not permitting it in “minor” clinical conditions 
because o f the greater harm caused by using it— namely the 
additional damage to, or destruction of, the embiyo.' '
2.1.1 Harm in bioethical literature
In the realm o f bioethical literature, concern with the avoidance o f harm has a long 
tradition. As Beauchamp and Childress explain, the ‘obligation not to inflict harm on 
others’ is ‘[o]ften proclaimed the fundamental principle in the Hippocratic tradition 
of medical ethics’, yet its precise origins are somewhat uncertain; the Hippocratic 
Oath certainly does not accord a prominent role to this principle.”  Nonetheless, the 
maxim prim im  non nocere appears to be widely accepted as a core tenet o f medical 
ethics.
Within the contemporary literature of bioethics, concern about the avoidance of harm 
is widespread, occupying some role in a variety o f ethical traditions. Most obviously, 
adherents to the Harm Principle regard harm as the necessary prerequisite o f any 
legal intervention with individual liberty. As discussed below, this view is perhaps 
less popular than once it was, having been supplanted to some extent by pluralist.
Memorandum from the British M edical Association to the H ouse o f  Commons Science & Technology  
Committee, May 2004 , available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-
bin/ukparl_hl?DB=ukpaii& STEM M ER=en& W ORDS=fertilis+harm +& COLOUR=Red& STYLE=s& URL=/ 
pa/cm 200304/cm select/cm sctech/599/599w el3.htm #m uscatjiighlighter_first_m atch, at Paragraph 33, 
view ed Sunday, 18 July 2004.
" Memorandum from the Royal Society o f  Edinburgh to the H ouse o f  Commons Science & technology  
Committee, May 2004, at http://www.publications.parliament.ul</cgi-
bin/ukparl_hl?DB=ukparl&STEM M ER=enc&W ORDS=fertilis+harm+&COLOUR=Red&STYLE=s&URL=/ 
pa/cm 200304/cm select/cm sctech/599/599we04.htm #m uscat_highlighter_first_m atch  
Tom  L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles o f  M edical Ethics, Fifth Edition, N ew  York, Oxford 
University Press, 2001 , at p i 13.
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Utilitarian and rights-based approaches, but nonetheless, a small but respected body
of bioethical literature persists which advocates just such a view. Max Charleswoith,
Emeritus Professor o f Philosophy at Deakin University, has based his consideration '
o f bioethical issues around a decidedly Mi Ilian approach:
In a liberal society people should as far as possible be allowed to 
make their own moral decisions for themselves and it is not the 
business o f the law to enforce a common code o f morality. The 
law should be brought in, so to speak, only when other people
are likely to be harmed in some obvious way.^^
Heta Hayry has expressed her approach in somewhat different terms, and in 
particular does not couch it in the language of harm, but there are clear similarities 
between her ‘liberal utilitarianism’ and the harm-based approach adopted by 
Charlesworth:
individuals should be left free to make their own choices, 
provided that the consequences o f their decisions are not likely 
to have a negative effect on the basic need-satisfaction o f 
others.
Whether Hayry would agree to applying the term ‘harm’ to having ‘a negative effect
on the basic need-satisfaction of others’ is a moot point, but it is clear that her
approach shares the liberal presumption o f adherents to the Harm Principle, and 
shares also their view that that presumption can be rebutted only to avoid adverse 
consequences for others.
For Charleswoith and Hayry, then, the presence of harm (or adverse consequences) to 
others is the only legitimate basis for state interference with individual liberty. More 
commonly, harm features as an element of a less narrowly focused approach to 
ethics. For ethical pluralists like Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, the 
obligation to avoid the infliction o f harm -  expressed as the principle of 
‘nonmaleficence’ -  is one o f the four core ethical principles,’  ^ not derived from, nor 
either superior or inferior to, the others. Furthermore, the notion o f ‘harm’ with 
which Beauchamp and Childress are concerned is remarkably similar to that adopted 
by ‘harm theorists’ like Joel Feinberg; thus, they ‘construe harm exclusively in the
M ax Charlesworth, B ioethics in a  L ibera l Society, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, at p74. 
See also p86, in relation to surrogacy.
''' Heta Hayry. Individual L iberty a n d  M ed ica l Control. Aldershot, Ashgate, 1998, at p.99.
Together with respect for autonomy, beneficence and justice.
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second and nonnormative sense o f thwarting, defeating, or setting back some party’s 
interests.’’^
As distinct from some o f the utilitarian commentators, who question the distinction
between acts and omissions, Beauchamp and Childress reject the idea that
nonmaleficence (avoiding harm) and beneficence (the conferring o f benefit) should
be incorporated into one principle.’  ^ However, they also reject the assumption
implicit in the primum non nocere principle that the former obligation should
automatically take precedence over the latter:
In general, if in a particular case the injury inflicted is very 
minor ... but the benefit provided by rescue is major ... then we 
tend to think that the obligation o f beneficence takes priority 
over the obligation o f nonmaleficence.’®
In this, they are closer to those utilitarian commentators who are also concerned with
balancing benefit and harm. John Harris has explicitly rejected the idea o f the Harm
Principle:
The decision to “criminalize” conduct is surely principally a 
question o f the utility o f so doing. The issue is most sensibly 
decided by weighing up the social, political, and moral 
consequences o f using the apparatus of the criminal law and o f 
imposing the stigma and social consequences of criminality on 
offenders. We should not predetermine this issue by deciding in 
advance that if conduct is not harmful it is not criminal.’^
It is not overly far-fetched to suggest that Harris’s concern with ‘the social, political,
and moral consequences’ o f criminalisation could, at least to a large extent, be
rephrased in terms o f the language o f harms and benefits, a contention that may to
some extent be borne out by the fact that the remaining eleven pages o f the chapter in
which Harris makes this claim are given over almost entirely to defining the concept
o f ‘harm.’
2.1.2 Harm and ‘moral conservatism’
Beauchamp and Childress, P rincip les o f  M edica l Ethics, op. cit., at p i 16
Tn our view , conflating nonm aleficence and beneficence into a single principle obscured relevant
distinctions.’ Ibid, at p i 14.
I S Id.
John Harris. W onderwom an a n d  Superman: The E thics o f  Human B iotechnology, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1992, at p86.
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Perhaps the most interesting development in the evolution o f harm-based ethics in 
recent years has been the apparently tacit acceptance o f its central premise by those 
who might be seen as the successors o f the ‘conservative’ opponents o f Mill and 
Hart. Bernard Harcourt expounds the plausible thesis that the Harm Principle is no 
longer the exclusive property o f ‘liberals’, but has been appropriated by supporters of 
further regulation -  he refers to ‘conservatives’, though this category includes such 
unlikely candidates for that epithet as radical feminists. Rather than casting their 
arguments in classic, legal moralist terms, that would view the behaviour in question 
as ‘being inherently immoral’ ®^ modern conservatives frequently couch their cases in 
terms o f the purported harm the disapproved-of behaviour is thought likely to cause. 
Harcourt provides contemporary examples o f the language of harm being invoked in 
opposition to décriminalisation o f prostitution and homosexual freedom -  both 
causes which liberal champions o f the Harm Principle such as Hart would have 
supported.
In relation to bioethical issues at the beginning o f life, a similar phenomenon can be
observed. In a recent submission to the House of Commons Select Committee on
Science and Technology, the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Great
Britain) phrased their concerns in these terms:
.The Abortion Act 1967 is based on the assumption that abortion 
will cause less mental or physical harm than continuing a 
pregnancy in some cases. This assumption is without evidentiary 
support. In fact scientific and anecdotal evidence suggests that 
the contrary is true, that many women are being hurt by abortion, 
thereby making abortion an inappropriate medical response to 
crisis pregnancy.^’
The statement goes on to make specific reference to evidence purporting to show 
“ ‘marked, severe or persistent” psychological or psychiatric disturbances’ and 
‘[d]eliberate self-harm’, ‘depression and substance abuse’, b r e a s t  can ce r,ce rv ic a l
Joel Feinberg, H arm less W rongdoing, Oxford, oxford University Press, 1988, at p8.
Memorandum from the Society for the Protection o f  Unborn Children (Great Britain) to the House o f  
Commons Select Com m ittee on Science & Technology (June 2004), at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-
bin/ukparLhl?DB=ukparl& STEM M ER=en& W O RDS-fertilis+harm +& CO LO UR=Red& STYLE=s& URL=/ 
pa/cm 200304/cm select/cm sctech/599/599we38.htm #m uscatJiighlighter_first_m atch, view ed Sunday, 18 July 
2004, at Paragraph 1.2..
Ibid, at Paragraph 1.3.
Ibid, at Paragraph 1.4.
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resistance, placenta praevia, preterm births, ectopic pregnancy and potential infertility 
problems,^'’ marital and other relationship problems leading to relationship 
breakdowns, general conflict and sexual dysfunction?^ The ideas that abortion might 
be intrinsically morally wrong, or that it contravenes any particular religious dictate, 
are not advanced at all in the submission.
As Harcourt demonstrates, this new willingness of conservatives to take up the 
challenge o f the Harm Principle has driven liberals to take up new weapons, most 
commonly the language o f rights, in attempts to respond to the ‘evidence’ of harm 
pointed out by their opponents. He points to a leading US Constitutional law case 
dealing with pornography, in which the judge accepted evidence that pornography is 
likely to be harmful, but held that it was this veiy quality o f dangerousness that 
demonstrated its status as the sort o f speech that must be p ro te c te d .R a th e r  than 
dispute the empirical premises o f the conservative position (in this case, presented by 
feminist lawyer Catherine MacKinnon) the judge shifted the debate onto a different 
terrain, allowing him to contend that the mere presence o f harm was not sufficient to 
justify a prohibition in the face o f a constitutionally-protected freedom.
Whether the presence o f likely or actual harm is sufficient to justify restrictions of 
choice in relation to PGD is an issue o f obvious importance for legislators in this 
area, and I am in no way contending that harm is the only important consideration in 
this area. However, in an important sense, beginning with an exploration of harm 
may nonetheless be a valid approach. For it may be seen that, insofar as liberal 
judges and commentators have abandoned the rhetoric o f harm for that o f rights, this 
has been the result o f a strong conservative empiricist response to the original liberal 
challenge to demonstrate some concrete harm. In those areas where such a challenge 
has never really been taken up by conservatives -  in relation, perhaps, to sterilisation 
of consenting adults or atheism -  the conservative case, at least in the ‘democratic 
world’, has become peripheral and ineffective (there have been no serious legislative
Ibid, at Paragraph 1.5. 
Ibid, at Paragraph 1.6.
26 Am erican B ooksellers A ssocia tion  Inc. v Hiidnut 111 F.2d 323 (7 Cir. 1985), per Judge Easterbrook.
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attempts to outlaw either contraception or atheism in Europe in recent years, despite 
the fact that both are strongly opposed by powerful religious bodies).
This trend demonstrates two phenomena of interest for the purposes o f this thesis. 
First, it adds weight to my core contention that the question o f harm remains one of 
wide and considerable relevance. If religious conservatives, radical feminists and 
classical liberals alike now seek to couch their arguments -  at least partially -  in 
terms o f harm, then a consideration o f the possible harm resulting from a practice 
like PGD will predictably interest many observers, even if  it will, on its own, rarely 
be determinative o f the issue for any o f them. Secondly, it may suggest that at least 
some o f the debates framed in other terms -  about rights, for example -  arise only 
after consensus that some issue o f harm is at play. Harcourt’s example of the 
pornography debate in the USA suggests that the ‘free speech liberals’ were pushed 
into arguing in terms o f rights only after the conservatives/feminists had met their 
initial challenge and identified some possible harm.
This latter contention, I concede, is considerably more tentative than the former, and 
it may be that a discussion about harm is not invariably a necessary precursor to one 
about rights. It would seem, though, that at least some of the time ethical 
controversies have moved onto discussions about rights only after some measure of 
agreement that harm is at least a real possibility.
The first section o f this chapter, then, has sought to demonstrate that a consideration 
o f the possible harms involved in PGD is a worthwhile endeavour, in part because 
concern about harm continues to occupy a prominent place in bioethical literature 
(albeit increasingly only one o f several prominent places). Perhaps more 
significantly, however, a consideration o f possible harm involved in this technology 
is valuable because that is one o f the foremost considerations in terms o f informing 
the judgements already being made about how PGD should be regulated, by 
legislators, by the HFEA, and by those august bodies (such as the BMA and the 
Royal Society o f Edinburgh) whose opinions might be expected to have a bearing on 
the legislative and regulatory decisions. It is my contention that such decisions have 
not invariably been informed by clear thinking about precisely what ‘harm’ might
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mean, or how it might arise from decisions such as those under discussion -  a 
contention I will seek to substantiate in later chapters,
2.2 ‘Harm’ defined
Since the question central to this thesis concerns the possibility o f harm resulting 
from the Genetic Supermarket approach to PGD, it is important to clarify precisely 
what is meant by ‘harm ’. At first glance, this may appear sufficiently self-evident as 
to obviate the need for further discussion. It should, however, soon become apparent 
that the term is far from uncontroversial.
2.2.1 Harm in its derivative sense
In common parlance, the verb ‘to harm’ is often used as a synonym for ‘to damage’; 
it is, for example, both commonplace and intelligible to enquire ‘will this weedkiller 
harm my lawn?’ Whether a notion o f harm can be extended to beings or objects 
which possess no awareness o f being harmed is an important decision, as will be seen 
when attention is turned in the next chapter to whether we can say embryos are 
harmed when they are destroyed. For, in much the same way as herbicide may 
‘harm’ a lawn by killing it outright or retarding its growth, so too might the 
destruction o f embryos, or the prevention o f their development such as by 
cryopreserving them, be thought to ‘harm’ an embryo.
Joel Feinberg, whose work has been so influential in exploring the notion o f harm, is 
quick to distinguish, and dismiss fi'om his consideration, this notion o f harm in its 
‘derivative or extended sense’, that is, ‘the sense in which we can say that any kind of 
thing at all can be “harmed.” ’ This is the sense in which harms can be attributed to 
asentient, and possibly even, inanimate objects, such as when we say ‘frost does 
harm to crops’.^ ® As Feinberg explains, ‘this is harm in a transferred sense; we don’t 
feel aggrieved on behalf o f the windows or the tomatoes, nor are they objeets o f our 
sympathies. Rather our reference to their “harm” is elliptical for the harm done to 
those who have interests in the ... crops.
Joel Feinberg, H arm  to O thers, Oxford University Press, 1994, at p.32. 
Id.
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For in the absence o f an interest in growing or developing, how are we to conceive of 
a change in the status o f the lawn or the crops as being welcome or unwelcome? 
Certainly, being sprayed with herbicide may well retard the growth o f a field o f grass,' 
but relative to what ethical principle are we to judge this retardation problematic? 
For Feinberg, it is a straightforward matter to exclude these suggested instances o f 
‘harm’, since the purported victims do not possess a quality that he regards as a 
prerequisite of being ‘harmed’: the capacity to be a bearer o f interests
2.2.2 Harm as set-back to interests
On Feinberg’s conception, what distinguishes ‘harm’ from other ways in which we 
can affect an object -  such as ‘damage’ or ‘break’ -  lies in the requirement that the 
victim o f ‘harm’ must possess interests. Harm, therefore, consists o f ‘the thwarting, 
setting back, or defeating o f an interest,’®’ What, then, is an interest?
It is perhaps useful to locate Feinberg’s seminal contribution to legal theory within
the context o f the evolution o f consequentialist thought. The tradition o f evaluating
actions in terms o f their effects upon people was already long established before the
notion o f harms and interests (arguably) became the dominant concepts in
consequentialist thought. In the essay entitled ‘Utilitarianism’, Mill contended
that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things 
desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as 
numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable 
either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the 
promotion o f pleasure and the prevention o f pain.®^
Although, at the outset o f Harm to Others, Feinberg openly acknowledged his 
intellectual debt to Mill, he completely rejected this notion o f ‘mental state’ 
utilitarianism, the view that the aim of morality is to promote some kind of 
subjectively pleasurable states o f mind.®® Rather, Feinberg’s approach added and 
relied upon the concept o f ‘interests’, closely related to, but distinct from, ‘wants’ or
"Ud.
For a contraiy v iew , according to which a certain variety o f  interests can m eaningfully be attributed to 
inanimate objects, see  Tom  Regan ‘Feinberg on What Sorts o f  B eings Can H ave R ights’ The Southern  
Journal o f  P hilosophy {1916)', 14: 485-498.
Ib id ,a tp .33 .
J.S.M ill, ‘Utilitarianism ’, in Warnock, ed. Utilitarianism, op cit, at p.257  
”  Feinberg, Harm to O thers, op. cit., at p.85.
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‘desires’. (Feinberg had earlier explained the relationship as being o f the nature that 
‘desires or wants are the materials interests are made of.’®'’) ‘A person has an interest 
in Y,’ he claimed, ‘when he has a stake in Y, that is, when he stands to gain or lose 
depending on the condition or outcome of F.’®^ If this definition is accepted, then the 
connection with wants becomes apparent. It may, after all, be difficult to see how a 
person could be said to ‘gain’ or ‘lose’ save by making reference to what he actually 
wants.
Feinberg certainly accepted this in relation to what he refers to as ‘ulterior’ 
interests.®^ However, he did not hold this to be true for that class o f interests which 
he called ‘welfare’ interests, that is, that class of minimum interests such as ‘health, 
economic sufficiency, emotional stability [and] political liberty’,®^ the fulfilment of 
which are necessary for the fulfilment o f all other interests.®® As regards these 
welfare interests, Feinberg took the view ‘that what promotes them is good for a 
person in any case, whatever his beliefs or wants may be.’®^
It is difficult to disagree with the claim that a certain minimum standard o f health is 
likely to be a prerequisite o f most other interests; an individual may not care very 
much about his health for its own sake, but will require to be in moderately good 
health if he is to act on his desire to visit Paris or make a parachute jump. This 
would be an example o f an interest which is linked to wants, but at one remove; the 
person does not want X for itself, but will require to have X if he is to achieve Y, 
which he does want. This idea will be explored more fully below. More generally, it
Feinberg, ‘Rights o f  Anim als and Unborn Generations’, in Rights, Justice, an d  the Bounds o f  L iberty, 
Princeton University Press, 1980, at p. 169.
Feinberg, Rights, Justice, a n d  the Bounds o f  L iberty, op. cit., at p.45.
‘[I]t is difficult at best to explain how a person could have a direct stake in certain developm ents without 
recourse to his wants and goals,’ H arm  to Others, Oxford University Press, 1994, at p.42.
”  Ibid, a tp .41 .
The concept o f ‘welfare interests’ has also been postulated by Goodin. He defines them as ‘that set o f  
generalized resources that will be necessai-y for people to have before pursuing any o f  the more particular 
preferences that they might happen to have’ - Goodin lists ‘[h]ealth, money, shelter [and] sustenance’ as 
examples. The essence o f  welfare utilitarianism, according to Goodin, lies in a recognition o f  the fact that the 
majority o f  preferences are formed in circumstances far removed from what he refers to as an ‘ideal choice  
situation’, that is to say, a situation ‘characterized by perfect information, strong w ill, settled preferences, and 
such like.’ This being so, a number o f  those preferences expressed by persons will have failed to take account 
o f  their welfare interests; in such a situation, ‘welfare utilitarianism would suppress short-sighted preference 
satisfaction in favour o f  protecting people's long-term welfare interests.’
Ibid, at p.42.
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may be that health can be seen as a desire in itself; as Ruth Chadwick has 
commented, ‘it might be possible to construe all claims for medical help in terms o f a 
desire, e.g. the desire to be well.’'’®
For the time being, it is submitted that, while almost all persons may be supposed to 
have interests which are bound up to some extent with health, for example, this 
interest is not entirely independent o f their wants. Certainly, some scepticism must 
be expressed as to the claim that anything could be said to be in the interest o f all 
persons in all circumstances.
2.2.3 Taking an interest and having  an interest
There are, as was submitted above, undoubtedly circumstances in which individuals 
may be said to have interests which do not correspond exactly with wants. An 
obvious example is the scenario wherein an individual is unaware o f the existence of 
certain factors which will have a significant bearing upon certain wants which he 
does harbour, or where he is unaware o f  the relationship of these factors to his wants.
A is going about his daily business, blissfully unaware of the fact that B has been 
offered a substantial sum of money to kill him. B, although he is desperate for the 
money, is wracked with indecision about whether or not to carry out the contract; as 
well as wonting the money, he also wants to comply with his moral beliefs, which tell 
him that killing is wrong, at least in circumstances such as these, and he also wants to 
be free from the feelings o f guilt which he suspects may trouble him if  he kills A. In 
view of the fact that A is not aware o f B ’s existence, still less o f the moral quandary 
with which he is faced, one could not truthfully say that A wants or desires or would 
prefer B to choose not to kill him. Quite simply, he has no view on the subject at all. 
However, A has a whole range o f wants and desires which will be frustrated if B kills 
him before he has a chance to fulfil them. There are friends he wants to see again, 
books he wants to read, and myriad other ambitions, great and small, which he will 
be denied the opportunity to achieve if his life is ended now. It would therefore be
Ruth Chadwick, ‘H aving Children: Introduction’ from her collection Ethics, R eproduction  an d  G enetic  
C ontrol, Routledge, 1990, at p .18.
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completely wrong to say that the outcome of B’s decision is o f no consequence to 
A ? ’
In situations such as these, where the likelihood of someone’s desires being satisfied 
is affected by decisions or action about which he knows nothing, a person may be 
said to have an interest in that decision, even though he has no desires or preferences 
corresponding directly to it. As Mary Anne Warren has said:
Non-self-aware beings may not consciously take an interest in 
their own survival, but it does not follow that they cannot have 
such an interest. Having an interest in something does not 
require a conscious desire for it, but only the potential to 
experience some benefit from it.'’^
This idea o f having an interest could, therefore, be extended to beings that are 
unaware even o f the concept o f interests, as in Warren’s example:
Thus, it seems plausible that if a spider has an interest in 
anything, then it has an interest in not being smashed flat -  even 
if the process is quite painless. Because continued life is 
necessary for the spider’s future enjoyment of whatever 
pleasures it has enjoyed in the past, it seems obvious that it has 
an interest in survival.'’®
Certainly, a spider is unlikely to possess the requisite reflective capacities to enable it 
to take an interest in its continued survival -  existential musing almost certainly 
requires a more sophisticated brain. But implicit in Warren’s contention is that the 
spider possesses some interests, even if  it is not consciously aware o f possessing 
them. Were it not capable even o f enjoying basic sensual pleasures, it is difficult to 
see what interests would be frustrated or thwarted by its painless demise. This 
question o f the attribution o f interests to beings that are not aware, in any reflective 
sense, of having interest will be revisited in the next chapter.
James Griffin has illustrated the same thing with a slightly more prosaic example: ‘i f  you cheat me out o f  an 
inheritance that I never expected, I might not know but still be the worse o f f  for it.’ Griffin, James. ‘A 
Sophisticated V ersion o f  the D esire A ccount’, in Glover, J., ed. U iilitananism  and its C ritics, N ew  York, 
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990, at p.72.
Mai-y Anne Warren, M oral Status: obligations to person s an d  other living things, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1997, at p80 
Id.
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2.2.4 Wants that don’t qualify as interests
Just as Feinberg saw some interests existing independently o f wants, so too did he 
recognise the possibility o f wants existing without giving rise to interests, contending 
that ‘it does not seem likely that wants, even strong wants, are sufficient to create 
interests.’'’"’ If this view were taken, it would follow that not all instances o f frustrated 
wants lead to ‘harm s.’ Indeed, Feinberg states this quite explicitly, opining that ‘[w]e 
are commonly enough disappointed, dissatisfied, even frustrated, without suffering 
harm.’'’® He cites the example o f a baseball fan, who wants his team to do well, but 
who - according to Feinberg - has not ‘ invested so much of a psychic stake in the 
outcome of a season’s play’"’® to qualify as having an interest bound up with his 
teams fortunes.
Objections could be levied at this claim on purely empirical, psychological grounds - 
for many, particularly those from the lower socio-economic groups, sport plays a 
major role in their lives. They take a pride, albeit a vicarious pride, in the 
achievements o f their football team or a loeal boxer, when their circumstances are 
such as to deny them this in any more direct way.
It may further be seen that this distinction between wants which lead to interests (and 
therefore, conceivably, harms), and those which do not, can seem rather arbitrary and 
difficult to sustain. Feinberg refers to various categories o f unpleasant experience -  
‘hurts’ and ‘offences’, for example - which frustrate wants, but do not, according to 
him, harm interests. Certainly, there are quantitative distinctions to be made between 
wants o f varying intensities, and between wants o f varying degrees o f permanence or 
transience. Yet it is difficult to see why wants o f varying degrees o f intensity, 
duration and stability should not be taken to give rise to interests which also vary in 
these respects. It is not immediately obvious, for example, why a ‘mere “passing 
desire,” however genuine or intense, does not establish an interest.’'’^  Nor is it 
evident, in the absence o f any clear criteria, how a decision would be made as to 
whether a want is o f sufficient permanence to give rise to an interest.
Ib id ,a tp .43 .
Id.
Id.
Ibid, at p.55.
28
Chapr.ci' 2
2.2.5 Harms o f omission?
Is the definition o f ‘harm’ to be limited to positive acts which set back Interests, or 
can omissions also qualify as harms? This question is o f great importanee to anyone 
interested in the limits which the Harm Principle sets on legislative interventions in 
the liberty o f individuals, not least because, were the former premise to be accepted, 
this would appear to curtail significantly the legislature’s ability to raise taxes or 
otherwise pursue social welfare, far less redistributive policies. If ‘harm’ is to be 
construed in the narrow sense o f rendering someone’s condition worse, then it is 
possible to argue that, when the state fails to provide universal aecess to education or 
healthcare, it does no harm; that failure, after all, did not worsen the condition of 
those who are already without those services.
Holtug argues that ‘It would seem that in order for a person to be harmed by some
event, her life must go worse because o f it.’"’® Yet far from settling the question of
omissions, this raises the further question ‘worse than what?’ Is harm to be defined
solely in terms o f the position immediately prior to the purportedly harmful
act/omission? The difficulties presented by such an analysis are illustrated by the
following scenario:
Suppose a person’s pain would have gone away, had I not acted 
to ensure that it continues. Clearly, I harm him, despite the fact 
that I leave him in no more pain than he was prior to my 
intervention.'’®
Holtug considers the possibility o f adopting a ‘normal’ condition, relative to which 
the person’s condition after the relevant event eould be assessed, but notes that this 
would scarcely assist the person who has always, or ordinarily, been in pain. Instead, 
he opts for a comparison with a ‘counterfactual baseline’, that is, a comparison with 
‘a person’s situation, had the putatively harmful event not taken place.’®® Thus, an act 
which prevents the fulfilment o f an interest can be described as harmful, even though
N ils Holtug, ‘The Harm Principle’, E thical Theofy a n d  Adorai P ractice, (2002); 5: 357-389 , at p 364.
Ib id ,a tp 368
Ibid, at p369
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that interest is no more unfulfilled than it was before the act. The relevant test is 
what would have happened ‘but for’ the act.
Holtug’s counterfactual baseline, then, extends the definition o f harm to acts which 
prevent improvement in, as well as those whieh actually worsen, someone’s 
situation. This, however, seems still to limit our account o f harm to positive acts; the 
question of ‘harmful omissions’ remains troublesome in the face o f the difficulty in' 
conceptualising how an omission might prevent anything.
Feinberg spends some time on this vexing issue,®’ concluding ultimately that 
omissions can indeed be harmful, when they prevent someone acquiring or attaining 
not only what they would have done otherwise, but that for which they had a 
legitimate expectation. For Feinberg, the all-important distinction is between a 
harmftil omission and a mere failure to confer gratuitous benefit, a distinction that 
depends upon whether the alleged harmer owed a duty to the other party. Duties can 
be incurred voluntarily, as when we make a promise to another, but for Feinberg, 
some duties to benefit, or to prevent harm, exist irrespective o f what we have agreed 
to do:
The good swimmer on the bridge who watches a stranger drown 
in the water below has inflicted a harm, and a grievous one, by 
his omission (the common law notwithstanding); and this is so 
not only because death is the sort o f thing we regard as harm 
whatever its cause, but also because the victim has a right to the 
assistance o f the stranger, and the stranger had a correlative duty 
to save him. Merely being a fellow human being is enough to 
ground a duty when the threatened harm is that severe.®^
A similar conclusion is arrived at by Joseph Raz:
Sometimes failing to improve the situation o f another is harming 
him. One can harm another by denying him what is due to him.
This is obscured by the common misconception which confines 
harming a person to acting in a way which results in that person 
being worse off after the action than he was before. While such 
actions do indeed harm, so do aets or omissions the result o f 
which is that a person is worse o ff after them than he should 
then be. One harms another by failing in one’s duty to him.
The chapter on Failures to Prevent Harm is the longest in Volum e 1 o f  The M oral L im its o f  the Crim inal 
Law; see Feinberg, H arm  to O thers, op. cit., pp .126-187.
Feinberg, Harm to O thers, op. cit., at p l4 0
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even though this is a duty to improve his situation and the failure 
does not leave him worse off than he was before?®
If the Harm Principle can recognise positive duties to prevent harm, as well as 
negative duties to avoid its infliction, then it is easy to see how this can have 
potentially important implications for the application o f that principle to the Genetic 
Supermarket thesis. If prospective parents (or anyone else) owe positive duties to 
improve the condition o f their future or actual children, then this may well curtail the 
range of choices available to them to a greater extent than if their duties were merely 
to avoid making matters worse than they already were. However, as I will explore in 
the next chapter, the question o f ‘worse than what?’ is one which emerges again 
within the context o f such decisions.
2.2,6 Harms and wrongs
Feinberg’s approach does not hold that any harmful conduct can justifiably be 
eurtailed by the criminal law. Later in this chapter, I will discuss the important de 
minimis restriction, but it is also important to realise that some non-trivially harmful 
conduct cannot, on Feinberg’s coneeption, by constrained by law. He has argued, for 
example, ‘no plausibly interpreted harm principle’ would justify the prohibition of, 
for example, ‘setbacks to interest incurred in legitimate competition or harms to the 
risk o f which the “victim” freely consented.’ Rather, ‘only setbacks o f interests that 
are wrongs ... are to count as harms in the appropriate sense.
How, then, does Feinberg define a ‘wrong’? This he explains by reference to
‘established priority rankings’ o f potentially competing interests:
The interests o f different persons are constantly and unavoidably 
in conflict, so that any legal system determined to “minimize 
harm” must incorporate judgments o f the comparative 
importance o f interests o f different kinds so that it can 
pronounce “unjustified” the invasion o f one person’s interest of 
high priority done to protect another person’s interest o f low 
priority. Legal wrongs then will be invasions o f interests which 
violate established priority rankings.®®
Joseph Raz, The Morality) o f  F reedom , Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986, at pp415-416, emphasis added. 
Feinberg, Harm to O thers, op. cit., at p3655 Feinberg, Harm to Others, op. eit., at p35.
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Criminal prohibition, then, is only justified when the conduct in question interferes 
with an interest deemed in advance to be o f high priority. Later in this chapter, I will 
advance the proposition that the interest in reproductive liberty should be accorded 
just sueh a status, and that interferences with it will usually, on Feinberg’s analysis, 
constitute both harms and wrongs.
Although Feinberg’s work is probably the most influential in the ethies o f harm and
interests, his definitions and explanations have not gone unchallenged. Bioethicist
John Harris has proposed an alternative account o f ‘harms’ and ‘wrongs’, and o f the
relationship between them. Harris begins by seeking to identify the common ground
he shares with Feinberg:
A condition that is harmful, Feinberg and I would agree, is one 
in which the individual is disabled or suffering in some way or 
in which his interests or rights are frustrated.®®
However, even this early in his commentary, Harris has created difficulties for
himself, or at least for his readers, by virtue o f some uncharacteristieally eareless use
o f language. First, this does not seem entirely to accord with Feinberg’s definition of
a harmful, as opposed to a harmed, condition. For Feinberg, a harmful condition is
one likely to give rise to further, future harms:
A harmed condition of a person may or may not also be a 
.harmful condition, depending on whether it has itself the 
tendency to generate further harm. A blistered finger may be to 
some small degree a harmed condition, but unless the finger is 
on the hand o f  a concert pianist or a baseball pitcher, it may not 
be at all harmful.®'^
Secondly, Harris is equally careless in his use of language when he claims that 
Feinberg would agree that a harmful (or harmed) condition is one in whieh the 
individual’s ‘interests or rights are frustrated’. A situation which sees someone’s 
rights frustrated -  perhaps ‘infringed’ or ‘violated’ are more apt verbs -  would for 
Feinberg, constitute a ‘wrong’, but need not involve a harm; indeed, he specifically 
acknowledges the possibility o f ‘harmless wronging’.®®
John Harris, W onderwom an a n d  Superman, op. cit., at p88.
Feinberg, Harm to  Others, op. cit., at p .3 1.
Feinberg, H arm less W rongdoing, op. cit.
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In large part, the essence o f Harris’s disagreement with Feinberg lies in his 
contention that is possible to be harmed without being rendered worse off. He offers 
this example:
When in the First World War soldiers deliberately shot 
themselves in the foot, or injured themselves in some other way 
so as to get what was called a ‘Blighty Wound’, one that would 
get them sent home to ‘Blighty’, and out o f the fighting, they 
were guilty o f an act of deliberate self-harming. Indeed were it 
not an act o f self-harming, which may have disabled or 
handicapped the individual to some extent, it would not have 
secured the desired effect. ... Insistence on tying harm to the 
idea o f being made ‘worse o ff  deprives us of the ability to 
characterise what is going on here as a self-interested act of 
harming. It is surely clearer and more consistent with what we 
wish to say in sueh cases to describe the acts o f these soldiers as 
acts o f self-harming but by which they did not wrong 
themselves.®®
In a sense, Harris is undoubtedly eorrect when he claims that the soldiers ‘harmed’ 
themselves; there is no question that they did indeed set back some o f their own 
interests, interests in avoiding extreme pain and possible disability, and perhaps 
interests in being suspected of, or even executed for, cowardice. However, if any act 
that sets back any interests whatever were to be regarded as a harm for the purposes 
o f the Harm Principle, then it would seem that the range o f justifiably prohibited 
behaviours would be very wide indeed. For as discussed elsewhere in this chapter, it 
is possible to find in almost any act an interest somewhere, however trivial, that is 
thwarted or frustrated. Most troublingly, acts that clearly benefit an individual by 
promoting some o f  his most important interests in important ways will often involve 
the setting back o f some other o f his interests. (To take an obvious example, life- 
saving heart surgery on someone who wants desperately to avoid death would be 
universally considered a benefit, but there is no question that such surgery sets baek 
that person’s interests in avoiding pain and a prolonged period o f infirmity while she 
recovers.)
By claiming that the soldiers harmed, but did not wrong, themselves, it seems 
perhaps as if Harris’s principal disagreement with Feinberg is not in his definition of
Harris, Wonderwoman and Superman, op. cit., at p92
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‘harm% but rather his definition o f ‘wrong’. For Harris, it would seem, a wrong 
occurs when someone sustains a balance o f harms over benefits. Thus, the soldiers 
are not wronged because their more important interests in avoiding early death are 
furthered, but are nonetheless harmed because their (relatively unimportant) interests 
in avoiding pain and disability are set baek.
As will become clear in the next chapter, this is an issue of partieular importanee for
consideration o f PGD, partieulaiiy in relation to what has become known as the Non-
Identity Problem, and it will be explored in greater detail there. For the moment, it
will suffice to say that a distinction can be drawn between harms per se and harms on
balance. Such a distinction would allow us to say, with Harris, that a soldier harmed
himself when he shot himself in the foot, but that in so doing he sustained a net
balance of benefits over harms. Assuming the wound has the desired effect, and he
does not end up succumbing to gangrene or before a firing squad, in the overall
reckoning, he was made better off than he would have been but for the injury; thus,
he is not harmed on balance.
There can be wrongs that are not harms on balance, but there are 
few wrongs that are not to some extent harms. Even in the most 
persuasive counterexamples, the wrong will usually be an 
invasion o f the interest in liberty.®®
2.3 The Harm Principle
While the concept o f harm is likely to be o f some relevance to most o f those with an 
interest in bioethics, it occupies a unique position for adherents to the Harm 
Principle, for whom the presence and magnitude o f harm alone are determinative of 
whether legal regulation is justifiable. This approach originated in the writings of 
John Stuart Mill, but attained more contemporary prominence thanks largely to the 
writings of H.L.A. Hart, Joel Feinberg and Joseph Raz.
Designating a starting point for any school of thought is inevitably a rather arbitrary 
business. No idea, however revolutionary, springs into being ex nihilo, uninfluenced 
by that which came before. In identifying the two seminal works o f John Stuart Mill
Feinberg, Harm to Others, op. cit., at p35
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-  respectively On Liberty (1859) and Utilitarianism (1861) -  as the central texts of 
the Harm Principle, I do not seek to assert that respect for the liberty or autonomy or 
freedom of the individual was an unknown notion until it was dreamt o f in mid- 
Nineteenth Century England. Both o f the central elements o f M ill’s philosophy were 
derived from other writers and traditions. The freedom of men ‘to order their actions 
and dispose o f their possessions and persons as they see fit ... without asking leave 
or dependency upon the will o f any other man’ had been central to John Locke’s 
writings almost two centuries before Mill produced his most famous works.®’ For 
Locke, the only justifiable restriction on this freedom was imposed by the ‘law of 
nature’, which included that ‘no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, 
or possessions’ -  a limitation that clearly found its echoes in M ill’s work.
It is clear, however, that in terms of influence upon the discourse o f harm in the
twentieth century. M ill’s influence was unparalleled. Indeed, almost every
contemporary writer concerned with such notions makes some reference to Mi 11.®^ In
probably his most renowned essay, ‘On Liberty’, he set out a position that, while
purportedly flowing logically from Benthamite utilitarianism, seems to many
observers to have departed substantially from it.®® Mill used this, probably his most
impassioned work, to rail against ‘the tyranny of the majority’,®"’ claiming that ‘there
is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual
independence . . . ’®® In the essay’s best known passage, Mill set out a theory with
regard to the extent o f this ‘legitimate interference’:
the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or 
collectively, in interfering with the liberty o f action o f any of 
their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which 
power can rightfully exercised over any member o f a civilised 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His 
own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.®®
.lohn Locke, Two Treatises o f  G overnm ent, ed. Peter Laslett, N ew  York, Cambridge University Press, 1967 
See Feinberg, H arm  to O thers, at (inter alia) pp.3-4, 11-15, 115-116; Harris, W onderwom an and  
Superman, at p52 and p83; Warren, M ora! Status, at p64;
See H. L. A. Hart, ‘Natural Rights: Bentham and John Stuart M ill’, in E ssays on Bentham: Jurisprudence  
a n d  P o litica l Theory, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982, at pp. 102-103. For others contended points o f  
departure between M ill and his utilitarian predecessors, see N eil Thornton’s The P roblem  o f  Liberalism  in the 
Thought o f  John Stuart M ill, London, Garland Publishing Inc., 1987.
‘On Liberty’, op. cit., at p. 129 
Ibid, at p. 130
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Whether M ill’s belief in liberty really derived, as he sometimes contended,®^ from an 
empirical belief that it was always the best route to happiness, or whether he was 
(perhaps unconsciously) importing a principle extrinsic to traditional utilitarianism,®®' 
remains a moot point. It may be the case that he was branching out into a primitive 
form o f ‘rule utilitarianism’, whereby he recognised that individual cases might arise 
wherein the greatest happiness could be maximised by curtailing individual liberty  ^
even in purely ‘self-regarding’ areas o f life, but felt that respecting a rule that 
protected those areas from encroachment by others would promote the best outcome 
in the majority o f cases.®®
What is clear is that he was the first to wed the two concepts that together form the 
Harm Principle; respectively, the ethical principles o f respecting individual liberty 
and protecting others from harm. In this. Mill brought about a radical change to the 
utilitarianism of Godwin, Bentham and James Mill, a change Mary Warnock 
maintains ‘without which it might well have been too rigid and narrow to survive.’'^®
The evolution o f utilitarianism, liberalism and the Harm Principle in the Twentieth 
Century in reality commenced about midway through that epoch. For a variety of 
reasons that will not be explored here, philosophy in the early 1900s came to be 
focused on areas other than the normative discipline o f Bentham and Mill; one 
commentator has referred somewhat scathingly to an academic tendency that 
‘reduced the once vigorous normative discipline into a linguistic game.’^’
Ibid, at p. 135
Ibid, at pp.206-207.
Hart contended that the liberty principle, ‘with its one exception is therefore, for M ill, a constraint on the 
pursuit o f  aggregate welfare at the cost o f  individuals and not merely an indirect way o f  securing it,’ ‘Natural 
Rights: Bentham and John Stuart M ill’, op cit, at p. 103.
Anne Maclean has certainly taken this view: ‘W e have seen that according to Mill the Principle o f  Utility is 
the “first” or “fundamental” principle o f  morality. He affirms, however, the practical necessity o f  “secondary 
principles” - derivative moral principles or rules by means o f  which, for the m ost part, moral judgements must 
be made in particular cases. These constitute the rules o f  rule utilitarianism. The point that must be 
emphasised is that on M ill’s account secondaiy principles all derive their authority from the Principle o f  
Utility; this principle alone, he insists, is the ultimate standard o f  right and wrong.’ The E lim ination o f  
M orality: Reflections on U tilitarianism  a n d  B ioethics, London, Routledge, 1993, at p. 10.
™ Mary Warnock, ‘Introduction to Utilitarianism’, op cit., at p.9.
Matti Hayry, L ibera l U tilitarianism  and A p p lied  Ethics, op. cit., p.45
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The 1950s and 1960s saw a revival in interest in utilitarian theories, with debates 
about, inter alia, the respective merits o f ‘act’ and ‘rule’ utilitarianism, and of 
‘average’ and ‘total’ utilitarianism, attaining prominence in academic discourse?^ 
From the perspective o f the Harm Principle, however, perhaps the next significant 
milestone was the publication in 1959 of the Report o f the Committee on 
Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, immortalised in the study o f contemporary 
ethics as the Wolfenden Report'^®.
Enough has been written on the deliberations and conclusions o f the Wolfendon 
Committee, and in particular on the legendary debate between Patrick Devlin and 
Professor H. L. A. Hart, to obviate the need for much further discussion here?"’ 
However, Hart’s arguments to the Committee, subsequently popularised in his series 
of lectures at Stanford University and collected in Law, Liberty and Morality, 
revived interest in the Millian argument that individual liberty is not lightly to be 
interfered with.
In particular, Hart’s contribution to the debate on sexual offences saw him adopt a
stance against what he referred to as ‘ legal moral ism’ - the notion, propounded by
(among others) Patrick Devlin, that an individual may be punished for conduct
which, while causing no harm, transgresses against the moral norms o f his society.
Hart’s antipathy to this doctrine is unambiguous:
The idea that we may punish offenders against a moral code, not 
to prevent harm or suffering or even the repetition of the offence 
but simply as a means o f venting or emphatically expressing 
moral condemnation, is uncomfortably close to human sacrifice 
as an expression o f religious worship.^®
‘An outline o f  a system  o f  utilitarian ethics’, first published in 1961 but available in J. J. C. Smart and 
Bernard W illiam s, Utilitarianism  F or A n d  A gainst, Cambridge University Press, 1973, contains overview s o f  
these and other debates within utilitarian philosophy.
Committee on H om osexual O ffenses and Prostitution, 1957. R eport o f  the C om m ittee on H om osexual 
Offenses and  P rostitu tion . London: Her Majesty's Stationery O ffice.
See, for example. Burton M. Leiser, Liberty, Justice, and  M orals: C on tem poraiy  Value C onflicts, Second  
Edition, N ew  York, M acM illan Publishing Co., Inc., 1979, pp .10-19; Gerald J. Postem a, ‘Public Faces -  
Private Places: Liberalism and the Enforcement o f  M orality’, in Gerald Dworkin, ed. M orality, JIarm, an d  the 
Law, Oxford, W estview  Press, 1994, pp. 76-90; Jeffrie G. Murphy ‘Legal Moralism and Liberalism ’ (1995)
37 A rizona Law R eview  73-93.
Law, Liberty, a n d  M orality. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1963.
Ibid, at pp.65-66.
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Hart, it must be made clear, was far from a slavish disciple o f Mill, a fact that he
makes clear early in the book. In particular, he rejected the strong Millian claim that
the protection o f others was the sole justification for interference with liberty: ‘for I
myself think there may be grounds justifying the legal coercion o f the Individual
other than the prevention o f harm to o th e r s .H a r t ’s disagreement from Mill on this
point, however, can be read as consistent with the utilitarian axioms to which Mill
purported to adhere. In particular, Hart questioned the empirical premises upon
which Mill’s views o f liberty were founded:
Underlying M ill’s extreme fear o f paternalism there perhaps is a 
conception o f what a normal human being is like which now 
seems not to correspond to the facts.^®
His departures from the Millian line notwithstanding, Hart’s work at this time 
propelled the notion o f the Harm Principle back to the forefront o f discussions about 
the role o f the state and o f the law. In particular, his antagonism to the concept of 
‘legal moralism’ carried significant echoes of Mill, and may have been influential in 
the décriminalisation o f certain o f the sexual offences that the Wolfenden Committee 
was established to discuss.
Although Hart’s contribution to the philosophy of law encompassed a far wider 
territory than that explored here, including, inter alia, questions o f the existence of 
natural rights,^® whether and when there is a duty to obey the law,®® legal 
responsibility and the justification o f punishment,®' his contribution to the Harm 
Principle is probably that for which he will most widely be remembered.
While the origins o f the Harm Principle lie in England, in the latter part o f the 
Twentieth Century it assumed a more international dimension, through legal 
theorists, Joel Feinberg and Joseph Raz. Both took M ill’s basic statement as their 
starting point, but went on to interpret and refine the principle in different ways. 
Raz, for example, sought to extend M ill’s dictum so as to add harm to the actor
’’ Ibid, atp.5.
Ibid, at pp .31-32.
‘Are there any Natural Rights?’, P hilosoph ica l Review  64 (1955): 175-191.
‘Legal and Moral O bligation’, in A. I. M elden, ed. E ssays in M oral P hilosophy, Seattle, University o f  
W ashington Press, 1958.
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himself as a ‘justifiable ground for coercive interference with a person’?® while 
Feinberg’s work imported the concept o f ‘interests’ into the notion o f harm. Both, 
however, subscribed to the view that the prevention o f harm was the only justifiable 
ground for state coercion.®®
2.3.1 Harm and liberty
The question at the heart o f this thesis can be formulated in one o f two ways. The 
‘positive’ formulation asks whether prospective parents should be permitted to avail 
themselves o f the technology of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) in a 
manner that would give effect to Nozick’s conception o f the Genetic Supermarket, 
i.e., free from intervention by the law. The ‘negative’ formulation, on the other hand, 
turns this around and enquires whether the state is justified in imposing restrictions 
on the use o f PGD, in restricting access to this Genetic Supermarket.
From a purely linguistic view, it might be thought that these are merely two ways of 
phrasing the same question. On closer examination, however, it seems that the 
direction from which we approach this question is a matter of more than grammatical 
significance. Whether the question is asked in the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ form says 
rather a lot about the way in which it will be approached, and in particular, about 
where the burden o f justification will lie. Should prospective users o f the Genetic 
Supermarket be expected to justify their choices (as well as the right to make those 
choices), or should that onus will lie with those who would restrict those choices?
The significance o f this question should become apparent when consideration is 
given to the necessity o f a default position; what should happen if neither party is 
able to make out a satisfactory case? As this chapter will show, a liberal default 
position would hold that, absent a convincing case to the contrary, those who wish to 
use PGD should be at liberty to do so. As subsequent chapters will show, however, 
this is not how the regulation o f reproductive technologies in the United Kingdom 
actually occurs. Rather, it is not uncommonly the case that a restrictive default
‘Intention and Punishment’, Oxford R eview  4 (1967); 5-22; Punishment an d  R esponsibility: Essays in the 
Philosophy o f  Law , Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1968.
Joseph Raz, The M orality  o f  F reedom , op. cit., at p413.
See Raz, Chapter 15, particularly pages 400, 413, 419, and Feinberg at pages 11-12 and 15.
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position is adopted, with the onus lying firmly with those seeking an exception to 
justify that exception.
(Consider, for example, the HFEA’s guidelines on the use o f PGD for human 
leukocyte antigen typing, a technology that allowed Raj and Shahana Hashmi to 
maximise the chances o f giving birth to a child that would be a viable donor for their 
existing child. This case, and the HFEA’s response thereto, will be considered in 
Chapter 5.)
For adherents to the Harm Principle, the default presumption will be one o f liberty,
that is, a presumption that the onus lies with those who would impose restrictions on
the liberty o f (at least competent adult) individuals. O f course, many people -
ethicists and otherwise -  would regard liberty as intrinsically valuable,®"' but it is
possible to construct a defence o f the liberty presumption without straying outwith
the discourse o f harm/interests. Mill, as we have seen, defended this presumption on
largely empirical grounds arguing that, as a matter o f fact, ‘Mankind are greater
gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by
compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.’®® In particular, he sought to
portray liberty as being the most efficient means of promoting happiness, noting first
that each agent is
the person most interested in his own well-being: the interest 
which any other person, except in cases o f strong personal 
attachment, can have in it, is trifling, compared with that which 
he himself has;®®
and secondly, that
with respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most 
ordinary man or woman has means o f knowledge immeasurably 
surpassing those that can be possessed by any one else.®®
8<1Beauchamp & Childress, P rincip les o f  B iom edica l Ethics, op. cit.
‘On Liberty’, op. cit., at p. 138
Ibid, at p.206. This sentiment has been recently restated in a markedly different context, by econom ist 
Michael Albert; ‘w e are all the world’s forem ost expert in our own preferences.’ Revolution B a sed  on Reason  
Not Faith or F antasy, 18 Decem ber 2003, published on Znet at 
http;//ww w.zm ag.org/content/showarticle.efm ?SeetionID =41& Item ID =4710.
‘On Liberty’, op. cit., at pp.206-7
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Although M ill’s Benthamite language would be unlikely to appeal to modern day 
‘interests advocates’ like Feinberg and Raz, the notion that the most efficient means 
o f furthering interests is by allowing individuals to conduct their affairs and 
determine their priorities as they see fit may nonetheless, in many cases, be thought a 
reasonable strategy for promoting interests and avoiding harms. And while we may 
agree with Gerald Dworkin that respecting liberty on the grounds that it actually does 
promote the interests o f individuals ‘is always a contingent question that may be 
returned by the evidence’,®® a presumption that this is ordinarily the case will place 
the onus upon those who would interfere with liberty to make out a harm-based case 
for doing so.
From this assumption flows the conclusion that allowing an individual to make his 
own choices is ordinarily the best means o f promoting the best consequences fo r  him. 
It says nothing, o f course, about whether this is likely to promote the best aggregate 
outcome for all those affected by his decision, into whose minds he can see and 
whose interests he cares about no more than the benevolent legislator. However, the 
point is precisely that the assumption o f enlightened self-interest says nothing about 
the likely impact on others, while it says something positive about the consequences 
for the agent himself. A positive that is not countered by any resulting negative leads 
to a net gain. Hence, the individual should be permitted to decide for himself in all 
matters unless and until it can be shown that his actions are likely to have detrimental 
effects for others. If that can be shown, then a decision must be made about whether 
the detrimental effect for others outweighs, or is outweighed by, the beneficial 
consequences for the actor himself. Such a balancing of interests may be difficult, 
but the point remains that, unless some likely harm to other parties can be shown, the 
most likely course o f action to maximise good outcomes lies in respecting liberty.
There is, in addition, another strand o f the argument in favour o f a liberty 
presumption. This asserts that, as well as being the course o f action most likely to 
further the agent’s other interests, the very fact o f interfering with liberty invariably 
frustrates an interest in itself. This derives from the belief that we each have an
Gerald Dworkin, ‘Paternalism’, from P hilosophy o f  Law, ed. Feinberg and Gross; Wadsworth Publishing 
Company, 1995, at p .209.
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interest in having our own choices respected, irrespective o f any consequences that 
flow therefrom. The Liberty Presumption may be based partly upon the ‘greatér 
likelihood o f this bringing about outcomes we find satisfactory in other ways.’®^ ‘ 
However, when considering how much weight to attach to the principle o f respect for 
liberty, we must also bear in mind the desire harboured by most persons to make 
decisions for themselves. According to utilitarian philosopher Jonathan Glover, th is . 
desire for self-determination must in itself be accorded substantial weight in any 
utilitarian calculus, independent o f the fact that respecting liberty is likely to lead to 
the maximum satisfaction o f other desires; ‘a desire so important to us would 
unavoidably be given a central role in any utilitarianism centred around people’s 
desires and preferences.’ ®^
On this view, when we deprive the reckless investor o f the ability to decide how to 
spend his money, or when we take from the poor judge o f character the freedom to 
choose her own relationships, we deprive them of something valuable even i f  the 
choices we make on their behalf lead to better outcomes for them than the choices 
they would probably have made for themselves; we deprive them of the knowledge 
that, however good or bad their life choices, they remain their life choices.
We therefore have two harm-based reasons for respecting liberty; first, the belief that, 
in practice, the best means o f furthering future interests and avoiding future harms in 
individual cases is by allowing individuals to choose for themselves; and second, the 
belief that there is harm inherent in any interference with liberty, regardless o f the 
future consequences o f so doing. Taken together, these beliefs give rise to a 
presumption in favour o f respecting liberty. Like all presumptions, this is open to 
rebuttal, whether by showing that the Millian presumption is untrue in a particular 
case, or by showing that any harm we inflict upon the individual when we interfere 
with his libeify is outweighed by harm avoided to (or benefit bestowed upon) other 
parties. But the onus o f rebuttal lies squarely with those who would restrict, obstruct 
or criminalise, rather than with those who would avail themselves o f individual 
choice.
Jonathan Glover, C ausing D eath  an d  Saving Lives, London, Penguin Books, 1990, at p .80. 
Ib id ,a tp .8 I .
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2.3.2 The dc m inim is  rule
A criticism frequently levied at the Harm Principle is that it sets the threshold for
interference with liberty too low. As Holtug has claimed:
it is very seldom that an individual’s behaviour does not affect 
others. And if all effects that are negative for some person 
qualify as harm, then it seems that the Harm Principle offers at 
best inadequate protection o f individual liberty.^*
Feinberg attempted to circumvent this problem of the ‘ubiquity of harm’ by defining 
harm so as to exclude certain adverse effects; ‘offences’ and ‘hurts’, for example, did 
not qualify as ‘harms’, while some wants did not give rise to interests, and hence 
would not give rise to harms when they were frustrated. I have already expressed 
some concern about the apparent arbitrariness o f such designation, but it is also 
worth considering the (perhaps even greater) danger that lawmakers would draw lines 
in a non-arbitrary but self-interested manner, excluding from the category o f ‘harms’ 
those adverse outcomes that actually furthered their own interests.
Fortunately for the Harm Principle, Feinberg’s response to the sort o f criticism levied 
by Holtug does not rely on excluding certain categories o f wants. There are two 
other strands to his approach that limit the legitimate interference o f the law with 
individual liberty: the first contending that not all acts that cause ‘harms’ also involve 
‘wrongs’, and the second that even when an act involves both a harm and a wrong, it 
may not be o f sufficient magnitude to warrant legal intervention.
The former criterion, that in order to satisfy the Harm Principle an act must be a 
‘wrong’ as well as a ‘harm’, has already been considered. The latter criterion, 
meanwhile, derives from the recognition that interference with liberty is itself 
harmful in no small measure. In the preceding section, the essence o f the liberty 
presumption was shown to lie in the recognition that (1) when an individual’s liberty 
is curtailed, his interests are always harmed to some extent (because o f the interest in 
choosing for oneself), and will ordinarily suffer a balance o f harm over good 
(because the agent him/herself will usually be the best judge o f what is in his/her
Holtug, ‘The Harm Principle’, loo.cit., at pp.363-364.
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interests), and/or (2) that the intrinsic value in respecting autonomy, o f which liberty 
is an indispensable component, will be offended against.
Given that any interference with liberty will cause some measure o f harm to the 
person who is the subject o f the restrictions, and perhaps to the intrinsic value in 
autonomy, it follows that any restrictions on liberty are justified only when this is 
necessary to prevent greater harms. Thus, Feinberg speaks o f the principle that ‘state 
interference with a citizen’s behaviour tends to be morally justified when it is 
reasonably necessary ... to prevent harm or the unreasonable risk o f harm to parties 
other than the person interfered with,’^  ^ but that in the ordinary case, ‘other things 
being equal, [legislators] should leave individuals free to make their own choices.
The presumption in favour o f libeity, then, involves more than protecting individuals 
from restriction purporting to be in their own best interests or in furtherance o f some 
moral ideal disconnected from harm; it serves as a reminder that any restriction 
purporting to be in the interests o f others also needs some justification. In the words 
o f Feinberg, ‘Liberty should be the norm; coercion always needs some special 
justification.’ '^^
For Feinberg, this gives rise to a de minimis rule regarding harm. This relates to 
those harms which by virtue o f their ‘falling short o f harm to the interests the law 
ascribes to the standard person ... are deemed to be less serious harms than those that 
would come from restricting the liberty o f o t h e r s . A s  Feinberg has argued, 
‘interference with trivia will cause more harm than it prevents,’ *^’ so harms must be 
o f sufficient intensity to outweigh the interest in liberty before restrictive rules are 
justified to prevent them; ‘Clearly, not every kind of act that causes harm to others 
can rightly be prohibited, but only those that cause avoidable and substantial harm.’^^
Feinberg, H arm  to O thers, op. cit., at p .11. 
”  Ibid, at p.9.
94 Id.
9^  Feinberg, H arm  to O thers, op. cit., at p.51. 
9^  Ibid, at p. 189.
97 Ibid, at p. 12
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The presumption in favour o f liberty does not, o f course, provide any means of 
determining which o f the competing interests is stronger; on its own, it provides no 
formula with which to weigh up the respective benefits and harms o f a particular 
exercise of liberty. What it does involve is a recognition that the case for restriction 
always has an obstacle to overcome which the case for liberty does not. To take the 
scenario under consideration, as well as the interest o f the prospective mother in 
having the option o f PGD if she desires it, an additional factor weighs in favour of 
the laissez faire approach: her ‘interest in having as many open options as possible’.
The Harm Principle, then, can be traced back at least as far as the writings o f John 
Stuart Mill, but the century and a half since the publication o f his seminal works have 
seen the doctrine evolve and diverge in a variety o f directions. The Benthamite 
concern with ‘happiness’ has, for the most part, given way to theories based around 
desires, preferences or interests. And the ground on which respect for liberty was 
built has shifted somewhat, with ethical pluralists such as Joel Feinberg, and 
Beauchamp and Childress, accepting liberty or autonomy as intrinsically, as well as 
instrumentally, valuable -  a rejection o f monistic utilitarianism about which J. S. 
Mill equivocated, and with which he struggled, throughout his life.
2.3.3 The interest in reproductive liberty
While writers like Feinberg and Glover have argued that there is general interest 
inherent in being able to choose for oneself, others have suggested that this is 
heightened further when the choices relate to matters particularly central to one’s life 
plan. John Robertson has argued that reproductive liberty constitutes one such 
interest, and hence that it ‘should enjoy presumptive primacy when conflicts about its 
exercise arise because control over whether one reproduces or not is central to 
personal identity, to dignity, and to the meaning of one’s life.’^ ^
Robertson adopts a liberal approach with regard to reproductive technologies, but he 
does not argue that reproductive liberty should always and automatically be accorded
9^  Feinberg, ‘The Interest in Liberty on the Scales’, op cit, at p.36,
99 John A. Robertson. C hildren o f  Choice: F reedom  a n d  the New R eproductibe Technologies, Princeton, N ew  
Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1994, at p24.
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primacy. ‘Rather, it means that those who would limit procreative choice have the 
burden of showing that the reproductive actions at issue would create such 
substantial harm that they could justifiably be limited,
Does an interest in reproductive liberty encompass decisions o f the sort under
consideration here? A decision to commence a pregnancy that will culminate in the
birth o f a severely handicapped child may well be thought to be ‘central to personal
identity’ or ‘the meaning o f one’s life’, as would a decision to give birth to a child
that will help save the life o f an existing child. But could the same be said o f the
more ‘frivolous’ choices which the Genetic Supermarket would permit? Would a
desire for a child o f the preferred sex constitute such an important interest? For
Robertson, whether a particular choice fails within the protected category
depends on an evaluation o f the importance o f the choice to the 
parents and whether that choice plausibly falls within societal 
understandings o f parental needs and choice in reproducing and 
raising children.^®'
With regard to the former, Robertson maintains that ‘[t]he strongest case for the 
parents is if they persuasively asserted that they would not reproduce unless they 
could select that trait, and they have a plausible explanation for that position. 
(This bears a close resemblance to the approach o f the Court o f Appeal in the tissue 
typing case, considered in Chapter 5). While this may seem a reasonable means o f 
gauging the subjective importance o f the decision to the potential parents, it could, if 
adopted, allow prospective regulators to be held hostage by those who would profess 
a ‘this or nothing’ commitment to a particular application o f PGD which may, in 
reality, constitute something o f an exaggeration. Is it really advisable, from a policy 
perspective, to tell those like Alan and Louise Masterton,'^^ or Sharon Duchesneau 
and Candy M c C u l l o u g h , t h a t  their best chance o f being allowed the sort o f child 
they want lies in an intransigent refusal to consider any other sort o f child?
Id.100
John A. Robertson ‘Extending preimplantation genetic diagnosis: medical and non-m edical uses.’ 
Comment in: J M ed Ethics. 2003 A ug;29(4):213-6, at p.216  
Ibid, at p.215
W hose desire to use PGD to ensure the birth o f  a girl w ill be considered further in Chapter 5.
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As well as providing an incentive for exaggeration, such an approach might be 
thought somewhat unfair on parents in the position o f the Hashmis and Whitakefs 
who honestly admit that they were planning to have another child even before the ' 
possibility o f a cord blood transfusion was brought to their a t t e n t i o n ; w o u l d  their 
interest in being able to have a tissue donor for Zain or Charlie be diminished merely 
because they wished to add to their family in any event?
Robertson’s second requirement, that we consider the extent to which the choice in 
question ‘plausibly falls within societal understandings of parental needs and choice 
in reproducing and raising children’, is also potentially problematic, in that it seems 
to require that the interest is one with which ‘society’ would empathise. While we 
might reasonably expect a substantial measure of public sympathy for the efforts of 
the Hashmis and Whitakers, it is perhaps less likely that the majority o f at least the 
‘non-disabled’ populace would have much understanding for the efforts o f a deaf 
couple who sought a deaf child, or a couple with achondraplasia who wanted a child 
with that same condition.
Yet this lack of public support need not diminish the importance o f those choices for 
those couples. The fact that their desires are not widely shared, or understood, may 
reflect instead the differing experiences of disabled people in a society that, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, is often ignorant of their experiences and perspectives. 
Indeed, it may be that their perseverance with a choice that risks not only exposing 
them to the glare o f media publicity (an experience shared by all o f the couples 
mentioned thus far, and almost guaranteed to any ftiture parents o f ‘designer babies’) 
but seeing their choice widely denounced as irresponsible, is some evidence o f the 
importance of that choice to them, and the strength of the interests that underlie it.
While it may be that Robertson is correct to regard the interest in reproductive liberty 
as being among the most central and important in most people’s lives, then, I suggest 
that he is on less steady ground when he seeks to limit that interest to choices which 
command a degree o f ‘public understanding’. The lack o f popular support for certain
'94 W hose choice a sperm donor was intended to maximise the chances that their child would be genetically 
deaf, and whose efforts w ill be considered in more depth in Chapter 3.
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choices may be as likely to reflect a lack of understanding o f the particular life 
circumstances and perspectives o f those who wish to make them as a lack of 
important interests underlying such choices.
My starting contention, then, holds that the burden o f proof lies with those who 
would constrain parental choice in this regard. This presumption derives from a 
belief that the interest in reproductive choice is a powerful one, and that any 
interference with it must further some interest, or prevent some harm, that is at least 
as great as the harm inherent in that interference. But is it really the case that a 
laissez faire approach to PGD will best further the interest in reproductive libeity? 
The centrality o f this assumption to my thesis requires, perhaps, that it be tested 
somewhat more rigorously than it has been thus far.
2.3.4 ‘A silent closing’ : choice as harm?
The first challenge to the contention that the Genetic Supermarket furthers the 
interest in reproductive choice comes from those who assert that genetic counsellors 
and other medical professionals will to some extent impose their own views 
regarding PGD on their c l i e n t s . I f  such influence was shown to exist, and if it was 
o f sufficient intensity that the ‘voluntariness’ o f the potential parents’ choices was 
compromised, one o f the essential components o f an autonomous choice - 
independence from controlling influences - would also be compromised. It may 
therefore become difficult to construct an argument claiming that this interest was 
furthered by a laissez faire approach to PGD.
However, for this assertion to be proven, two elements must be shown to be true: that 
counsellors and medical professionals do in fact influence their clients with their own 
opinions; and that this influence is sufficient to compromise the ‘voluntariness’ o f the 
clients’ decisions.
C. Hall, ‘Two Cases H ave Similarities and Vital D ifferences’, Telegraph, 3 August 2002.
'9^  Angus Clarke refers to those individuals who consult genetic counsellors as ‘clients’ rather than ‘patients,’ 
‘as the word “patient” would suggest that they were suffering from a disease, which is veiy  often not the 
case.’ Introduction to G enetic Counselling; P ractice an d  Principles, ed. Angus Clarke, 1994; Rout!edge; 
London and N ew  York.
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Barbara Katz Rothman, in The Tentative Pregnancy, expresses scepticism as to the 
possibility of counsellors being genuinely non-directive: ‘counselors are bound to be 
directive sometimes - avowedly so in some circumstances, perhaps unwittingly so in 
others.’ While recognising that ‘most o f them do truly value nondirectiveness,’’^^  
she believes that even the most well-intentioned o f counsellors will inevitably find 
themselves influencing their clients with their own views: ‘If  the counselor thinks 
this woman sitting across from her is going to do something she will deeply regret for 
the rest of her life, how can she not influence her?’’°^
Those who are concerned about the influence of genetic counsellors upon their 
clients are effectively unanimous in their opinion that this influence will be 
favourably disposed towards making use o f screening. Clarke, for example, has 
expressed concerns that ‘clients may be subtly encouraged to take part in a 
programme.’”  ^ This encouragement may take the form o f screening being 
represented as ‘the decision of the responsible citizen ... reinforc[ing] the notion of 
“social responsibility in reproduction.’” Somewhat more subtly, it may take the 
form of depicting screening ‘as a matter of routine, with staff clearly expecting 
clients to participate.’” ^
Aside from the influence allegedly brought to bear, consciously or otherwise, by 
counsellors and medical staff, various references have been made to other sources of 
influence which may conceivably cast doubt upon the notion that the availability of 
PGD enhances choice. Katz Rothman’s research has, for example, revealed several 
instances o f pressure from the husbands and families o f pregnant women. It is 
interesting to note that, while the evidence o f pressure from the medical profession 
suggests that it is almost entirely in favour o f making use of genetic diagnosis, Katz 
Rothman’s work concerning familial attitudes to amniocentesis reveals no such 
unanimity. ‘Some women want the amnio,’ she reveals, ‘but their husbands “won’t
'99 Barbara Katz Rothman, The Tentative Pregnancy, Pandora, 1994 edition, at p.41. 
‘9^  Ibid, atp .41.
'99 Ibid, at p.47.
"9 Introduction to G enetic  Counselling; P ractice an d  P rinciples, op cit, p. 18.
" 'Id .
"2 Id.
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let them” have it. Others are pressured by family into having the test,’”  ^ Chadwick 
and Ngwena also speak o f ‘pressure from relatives to make certain reproductive 
decisions.’” '’
Frequent reference is also made in the literature to a source o f influence which,
although it lacks the immediate proximity o f family, is perhaps equally powerful:
prevalent attitudes within the prospective parents’ (usually the concerns relate to the
potential mothers) social environment. One American commentator has suggested
that ‘the cultural climate in the United States’ may be such as to exert ‘cultural
pressures to select for ... highly valued traits such as intelligence or thinness,’” ^
while British writers have referred to the fact that
attitudes prevalent in society towards abortion and genetic 
disease may have an effect, as may the attitudes o f religious or 
cultural groups to which counsellees belong.” ^
The extent to which this societal influence should cause concern has been considered
by Kitcher. He notes that no ‘[ijndividual choices are ... made in a social vacuum,’
but feels that present social attitudes are such as to suggest that ‘many future genetic
parents ... will have to bow to social attitudes they reject and resent.’” ^
Although a handicapped neonate in the UK will not, at least in theory, be left to die
due to the absence o f adequate medical insurance, it has been suggested that, in a
society which does not make adequate provision for the handicapped, it is misleading
to speak in terms o f there being a choice whether or not to make use o f screening
technologies. Thus it has been claimed that
It is arguably unrealistic to suggest that people should be free to 
make choices about their reproductive habits, in the context o f a 
society which places constraints on the choices available 
because o f inadequate health and social services.” ^
113 Ibid, at p.42.
' ‘4 Ruth Chadwick and Charles N gw ena ‘The Developm ent o f  a Normative Standard in Counselling for 
Genetic Disease: Ethics and Law ’, Journal o f  Socia l Welfare an d  F am ily Law  (1992) 276-295 , at p.284.
Vicki G. Norton, ‘Unnatural Selection: Nontherapeutic Preimplantation G enetic Screening and Proposed 
Regulation’, 47 VCLA Law R eview  1581 (1994), p .1602.
"9 Chadwick and N gw ena, ‘The Developm ent o f  a Normative Standard loc. cit., at p.284.
"9 Philip Kitcher, The L ives To Com e, op. cit., at p. 199.
Chadwick and N gw ena, ‘The Developm ent o f  a Normative Standard . . . ’, loc. cit., at p.282.
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and that ‘prenatal diagnosis cannot really be a choice when other alternatives are not
available.’” ^
it is difficult to dispute the contention that having a child affected by certain 
conditions is likely to have a considerable impact upon the social and economic 
status o f its parents. Certainly, it would be reasonable to expect prospective parents 
to have reservations about bringing a handicapped child into existence ‘if there is no 
confidence in the willingness o f society to care for their child once they are unable to 
do so’.’^ ’^
Whether this fact is sufficient to bear out the contention that genetic prenatal
diagnosis ‘cannot really be a choice’’^’ is somewhat more contentious. The nature of
‘voluntariness,’ and the varieties o f influence which can be brought to bear, will be
considered later in this chapter. For the time being, however, two observations will
be made relating to the argument that the lack o f societal provision for the
handicapped renders the language o f ‘choice’ inappropriate.
The first observation relates to the assertion levied by Abby Lippman, that
[c]ontinuing a pregnancy when the fetus has been found to have 
Down syndrome cannot be considered a real option when 
society does not truly accept children with disabilities or provide 
assistance for their nurturance.'^^
(Once again, although this particular argument was directed at prenatal screening by
amniocentesis, it is submitted that the essence o f Lippman’s argument would be
equally valid if applied to PGD.)
The first, rather glib, observation in the face of such a suggestion would be that, 
while some women faced with a diagnosis of Down’s syndrome do indeed elect to 
abort, many others choose to continue with the pregnancy, while at least some decide
"9 Abby Lippman, ‘Prenatal genetic testing and screening: constructing needs and reinforcing inequalities’, in 
Genetic Counselling: P rincip les a n d  P ractice, from Genetic Counselling; P ractice  a n d  Principles, ed. Angus 
Clarke, London, Routledge, 1994, at p. 152.
Angus Clarke, “G enetics, ethics, and audit”, The Lancet 1990; 3 3 5;1146.
Lippman, ‘Prenatal genetic testing’, loc, cit., at p. 152.
Abby Lippman, “T he Genetic Construction o f  Prenatal Testing: Choice, Consent, or Conformity for 
W omen?” from Women a n d  P ren a ta l Testing: F acing the C hallenges o f  G enetic Technology, ed. Rothenberg 
and Thomson; Ohio State University Press, 1994, at p. 19.
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to forego the option o f amniocentesis a l t o g e t h e r . I n  one sense, this is surely 
evidence that a ‘choice’ exists, albeit in the crudest sense. Yet it may be that, while 
the prevailing societal attitudes may not be sufficiently powerful to deprive all 
women of a meaningful choice, at least some -  perhaps those without adequate 
economic resources or strong networks o f familial or social support -  are effectively 
deprived of a choice.
The second observation is, perhaps, more serious for Lippman’s contention. In 
deciding whether the availability o f PGD has widened or narrowed the degree of 
choice which women have in relation to reproduction, it is perhaps interesting to 
consider what measure o f choice would have been available to them had this 
technology never been invented. If it were really the case that those women who give 
birth to handicapped babies face such severe hardship that they effeetively have no 
choice but to undergo screening, the question arises: what options would they have 
faced if prenatal screening (or PGD) did not exist? A woman who had already given 
birth to one handicapped child, or who knew from experience that a certain condition 
‘ran in the family,’ would surely be under severe, and perhaps irresistible, pressure 
not to reproduce at all. This suggestion is borne out by clinical geneticist Angus 
Clarke, who notes that ‘many women in families with Duchene muscular dystrophy 
... used to fear pregnancy and chose to have few children, if any, or to terminate all 
male fetuses.
We might also wonder whether, if Clarke, Katz Rothman, et al, are correct in 
claiming that it is genuinely impossible for counsellors to avoid influencing their 
clients with their own opinions, a case perhaps emerges for dispensing with the 
facade o f non-directiveness, for stating their opinions and biases explicitly. This 
suggestion is taken seriously by Clarke. He considers that ‘non-directiveness is 
unattainable, and that directiveness is acceptable as long as it is explicit; 
unacknowledged directiveness may be much more manipulative.’'^  ^ A similar 
approach has been examined by Chadwick and Ngwena, who suggest that ‘it is
'^ 9 Several exam ples o f  each choice are, in fact, represented by the wom en whose experiences are 
documented by Katz Rothman in The Tentative Pregnancy, op. cit.
'^ 4 Clarke, ‘G enetics, ethics, and audit’, loc. cit., at p .l 145.
Clarke, Introduction to Genetic Counselling; Practice an d  P rinciples, op. cit., p. 19.
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perhaps a matter o f candidly owning up to it [the bias in favour o f directive 
counselling] and justifying it on the grounds o f non-maleficence.’'^'’
While it is possible that a combination of openness, reasoned argument and 
sensitivity to the client’s values and priorities could ensure that counsellors do not 
exert such influence as to undermine voluntariness or independence from controlling 
influences, it is o f course impossible to make the same guarantees regarding other 
sources of influence. With the possible exception o f Angus Clarke’s (presumably 
flippant) suggestion that all prospective mothers should attend assertiveness 
c l a s s e s , i t  is impossible to imagine how women could be protected from familial 
or societal pressures which exceeded acceptable persuasion and entered the realm of 
manipulation, or even coercion.
It does not automatically follow, however, that these influences are sufficient to 
undermine the voluntariness, and therefore the autonomous nature, o f the choice in 
question. While there will almost certainly be circumstances in which voluntariness 
will be seriously compromised by manipulative or coercive influences, it may still be 
the case that unrestricted access to PGD is the best available means o f protecting 
autonomy. That this is so may become clearer when consideration is given to the fact 
that a great many other choices o f substantial importance are made in a similar 
environment.
In recent years, the view that decisions to procreate take place within an environment
which portrays childbirth overwhelmingly as desirable, or even inevitable, has
become increasingly accepted. Thus, it has been contended that ‘the context in our
culture is such that a childless woman is an unenviable social anomaly,’ and that
[t]he ideology o f obligatory fertility and the definition o f women 
in terms o f reproductive destiny and fulfilment is one o f the 
most powerfully oppressive psychological forces bearing down 
on married heterosexual women of childbearing age.*^^
'99 Chadwick and N gw ena, ‘The Developm ent o f  a Normative Standard . . . ’, loc. cit.,at p.277.
™ Clarke, Introduction to Genetic Counselling; P ractice an d  Principles, op. cit., p. 19.
'9® Paul Lauritzen, ‘W hat Price Parenthood?’, from Life Choices: A H astings C enter Introduction to 
Bioethics, eds. Joseph H. H owell and W illiam Frederick Sale, Georgetown University Press: W ashington 
D.C., 1995.
'99 Kathryn Pauly M organ, ‘O f Woman Born?...’, from The Future o f  Human R eproduction , op. cit., at p.70.
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Indeed, the perspective o f contemporary society which views it as overwhelmingly 
pro-natal 1st is becoming so widely held in some disciplines that it may even be 
considered the orthodox view. Does this lead inevitably to the view that all 
reproductive decisions are subject to such influence as to invalidate any purported 
exercise of autonomy?
In many areas o f life, decisions are made in the context o f a society which makes its 
endorsement o f one set o f choices rather than another quite explicit. The choice o f 
one’s sexual partner, for example, takes place within the context o f a society which 
may be seen only fully to approve o f monogamous heterosexual relationships 
between persons o f the same race and religion.'^'' Decisions concerning modes of 
dress, for example, and products purchased may lack the dimension of moral 
disapproval which accompany the other decisions mentioned so far, but there is a 
very real case for supposing that the influence exerted by both advertising and peer 
pressure is substantial.
Perhaps Katz Rothman is correct when she suggests that ‘what we should realise is 
that human beings living in society have precious little choice ever. There may really 
be no such thing as individual choice in a social structure,’ she proposes, ‘not in any 
absolute way. ... Society, in its ultimate meaning, may be nothing more and nothing 
less than the structuring o f choices.’'^' This view is closely related to that o f dialectic 
determinism, the perspective which holds that ‘people never act entirely voluntarily, 
that is, independently o f societal conditions, nor entirely involuntarily, that is, totally 
dependently on these conditions.’ If this assessment is accurate, then it is not just 
decisions about PGD and prenatal screening which ‘Iead[ ] to doubts that 
assumptions o f “free choice” ... are appropriate.’'^  ^ Many of the most intimate and 
important decisions in life are, on this view, not true exercises in voluntariness at all, 
but responses elicited at least in part by the weight o f societal pressure.
"9 In many respects, it could be argued that the influence imposed by society to restriet one’s sexual activities 
to partners o f  the opposite sex com es closer to Beauchamp and Childress’s concept o f ‘coercion,’ in v iew  o f  
the differing status o f  heterosexual and hom osexual acts in the eyes o f  the criminal law.
Katz Rothman, The Tentative Pregnancy, op. cit., p .14.
"9 Theresia Degener, ‘Female self-determination between feminist claims and “voluntary” eugenics, between  
“rights” and ethics’. Issues in R eproductive a n d  Genetic Engineering, (1990); 3(2): 87-99. at p.93.
"9 Lippman, ‘Prenatal genetic testing and screening: constructing needs and reinforcing inequalities’, loc. cit., 
at p. 152.
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The question as to the extent o f ‘real choice’ or ‘voluntariness’ which survives this 
immersion in influences is moot. What seems almost universally recognised, 
however, is that some measure o f control over these decisions is retained by those 
making them. Almost no-one would contend that decisions about reproduction or 
choices of sexual partners are so devoid o f voluntariness that we would not be worse 
off were these decisions overtly and completely taken over by some other party. It 
does not require any fanciful leap o f imagination to anticipate that any attempt by the 
state to regulate the reproductive options o f its citizens would meet with furious 
r e s i s t a nc e . Whi l e  this recognition that things ‘could be worse’ does not constitute a 
resounding endorsement o f the status quo, it does tend to suggest that there still 
exists something worth striving to protect, that some element o f genuine choice 
remains. Similarly, in relation to PGD, an outcry could be foreseen if geneticists were 
allowed to subject all in vitro embryos to whatever tests they deemed appropriate. 
Again, this seems to involve a recognition that the present situation, while imperfect, 
allows the prospective mother some degree o f control.
It may be argued, then, that while some degree o f influence from counsellors, and 
from outside sources, is likely, or even inevitable, it is less clear that such influence 
is greater than the influence brought to bear on many other important and intimate 
choices, involving choice o f sexual partner or decisions whether to have children at 
all. Furthermore, doubts exist as to whether the influences are sufficiently 
controlling to rebut the presumption that a laissez faire approach furthers the interest 
in reproductive choice; it is surely possible to recognise that ‘[w]e typically make 
choices in a context o f competing influences, such as personal desires, familial 
constraints, legal obligations, and institutional pressures’ but to recognise also that 
‘[ajlthough significant, these influences need not be controlling to a substantial 
degree.’
‘94 As evidenced on a yearly basis by student reactions to Hugh Lafoiette’s suggestion that prospective 
parents should be vetted by the state support this contention; ‘Licensing Parents’ (1980); 9(2) Philosophy an d  
P ublic Affairs, 182.
‘99 Beauchamp and Childress, P rincip les o f  B iom edical Ethics, 1994 edition, op. cit., at p .l6 5 .
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However, even if  there were shown to be some merit in the assertion that women 
would in some sense have been more ‘free,’ would have had more ‘real choice’ - or 
at least an ‘easier’ life'^’ - had PGD and other screening technologies never been 
invented, it must be recognised that turning back the clock to ‘uninvent’ these 
technologies is not possible. The existence o f PGD is now a technological fa it 
accompli, and the hard questions it throws up are now a fact o f life for many people. 
The choices on offer may be less than perfect, and are undoubtedly subject to certain 
pressures and influences. And for some women, a fatalistic acceptance o f the cards 
dealt to them by the genetic lottery may have been preferable to the soul-searching 
required by the new t e c h n o l o g y . G i v e n  that the technology does now exist, 
however, it may be seen that the only real issue relates to who precisely should be 
empowered to make the hard moral choices which accompany it. The central tenet of 
the Genetic Supermarket proclaims that these choices must be made by the women 
who will bear the children whose very existence is in question. However impure or 
compromised the purported exercises in choice may be in the scenarios looked at 
here, it is difficult to see how allowing such choices to be taken over by the medical 
profession or by some executive body would be preferable.
Whether, in retrospect, the changes brought about by PGD should be welcomed or
regretted, whether the choices to which it has given rise have improved or diminished
the lives o f those women touched by this technology, it is difficult to see how
denying those choices to, or taking them from, individual women can really be said
to enhance their control over their own lives. As Mary Anne Warren has written with
particular reference to sex selection:
it is neither necessary nor desirable to defend women’s right not 
to be forced to use new methods o f sex selection at the expense 
of their right to voluntarily choose to do so.'^^
'99 Abby Lippman has argued that ‘The very availability o f  those technologies necessarily forces every 
woman at least to consider if  she desires genetic testing - or i f  she even desires that testing be available for 
use by other wom en - and merely facing this choice is itse lf difficult, and often painful.’ ‘The Genetic  
Construction o f  Prenatal Testing: Choice, Consent, or Conformity for W om en?’ from Women an d  P renatal 
Testing: Facing the C hallenges o f  G enetic  Technology, ed. Rothenberg and Thomson; Ohio State University 
Press, 1994, at p. 11.
'99 Fern, one o f  the wom en interviewed by Katz Rothman, expressed the follow ing sentiment: “There are 
times when I really curse modern technology. N o  one should have to make these kinds o f  decisions.’ Katz 
Rothman, The Tentative P regnancy, op. cit., at p. 182. This kind o f  reaction led Katz Rothman herself to 
speculate whether ‘M aybe there are limits to the value o f  knowing.’ Ibid, at p200.
'9® Warren, G endercide, op. cit., at p i 97.
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2.4 Justice
I have argued, then, that the question which lies at the heart o f this thesis is one that 
should be of interest from a number o f ethical perspectives other than the obvious 
Millian liberal utilitarianism; anyone concerned with how the liberty o f  the individual 
should be balanced against the welfare or protection from harm o f others should 
regard this approach as worthwhile.
However, several further issues merit consideration before moving onto the speeific 
questions which arise from the Genetic Supermarket. First, it should be noted that 
thus far the discussion has been confined to the question of whether and to what 
extent the state should permit access to PGD. This is, o f course, a separate question 
from that which asks whether and to what extent the state should provide access to 
the technology in question.
As numerous writers have explained, liberty - defined as freedom from controlling
influences from others - is but one component o f ‘autonomy’; while liberty and
capacity may be all that is necessary for an autonomous choice, acting to further
one’s interests will often require the wherewithal - economic or whatever - to put
those decisions into practice. Thus, Isaiah Berlin noted that ‘[i]t is important to
discriminate between liberty and the conditions o f its exercise. If a man is too poor
or too ignorant or too feeble to make use o f his legal rights, the liberty that these
rights confer upon him is nothing to him Shelly Kagan, meanwhile, has
questioned the use o f the term ‘freedom’ as being synonymous with liberty; ‘the
argument from liberty,’ she maintains,
unjustifiably restricts itself to one kind o f freedom - freedom 
from interference. ... Yet such “negative freedom,” as it is 
sometimes called, is not the only kind o f freedom with 
legitimate moral significance. An adequate moral system should 
also express the value o f “positive freedom,” or the ability to 
accomplish one’s various goals.
'99 Isaiah Berlin, Introduction to Four E ssays on L iberty, N ew  York, Oxford University Press, 1969, p.liii.
'4° Shelly Kagan, ‘T he argument from liberty’, from In H arm 's Way, ed. Coleman and Buchanan; Cambridge 
University Press, 1994, at p. 17.
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Whether liberty is considered valuable as an indispensable component o f autonomy 
(as by Beauchamp and Childress), or as an instrument to the promotion o f interests 
(as by contemporary utilitarians such as Peter Singer), it can be seen that it will rarely 
be considered to be the only kind o f freedom that is important. If we are to be 
concerned about the ability o f prospective parents to give effect to their wishes, 
and/or to choose their own life path, then perhaps it will require more than a ‘hands- 
o ff  approach by the state. What, it might be asked, o f those who cannot afford to 
shop in the Genetic Supermarket o f Nozick’s dreams?
In a sense, that is not especially relevant to the question considered here, which is 
essentially about whether constraints on liberty, in the form of legislative or quasi- 
legislative restraints, can justifiably be imposed on those who wish to use PGD. The 
extent to which the state should assist those who wish to use this technology is a 
fascinating question, perhaps as important as the question o f whether it should permit 
them to do so. It is tempting, though, merely to note that it is not the question that is 
being addressed here.
There is, however, a sense in which confronting that question is unavoidable within 
this analysis. For one species o f harm that has been suggested might flow from the 
Genetic Supermarket is a potential exacerbation o f divisions that already afflict our 
society, divisions along social, economic and health lines. Allowing only those with 
sufficient economic means to access the Genetic Supermarket could further allow the 
wealthier elements o f our population to ensure that their offspring are healthier, 
longer lived, perhaps even more intelligent or conventionally attractive than those 
further down the Socio-Economic scale.
While some observers have viewed this threat as a reason for curtailing access to the 
Genetic Supermarket (q.v. George M onbiot''"), an alternative suggestion would be to 
ensure universal access to this technology. If a potential harm can be avoided while 
enhancing rather than curtailing liberty, then the Harm Principle would require that it 
is this alternative that should be followed. As Chapter 4 will suggest, however, an
George M onbiot, ‘Rock-a-bye baby with the perfect genes’, The Guardian, 18 February 1997.
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approach that sees the state provide universal access to PGD might bring its own 
problems, problems that include but also extend beyond questions o f limited 
resources.
2.5 Impersonal or person-regarding approaches
The ethical axiom by reference to which PGD will be evaluated, then, has at its core 
a weighing up o f the possible harm to which a laissez faire approach to this 
technology could give rise. Harm, as conceived by both descendants from traditional 
utilitarianism and by pluralists such as Beauchamp and Childress, is defined as the 
thwarting, frustrating, or setting back o f the interests o f those affected by an action or 
decision. But is it possible that ‘harm’ could take a different form, a form that does 
not necessarily relate to the interests o f particular individual people (or perhaps also 
those people who inevitably will exist), but rather concerns itself with increasing the 
satisfied wants or interests in the world} The distinction between ‘person-regarding’ 
and ‘impersonal’ approaches is highly significant for the subject matter of this 
discussion, and it will therefore be considered in more depth.
An impersonal approach to utilitarian ethics would be concerned with ‘the promotion 
of total or average happiness in the w o r l d . R e p h r a s e d  in terms more suited to the 
axiom of interests, the objective may be seen as either the maximisation (taking 
account o f both number and intensity) o f total satisfied interests in the world - total 
utilitarianism - or the maximisation o f the average level o f happiness (defined, 
presumably, as the balance o f satisfied over frustrated interests) - average 
utilitarianism.
Possible objections to the average approach are fairly obvious. The objective of the 
average utilitarian is to maximise the average level o f ‘happiness’, yet this could be 
accomplished in one o f two ways. He could certainly set about making existing 
individuals ‘happier,’ by helping them satisfy their desires and fulfil their interests. 
Equally, however, he could set about increasing the average level o f ‘happiness’ by
'4^  David Heyd, Genethics: m ora l issues in the creation o f  peo p le , Berkeley, University o f  California Press, 
1992, at p. 120.
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killing those who were less happy than average, even if those individuals have lives 
which are still subjectively worth living or which could easily be improved. His 
duty, after all, would be an impersonal one, and if this course o f action would 
increase the average level o f ‘happiness’ then he would surely be acting in 
furtherance o f it.
For the vast majority o f those who confront this conclusion, average utilitarianism is 
deemed unacceptable. It will not, therefore, be adopted as the ethical basis o f this 
thesis. Attention will instead be turned to the other variety o f impersonal approach, 
known as total utilitarianism. As the name would imply, this imposes a ‘duty to 
promote the overall good in the world.’ This has the apparent advantage over 
average utilitarianism that it would not ordinarily be acceptable to kill an individual 
whose life was subjectively worth living - while this may increase the average level 
o f ‘happiness,’ the aggregate would be decreased.
However, according to a recent article by Michael Too ley, circumstances may exist
in which it would be acceptable, and perhaps even obligatory, for the total utilitarian
to do exactly this. He imagines the following hypothetical case:
suppose, for example, that one has a happy and healthy child, 
and that one would very much like to have another happy child, 
but that, unfortunately, as things stand, one is unable to raise a 
second child. ... [Total utilitarianism] appears to imply that, 
other things being equal, the best thing to do would be to kill the 
one child in order to have another, assuming that the life spans 
o f the first and second child together will be longer than what 
the first child would enjoy if it were not killed.” ''
What is perceived by many to be the fatal flaw in the total utilitarian approach lies in 
the fact that the total aggregate ‘happiness’ could be increased by the creation o f ever 
greater numbers o f marginally happy persons. This may be so even if this was at the 
expense o f the quality o f each o f these lives, since ‘[t]he loss in quality o f life might 
be outweighed by a sufficient gain in the number o f lives lived.’ This is what Parfit 
has referred to as The Repugnant Conclusion, the conclusion that
'49 Ibid, a tp .57 .
'44 Michael T ooley, ‘Value, Obligation and the Asymmetry Question’, Bioethics 1998, 12(2), at p .l 15.
'49 Derek Parfit, R easons an d  P ersons. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, at p.386.
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[f]or any possible population o f at least ten billion people, all 
with a very high quality o f life, there must be some much larger 
imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, 
would be better, even though its members have lives that are 
barely worth living.” ^
Thus, it would be required by this variant on the utilitarian axiom that all existing 
persons should act in such a way as to overpopulate the planet, up to that point at 
which the lives o f the extra persons cease to increase the aggregate amount of 
satisfied interests. In addition, this approach could conceivably be taken to justify the 
exerting o f pressure upon existing persons who wish to remain childless, or to 
procreate at less than optimum capacity; although it would frustrate certain o f the 
interests o f the reluctant parents to be coerced into producing unwanted children, this 
would arguably be more than compensated for by the creation o f whole new 
worthwhile lives, even if  these lives were o f a fairly poor quality.
An axiom which led inescapably to the conclusion that everyone capable of bearing 
children should be coerced into so doing, or that existing children should be killed to 
make room for other children with more worthwhile years ahead o f them, would be 
very unlikely to meet with widespread acceptance, and the same may presumably be 
said o f one which created a moral imperative to overpopulate the planet to the extent 
envisioned in the Repugnant Conclusion. It would therefore appear that either form 
of impersonal utilitarianism seems likely to lead very quickly to conclusions which 
the majority would deem repugnant, since each would involve sacrificing ‘the utility 
of individuals to the promotion o f the impersonal value o f the overall good ... in the 
world.’
The alternative would be to adopt a person-regarding approach, that is to say, an 
approach which holds ‘that value is analytically related to the needs and wants, 
interests and ideals o f actual human beings and cannot be ascribed “to the world.’” 
Such an approach may be intuitively more appealing, in that it would not require us 
to regard the wants o f existing persons as being secondary to some abstract,
'49 Ib id ,a tp .388 .
'49 Heyd, G enethics, op. cit., at p.57.
M S Ibid, Preface.
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impersonal i d e a l . I t  is therefore a person-regarding approach which will be adopted 
for the remainder o f  this thesis.” '' However, as will become clear in subsequent 
chapters, the person-regarding approach requires further clarification, particularly ‘ 
when considering which persons have interests worthy o f consideration. 
Furthermore, it is an approach which yields its own share o f results which many will 
regard as intuitively unappealing.
2.6 Means, ends and harms
In its report on PGD for tissue typing, discussed earlier in this chapter, the HFEA
Ethics Committee addressed the ‘putative child’s actual moral, psychological, social
and physical welfare’.” ' In so doing, it considered both a fairly traditional
formulation o f the ‘welfare principle’, asking ‘whether the outcome o f the technique
adversely shifts the balance o f benefit and harm’,'^^ together with a more unusual
formulation where the Committee considered the proposition that:
It could be suggested that positive consideration o f the welfare 
o f the child requires respect for beings as ends and that the 
putative child be treated not merely as a means to a further end 
but also as an “end in itse lf’.
This concern derives -  as the Committee acknowledged -  from Immanuel Kant’s 
categorical imperative that each person must be treated as an end in him or her self, 
and never merely as a m e a n s . A s  a distinct species o f ethical principle, the 
imperative is widely acknowledged and respected, but it would seem that, in this 
case, the Ethics Committee regarded it within the context o f the welfare principle. If 
being treated merely as a means rather than an end in itself would have adversely
'49 It may also be expected to be less intuitively repellent to those who subscribe to the Kantian imperative 
that no person should be treated solely as a means to som e other end.
'9° Once again, it is not being contended that either o f  the impersonal approaches would constitute an axiom  
which is internally logically incoherent. Rather, the total and average approaches are being rejected on the 
grounds that they lead to conclusions which would result in their being deemed unacceptable by almost 
everyone. It is further contended that an examination o f  PGD, or any other topic, from an ethical perspective 
to which no-one adheres would be o f  negligible interest to prospective readers and negligible practical value 
to the debate.
'9' Ethics Committee o f  the Human Fertilisation and E m biyology Authority, E thical Issues in the Creation  
an d  Selection o f  Preim plantation  E m bryos to P roduce Tissue D onors, 22 Novem ber 2001 , at paragraph 3.2 
'9-^  Ibid, at paragraph 2 .14  
'99 Ibid, at paragraph 2.9
'94 Immanuel Kant, G roundw ork o f  the M etaphysics o f  M orals, 1785, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1998.
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affected the future child’s welfare, then it may be that such treatment is being 
considered as a species o f harm, albeit of a less tangible variety.
It is by no means clear that the Kantian imperative should be regarded as being 
concerned with harm, rather than as a proposing a distinct and separate ethical 
concern. Certainly, on some conceptions, the categorical imperative seems to be 
concerned more with motives and mindsets than with interests and harms. By the 
same token, however, it is not unintelligible to attribute to any fiiture child an interest 
(whether or not they are aware of it) in being treated as an end in themselves, and if 
such an interest is deemed to exist, then its frustration might well be regarded as a 
harm.
Given this ambiguity, and given that the HFEA and its Ethics Committee placed 
considerable emphasis on this imperative when considering the ‘welfare’ o f the 
future child, the possible harm inflicted when a child (or a potential future child, as 
the case may be) is treated only as a means will be considered further in Chapter 5.
2.7 A rejection of rights?
The second apparent omission from the perspeetive to be adopted here relates to the 
concept of rights. The failure to accommodate a rights-based perspective within this 
thesis might seem like a substantial oversight. From the mid-Twentieth Century 
onwards, the language o f rights has occupied a central place in jurisprudential 
discourse.”  ^ While the immediate aftermath o f the Second World War and 
particularly the Holocaust saw nations rush to endorse the notion o f human rights in 
fairly abstract form,”  ^ the decades that followed saw legal theorists dedicate 
themselves to the details: defining what rights meant, discussing from whence they
'99 See, for exam ple, the attitude o f  the HFEA Ethies Committee towards tissue typing for the benefit o f  a 
parent, considered further in Chapter 5.
'9^  Brenda Almond reminds us that the concept o f  rights can be traced back at least as far as Grotius and 
Locke in the Seventeenth Century, but that the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries saw ‘appeal to rights 
. . .  eclipsed by m ovem ents such as utilitarianism and Marxism which could not, or would not, accommodate 
them.’ ‘Rights’, in Singer, P., ed. A Com panion to Ethics, op cit, at p.259.
'9’ q.v. United Nations Declaration o f  Human Rights 1948, European Convention for the Protection o f  
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950.
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derived their ethical force, listing and ranking rights and constructing a mechanism 
for adjudicating between them when they compete.” ®
As the discourse on rights became more refined, it began to specialise and subdivide, 
such that specialist literatures emerged dealing with particular rights. The 1970s and 
1980s saw one such body of literature emerge that is o f particular relevance for the 
subject o f this thesis: the right to reproduce. As Sheila McLean has noted, the notion 
of a right to reproduce has two facets: the negative states that ‘no person or 
organization has a right to interfere with an individual’s existing capacity to 
procreate’, while the positive facet ‘may even imply that there is some duty, for 
example, on states, to facilitate reproduction.’” ^
It is immediately clear that at least the former o f these manifestations o f a right to 
reproduce could have important implications for the idea of the Genetic Supermarket, 
for while it is not entirely obvious that a negative right to reproduce implies a right to 
choose the genetic characteristics o f one’s offspring, it is at least an arguable 
derivation from that right. Why, then, is a rights-based analysis being neglected 
here?
It is my contention that an examination o f the Genetic Supermarket hypothesis from
the perspective o f a right to reproduce, while interesting, may in fact be superfluous.
This conclusion, I submit, follows from a consideration o f the conventional
understanding o f a right as being a species of interest that is afforded special weight,
over and above what is afforded to other interests. In his seminal Taking Rights
Seriously, Ronald Dworkin speaks o f rights in the following terms:
O f course, a responsible government must be ready to justify 
anything it does, particularly when it limits the liberty o f its 
citizens. But normally it is sufficient justification, even for an 
act that limits liberty, that the act is calculated to increase what
‘9® For a variety o f  perspectives on these and other questions, see, inter alia, Dworkin,. Taking Rights 
Seriously, op cit; N ozick , Anarchy, State an d  Utopia, op cit; Alan Gewirth, Human Rights: E ssays on 
Justification and  A pplica tion s, Chicago, University o f  Chicago Press, 1983; John Finnis, N atural Law and  
Natural Rights, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980.
'99* Sheila M cLean, ‘The Right to Reproduce’, in Tom Campbell, ed. Human rights: fro m  rhetoric to reality, 
Oxford, Blackwell, 1986, at p.99 . It should be noted that it is by no means unanimously agreed that the ‘right 
to reproduce’ is a distinct species o f  right, as opposed to one aspect o f  a right to bodily Integrity, or indeed 
liberty.
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the philosophers call general utility -  that it is calculated to 
produce more over-all benefit than harm. ... When individual 
citizens are said to have rights against the Government, 
however, like the right o f free speech, that must mean that this 
sort o f justification is not enough. ... Someone who claims that 
citizens have a right against the Government need not go so far 
as to say that the State is never justified in overriding that right.
... What he cannot do is say that the Government is justified in 
overriding a right on the minimal grounds that would be
sufficient if no such right existed. He cannot say that the
Government is entitled to act on no more than a judgment that
its act is likely to produce, overall, a benefit to the community.160
What Dworkin is saying, then, is that while justification is needed for overriding any 
interest, those designated as rights are elevated to a higher plane whereon a more 
onerous burden o f justification applies. Thus, rights as conceived o f by Dworkin 
have come to be described as ‘trumps’, automatically assumed to outweigh other 
interests and lifted above the usual balancing o f harms and benefits.
If such a ‘trum p’ status is to be applied to reproductive liberty, and if that liberty is 
thought to encompass the freedom to make use o f the Genetic Supermarket, then 
clearly prospective consumers would have a stronger case than if they are deemed 
merely to have an interest in being allowed to make such choices. But if  the mere
fact of having such an interest is itself enough to safeguard the such an exercise of
liberty, if a case can be made out from the general liberty principle, then having 
recourse to a particular ‘trump’ relating specifically to reproductive freedom might 
ultimately prove unnecessary. If a mere interest in being allowed to choose the 
genetic makeup of one’s future offspring is shown to outweigh the suggested harms 
that this would cause, then there is no need to ‘supercharge’ that interest by 
designating it a right.
2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have sought to demonstrate that the language o f harm continues to 
occupy a prominent role within bioethical discourse. Legislators and regulatory 
bodies continue to phrase their questions and conclusions in terms o f harm, potential
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, London, Duckworth, 1977, at p. 191.
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or actual, while bioethics commentators on both liberal and conservative sides of 
debates concern themselves with it. For adherents to the Harm Principle such as 
Charlesworth, harm is an indispensable precondition for legal intervention in matters 
o f individual liberty, while for ethical pluralists it is but one concern among several, 
but almost no-one would seek to argue that it is o f no significance at all.
I have then attempted to elucidate what we might mean by harm, adopting the view 
popularised by Feinberg that it involves the thwarting, setting back or frustrating of 
an interest. I have referred to, but not yet explored in depth, the possibilities that 
being treated as a means to an end, or treated unjustly, may constitute ‘metaphysical’ 
harms regardless o f any tangible adverse effect on the individuals concerned, 
possibilities to which I will return in later chapters.
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Chapter 3 The Children o f the G enetic Superm arket
The question at the heart of this thesis, then, is whether any harm  can be said to result 
from  unfettered access to the Genetic Supermarket. If  this question is answered in the 
affirm ative, then a second category o f questions arises, concerning the m agnitude o f that 
harm  and the cost, in terms o f other harms, o f avoiding it. For it may well transpire that 
there is no way to respond to the possibilities offered by PGD that does not involve the 
infliction o f some harm  on someone.
The im m ediate task, however, is to consider whether any harms would arise from the 
default position. As explained in the previous chapter, the Harm  Principle traditionally 
takes as its default position the presum ption that the law should not interfere with 
people’s choices. Only if  it can be dem onstrated that the laissez faire position gives rise 
to greater harms than those inherent in legal restriction can that presum ption be said to be 
rebutted, and curtailm ent o f liberty justified. W hat, then, are the harms thought to arise 
from  the unregulated Genetic Supermarket? Or, to phrase the question in another way, 
whose interests are likely to be affected by the choices allowed by PGD?
3.1 H arm  to the deselected em bryos
An obvious group o f candidates for classification as ‘interested parties’ are the embryos 
them selves. As explained in the opening chapter, the decisions m ade in the wake o f the 
in vitro  fertilisation o f several ova will be concerned with which o f several cryopreserved 
em bryos will be im planted in the uterus, and which will not. The respective fates 
awaiting the two groups could not be m ore dissimilar. For those which are selected, the 
possib ility ' that they will one day be born into an environm ent where they are much 
wanted beckons, while for the ‘unsuccessful’ candidates, the future holds only the 
prospect of destruction, perhaps after being the subjects of experimentation. In view of 
this situation, the conclusion that the embryos have some interest in what is decided 
m ight seem  an obvious one.
' It m ust o f  course b e  rem em bered that this is  o n ly  a possib ility; the m ajority o f  em bryos im planted after IV F  
w ill not result in a su ccessfu l pregnancy. S e e  The P a tie n ts ' G u ide to  D1 a n d  IV F  C lin ics, 3rd E dition (1 9 9 7 ), 
pu blished  by the H um an F ertilisation  &  E m bryology  Authority.
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However, for a num ber o f reasons, the determ ination as to whether the embryos qualify 
as interested parties is considerably m ore problematic. Certainly, any decision will have 
an effect upon the embryos; but this is not the sam e as saying that the embryos have 
interests which will be affected thereby. Any attem pt to make a determ ination as to 
whether the interests o f the cryopreserved embryos should enter into an evaluation o f the 
potential harm caused by PGD will o f course depend upon the answer to the question as 
to whether embryos are the kinds o f beings which are capable of having interests at all.
This part o f the ‘embryo question’ can be answered with some brevity. In the previous 
chapter, I subm itted that the sort o f interests the frustration o f which give rise to harms 
are those which relate, albeit not always directly, to wants. There, I argued that while it is 
not unknown to hear people ask whether a particular weedkiller m ight harm  his lawn, this 
was not harm in the norm ative sense; we do not feel any sympathy for, nor empathy with, 
the lawn, do not feel that it has sustained any loss that is m eaningful to it.
The question as to whether a being is the bearer o f that type o f interests with which we 
are concerned, then, depends upon the possession o f wants, which in turn rely on the 
possession o f consciousness. That is to say, for interests to be m eaningfully attributed to 
any person, that person m ust be, or at some point have been,^ conscious. Thus, it has been 
observed that
it is both a necessary and sufficient condition for having interests, in the 
sense that is relevant to the question o f moral status, that one be 
conscious in the m inimal sense o f that term,^
and that
[i]t makes no sense to suppose that something has interest o f its own  - as 
distinct from  its being im portant what happens to it - unless it has, or has 
had, some form  of consciousness; some m ental as well as physical life."^
The question o f w hen precisely a hum an being attains a level o f consciousness sufficient 
for us to attribute to it even the m ost basic o f interests^ has still not been answered to the 
satisfaction o f all, but although this is o f great im portance in any consideration o f the
 ^ T h e  question  o f  w hether interests can su rv ive  the b e in g  w h o  harboured those interests is ph ilosoph ica lly  
contentious, and w ill be considered  again later in this chapter.
 ^J. A . B urgess and S. A . T aw ia. ‘W hen D id  Y o u  First B eg in  T o F ee l It? - L ocating T h e B eg in n in g  O f H um an  
C o n sc io u sn ess’ B io e th ic s  (1 9 9 6 ) 10(1); 1 at p25  
R onald  D w ork in , L ife ’s  D o m in ion  at p.
 ^ It is usually  assum ed that an interest in avo id in g  ph ysica l pain accom panies the o n set o f  sen tience  (the  
ability  to experien ce that pain), and predates any other experiential interest. S ee , e .g . D w ork in , op  c it.
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ethics o f abortion, for example, it m ay be seen that ascertaining the precise tim ing o f the 
onset o f consciousness is not necessary for the present discussion. For while doubt may 
exist as to when consciousness is first present in a hum an being, no-one would seriously 
seek to attribute that quality to an eight-cell embryo.
The reason for this certainty lies in recognition o f the fact that, in order for consciousness 
to be possible, a being m ust fulfil certain physiological criteria.^ As Burgess and Tawia 
have commented,
(mental) facts about hum an consciousness are supervenient on (physical) 
facts about the hum an central nervous system  - more specifically, they 
are (at least largely) supervenient on facts about the cerebral cortex,^
that is, ‘the folded sheet o f gray m atter ... that covers the surface o f the cerebral 
hem ispheres’
W hen precisely an adequate neural substrate for sentience can be assum ed to be present is
the subject o f some dispute. A  review  o f the literature does suggest, however, that there
is no serious doubt that the possibility o f sentience does not exist until a relatively
advanced stage of the pregnancy. Thus it has been claim ed that
it appears unlikely that the neural apparatus with which the foetus is 
endowed is capable o f m uch m ore than unconscious reflex activity until 
at least m idgestation and perhaps m uch later.^
The Royal College o f Obstetricians and Gynaecologists W orking Party were somewhat
m ore specific, observing that ‘thalam ocortical connections are first observed penetrating
the frontal cortical plate at 26-34 w eeks’ gestation’ and stating that ‘before that tim e there
is no sensory input to the cortex.’
Indeed, so widely shaied is this view among embryologists and neurologists that to 
describe it as the orthodox view is something o f an understatem ent - as Bonnie Steinbock 
has said.
 ^ ‘an interest, h ow ever  the con cep t is fin a lly  to b e  analyzed , presupposes at least rudim entary co g n itiv e  
equipm ent. Interests a ie  com poun ded  out o f  d e s ire s  and aim s, both o f  w h ich  presuppose som eth ing  lik e  ... 
co g n itiv e  aw aren ess.’ Joe l Feinberg, ‘T he R ights o f  A n im als and U nborn G enerations’, from  R ights, Justice, 
a n d  the B ou n ds o f  L ib erty , op. c it., p. 168.
’ B urgess and T aw ia, ‘W h en  D id  Y ou  First B e g in  T o  F eel It?’, lo c . c it., at p.2.
® R odrigo O. K uljis. ‘D ev elo p m en t o f  the H um an Brain: T he E m ergence o f  the N eural Substrate for  Pain  
P erception  and C on sciou s E xperien ce’ , from  The B eg in n in g  o f  H um an L ife, B e ller  and W eir, eds., D odrecht, 
K luw er A cad em ic  P ublishers, 1994, at p .50 .
 ^Ibid, at p .55 .
R C O G  Report, at p. 16. S e e  a lso  G robstein , o p  c it, at p .55 .
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there is com plete agreem ent that the very early embryo cannot be 
sentient, because it has not yet developed the rudim entary structures o f a 
nervous system /^
Even Elizabeth Peacock o f the UK Pailiam entary Pro-Life Group does not allege that the 
capacity for pain exists prior to ten w e e k s T h u s ,  embryos do not and can not in any 
sense be said to care about what happens to them, or indeed care about anything at all; 
‘[w]hether they are preserved or destroyed, cherished or neglected is of no concern to 
them .’^^  This does not o f necessity lead to the view that what happens to an embryo is a 
m atter o f moral indifference; other individuals may have interests bound up with the fate 
o f the embryos, and other ethical principles may be violated if they aie treated in certain 
ways.*'^ Nonetheless, it is as well to be clear- at this point that, if  it is possible to treat an 
em bryo in ways that m ay be said to be ‘w rong,’ it is not because the embryo itself is 
being haim ed in any subjectively m eaningful sense; ‘a being without interests has no 
“b e h a lf’ to act in, and no “sake” to act fo r.’^^  In short, it cannot be harmed.
W hat could be argued, however, is that they possess the potential to becom e beings with
interests. Establishing that there exists no reason to be concerned about the interests of
the embryos - quite simply, they have none - does not address the question o f whether
concern ought to be due to the future interests o f the persons those embryos have the
potential to become. For many adherents to the view that embryos are of moral
significance, it is this potential which renders those lives valuable. There are, however,
persuasive reasons to reject that argument. As Harris has pointed out,
the fact that an entity can undergo changes that will make it significantly 
different does not constitute a reason for treating it as if  it had already 
undergone those changes,
" B o n n ie  Steinbock , ‘T h e  M oral Status o f  Extracorporeal E m b ryos’, from  E th ics a n d  B io tech n o lo g y ,  eds. 
D y so n  and Harris, R ou tled ge , 1994, at p .84 .
The G u ard ian , 2 2  July 1996.
S te in b ock , ‘T he M oral Status o f  Extracorporeal E m bryos’ , loc . c it., at p .S l.
S te in b ock  draws an illum inating parallel w ith  the issu e  o f  fla g  burning in  the U S A .
Joel Feinberg, ‘T he R ights o f  A n im als and Unborn G enerations’, from  R igh ts, Justice, a n d  the B oun ds o f  
L ib erty , op . c it., at p l6 7 . A  rare opp osition  to this v iew  can b e  found in Francis F ukuyam a’s O u r P osthu m an  
F utu re: C on seq u en ces o f  the  B io tech n o lo g y  R evo lu tio n , N e w  Y ork, Faber, Strauss and G iroux, 2 0 0 2 .  
F ukuyam a cla im s ‘that em bryos a ie  routinely  harm ed by  in  vitro fertilization c lin ics  w h en  they are d iscarded’ 
(p .9 1 ), but m akes no attem pt to situate this assertion w ithin  the con tex t o f  the debate as to w hether em bryos  
are the sort o f  bein gs than can b e  harm ed.
F or the purposes o f  this thesis, the term  ‘p erso n ’ m ay b e  taken to denote any b e in g  to w h ich  interests can  
m ean in gfu lly  be attributed. In so  say ing , it is acknow ledged  that m any writers in this fie ld  have set the 
threshhold  for personhood considerably  higher. F or exam ple, in  W on derw om an  a n d  Su perm an , John H airis 
d efin es a person as ‘a creature capable o f  valu ing its o w n  ex is ten ce ’ (p .68).
Harris, W on derw om an  a n d  Su perm an , op. c it., at p .34 .
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adding somewhat flippantly that ‘[w]e are all potentially dead, but no one supposes that 
this fact constitutes a reason for treating us as if  we were already dead.’^^
Furthermore, m any ethicists have drawn attention to the fact that, were a duty ‘to protect
and actualize all hum an potential’ held to exist, it would logically extend beyond a duty
to refrain from  killing embryos. As Harris has stated,
it is not only the fertilised egg, the embryo, that is potentially a fully- 
fledged adult. The egg and the sperm  taken together but as yet un-united 
have the same potential as the fertilized egg. For som ething (or 
somethings) has the potential to become a fertilised egg, and w hatever 
has the potential to becom e an embryo has w hatever potential the embryo 
has.^^
Follow ing the same logic. Singer has noted that the potentiality argum ent ‘does not
provide any means for thinking abortion worse than any other means o f population
c o n t r o l , i n c l u d i n g
contraception, whether by “artificial” means or by “natural” m eans such 
as abstinence on days w hen the woman is likely to be fertile; and also 
celibacy
It m ay also be seen that the argum ent from  potentiality has even less m erit when applied
to extracorporeal embryos. Steinbock has pointed out that the potentiality argument
depends upon the view that
fertilization marks the beginning o f an ongoing process which, if it is not 
deliberately interrupted, has a pretty good chance o f resulting in the birth 
o f a baby.^^
This m ay form a good description o f the ordinary pregnancy, but it can in no way be seen 
as applicable to IVF. As Steinbock has noted, there is no possibility o f the ex utero 
em bryo developing into anything else ‘[u]nless someone intervenes, and transfers the 
embi-yo into a uterus.
It should, perhaps, be noted that the foregoing applies specifically to experiential 
interests, i.e., those interests that relate to the subjective experiences o f the being in 
question. In recent years, a bend  has em erged in bioethics towards respect for another
18
19
20
Peter S inger, P ra c tic a l E th ics, C am bridge U n iversity  Press, 1993 , at p. 155.
Id. S e e  a lso  R onald  D w ork in , L ife's D o m in ion , L ondon, H aip erC ollin sP ub lish ers, 1993 , at p .l6 .
23
Id.
Id.
Id.
Steinbock , ‘T he M oral Status o f  E xtracorporeal E m bryos’ , lo c . c it .,at p .85 .
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form  of interests, which do not rely on the present subjective m ind-state o f the interest-
bearer. Ronald D w orkin has dubbed these critical interests,
Interests that it does make their life genuinely better to satisfy, interests ‘ 
they would be mistaken, and genuinely worse off, if  they did not 
recognize. Convictions about what helps to make a life good on the 
whole are convictions about those more im portant interests. They 
represent critical judgm ents rather than ju st experiential preferences.
M ost people enjoy and want close friendships because they believe that 
such friendships are good, that people should  want them.^^
If the critical interest thesis is accepted, this m ight lend ethical credence to the widely 
held belief that the wishes o f the deceased, the perm anently unconscious or the senile 
should be respected even once they cease to be aware of such wishes. M any people, it 
may reasonably be assumed, care deeply that their bodies are treated in a ‘dignified’ 
m anner after their death, despite the realisation that, at that time, they will have neither 
awareness of nor concern with such matters. The notion of critical interests adds both 
coherence and ethical force to such feelings.
Could presentient embryos be said to possess something akin to critical interests, vesting 
them  with an interest in, for example, not being turned into eanings?^^ A closer 
exam ination o f the concept of critical interests suggests that their application to 
preim plantation embryos may be som ewhat problematic. In each o f the scenarios 
exam ined in the preceding paragraphs, the party to whom the critical interests were 
attributed, although now no longer aware of their existence, at one tim e harboured 
beliefs, values and preferences from  which these interests can be said to derive. If  the 
vegetative patient can be said to possess a critical interest in not being used as a 
sideboard,^^ this, we m ight think, is because he once haiboured values that would be 
offended by such treatm ent o f his corpse. And if the deceased person has a critical 
interest in being rem em bered in a particular fashion, this is because, when alive, she 
w ished to rem em bered in that fashion.
24 Id.
2^  R onald  D w orkin , L ife ’s  D o m in io n , op. c it., at p p .2 0 1-202. In h is m ore recent w ork, D w ork in  has 
rephrased this d istin ction  in term s o f  critical and vo litional w ell-b ein g; S o vere ig n  V irtue: The T h eory a n d  
P ra c tic e  o f  E quality , C am bridge, L ondon, H arvard U n iversity  P ress, 2 0 0 0 , at p .2 4 2 .
2® M atti H ayry and H eta  H ayry, ‘T he bizarre case  o f  the hum an e a n in g s ’ . P h ilo so p h y  T o d a y  7, 1991, 1-3. 
R eprinted in: B io eth ics  N ew s  no. 4 , 1991, 2 3 -2 4 .
22 T o  boiTOw John K eo w n ’s red u c tio  a d  a bsu rdu m \ ‘R estoring M oral and Intellectual Sh ape to the Law A fter  
B la n d ’, T he L a w  Q u a rter ly  R e v iew  (1 9 9 7 ); 113: 4 8 1 -5 0 3 , at p .494 .
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The attribution o f continuing interests to those who are no longer aware o f them  is 
problem atic in itself, especially when we come to consider whether any harm  would 
result if  those interests were frustrated (who, it m ight be asked, w ould sustain the harm?), 
and turn to the vexed question o f how such interests should be w eighed against the 
contem poraneous, experiential interests o f the incom petent individual who now exists 
(see Appendix). However, for present purposes, it is sufficient to observe that the 
extension of critical interests to that class of beings that do not possess, and have never 
possessed, experiential interests, would involve extending the thesis onto even more 
treacherous ground.
W hile the nature o f the critical interests which we may want to attribute to the deceased 
can be derived from  the interests they harboured while alive, it is difficult to see how we 
m ight arrive at a sim ilar body of critical interests for the embryo. Critical interests, as 
conceived by Dworkin, ‘represent critical judgm ents  rather than ju st experiential 
preferences’,^ ® while he goes on to add that ‘[mjost people enjoy and want close 
friendships because they believe that such friendships are good’ Preim plantation 
embryos being capable o f neither form ing judgm ents nor holding beliefs, it is at least 
questionable whether critical interests, at least as Dworkin describes them, could be 
attributed to them.
Indeed, it is difficult to see how any interests attributed to the embryo could be any m ore 
than projections o f our own views and preferences, or perhaps o f those that we m ight 
assum e the embryo would one day possess if  it survived until sentience. W hether any 
weight should be accorded to such presum ed future interests will be the subject o f the 
next section. For now, it is sufficient to note that, even i f  such interests can be attributed 
to the potential future person that the embryo might some day become, they cannot be 
attributed to the em bryo itself.
3.2 Potential persons: those who m ight have been
The fact that the em bryos have the potential to become morally valuable beings, or 
interest bearers, if  some other party intervenes and treats them  in a particular way, then, 
does not provide a reason to accord value to the embryos themselves. Does it, however,
2® D w ork in , L ife ’s D o m in io n ,  op. cit., at p .202 , em phasis added. 
2^  Id ., em phasis added.
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necessarily follow that no value should be accorded to the potential future persons which 
could have existed? In deciding not to im plant a particular embryo, do we harm  the 
potential future person who that embryo could have become? Should we be concerned 
about those potential lives that, as one participant in a discussion group once put it, are 
left to ‘wither on the v ine’?®^
A recent proponent o f this kind o f harm  is Francis Fukuyama. In his m ost recent book,
Fukuyam a addresses the perceived excesses o f biotechnology. In the context o f a
discussion o f preim plantation gender selection, he makes the following claim:
In m any A sian cultures, having a son confers clear-cut advantages to the 
parents in terms of social prestige and security for old age. But it clearly 
harm s the girls who then fail to be bom.®^
The arguments surrounding the particular issues raised by gender preselection will be
discussed in Chapter 5. For present puiposes, what is o f interest about Fukuyam a’s claim
is the tacit assum ption that a being which has never existed can be the subject o f harm.
That this assum ption is problem atic should becom e clear when we consider the 
relationship, discussed at length in the previous chapter, between harm s and interests. 
Follow ing Feinberg, it was suggested that a harm  occurs when an interest is thwarted or 
frustrated. The concept o f ‘in terest’ was som ewhat com plicated when consideration was 
given to Ronald D w orkin’s controversial notion o f critical interests, but not even 
D w orkin would dispute that interests can only m eaningfully be attributed to beings which 
exist, or have existed.
To argue that a potential future person has an interest in being brought to existence is 
problem atic for at least two reasons. First, this claim  would seem  to fly in the face o f the 
earlier suggestion that interests are a product o f awareness. Em bryos, it was argued, have 
no interests, because they lack even a basic awareness o f their surroundings, and have not 
even the m ost rudim entary preferences. If this is true o f embryos, then it is surely at least 
as true o f the ethereal class o f ‘potential persons’, which at the time o f  the implantation 
decision, exist m ore as hypothetical concepts than as actual entities.
2" C ited  in C olin  G avaghan , ‘O ff-th e-p eg  O ffsp rin g’, P h ilo so p h y  N o w , W inter 1 9 9 8 -1 9 9 9
2* Francis Fukayam a, O u r P osth u m an  F uture: C on seq u en ces o f  the B io tech n o lo g y  R evo lu tio n , N ew  York,
Faber, Strauss and G iroux, 2 0 0 2 , at p .97
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A second objection to Fukuyam a’s attribution o f hai*m to ‘those who m ight have been’ 
arises when we consider the question o f numbers. How many such potential future 
persons are haim ed? It is a straightforw ard m atter to count the num ber o f embryos 
discarded in a fertility clinic. But if we are concerned not with embryos per se, but with 
potential persons who m ight have lived but for our decisions, then we cannot confine the 
calculation to that setting. W hat o f the potential persons who m ight have lived had the 
prospective parents harvested m ore ova and im planted more embryos?^^ And those who 
m ight have lived but for the availability o f contraception? Or for lifestyle choices like 
celibacy, voluntary childlessness or defem ng reproduction until later life? The potential 
future girl who m ight have lived in Fukuyam a’s hypothetical scenario has no more actual 
existence, and no m ore right to existence, than the potential future children who might 
have lived but for any o f the other choices that lim it the num ber o f children brought into 
the world.
The sort of conceptual confusion underlying Fukuyam a’s contention can also be found in 
an argum ent advanced almost thirty years before by R. M. Hare. In an article entitled 
‘Abortion and the Golden R ule’, Hare sought to develop an argum ent along the lines that, 
if an individual is now glad to be alive, then being born was cleax'ly a benefit to him; and 
if this is so, then it follows that an act -  such as abortion -  that prevented his being born 
would have constituted a harm  to him. ‘If  it would have been good for him  to exist,’ 
Hare argued, ‘surely it was a harm  to him  not to exist.
This sort o f haim -benefit symmetry is problem atic in many other settings. M ichael 
Bayles has claimed that, from  the fact that an act may confer benefit on someone ~ giving 
him $500, for exam ple -  it does not follow that om itting to so act harms him. In arguing 
otherwise, Bayles m aintains. Hare ‘has collapsed the distinction betw een harm  and 
nonbenefi t ’ The Hare-Bay les dispute raises a serious question for the ethics o f harm , 
specifically: if  I have it w ithin my pow er to benefit someone, and I elect not to do so, 
does it imm ediately follow that I have harm ed him?
22 In practice, there is a lim it im posed  on the num ber o f  em bryos that can be im planted in each  c y c le  o f  IV F, 
a p o licy  w as fram ed w ithou t appaient concern for the potential future liv es sacr ificed  by this lim it.
22 R. M . Flare, ‘A bortion  and the G olden  R u le ’ P h ilo so p h y  a n d  P u b lic  A ffa irs  (1 9 7 5 ); 4 (3 ): 20 8 , at p .2 2 1 .
24 M ichael D . B ay les , ‘H aim  to the U n co n ce iv ed ’ P h ilo so p h y  a n d  P u b lic  A ffa irs  (1 9 7 6 ); 5(3): 2 9 2 -3 0 4 , at 
p .298 .
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This was discussed briefly in Chapter 2, but fortunately, it need not detain us further here. 
For whether or not H are’s claim  is true with regard to gratuitous donations o f money, it is 
alm ost certainly not true w ith regard to the present question. ‘Genesis questions’ have 
certain distinct characteristics that render H are’s claim  paiticularly problem atic. The fact 
that a person is relieved that his parents brought him  into existence does not support the 
conclusion that any such interests existed when the decision about abortion was reached. 
In B ayles’ hypothetical scenario, Sm ith may not harm  Jones when he declines to give him 
the $500, but it is at least coherent to speak o f Jones having interests that are affected by 
Sm ith’s decision. If, however, the alleged harm  that Sm ith had visited upon Jones took 
the form  of a decision not to im plant the embryo that would some day have become 
Jones, then it appears that Jones had no interests bound up in the outcom e of Sm ith’s 
decision at the time Smith made that decision. Furtheim ore, the nature of Sm ith’s 
decision is such that he ensures that Jones will never acquire any interests that aie 
affected by Sm ith’s earlier decision.
Thus, Parfit, while sharing H are’s view that causing someone to exist may indeed confer a
benefit upon him,®^ does not accept H are’s purportedly sym m etrical conclusion that
preventing him from  existing inflicts a harm. ‘Causing someone to exist,’ Parfit contends,
is a special case because the alternative would not have been w orse for 
this person. ... W hen we claim  that it was good for someone that he was 
caused to exist, we do not im ply that, if  he had not been caused to exist, 
this w ould have been bad for him. ... W e are not claiming that it is bad 
for possible people if  they do not become actual.®^
Similarly, Harris asserts that
to cause someone to exist is to benefit that person, but to cause someone 
not to exist by failing to bring them  into existence harms no one; for the 
simple and sufficient reason that there is no one who suffers this 
misfortune.^^
Parfit, R ea so n s a n d  P erso n s, op. cit., at p489 . 
2*^ Id.
22 Hai-ris, W on derw om an  a n d  Su perm an , op. cit., at p55 . S ee  a lso  M elinda  R oberts, C h ild  versu s  
C h ildm aker, M aryland, R ow m an and L ittlefield  Publishers, Inc., 1998 , at p. 11: ‘w e  cannot w rong those w ho  
w e  refrain from  ever bringing into e x is ten ce .’; Joel Feinberg, The m o ra l lim its o f  the c r im in a l law . V o l.l:  
H a rm  to  o thers. N ew  Y ork, O xford, O xford U n iv ersity  Press, 1984, at pp.96-97; H ans S . R einders The 
F utu re o f  the D isa b le d  in L ib e ra l S oc ie ty : A n  E th ica l A n a lysis , N otre D am e, Indiana, U n iversity  o f  N otre  
D am e Press, 2 0 00 , at p .40 .
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If harm is inextricably linked to interests, and non-existent people have no interests, then 
it is meaningless to speak in terms of causing them harm. To seek to attribute interests, in 
existence or anything else, to those who were never born seems to require a belief in 
some sort of extracorporeal waiting room, a ‘a strange never-never land from which 
phantom beings are dragged struggling and kicking into their mother’s wombs and thence 
into existence as persons in the real world.
3.3 Potential persons: those actually born
This conclusion does not, however, inevitably commit us to the view that potential future 
persons are outwith the sphere of legitimate ethical concern. According to the ‘person 
affecting’ approach discussed at the end of the last chapter, ‘an action is only right or 
wrong where there are people who are better or worse off than they would have been on 
some alternative.’^  ^However, this says little about which persons ought to be considered. 
Quite clearly, an existing person whose interests seem likely to be affected by a course of 
action must be considered in evaluating the ethical propriety of that action. It is equally 
clear that those persons who would have existed had a particular contingency come to 
pass, but who will now never exist, cannot be said to have interests in that action. It is 
submitted, however, that the weight to be attached to that class of persons, about whom it 
may be said that they either will or might exist as interest-bearers at some point in the 
future, is the subject of some doubt.
It could, perhaps, be argued that a moral axiom may be constructed in such a way as to
require concern to be shown only for the interests of presently existing persons. This
would, however, require some conclusions to be arrived at which, it may be assumed, few
people would find satisfactory. Parfit has illustrated the duties he claims are owed to
future generations with the following hypothetical example.
Suppose that I leave broken glass in the undergrowth of a wood. A 
hundred years later this glass wounds a child. My act harms this child. If 
I had safely buried the glass, this child would have walked through the 
wood unharmed. Does it make a moral difference that the child whom I 
harm does not now exist?'^ ®
Anyone who would answer this rhetorical question in the negative would seem to be
sharing Parfit’s view that ‘Remoteness in time has, in itself, no more significance than
Joel Feinberg, H a rm  to  O th ers , op. cit.. at p 101
2^  Jonathan G lover, W hat S o r t O f  P eo p le  S h ou ld  T here B e?  L ondon, Penguin , 1984 , at p . l4 6 .  
4” Parfit, R ea so n s a n d  P erso n s , op. c it., at p .356 .
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remoteness in space’ a view he shares with Glover/^ Feinberg/^ and many other 
bioethicists/"^ Thus, it would be wrong to bury radioactive material in such a way that it 
will be rendered safe for only two hundred years, despite the fact that no one alive today 
is likely to suffer as a consequence."^^
But if it is assumed that abandoning the broken glass, or burying the radioactive waste, 
are harmful acts, the question inevitably arises as to where the subject of the harm is 
located. At the time I abandon the glass, the party who eventually sustains harm because 
of that act does not exist, and therefore cannot -  following the logic of the preceding 
section -  be the subject of haim. Indeed, following Parfit’s example, no harm is caused 
by my carelessness until long after the end of my own anticipated life expectancy. Does 
it therefore follow that, at the time of leaving the broken glass, I have done nothing 
wrong?
The interests approach, it may be seen, does not lead to such a conclusion. For although 
my act inflicts no harm at that time, it sets in motion a chain of events that will eventually 
result in haim to an actual, existing person. That my act does not cause any harm at that 
time is undeniable, but this is not unique to the scenario wherein the eventual victim has 
not yet been born. In fact, the same could be said if the eventual victim is presently 
existing, but is currently playing in the meadow and has not yet entered the woods. If 
that child injures itself on the glass in six months, or five minutes, time, I could not claim 
that it was not harmed by my act. The extent of culpability that should attach to me will 
depend on various factors, including the foreseeability of the harm, and any contributoiy 
carelessness on the part of the child or its parents. But the fact of a temporal gap between 
my negligence and the eventual harm does not present a problem for the Harm Principle,
4* Ibid , at p .357 .
42 ‘W hy should  a b ias in favour o f  p eo p le  liv in g  n o w  be any m ore d efen sib le  than a sp ace bias in favour o f  
p eo p le  liv in g  h e re T  G lover, op. c it., at p .66.
42 ‘W e  can te ll, som etim es, that sh adow y form s in the spatial d istance b e lon g  to  hum an beings, though w e  
kn ow  not w h o or h ow  m any they are; and this im p o ses a duty on us not to throw  bom b s, for exam ple, in their 
direction . In like m anner, the vagu en ess o f  the hum an future d o es not w eaken  its c la im  on us in ligh t o f  the  
nearly certain k n o w led g e  that it w ill, after all, b e  hum an.’ Joel Feinberg, ‘T he R ights o f  A n im als and U nborn  
G en eration s’, loc. cit., a tp .1 8 1 .
44 S ee , for  exam ple, R oberts, C h ild  V ersu s C h ildm aker, op. cit., at pp. 15-18, S inger, P ra c tic a l E th ics , op. 
cit., at p .2 6 8 , and H arris, W on derw om an  a n d  S u perm an , op. cit., at p .l7 8 .
42 T h is fam ous exam ple w as postulated by D erek  Parfit; see  R ea so n s a n d  P erso n s, op . c it.. Chapter .
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Neither is there an insurmountable problem with the fact that my victim’s actual identity 
is unknown (and unknowable) to me. As long as it can be predicted with a reasonable 
degree of certainty that the affected areas will be inhabited by some human or other 
sentient life, it would be wrong to act in a way likely to frustrate the interests which those 
beings are likely to possess.
What significance does this acknowledgement have for the Genetic Supermarket? This, 
it will be seen, is a far from straightforward matter. However, for the moment it is 
enough to note that it is meaningful to speak in terms of harming those who do not 
presently exist, if we know or have strong reason to suspect that they will exist at some 
time in the future. Unlike ‘those who will never live’, the subjects of the harm in this 
case will develop interests, and it makes sense to consider whether our actions now will 
give rise to a state of affairs wherein those interests will, in time, be thwarted or 
frustrated. That their identities are still unknowable does not mean that I cannot, with 
some accuracy, predict where their interests will lie; there is much that I cannot predict 
about the values and fashions of society a hundred years hence, but it is reasonable to 
anticipate that children will still have interests in not being cut by broken glass, and that 
everyone will have an interest in avoiding premature and unpleasant death from radiation 
poisoning. I should therefore avoid harmful acts, even though the harms they cause may 
not eventuate for many years. Furthermore, legislators may -  in terms of the Harm 
Principle -  be justified in intervening to prevent me from so acting.
3.3.1 Possible harms to future people
What kind of harms might we expect the Genetic Supermarket to inflict on the future 
people who emerge from its doors? The literature is replete with suggestions, but these 
appear to fall into two broad categories:
• Children of the Genetic Supermarket could suffer psychologically and 
emotionally as a result of unusual relations with their parents.
• Those children may be harmed by the paiticular traits chosen by parents.
To deal first with the former of these concerns, there are several ways in which future 
children might be thought to be harmed by their parents’ use of PGD. This may be 
because they will be burdened with the unrealistic expectations of parents who believe
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that the genotype they have selected will guarantee success in a particular field, or a 
particular kind of character. For present purposes, this can be deemed the Parental 
Pressure Problem.
Andrew Niccol’s 1997 movie Gattaca postulates a dystopian future where the use of 
PGD is so widespread, and its consequences for employment so significant, that it has 
become effectively compulsory. (The suggestion that such a pressure can be brought to 
bear on prospective parents was considered in the previous chapter.) Much of the movie’s 
attention is focussed on Vincent Freeman, one of the few remaining ‘faith babies’ (those 
whose parents entrusted their genotype to chance rather than science), whose ambition to 
go into space is thwarted by the genetic flaws which his parents did not eliminate. 
However, equally interesting, and perhaps more tragic, is the character of Jerome Eugene 
Morrow, a man so haunted by his failure to live up to the quality of his premier-quality 
genome that he several times attempts, ultimately successfully, to take his own life. 
Although to most people’s eyes a successful athlete, Jerome never quite attained the 
supremacy that his parents expected -  a failure powerfully (if unsubtly) symbolised by 
the silver medal which he places around his neck before his final act of self-immolation.
Is it plausible that parents who use PGD will see this as a guarantee that their children 
will grow up according to their expectations? Such an assumption would display a 
startling degree of ignorance about the interaction between genes and environment, and a 
naïve faith in genetic determinism. It might be hoped that counselling would dispel many 
such errors. However, the possibility that such pressures might be brought to bear on 
children of the Genetic Supermarket cannot readily be discounted.
Whether such problems would be unique to such children is, of course, a different 
question. Both literature and real life are replete with accounts of children who have been 
unable to conform to their parents’ Willie Loman-esque expectations. Of course, there 
may be unique and unforeseeable burdens associated with being a ‘designer baby’ ; the 
technology is still too new to be certain. Equally, though, it is foreseeable that there 
would be unique burdens associated with being bom into a family with a history of 
criminality, or a history of notable achievement. It lies outwith the remit of this thesis to 
consider the complicated interaction between parental expectation, childhood stress, and 
the happiness of the adult that child grows into. However, it is submitted that while the
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laissez faire approach to PGD could give rise to another form of parental pressure, there
is at present no particular reason to suppose that it will be uniquely common or severe.
There have always been unrealistic parental expectations, and some of these have even
had genetics at their core, albeit a more unsophisticated genetics that simply assumed that
talent would be passed through blood."*^  As Julian Savulescu has noted,
parents inevitably have hopes and expectations for their children which 
are deflated every day. ... Some parents want their children to be great 
musicians. Sometimes this desire becomes overbearing, as depicted in the 
film Shine. But the answer is not to ban music schools. The solution is to 
help parents to be more tolerant and accepting."^ ^
Even if this is an inaccurate prediction, however, there is another reason why this concern
should not be fatal to the Genetic Supermarket, a reason that will be explored in the next
section.
The suggestion has also been advanced that, iirespective of the particular choices that 
their parents made, those children might be resentful of the very fact that their parents 
made choices about their genetic composition."^ ® In a sense, of course, this may seem 
illogical. Children, and the adults they become, presently have no control whatever over 
the genes they inherit. The fact, then, that their genotype was selected by parents rather 
than blindly selected by chance does not deprive them of any control over their own lives 
which they would otherwise have had.
It has been suggested, however, that while accepting the inevitability of the genetic
lottery is one thing, the knowledge that one’s pai’ents had made such choices could be
altogether more problematic:
Even if an individual is no more locked in by the effects of a parental 
choice than he or she would have been by unmodified nature, most of us 
might feel differently about accepting the results of a natural lottery
4^  q .v .. the tale o f  B e e th o v en ’s son , as recounted in Im m o rta l B e lo ved ,  Colum bia/Tristar Studios, 1994.
42 Julian S avu lescu , ‘S e x  selection : the ca se  fo r ’, M e d ica l Jou rn a l o f  A u s tra lia  (1 9 9 9 ); 171(7): 3 7 3 -3 7 5 , at 
p373
‘Parents have sign ifica n t control over the so c ia l and ph ysica l environm ent o f  the ch ild , but no co n tio l over  
their o w n  genetic  in flu en ces . T he question that is  em ergin g  is w hether it is desirable to peiTnit parents soc ia l, 
environm ental, and b io lo g ic  control over children. T he issu e  is one o f  ind ep en dence and ind ividuality in their 
deep est sen ses . Such  c o n tio l m ay have a p ow erfu l p sy ch o lo g ica l e ffect. . . .  W e m ust be seriou sly  concerned  
about the p sy ch o lo g ica l im plications for both  children and parents o f  the k n o w led g e  (or fear) that w e  w ere  
carefu lly  se lec ted  or e v en  m ade to be the w ay  w e  are. W h ile  there m ight be satisfaction  all around for a child  
w ell m ade, there m ay a lso  be a lo ss  o f  fu ll authorship in victory, and broader grounds for  resentm ent in 
fa ilu re .’ Jeffrey B otk in , ‘Fetal privacy and C on fid en tia lity ’, H a stin g s C en ter R e p o r t  (1 9 9 5 ); 25 (5): 3 2 -3 9 , at
p???
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versus the imposed values of our parents. The force of feeling locked in 
may well be different."^ ^
Again, a degree of expertise in the complex psychology of parent-child relationships
would be required to stand any realistic prospect of evaluating this claim, and even then
the evaluation would be highly speculative. But it can be recognised that there may be
unique problems in the knowledge that one’s life has been pre-determined to a significant
extent by another. For present purposes, this can be refened to (following Josh
Parsons^^) as the Resentm ent Problem.
Fortunately for the Genetic Supermai'ket thesis, there is no need to discredit or reject 
either the Parental Pressure Problem  or the Resentm ent Problem  on empirical, 
psychological grounds. Rather, a more sweeping and less empirically contingent counter­
argument can be raised against both claims.
3.3.2 Derek Parfît and the Non-Identity Problem
In his seminal work of consequentialist philosophy, Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit
postulated the now famous hypothetical example of The 14-Year-Old Girl. The imagined
facts are as follows:
This girl chooses to have a child. Because she is so young, she gives her 
child a bad start in life. Though this will have bad effects throughout the 
child’s life, his life will, predictably, be worth living. If this girl had 
waited for several years, she would have had a different child, to whom 
she would have given a better start in life.^^
If scepticism surrounding the ability to make such a prediction about the child’s future
life can be temporarily suspended, the question immediately aiises as to whether the girl
in this example can be said to have made the wrong decision. As Parfit has famously
demonstrated, if any criticism may be levied at the girl’s decision to have a child now, it
cannot be due to any harm which has been done either to the child which she actually
had, or to the child which she could have had several years from now.
4^  B uchanan, A llen; B rock , D an W .; D an ie ls, Norm an; W ilder, D an iel. F rom  C han ce  to  C h o ice: G en e tic s  
a n d  J u stice . N ew  Y ork, C am bridge U n iversity  Press, 2 0 0 0 , at pp. 177-178
2° Josh  Parsons, ‘W hy the handicapped ch ild  case  is  hard’. P h ilo so p h ica l Studies, O ctober 15, 2 0 0 2  
2^  T h e  question  o f  the lik e ly  im pact o f  parental gen etic  c h o ices  on parent-child  relationsh ips is also  
considered  by Jeffrey B otk in , in ‘Prenatal D ia g n o s is  and the S e lec tio n  o f  C h ildren’ F lo rid a  S ta te  U n iv e rn ty  
L a w  R e v ie w  (2003); 30: 2 6 5 -2 9 3 , at p292.
22 Parfit, op. c it., at p .358 .
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The latter is an example of a never-existing potential future person, and, as was shown 
above, may be discounted from the array of potential subjects of harm. It never 
possessed, nor will it ever possess, any interests to be taken into account, and to speak in 
terms of its having an interest in being allowed to have interests seems circular and 
ultimately nonsensical. (Although this conclusion may give rise to certain counter­
intuitive conclusions that will be discussed in the final section of this chapter).
What, though, of the child which the 14 Year Old Girl actually goes on to have? As a 
being that will have interests, it is meaningful, and arguably morally obligatory, to take 
these interests into account when we act, even though the harms we may cause will not 
eventuate for some months or years. To speak, then, of harming the future child is not 
incoherent. As Parfit demonstrated, though, greater difficulties are encountered when we 
ask what form these harms may take.
Parfit has argued that, even if its life did in fact transpire to be poorer due to its bad start 
in life, this is not sufficient to draw the conclusion that the girl’s decision caused it harm. 
This becomes clear* when we consider that the difficulties that the child will face were an 
inevitable and indispensable consequence of that child coming to exist at all. For that 
child, the option of being born to a more adult mother, or into a more secure environment, 
was simply not available. Tf she had waited,’ Parfit explains, ‘this particular child would 
never have existed.’^ ®
The question, then, must be whether the child of the 14 Year* Old Girl is likely to be bom 
into a life so wretched that it would have been preferable for that child -  from its own, 
subjective point of view -  never to have been born. As Parfit suggests, ‘We should ask, 
“If someone lives a life that is worth living, is it worse for this person than if he had never 
existed?”’^ "^ concluding that inevitably ‘Our answer must be No’.^  ^ This is the famous 
Non-Identity Problem with which his work has become closely associated.
In so saying, it is being assumed - as it is by almost all commentators on this subject - 
that an embryo produced by this girl at a different time, resulting as it invariably would
22 Ibid, at p .359 ,
24 Parfit, op. c it., at p .3 5 9 .55 TrlId.
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from the fusion of different gametes, would develop into a different person/^ This notion
has been referred to by Bernard Williams as the Zygotic Principle. Williams describes
this as holding that
the identity of human beings, as of other sexually reproducing creatures, 
lies in the union of two given gametes: if either the sperm or the ovum or 
both had been different, a different human being would have been 
formed and born/^
As will be discussed below (Appendix A), this assumption, and what some people would 
regard as its implicit genetic determinism, is not entirely unproblematic.
If for the moment we accept the Zygotic Principle, however, it seems that no haims - 
present or future - may be said to be caused by the girl’s decision. That this conclusion 
has serious implications for the study of the GS becomes clear* when we retui*n to the 
question of the Parental Pressure Problem and the Resentment Problem. In both cases, 
to conclude that the children in question had, on balance, been harmed, we would need to 
conclude that these problems were so severe that the very fact of their existences 
constituted net harms.
Parfit’s Non-Identity approach succeeds, then, in rebutting the claim that the children of 
the Genetic Supermarket themselves will be subjects of harm -  at least in the sort of 
circumstances considered thus far. As such, it will have considerable importance for the 
question that lies at the heart of this thesis. Referring to the Non-Identity Problem, 
however, may be seen as somewhat question-begging. It seems implicit in this 
terminology that this approach is unsatisfactory, in need of resolution or refinement. (For 
Parfit, the contradiction between this conclusion and the intuitive sense that the 14 Year 
Old Girl should delay procreation is indeed unsatisfying, although he has admitted being 
unable to find a way around this without abandoning the Person-Affecting Principle.^®)
2^  Pai'fit, interestingly , seem s to require that b o th  gam etes be d ifferent before w e  can sp eak  o f  a w h o lly  
different person. T his is  im p lic it in h is statem ent that ‘[ i j f  any particular person had not been  co n ceiv ed  
w ithin  a m onth o f  the tim e w h en  he w as in fact co n ceiv ed , he w ou ld  in fact never ha v e  ex is ted ’ {R eason s a n d  
P erso n s ,  op. cit., at p 3 7 2 ), the im plication  b e in g  that both sperm  and ovum  m ust be d ifferent. T his seem s to 
b eg  the question  as to  h o w  m uch gen etic  d ifference is  required before w e  can speak o f  a ‘d ifferent person’ . 
W ou ld  a ch ild  c o n ce iv ed  o f  the sam e ovu m  but a d ifferent sperm  be su ffic ien tly  sim ilar to  constitu te, in som e  
sen se , the sam e person as the ch ild  that w o u ld  ha v e  been  c o n ce iv ed  a fe w  hours or days earlier? Issu es  
relating to  the constitu tion  o f  identity w ill be  rev isited  at the end o f  this chapter.
22 Bernard W illiam s, ‘W h o m ight I have  b een ? ’, in  H um an G en e tic  In form ation : Scien ce, L a w  a n d  E th ics  
Ciba F oundation S y m p o siu m  149, John W iley  &  Son s, C hichester, 1990, at p . l6 9 .
2® Parfit, op . c it., at p .443 .
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It is submitted, though, that there is nothing inherently problematic in this approach or the 
conclusion to which it leads, save that it is difficult to reconcile with some of our less- 
considered intuitions.For that reason, this term will be replaced with reference' to a 
Non-Identity Principle (NIP). It is conceded that the NIP might sometimes lead to 
conclusions that are counter-intuitive or unappealing. However, this is no more than 
could be said for the Harm Principle itself, or indeed any other ethical principle when 
applied in ‘hard cases’. The Non-Identity Principle (NIP) is the direct offspring of the 
marriage of the Harm Principle and the Zygotic Principle; acceptance of those parent 
principles leaves us no option but to accept the NIP.
3.3.3 ‘Harmful’ choices
The Non-Identity Principle, then, provides a response to both the Parental Pressure and 
Resentment Problems, Does it, however, allow us to refute the second category of 
purported harms that were mentioned above, the harms that would derive from the actual 
choices prospective parents made, rather than the mere fact of making those choices?
At first glance, the prospect of parents making such choices might seem unlikely; 
Fukuyama’s view that ‘[w]e can further presume that parents will not seek to deliberately 
harm their children, but rather will try to maximise their happinesssurely seems more 
plausible than a scenario where parents deliberately choose traits that could be deemed 
harmful. Difficulties arise, however, when we note the inherent ambiguities in the 
concepts of ‘harm’ and ‘benefit’ as invoked in this context. The reports of Sharon 
Duchesneau and Candy McCullough’s attempts to ensure their child was deaf (although 
not actually relying on PGD technology to give effect to their choices) illustrates the 
controversies surrounding these concepts.^^
2® P h ilip  G . Peters, Jr., for  exam ple, asserts that the N on-Identity  co n c lu sio n  ‘assaults our com m on  se n se ’ and 
‘sim p ly  d o[es] not pass a m oral gut test.’ ‘H arm ing Future Persons: O bligations to the C hildren o f  
R eprodu ctive T e ch n o lo g y .’ Sou thern  C a lifo rn ia  In te rd isc ip lin a ry  L a w  Jou rn a l (1 9 9 9 )  8: 3 7 5 -4 0 0 , at pp. 3 84-  
38 5 .
2° Francis Fukayam a O u r P osthu m an  F uture: C o n seq u en ces o f  the  B io tech n o lo g y  R evo lu tio n , N e w  York, 
Faber, Strauss and G iroux, 2 0 0 2 , at p .92 . S e e  a lso  R onald  D w orkin: 'Presum ab ly  all parents, i f  g iv en  a 
ch o ice , w ou ld  w ish  their children to h a v e  the lev e l o f  in te lligen ce  and other sk ills  that w e  n o w  regard as 
norm al, or even  that w e  n ow  b e lie v e  superior.' R onald  D w ork in  S o vere ig n  V irtue: The T h eory a n d  P ra c tice  
o f  E qua lity , C am bridge, L ondon, Harvard U n iversity  Press, 2 0 0 0 , at p .441 .
M . Spriggs, ‘L esb ian  co u p le  creates a child  w h om  is d ea f lik e  them ’ Jou rn a l o f  M e d ic a l E th ics , O nline  
eCurrent C ontroversies, 2  M ay 2 0 0 2 .
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Much of the commentary on Duchesneau and McCullough’s attempts have concentrated 
on the couple’s claim that deafness, and more specifically membership of the Deaf 
community, is in fact properly regarded as a minority status, akin to membership of a 
racial minority, rather than a disability.K . W. Anstey, for example, gives serious 
attention to the claim that the harms experienced by deaf children are at least in part 
socially constmcted rather than inherent to the condition of deafness.^® However, of 
interest for the present discussion is the assumption implicit in Anstey’s analysis that the 
child in question will indeed be harmed by being born deaf. While prepared to concede 
the prospective parents’ contention ‘that it is not wrong to have a child when the harms 
they will experience aie socially imposed ,he  at no point considers the possibility that 
the child is not a subject of harm at all.
Yet that is precisely the conclusion to which the Non-Identity Principle commits us. 
Duchesneau and McCullough have not taken an existing baby and rendered it deaf 
(although that in itself would be a scenario that poses interesting questions for the Non- 
Identity Principle; see Appendix A). Rather, they have brought into existence an 
individual for whom deafness is an indispensable prerequisite of existing at all. Had they 
not sought out the sperm of a deaf man, this child would never have existed at all, but 
rather would have been replaced by a different, hearing child (or, of course, by no child at 
all).
If we assume that deafness is not so limiting a condition, or one which imposes so much 
suffering, as to render a life intolerable, then it is difficult to conclude that the child was 
harmed by the act which, in giving it deafness, also gave it existence. Sharon Duchesneau 
and Candy McCullough are seeking to make a deaf baby, not to make a baby deaf. If 
there is anything objectionable about their attempt, it is submitted, it does not lie with any 
harm done to the child itself.
How far, though, does this assessment of the Duchesneau-McCullough case answer the 
broader question of ‘harmful choices’? The reliance on the example of deafness, after all.
22 K. W . A n stey , ‘A re attem pts to have  im paired children ju stifia b le? ’ Jou rn a l o f  M e d ic a l E th ics , 2002; 28; 
2 8 6 -2 8 8 .
22 ‘the lim itation  o f  opportunity here [in the case  o f  deafness] is not inherent in the sen se  o f  resid ing so le ly  in  
the im pairm ent: to be understood as a lim itation  o f  opportunity, there m ust b e  a so c ia l expectation  that the 
activ ity  that is lim ited  ough t to be perform ed.’ Ib id , at p .286.
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might be thought to be taking an easy option, given the controversy at the heart of this 
case as to whether deafness is in fact a disability. The choice of a deaf child would 
indeed be unproblematic if it were accepted that deafness is unlikely to impact 
deleteriously on the child’s quality of life -  but what of more uncontroversially 
deleterious conditions? It may be straying into the realm of horror fantasy to suggest that 
a parent would deliberately choose to have a child affected by cystic fibrosis, for 
example. But with suggestions of genetic predispositions toward aggression, or certain 
sexual preferences,^^ it is perhaps prudent to imagine future disputes about what 
constitutes saddling a child with a harmful condition.
Yet the argument being advanced here does not rely on any particular position as to the 
effects of deafness, or aggression, or sexual preferences, on a child’s life. Although there 
are certain to be controversies at the margins of defining harmful conditions, it is not at 
all implausible that there are some genetic traits that will have a predictably positive or 
negative impact on the quality of life of those affected by them. Buchanan, Brock, et al 
refer to ‘natural primary goods’, capacities such as sight that are ‘useful or valuable in 
carrying out nearly any plan of life.’^  ^ Irrespective of the provisions society made to 
allow blind people to function and interact with a minimum of danger and inconvenience, 
there are no -  or almost no -  imaginable societies in which being blind would be 
anything other than a disadvantage.®^
Yet the Non-Identity Principle, it is submitted, does not require a comparison between 
life with sight and blind life, but rather, between blind life and no life at all. Whatever 
the disadvantages and frustrations of blindness, the possibility of sighted life was never 
available for the child which is chosen to be blind. The only way in which such a child 
could be said to be harmed would be if we concluded that being bom without sight was 
worse than never being born at all. As Melinda Roberts reminds us, the ‘sole means of
24 Ibid, at p .287 .
22 S ee , for exam ple, the theories expounded  in D ean  H am er and Peter C op eland’s L iv in g  W ith O u r G enes, 
L ondon, Fan B o o k s, 2 0 0 0 .
22 B uchanan, A llen; B rock , D an W .; D an ie ls, Norm an; W ikler, D an ie l. F rom  C han ce to  C h o ice: G en e tics  
a n d  J u stice . N ew  Y ork, C am bridge U n iversity  P ress, 2 0 0 0 , at pp. 167-168.
22 In a som ew h at sim ilar  vein , Joel Feinberg has written o f  T h e  C h ild ’s R ight to an O pen Future’ ; in A itken  
and L aF ollette, eds., W h ose C h ild ?  C h ild re n ’s  R igh ts, P a re n ta l A uth ority , a n d  S ta te  p o w e r ,  T otow a, N e w  
Jersey, R ow m an and L ittle field , 1980.
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saving the baby from the effect of the disorder ... is to refrain from bringing the baby into 
existence to begin with.’®®
The Non-Identity Principle renders it meaningless to speak in terms of harming a future 
child where:
• the ‘harmful’ act is an indispensable condition of the child’s coming into 
existence at all -  a so-called ‘genesis act’; and
• the child has a minimally worthwhile quality of life.
It leaves open, however, the possibility that a child could be harmed by a ‘genesis act’ 
where that minimal standard of quality of life is not attained. This possible exception, 
and the implications for the law arising from it, will be considered later in this chapter.
3.3.4 Voices of dissent: Person-affecting objections
The contention advanced so far in this chapter, then, is that following the Non-Identity 
Principle, only those children born into lives so wretched that non-existence would be 
preferable have a complaint against those who brought them into existence. Where a 
handicapped but worthwhile life was the only life available to that child, it simply cannot 
claim to have been harmed by the acts that bestowed that life upon it.
As will be discussed below, the majority of opponents of the Genetic Supermarket accept 
the Non-Identity Principle, and do not direct their objections at alleged harms to the 
children actually born. As will be seen, their opposition generally derives either from 
Non-Person-Affecting concerns, or from perceived negative externalities. However, for 
the sake of completeness, there are perhaps a couple of perspectives from which the GS 
could be criticised, and objections like the Parental Pressure, Resentment and Harmful 
Choice Problems salvaged, without abandoning the Person-Affecting Principle.
3.3.5 The ‘No Trade Offs’ View
2® M elin d a  Roberts, ‘P resent D u ties and Future Persons; W hen A re E xistence-Indu cing  A cts W rong?’, L a w  
a n d  P h ilo so p h y  (1 9 9 5 ); 14(3/4); 2 9 7 -3 2 7 , at p .316 .
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James Woodward has taken issue with the idea that gains and losses can be offset in the
manner implicit in the Non-Identity Principle. While conceding that cases exist where
the benefits of existence can be said to outweigh the harms brought about thereby, he
questions whether this is sufficient justification for such harms. Interests, Woodward
argues, are not fungibles that can be traded off against one another, or factored into a
single calculation of ‘overall well-being.’ Rather, he maintains,
people have relatively specific interests (e.g., in having promises kept, in 
avoiding bodily injury, in getting their fair share) that are not simply 
reducible to some general interest in maintaining a high overall level of 
well-being and ... many moral requirements function so as to protect 
against violations of such specific interests. That an action will cause an 
increase in someone’s overall level of well-being is not always an 
adequate response to the claim that such a specific interest has been 
violated.®^
By way of illustration, Woodwai'd offers the following hypothetical example:
Suppose that Smith, who is black, attempts to buy a ticket on a certain 
airline flight and that the airline refuses to sell it to him because it 
discriminates racially. Shortly after, that very flight crashes, killing all 
aboard. There is a clear sense in which the airline’s action has the result 
that Smith is better off than he otherwise would be, and if selling or not 
selling Smith the ticket are the only relevant actions which the airline can 
perform, not selling leaves him better off than any other possible action 
the airline might have performed. Nonetheless, it seems quite natural to 
say that the airline’s action wrongs Smith.™
For Woodward, then, I may wrong someone by an action that leaves him better off than
he would have otherwise been, or indeed ‘better off than any other action one might have
taken’, i f  I have breached a particular obligation that I owed to him.
We resist the temptation to think just in terms of some single dimension 
of moral assessment (how well off overall a person is) and to think that if 
an action affects a person negatively in some respect but has other effects 
such that the net result is an overall gain (or no total loss) in well-being: 
moral assessment ought to focus just on this overall outcome.^^
When applied to Parfit’s hypothetical fourteen-year-old girl, this approach allows
Woodward to conclude that she will in fact wrong her future child by the very fact of
bringing it into existence. Designating the girl ‘Alma’, Woodward contends that
Alma knows that if she has a child she will incur certain duties and 
obligations which she would not otherwise have and which she is very
2^  W oodw ard , at p .809 .
2° Ib id ,a tp p .8 0 9 -8 1 0 .
2^  Ibid, at p .812 .
22 Ibid, at p .818 .
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unlikely to meet adequately. I contend that the failure to fulfil these 
duties and obligations constitutes an important reason ... for Alma not to 
have a child. If Alma has her child and fails to meet the duties and 
obligations she owes to her child, the child has a complaint against her, 
based on a wrong done to the child.^^
There are two counter-arguments that can be levied against Woodward’s contention that 
Alma has acted wrongly. The first does not involve rejecting Woodward’s central 
premise -  that rights and interests (he seems to use the terms interchangeably) are distinct 
and that their breach or frustration cannot be offset against other gains -  but questions 
precisely which interest or right has been breached in such cases. This counter-argument 
begins by asking precisely what duties and obligations Alma actually owes to her future 
child that she is overwhelmingly likely to breach by virtue of her immaturity. We might 
answer this by reference to any number of obligations that a parent might be thought to 
owe her children: emotional stability and a minimum standard of economic security being 
but two. The fact that Alma will foreseeably be unable to meet these obligations would, 
for Woodward, provide a reason for her to refrain from creating those obligations in the 
first place.
But what exactly is the nature of the obligation owed by Alma to her future offspring? In 
particular, is the standard of emotional stability or economic security that she is obliged 
to provide an absolute or a relative standard? On an absolute standard, it might be argued 
that she must provide X amount of stability (however we might quantify this) and Y of 
economic security. Any parent who failed to provide these quantities would derogate 
from their duties, and the mere fact that they could not fulfill them is to be no excuse, for 
the preferable option in such circumstances would be to refrain from procreating at all.
Yet it is unlikely that many of us regard parental obligations in such terms. Is it 
Woodward’s contention that the 800 million of the world’s population who live on less 
than $1(US) per day act wrongly whenever they procreate? For it is not unreasonable to 
suppose that a mature woman living in an area beset by famine, war, disease or abject 
poverty will be worse placed than a fourteen-year-old girl living in the UK to provide 
emotional stability and economic security for her children. Indeed, the situation is worse
22 Ibid, a tp .8 1 5 .
9 0
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for such women, because unlike Alma, they are not merely being required to delay 
procreation for a few years, but indefinitely.^"^
One way of avoiding this conclusion is to gauge the extent to which parents meet their 
parental obligations against the extent that it was possible for them to do so. On that 
relativist analysis, we would judge the extent to which Alma (or the grossly malnourished 
woman living in abject conditions) fulfilled her duties relative to what it was possible for 
her to have done. Provided the child’s life is not of the worse-than-nothing variety, then, 
we might say that she has breached no obligation to it provided she does her best to 
provide the child with emotional stability and economic security, even if she is, by virtue 
of her tender years, incapable of providing these things in the same quantities as an older 
parent might.
A further conception of the duty she owes to her child might say that what she is obliged 
to provide for her future offspring is as good a life as was possible fo r  that child. The 
Non-Identity Principle holds that, for this child, the only alternative to a life of relative 
instability and insecurity was no life at all. If Alma’s obligation is to provide the best that 
this child could possibly have, then she might satisfy this even by providing less stability 
and security than a different child, born to an older Alma, might have enjoyed.
An obligation to provide one’s children with as optimal an environment as that child 
could possibly have enjoyed is actually a very onerous obligation indeed, and we may 
need to balance this against Alma’s other obligations, and indeed her own interests. But 
again, it becomes clear that it is possible to reconcile Woodward’s claim about the 
specificity of interests or duties with the claim that Alma does no wrong, simply by 
defining those specific interests and duties in a different way.
The No Trade-Offs view only leads to Woodward’s conclusion, then, if we adopt a 
particular view of the duties Alma owes her child, a view that takes no account of what 
was possible for Alma, or for this child. This view, as well as being somewhat arbitrary 
in its selection of duties (an allegation, after all, which could equally be levied against
24 In fairness, W oodw ai'd does c la im  that A lm a ’s ob ligation s m ight be d ifferent i f  it w ere  lik ely  to b e  the case  
that sh e  w ou ld  never be ab le to m eet these ob ligation s. B u t w h y should  this be so? I f  the ob ligation s o w ed
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any of the other views considered here), might be thought unappealing because it appears 
to have the consequence of requiring the majority of the world’s population to refrain 
from procreation.
Woodward’s objection to the Non-Identity Problem was actually anticipated by Derek
Parfit, who proposed a different counter-argument. Parfit does not take issue with the
claim that the breach of a particular obligation cannot be defended simply by reference to
overall benefit. Nor does he dispute that breaching a duty might be wrong even when it
is an indispensable pre-condition of existence itself, conceding that
The objector might reply: “It is wrong to cause someone to exist if we 
know that this person will have a right that cannot be fulfilled.”™
What Parfit does point out is that rights are the sorts of thing that can be waived.
Suppose that I have a right to privacy. I ask you to marry me. If you 
accept, you are not acting wrongly, by violating ray right to privacy.
Since I am glad that you act as you do, with respect to you I waive this 
right. ... This would have undermined our objection to his mother’s act.^ ®
Since rights can be waived contemporaneously. Parfit maintains, it makes sense to 
assume that they can be waived retrospectively; and since, if people like Alma’s child 
‘knew the facts, they would not regret that we acted as we did’, they ‘might waive their 
rights’.™ With characteristic intellectual candour, Parfit concedes that this is merely an 
assumption, and that it is possible that some future people will not regard the violation of 
their rights as a price worth paying for their existence. For that reason he regards this as 
only a partial response to the No Trade-Off view.
It may be thought, however, that Parfit is being unduly tentative here. It is by no means 
certain that the wrongness of an act should be judged retrospectively, according to the 
subjective perception of another paity. For a consequentialist like Parfit, an act that 
subsequently transpires to produce bad consequences may be a source of regret, but 
whether it should be a source of guilt or shame or moral opprobrium -  whether it could 
be described as a morally wrong act - depends largely on the intent with which it was
to the ch ild  are absolu te and not relative to A lm a ’s circum stances, then w hat d ifference  does it m ake w hether  
sh e w ou ld  b e  better equ ip ped  to provide for a d ifferent ch ild  in the future?
22 Parfit, R ea so n s a n d  P erso n s , op  cit, at p .3 6 4  
22 Ibid, at p .3 6 4  
22 Ibid, at p .365
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carried out. If it is reasonably foreseeable that you will regard the violation of your right 
as a price worth paying for some benefit you accrue (as Parfit puts it, that you will 
retrospectively waive your right) then it would be unusual to regard that violation as 
wrongful.
To see that this is normally regarded as so, we need only consider a relatively mundane 
example. Almost any conception of rights will include some variation of a right to bodily 
integrity. Yet even among the most ardent proponent of rights, there are few who would 
claim that I act wrongly when I push you out of the way of the swerving bus. In so 
doing, I have clearly violated one of your rights, but the anticipated benefit for you -  
survival or the avoidance of serious injury -  is foreseeably great enough to justify my act, 
in the eyes of almost all ethicists, and indeed of UK law. This will be equally true if, for 
some reason, you subsequently take exception to my push, claiming that you would have 
preferred to take your chances with the bus. My act does not become wrongful in 
retrospect, with the occurrence of some unforeseeable event.^^
Similarly, while it is, as Parfit acknowledges, theoretically possible that Alma’s child 
might not regard the violation of its rights as a price worth paying for a life that is on 
balance worthwhile, we might well conclude that this is a turn of events so unlikely as to 
lie outwith the realm of reasonable foreseeability. Alma is justified in infringing her 
child’s rights to emotional stability and economic security (or, to be more accurate, acting 
in a way that ensures those rights will one day be infringed) because of her reasonable 
belief that the child will one day regard that infringement as a price worth paying, just as 
surely, and for exactly the same reason, as she would be justified in infringing her child’s 
right to bodily integrity by pushing it out of the way of a swerving bus.
3.3.6 The ‘Generic Child’ View
It d o es not, h ow ever, fo llo w  that m y com petent refusal can  be disregarded by a w e ll-m ea n in g  surgeon  
b ecau se  o f  h is firm  co n v ictio n  that 1 w ill subsequently  regard h is actions w ith gratitude. A s  exp la in ed  in the  
preceding  chapter, the express w ish es  o f  a com petent person are, in  the ordinary case , assum ed to b e  the best 
ind ication  o f  w hat is b est for that person. I f  it w ere so m eh o w  p o ssib le  to ask A lm a ’s future ch ild  its op in ion  
o f  the trade-off b e tw een  rights and benefits, then that op in ion  sh ould  gu id e her action . S in ce  it is  not, she has 
no option but to rely on  fo reseeab le  ou tcom es and probabilities. In this respect, her position  is c lo ser  to the  
surgeon  w h o  operates o n  m e w ithou t m y co n sen t w h en  1 am  u n con sciou s. H is invasion  o f  m y b od ily  
integrity is  deem ed ju stifia b le  i f  it w as foreseeab ly  in m y b est interests, and does not subsequently  becom e  
w ron gfu l i f  1 subsequently  respond w ith  u n foreseeab le  hostility  to h is actions.
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Robert M. Green is another writer who has sought to challenge the ‘No Difference’ 
conclusion without straying from the realm of Person-Affecting Principles. Green’s 
argument rests on two premises that, if accepted, seem to allow us to conclude that 
someone is harmed by Alma’s decision to become pregnant now;
• the rejection of the comparison between the life her child actually has and the 
only alternative for it (i.e. non-existence) with a comparison with ‘the reasonably 
expected health status o f others in the child’s birth cohort.
• the attribution of interests to a ‘generic’ child, a sort of composite of all the 
possible children our hypothetical prospective parent might have had.
Green’s argument relies on the (uncontested) realisation that, prior to conception, the
‘potential future child’ of whom prospective parents speak is not a discrete entity at all,
but rather, an amalgam of myriad possibilities:
before conception (for most people) and even following conception 
during early pregnancy (for many others), lives are in a sense “fungible”; 
they are interchangeable generic units, rather than identifiable and 
unique. Parents intending to have a child do not imagine the identifiable 
child “Mary” who they come to know in the yeais following her birth, 
but a “generic” child with qualities like those of most other children 
being born in its cohort. It is this imagined child whom they usually have 
in mind in choosing to have a child in the first place, and against whom 
they and others measure the actual condition of the real child when it is 
born.^°
If it is intelligible to speak of a single ‘generic child’, then it is perhaps intelligible to 
attribute to that child a unitary set of interests; and it may be intelligible to include among 
those interests something like an ‘interest in being born in the best possible genetic 
health’, or perhaps an ‘interest in being born with a minimum standard of genetic health’.
For Green, the required standard would fall between these two poles. He goes 
considerably further than those like Parfit, who contend only that a prospective parent 
should stop short of bringing a child into existence who would have a worse-than-nothing 
life. Rather, he contends, ‘we should compare the status of the actual child born with that 
of the average child in its birth cohort’ acting so as to avoid
Robert M . G reen ‘Parental A u ton om y and the O bligation  N o t to Harm O n e’s C hild  G en etica lly ’ J o u rn a l o f  
Law, M ed icin e  & E th ics  25 (1997): 5 -1 5 , at p.8  
Ibid, at p8. For a sim ilar  argum ent, see  S im o  V ehm as, ‘Is it W rong to D elib erately  C o n ce iv e  or G iv e  Birth  
to a Child w ith M ental R etardation?’ J o u rn a l o f  M ed ic in e  a n d  P h ilo so p h y  (2 0 0 2 ) 2 7 (1 ): 4 7 -6 3 , at pp .52-53 . 
Id.
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“significantly greater” suffering or disability than others in the child’s 
birth cohort. ... As a practical measure, we can determine whether harm 
is significant by asking whether, as a generality, children (or, later, 
adults) with a specific condition would prefer to have lived their lives 
free of their specific congenital disorder or disability.^^
Some of Green’s argument seems to rely heavily on the presumed linguistic slackness
and conceptual confusion of others. ‘This is the appropriate benchmark,’ he argues,
... because it is the one that most parents aie likely to use in deciding 
whether to have a child in the first place, and it is also the benchmai'k that 
the child and those around it are likely to use in assessing the quality of 
its start in life.^^
It is noteworthy that although his suggestion derives from an empirical rather than 
philosophical premise -  we should adopt this benchmark because most people do in fact 
think this way - he offers no sociological evidence to support this. Even assuming the 
accuracy of his contention, though, it might be thought somewhat illiberal to use the fact 
that ‘most parents’ think this way as a justification for forcing the few dissenters who he 
goes on to discuss to comply. In the absence of some argument proving the superiority of 
the majority view, this might be thought little more than an example of gratuitous 
reproductive totalitarianism, forcing a particular view of reproduction on a minority for 
no other reason than that theirs is not a common view.
Yet not only does Green fail to demonstrate the superiority of his view, he actually
concedes, quite explicitly, its paucity of intellectual rigour. In discussing the claim ‘If my
mother had only waited a few months until after the rubella epidemic had passed to
conceive me, “1” would never have been born with this deformity’, he concedes that
Taken strictly, this statement is nonsense: the child who could have been 
conceived and born after a delay of some months is not the same child as 
the one who was conceived and bom earlier.
The only way to circumvent the absurdity of this position is by
think[ing] of ourselves before conception or birth as an imaginary 
fungible intended child of our parents, who could come into being with 
roughly the same physical and mental attributes as other children, this 
statement makes perfect sense.^^
Ibid, at p9  
Ibid, at p8  
Ibid, at p885 Id.
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These two statements, taken together, reveal that Green’s argument is weakened by 
reliance on what he acknowledges to be a fantasy, in which interests are projected onto an 
‘imaginary’ child, in an attempt to prop up a belief that its chief proponent admits is 
‘nonsense’. It may well be that disabled children or adults from time to time engage in 
the sort of speculation he suggests, about how much better ‘their’ lives would have been 
had their parents delayed conception. Many of us have daydreamed of alternative livfes in 
alternative times or places that we might have lived. But, as even Green acknowledges, 
these alternative lives of which we dream would not have been ‘our’ lives at all.
It should, of course, be noted that jurisprudential and philosophical reasoning have a long 
and respected tradition of reliance on imagined entities, from Hobbes’ Leviathon to 
Nozick’s Utility Monsters. Green’s reference to a ‘generic’ child and ‘an imaginary 
fungible intended child of our parents’ bears some superficial similarities to one such 
fantastic entity: John Rawls’ ideal lawmaker, peering out through the ‘veil of 
ignorance’.^ '" In this famous thought experiment, Rawls imagined a lawmaker passing 
laws from a position of ignorance as to which position he would occupy in the world.^  ^ If 
he did not know whether he would be a prince or a pauper, then his decisions as to what 
the law should be were unlikely to be unfairly skewed in the interests of either princes or 
paupers, but would be designed so as to produce the best outcome for the lawmaker 
irrespective of the role he is allocated. (For Rawls, in fact, the logical lawmaker would 
act so as to level out the inequalities in society, thereby ensuring that whatever role he 
was allocated would not be intolerably bad.)
It is possible that Green had something of this nature in mind when he conceived of the 
‘generic child’, which is also a sort of pre-existence entity that could view all of the 
possible lives into which it could be born. However, unlike Green, Rawls never seriously 
sought to argue that such an entity actually existed; rather, this was an imagined ideal to 
which the just lawmaker ought to aspire. If the lawmaker transpired to be less than just, 
Rawls at no time argued that this would be bad for the being that exists behind the veil of 
ignorance. His decisions would be bad because they were bad for others, or bad because 
they were unjust. The imagined veil of ignorance serves as a useful device insofar as it
86 John R aw ls, A T h eory  o f  Justice. R e v ise d  E dition . O xford, O xford U n iversity  P ress, 1999.
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provides us with a mechanism whereby we can act so as to further these other ethical 
objectives. Unlike Green’s generic child, though, the pre-existence lawmaker who dwells 
behind it has no interests of its own, and no intrinsic worth beyond its value as a decision­
making device.
3.3.7 Person-Affecting Objections: Sununary
The ethical basis spelt out thus far would appear to give no reason whatever for preferring 
to implant Embryo X rather than Embryo Y. This is so because, despite the fact that 
Person X is likely to have a much higher quality of life than Person Y, the decision to 
bring about the existence of the latter cannot be shown to be contrary to the interests of a 
particular person. Person Y, after all, has ‘a life that is better than no life at all,’ ®^ and the 
only alternative for him would have been non-existence; the ‘sole means of saving the 
baby from the effect of the disorder ... is to refrain from bringing the baby into existence 
to begin with.’^^  As discussed above, we have no duty to bring Person Y into existence. 
Having done so, however, we have no alternative but to consider the effect of that act on 
Person Y by reference to the whole package of harms and benefits that life brings him.
Person X, meanwhile, has no interests and never will have any interests to be frustrated 
since, in this scenario, she will never exist. Those who accept Heyd’s generocentric 
version of the utilitarian moral axiom may find this conclusion quite acceptable; if 
concern in ethical matters should be restricted to the interests of ‘actual’ persons, present 
or future, then the failure to create a more rather than less worthwhile life may be seen to 
be of no consequence. On such a view, the only interests to be weighed up^  ^in deciding 
how the GS should be regulated are those of the prospective mother and those third party 
interests which will be considered later.
However, for those who find this perceived moral neutrality of the woman’s choice to be 
unsatisfying, it would seem that some argument must be advanced for the implantation of 
Embryo X rather than Embryo Y which relies on something other than frustrating the
T h e law m aker w ou ld , o f  course, b e  able to  su pp ose that he w ou ld  not fall into that category  o f  b e in gs w ho  
are unable to consider the very question that s/h e  is presently considering. T o  par aphrase D escartes, T think, 
therefore I am , at a m inim um , the kind o f  b e in g  that can think.’
^  D an B rock , ‘T he N on -Identity  P roblem  A nd G en etic  H arm s - T h e C ase O f W rongfu l H and icaps’,
B io e th ic s  (1 9 9 5 ) 9 (3 /4 );2 6 9 .
R oberts, op  cit, at p 3 1 6 .
A ssu m in g  that no em bryo ex ists w h ich  w ou ld  lead  to  a person w ith a life  w orse  than n on -ex istence.
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interests of particular persons, an argument which rejects the claim that a ‘wrong act must
be bad for someone.
3.4 Non-Person-Affecting Objections
I have argued, then, that the Non-Identity Principle renders it intelligible to speak of 
harming a potential future child by a genesis act only in those rare cases where its life is 
foreseeably so awful as to constitute a harm in itself. Does this, then, conclude the 
question of future children? For the majority of commentators in this area, the matter 
cannot be left there; the conclusion that implanting a disabled embryo rather than a 
healthy one is a matter of ethical indifference -  what Parfit called the ‘No Difference’ 
conclusion -  is too counter-intuitive to be accepted. However, the majority of 
commentators also accept the Non-Identity Principle, thereby presenting them with the 
problem of identifying who precisely is the subject of harm.^^
For such writers, the only way to establish a harm resulting from such choices is by
moving away from Person-Affecting approaches and seeking to ground their arguments
in Non-Person-Affecting (NPA) concepts of harm. This was what Parfit attempted by his
“The Same Number Claim, or This view he describes as follows:
If in either of two possible outcomes the same number of people would 
live, it would be worse if those who lived are worse off, or have a lower 
quality of life, than those who would have lived.^ '^
Similar NPA principles have been suggested by Joel Feinberg,^^ Buchanan, Brock, et al,^ ^
and by Julian Savulescu.^^ As Buchanan, et al, explain.
B rock , op  cit..
Get-retV-Buchanan, A llen ; B rock , D an W .; D a n ie ls, Norm an; W ikler, D an ie l. F rom  C h an ce  to  C hoice: 
G en e tic s  a n d  Justice. N e w  Y ork, C am bridge U n iversity  P ress, 2 0 0 0 , at p .225; Philip  G. P eters, Jr., ‘H arm ing  
Future Persons: O bligations to the C hildren o f  R eproductive T e ch n o lo g y .’ Sou thern  C a lifo rn ia  
In te rd isc ip lin a ry  L a w  Jo u rn a l  (1 9 9 9 ) 8: 3 7 5 -4 0 0 , at p .399; Julian S avu lescu  ‘Procreative B en eficen ce: W hy  
W e Sh ou ld  S e lec t the B e st  C hildren’ B io e th ic s  (2 0 0 1 ) 15 (5 /6): 4 1 3 -4 2 6 , at p .418 .
Parfit, op. cit., at p 3 6 0 .
Id.
‘T he w rongdoer in the exam p le  m ust b e  b lam ed  for w antonly  introducing a certain e v il  into the world, not 
for  in flic tin g  harm on a person .’ H arm  to  O th ers , op. cit., at p l0 3 .
T heir version  o f  a N P A  princip le is referred to as ‘N ’, and states that:
Individuals are m orally  required not to let any ch ild  or other dependent person  for  
w h o se  w elfare they are responsib le  experien ce  serious su ffering or lim ited  opportunity  
or serious lo ss  o f  happiness or g o o d , i f  they can act so  that, w ithout a ffec tin g  the  
num ber o f  persons w h o  w ill e x is t  and w ithout im p osin g  substantial burdens or co sts  or 
lo ss  o f  ben efits on  th em selves or others, no  ch ild  or other dependent person for  w h o se  
w elfare they are responsib le  w ill exp erien ce  serious su ffering or lim ited  opportunity or 
serious lo ss  o f  happiness or good .
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this principle for the prevention of suffering applies not to distinct 
individuals, so that the prevention of suffering must make a distinct 
individual better off than he or she would have been ... but to the classes 
of individuals who will exist if the suffering is or is not prevented ...
While it would still, then, be true that no distinct individual is harmed if the disabled
embryo is implanted, the subject of harm can be seen as
the classes of all persons who will exist in each of two or more 
alternative courses of action will be a non-person-affecting principle.^^
This view might seem very close to that espoused by Robert Green, and considered (and 
ultimately rejected) in the preceding section. However, the NPA approach differs from 
that of Green in several important respects. Green, for example, sought to keep his 
argument within the confines of the Person-Affecting Principle, by speaking of one 
Generic Child, an amalgam of all the possible future children that the prospective parents 
might have. The person to whom the harm might be done, then, is this fungible, 
composite Generic Child.
The NPA apparoach, in contrast, purports to make no such attempt at identifying a 
particular person (notional or otherwise) who is the subject of harm, but relies instead on 
the purportedly shared interests of that group of potential future persons. As such, it is 
not subject to the criticism that was levied at Green; namely, that he relied upon an 
admittedly fictitious entity for a subject of harm. There clearly are a number of potential 
future children who could arise from the GS, and to speak of them as a ‘class’ is not 
obviously nonsensical in the manner of Green’s Generic Child,
It is submitted, however, that the NPA objections to the GS are themselves ultimately 
unsatisfactory, for at least two distinct reasons. First, doubts may be expressed about the 
NPA’s reliance upon a notional class of potential beings with a collective pool of 
interests. There are, of course, myriad circumstances in which it is quite accurate to refer
B uchanan, A llen ; B rock , D an W ,; D an ie ls, Norm an; W ikler, D an iel. F rom  C hance to  C h o ice: G en e tic s  a n d  
Ju stice . N e w  York, C am bridge U n iversity  P ress, 2 0 0 0 , at p .249 .
S avu lescu  has argued for a P rincip le o f  Procreative B en eficen ce , w h ich  w ou ld  m aintain that: 
cou p les (or sin g le  reproducers) should  se lec t the ch ild , o f  the p o ssib le  children they cou ld  have, w h o  is 
ex p ected  to have the b est life , or at least as g o o d  a l ife  as the others, based  on the relevant, ava ilab le  
inform ation. Julian S a v u lescu , ‘P rocreative B en eficen ce: W hy W e Should  S e lec t the B est C hildren’ 
B io e th ic s  (2 0 0 1 ) 15 (5 /6 ): 4 1 3 -4 2 6 , a tp .4 1 5  
B uchanan, A llen; B rock , D an W .; D a n ie ls, Norm an; W ikler, D an iel. F rom  C han ce  to  C h o ice: G en e tics  
a n d  Ju stice . N e w  Y ork, C am bridge U n iversity  Press, 2 0 0 0 , at p .249  
Id.
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to classes of individuals having collective interests. A footballer may resent being 
substituted in an important match, but his manager may justify this as being in the 
interests of the team. If the player accepts this, it is because he identifies his own 
interests with the team’s ultimate success; his individual interest in staying on the pitch 
coexists with the collective team interest, of which others of his individual interests form 
a part.
There is nothing linguistically or logically incoherent about refemng to X and Y as 
belonging to the class of potential future beings. What is problematic is seeking to 
attribute to that class a set of shared interests, analogous with that of a football team, 
which can be furthered or frustrated by the implantation choice. Quite simply, only one 
of the rivals for implantation will ever attain any interests whatever -  a fact that 
Buchanan, et al, specifically acknowledge. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the 
rejected embryo cannot be said to be harmed or benefited by the decision to reject it. The 
choice between X and Y is simply a choice between which of two different sets of 
interests we will bring into existence. To speak of the two as having a shared pool of 
interests flies in the face of this reality. The notion that we can owe duties to the class of 
possible children we might have, I submit, is tempting only in the linguistic sense, relying 
as it does on the false aggregation of intrerests which cannot co-exist.
A rather different conception of the NPA principle has been advanced by writers such as 
Hai'ris and Feinberg. While both explicitly recognising that the disabled child will, in all 
but the rarest scenarios, have no cause for complaint, both agree that the mother who 
chooses a disabled over an able-bodied child still acts wrongly. For Feinberg, the wrong 
lies in ‘wantonly introducing a certain evil into the world, not for inflicting harm on a 
person’ while in almost identical terms, Harris speaks of ‘the wrong of bringing 
avoidable suffering into the world, of choosing deliberately to increase unnecessarily the 
amount of harm or suffering in the world or of choosing a world with more suffering 
rather than one with less.’ ®^^
B uchanan, B rock , et al. F rom  C han ce to  C h o ice , op. cit., at p .2 3 6  
F einberg, H arm  to  O th ers , op. c it., at p l0 3 ,  em phasis added.
H an’is, W o n derw om an  a n d  Su perm an , op. c it., at p90.
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On the face of it, an ethical principle that imposes impersonal duties to the world is 
tempting for those who are dissatisfied by the No Difference conclusion, as it obviates the 
need to identify a particular person -  actual, potential or notional -  who is the subject of 
the harm. It would allow us to conclude that the 14 year-old girl, as well as Candy 
McCullough and Sharon Duschesneau, acted wrongly, even though the children that they 
brought into the world have no grievance against them.
However, on closer examination, it seems that the ‘duty to the world’ approach is itself 
problematic. This becomes apparent when we consider that a duty to the world -  at least 
in the vaguely utilitarian sense advanced by Hairis and Feinberg - must take one of two 
forms. The first involves a duty to minimise the amount of suffering in the world, 
regardless of any offset against happiness (referred to here as the No Suffering view. 
There is a suggestion, perhaps, that this is what Harris is thinking of when he refers to the 
wrong of ‘choosing a world with more suffering rather than one with less.’ °^^ )
If the duty took this form, then it would make sense to say that the mother of the disabled 
child does wrong when she goes ahead with the pregnancy, because the child she has -  
although benefited overall -  will live a life containing more suffering than the alternative 
child that she could have had, and therefore, her choice causes more rather than less 
suffering in the world. That this view is problematic, however, becomes clear when we 
consider that it seems to lead to the conclusion that anyone would do wrong when they 
bring any child into existence. Every life involves some degree of suffering, and while 
we ordinarily regard this as being offset by the amount of happiness/enjoyment/satisfied 
desires in those lives, the No Suffering view appears not to allow us any such trade-off.
The ethical imperative to minimise the amount of suffering in the world, then, could best 
be achieved by having no children at all, and anyone who chooses to have a child in the 
knowledge that its life will contain some degree of suffering seems to violate this 
imperative.
103 Id.
A  poin t e loq uently  exp ressed  by S. D . E dw ards in ‘P revention o f  d isab ility  on grounds o f  su ffer in g’, 
J o u rn a l o f  M e d ica l E th ics  (2 0 0 1 ); 2 7 :3 8 0 -3 8 2 , at p380 .
It is a lso , perhaps, in teresting to  note that the N o Suffering  concep tion  o f  the N P A  princip le w ou ld  
se em in g ly  find  no objection  to the deliberate creation o f  an anencephalic or o therw ise  asentient child .
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Alternatively, we may recognise a duty to the world that is slightly more complex than 
the No Suffering  view, requiring instead that we do indeed offset the suffering we 
introduce into the world against the happiness we introduce. A duty to maximise the 
amount of happiness-over-misery in the world -  refened to here as the Aggregate  
approach - would provide us with a reason to say that the actions of the 14 Year-Old Girl 
and Duschesneau and McCullough are wrong only ï/ there was an alternative course of 
action open to them that would have produced a greater aggregate of happiness-over- 
misery in the world.
Since, in Parfit’s scenaiio, the 14 Year-Old Girl has the option to delay pregnancy until 
such time as she can give her child a better start in life, and since Duschesneau and 
McCullough could certainly have had a child that was not (or had a much lower 
likelihood of being) deaf, they acted wrongly when they elected to act as they did. But 
had those children been the only children to whom they could possibly have given birth, 
then -  assuming the lives of those children contain some balance of happiness over 
misery -  then they have not offended the Aggregate  principle.
It is easy to imagine how this version of the NPA principle might seem more moderate, 
and hence more appealing, than the No Suffering  view. However, I would submit that it 
gives rise to conclusions that are no less implausible than the latter. For, as distinct from 
the No Suffering  view, the Aggregate  view contains not only an obligation to minimise 
suffering in the world, but a symbiotic obligation to maximise happiness (perhaps 
conceived of in terms of satisfied interests). Note that this is distinct from an obligation 
to satisfy existing interests; rather, the obligation implicit in this version of the axiom is 
to create satisfiable interests ab initio, in order that they might be satisfied.
The obvious problem here is that such a principle regards as ethically wrong not only the 
decision to create a less-than-optimally-happy baby, but would also regard as wrong the 
decision to refrain from having a child at all. After all, the individual who elects to 
remain childless when the option of having a reasonably happy child was open has failed 
in her duty to maximise the amount of happiness-over-suffering in the world.
To say otherwise would be to adopt the rather strange position of denying that a woman 
is subject to any kind of moral obligation to increase the overall ‘happiness’ by
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reproducing, but that having voluntarily elected so to do, she suddenly becomes subject to 
a more onerous obligation to increase the overall happiness to as great a degree as 
possible by having a particular kind of child. This may be seen as analogous with an 
argument which claimed that, while no-one is under any obligation to donate money to 
charity, those who voluntaiily elect to give a little will be forced to give as much as 
possible.
Furthermore, it may be seen that the Aggregate Principle imposes a duty to reproduce to 
the optimum degree, or at least up to the point where each additional child would cease to 
yield a marginal gain to ‘the world’ in terms of happiness. That is to say, there may come 
a point where poverty or overcrowding meant that the birth of an extra child would 
actually decrease the happiness balance, because its life would be of a low quality, while 
its birth would impact detrimentally on the lives of its siblings. Nonetheless, until that 
point is reached, and while the birth of each successive child contributes positively to the 
happiness-over-misery balance sheets, it is difficult to see how the reproductive 
imperative can be avoided.
Several writers have attempted to avoid this conclusion by claiming that the effect upon 
the quality of lives of individuals coerced into having unwanted children would be so 
severe as to render this argument redundant,while others have argued that the act of 
procreation constitutes an inefficient use of resources which could, from a utilitarian 
view, be better spent improving the lives of existing persons - the so called Aigument 
From Transfer. However, neither argument is entirely convincing. The claim that 
forcing reluctant parents to procreate would cause more harm than good seems dubious; 
if the reluctant parents still have worthwhile, albeit diminished, lives, it is difficult to see
S ee , e .g ., G lover, C a u sin g  D e a th  a n d  S a vin g  L ives , op cit, at p .70 .
C hristian M unthe, ‘T h e  A rgum ent From  T ransfer’, B io eth ic s  (1 9 9 6 ) 10(1); 2 6 -4 2 . It should  b e  noted  that 
M unthe's argum ent d o es not rely upon a b e lie f  that concern  sh ould  b e  restricted to actual persons, nor indeed  
d o es it require a b e lie f  that the interests o f  actual persons be accorded priority o ver  th o se  o f  potential future 
persons. Rather, h is c la im  is  based upon the reasoning that, w h ile  creating a w orthw hile  life  in v o lv es  an 
im provem ent in overall u tility  o f + 1 , there are in ex is ten ce  a considerable num ber o f  persons w h o se  liv e s  a ie  
in fact so  bad as to b e  su b jective ly  w orse  than n o n -ex isten ce , and to w h om  w e  cou ld  accord a utility  rating o f  
-1. O b viou sly , i f  it w ere p o ssib le  to render these  ex istin g  liv e s  su b jective ly  valuab le b y  u sin g  the resources 
w h ich  w ou ld  have been  sp en t on a new  person, this w ou ld  be the better course o f  action , sin ce  the  
im provem ent from  -1 to +1 is  greater than the im provem ent from  0  to +1. H is argum ent, o f  course, depends  
for its su ccess upon the assum ptions that (i) there are in ex isten ce  sign ifican t num bers o f  persons w h o se  liv es  
are w o rse  than n o n -ex isten ce , and (ii) that these  liv e s  cou ld  be m ade w orthw hile  by the dep loym en t o f  the 
resources w h ich  w ou ld  otherw ise  have  been  spent upon procreation.
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how their loss could outweigh the gain in overall utility brought about by the creation of
another worthwhile life/°^
The Argument From Transfer, meanwhile, seems only to discharge from the duty to 
procreate those who redirect that time and effort which would have been spent on the new 
child to improving the lot of those leading the most miserably unfulfilled lives. While 
there is nothing logically wrong with this view, those who consider this burden to be 
unduly onerous must concede that the Argument From Transfer does not constitute a 
valid defence of the Aggregate Principle.
The application of Non-Person Affecting principles, of the type advocated by Harris and 
Feinberg, to the area of human reproduction seem destined to be acceptable only to those 
who concede either (a) that all potential parents can be subject to a duty to reproduce, and 
continue reproducing up the point where their own or the children’s lives would be 
miserably wretched, or (b) that all potential parents should refrain from reproducing at 
all, since every life contains some degree of suffering. Since it seems safe to assume that 
both of these conclusions would be ridiculous or repugnant to most readers, it is 
submitted that NPA principles are unsatisfactory, and that instead, we should concentrate 
on the effect of PGD and the Genetic Supermarket on actual individuals, cun*ent or 
future.
3.5 ‘Worse Than Non-existence’ lives
I have suggested in this chapter that the Non-Identity Principle made it impossible to 
argue that a child was harmed on balance by a decision on which its very existence was 
contingent, but noted at that time that a possible exception could exist for those cases 
where the experiential existence of that child is such as to allow us to deem it worse than 
non-existence, or worse than nothing (WTN). Such a judgement could be made where 
the child’s most important interests are doomed from the outset -  such as its interest in 
avoiding intolerable suffering -  while at the same time no corresponding interests could 
be furthered.
S e e  Stuart R achels, T s It G ood  T o  M ake H appy P eo p le? ’, B io eth ics ,  (1 9 9 8 ) 12(2); at p l0 9 .
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Since predictable future interests constitute a valid, indeed unavoidable, cause for
concern, it may be said that, in electing to im plant a ‘doom ed em bryo’, a course of events
is set in motion which will result in a predictable future harm, ju st as surely as when the
broken glass is carelessly discarded in the woods. The harm  in question, though, will not
be a cut foot, but rather a life o f such wretched quality that, from  the subjective
perspective of the child itself, it would have been better never to have been born.
Exam ples would alm ost certainly be rare, but we m ight plausibly consider that the lives of
those affected by genetic disorders that guarantee brief, severely cognitively impaired and
pain-filled lives m ight be so considered. Consider, for example, Philip Kitcher’s
description of the progress o f Lesch-N yhan syndrome:
an allele on their single X  chrom osom e causes boys to suffer mental 
retardation and extreme physical pains o f the type associated with gout.
Yet perhaps the m ost disturbing feature o f the condition is an apparently 
irresistible urge to self-m utilation - the boys chew their lips and the tips 
o f their fingers until they are raw  and bleeding. At present, doctors can 
relieve some of the gouty symptom s, but they are unable to prevent the 
mental retardation and can only block the com pulsive m utilation by 
applying bandages to hands and lips.^°^
There is, I submit, a strong argum ent for concluding that such lives ai'e ‘worth not living’; 
they contain constant pain which cannot be entirely relieved, a com pulsion to self- 
m utilate which can only be controlled by restraining the child, and - in view of the severe 
retai'dation, behavioural disorders and short life expectancy - no real opportunity for 
com pensatory pleasures or satisfied interests o f any sort. ‘There is nothing to be done,’ 
K itcher observes, ‘except to alleviate pain and discomfort, no aspirations we can expect 
to foster, no plans, how ever humble, to bring to fruition.
U K  law adopts a som ew hat am bivalent attitude to the prospect o f W TN lives. In the 
context o f non-treatm ent decisions involving infants, the courts have been willing to 
recognise that a ch ild ’s life is so subjectively unpleasant as to m ake it im possible to regard 
life-prolonging treatm ent as being in that child’s best interests. In Re B (a minor) 
(wardship: medical t r e a t m e n t Lord Tem plem an was willing to confront this issue head 
on. It was the duty o f the court, he stated.
Philip  K itcher, The L iv e s  to C om e, A llen  L ane T he P enguin  Press 1996, at p82. 
Ibid, at p288.Ill (1981)3 All ER 927
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to decide whether the life o f this child is demonstrably so awful that in 
effect the child  m ust be condem ned to die or whether the life o f this child» 
is still so im ponderable that it w ould be wrong for her to be condem ned 
to die.
In this particular case, the court concluded that the child’s condition was not such that life-
sustaining treatm ent would necessarily achieve no m ore than the prolongation o f suffering.
However, Lord Tem plem an went on to make it quite cleai' that there may bë other
circum stances where
the future [of the child] is so certain and where the life o f the child is so 
bound to be full of pain and suffering that the court m ight be driven to a 
different conclusion.
Indeed, in several cases subsequent to Re B, the courts did  reach different conclusions as
to the requirem ent to prolong life, and in each o f those the principle that, occasionally,
life can be a burden rather than a benefit was restated. In Re J  (a m inor) (wardship:
m edical treatment) , L o r d  Donaldson, M .R., acknowledged the ‘very strong
presum ption in favour of a course of action which will prolong life’, but added that this
presum ption ‘is not irrebuttable.’ On the contrary,
account has to be taken o f the pain and suffering and quality of life which 
the child will experience if  life is prolonged ... In the end there will be 
cases in which the answer m ust be that it is not in the interests o f the 
child to subject it to treatm ent which will cause increased suffering and 
produce no com m ensurate benefit^
Indeed, at least one lower court judge has been willing to recognise a positive interest
held by an infant in being allowed to die. In the m uch-publicised conjoined twins case,^^^
Johnston, J. claimed that
the few m onths of M ary’s life if  not separated from  her tw in w ould not 
simply be worth nothing to her, they would be hurtful. ... To prolong 
M ary’s life for these few m onths would in my judgm ent be very 
seriously to her disadvantage.
The courts have, however, displayed a m arked reluctance to require such evaluations to 
be m ade prospectively. In the one and only ‘wrongful life’ case to be heard in the UK,
' Ibid, per Lord T em plem an , at p929. 
[1991] Fam  33.
114 Ibid, at p .46.
R e A  (ch ild ren ) (c o n jo in ed  tw ins: su rg ica l se p a ra tio n )  [2001] 5 7  B M L R  1
Ibid, at pIO. T he c la im  that M ary’s life  w ou ld  b e  ‘hurtful’ to her m ight, how ever, b e  thought d ifficu lt to 
reco n c ile  w ith Johnston J .’s com m ent on the preced ing  page that ‘T here is no w ay  that cou ld  rem otely  be  
d escribed  as reliable by w h ich  those tending M a iy  can kn ow  ev en  now  w hether sh e is hurting or in pain .’
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M cK ay  v. Essex Area Health A u t h o r i t y the Court o f Appeal refused to attempt a
com parison betw een a particular quality o f life and non-existence. Lord Justice
Stephenson expressing this reluctance in the following terms:
The only loss for which those who have not injured the child can be held 
liable to com pensate the child is the difference between its condition as a 
result o f their allowing it to be bom  alive and injured and its condition if 
its em bryonic life had been ended before its life in the world had 
begun.
It is interesting to note that the Lords o f Appeal seem to have enjoyed a firm er grasp of
the Non-Identity Principle than the m em bers o f the HFEA showed when discussing PGD
or tissue t y p i n g . S t e p h e n s o n ,  LJ continued:
But how can a court o f law  evaluate that second condition and so 
m easure the loss to the child? Even if  a court were com petent to decide 
betw een the conflicting views o f theologians and philosophers and to 
assum e an “after life” or non-existence as the basis for com parison, how 
can a judge put a value on the one or the other, compare either alternative 
with the injured child’s life in this world and determine that the child has 
lost anything, without the means o f knowing what, if  anything, it has 
gained?
In a sim ilar vein, Ackner, LJ asked:
But how can a court begin to evaluate non-existence, “the undiscovered 
country from  whose bourn no traveller returns?” No com parison is 
possible and therefore no dam age can be established which a court could 
recognise.
This is a curious contention, and, it m ay be thought, an even more curious choice of
quotation with which to illustrate it. The reference to the ‘undiscovered country’ comes
from  H am let’s soliloquy on contem plating suicide, and its context m akes it entirely clear
that it refers to death  and not to non-existence:
W ho would fardels bear, to grunt and sweat under a weary life, B ut that 
the dread o f som ething after death, The undiscover’d country from  
whose bourn no traveller returns ...
Can it really be A ckner L J’s contention that no m eaningful com parison can be attempted
betw een death and life? This would certainly fly in the face o f the rationale o f the non-
" ’ [1 9 8 2 ] Q .B . 1166.
" ' I b i d ,a t p l l 8 1 .
‘ E ven  clearer ev id en ce  o f  this understanding can be found at p i  182, per S teph en son  LJ.: ‘I f a court had to 
d ec id e  w hether it w ere  better to enter into life  m aim ed or halt than not to enter it at all, it w ou ld , I think, be  
bound to say  it w as better in all ca ses o f  m ental and ph ysica l d isab ility , ex cep t p o ssib ly  th ose  extrem e cases  
already m entioned  . . .  but certain ly not excep tin g  such  a case  as the present.’ S ee  a lso  A ckner, LJ., at p i  189  
Ibid , at p i  181, per S teph en son , LJ.
Ibid , at p 1189.
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treatm ent cases considered above. The only way to make sense o f non-treatm ent
decisions (and o f the damages awarded for ‘[l]oss o f expectation o f life’, referred to by
Stephenson, is by demonstrating that wrongful life claims ai‘e asking the courts to
consider, in non-existence, something that is not only different from  death, but somehow
m ore difficult to quantify or compare. In this, it may be seen the Lords o f Appeal were
less than wholly convincing. Certainly, Stephenson, L J’s claim  that
In m easuring the loss caused by shortened life, courts are dealing with a 
thing, hum an life, o f which they have some experience; [in the wrongful 
life case] the court is being asked to deal with the consequences o f death 
for the dead, a thing o f which it has none.^^'^
appears to offer scant support for the distinction. It simply is not true that wrongful death
cases involve only a knowledge o f life, nor that wrongful life cases involve only a
knowledge of ‘the consequence o f death for the dead’. Rather, both -  and we may also
involve non-treatm ent decisions in this -  involve comparisons between  existence and
non-existence.
To award damages on the basis that someone has lost out by being deprived of life 
necessarily involves some tacit assum ptions about what death involves, and those 
assum ptions seem  to be that death is, ordinarily, worse than further life. It is obviously 
true that neither judges nor anyone else has personal know ledge o f what that 
‘undiscover’d country’ involves, but no decision about whether to allow a handicapped 
neonate to die could be meaningful without some means to effect a com parison between 
the alternatives on offer. If such assumptions, unsubstantiated by evidence, are possible 
in relation to non-existence states after death, there is no obvious reason why sim ilar 
assum ptions could not be possible in relation to non-existence states prior to birth.
It may, indeed, be true that -  as Stephenson, LJ s u g g e s t e d -  in m any cases, an accurate 
prediction of the future child’s state will be extremely difficult in advance of its birth. 
This, though, is an evidentiary problem, and if it were shown that the extent of the child’s 
suffering was not foreseeable at the time of the im plantation decision, then this would 
presum ably constitute a defence against either a crim inal charge under s. 13(5), or a civil 
suit for wrongful life. However, this difficulty provides no principled basis to distinguish
H a m le t, A ct 3 , S cen e  1.
[1982] Q .B . 1166 , a t p l l S l .
124 I d .
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the task before the court in a wrongful life suit from  the equally galling tasks it faces in 
non-treatm ent and other d e c i s i o n s i n  both cases, assumptions m ust be m ade about the 
subjective experiential existence o f an entity that will sometimes have no means of 
com m unicating its feelings.
A ttaching a notional value to non-existence is undeniably problem atic, but it is as 
necessary for any com parison betw een life and death (which courts m ake on a regular 
basis) as it is for a com parison between life and never existing (which the Court o f 
Appeal steadfastly refused to undertake). W hile Stephenson, LJ was alm ost certainly 
right to rule that it could not be suggested o f the child in M cKay  that ‘the quality o f her 
life is such that she is certainly better dead’/^^ even this observation seem ed to sit 
uncom fortably with his contention that no such com parison was possible.
Even less easy to reconcile is the judicial reluctance to attempt such comparisons, and the 
w illingness o f Parliam ent to im pose a duty on providers o f reproductive technologies to 
do exactly this. Section 13(5) o f the 1990 Act specifically requires a consideration of the 
welfare o f the future child prior to the provision of such services. Since it is presum ably 
unlikely that Parliam entary intent was that such a consideration should have no bearing 
on the decision w hether to provide treatm ent, it seems obvious that the intention was that 
certain welfare considerations would lead to the refusal o f such treatment.
Im plicit in such a provision is the assum ption that, in certain circum stances, it is 
foreseeably in the interests o f a potential future child to be spared existence, or that the 
life o f such a child, were it to be created, would contain such a balance o f harm s over 
benefits that its life w ould constitute a ‘harm  on balance’. T h u s ,  a burden has been
Ibid, at p i  180.
A  poin t m ade by R obert L ee  in T o  b e  or not to be: is that the question? T he c la im  o f  w rongfu l l if e ’ , in 
L ee and M organ, eds. B irth righ ts: L a w  a n d  E th ics a t the  B eg in n in gs o f  L ife, L ondon, R ou tledge, 1989, at 
p l7 7 .
Ibid, at p i  180. T h e  ch ild  w as d ea f and partially b lind as a  result o f  contact w ith  the rubella virus.
L ee  and M organ h a v e  c la im ed  that, b y  avo id ing  m ention ‘o f  any requirem ent that the w elfare o f  that child  
b e  considered  as param ount’. Parliam ent ‘at least sa ved  the w orkings o f  the section  from  a ph ilosophica l 
appreciation  o f  ex is ten ce  against n o n -ex isten ce .’ R obert G. L ee  and D erek M organ H um an F ertilisa tio n  &  
E m b ryo lo g y : R eg u la tin g  the R e p ro d u c tive  R evo lu tio n . L ondon, B lack stone Press L im ited , 2 0 0 1 , at p. 164. 
A lth ou gh  the absen ce o f  such a param ountcy requirem ent m ay ha v e  som e sig n ifica n ce  in  tissu e  typing cases  
-  se e  Chapter 5 -  it is unclear h o w  this obviates the need  for such  a com parison, or w ith  confronting the NIP. 
C on sidering  the w elfare o f  the future ch ild  before providing treatm ent serv ices can o n ly  be a m eaningfu l 
requirem ent i f  it is en v isio n ed  that, in so m e ca ses, this w ill lead to a d ec is ion  -  m otivated  by  concern for that
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placed on infertility clinics that the Court of Appeal deemed too onerous to assume for
itself
W hat, then, w ould constitute a proportionate and consistent approach to W TN lives? 
Given the predictability o f the phenotypical m anifestations of certain genetic conditions, 
it may be that the judges in M cKay  were unduly reticent about attem pting a comparison 
betw een a life o f any  quality and non-existence. Indeed, we may well be sceptical about 
the disanalogy betw een death and non-existence, upon which the distinction between 
non-treatm ent and wrongful life cases rests.
Perhaps more com pelling is John H arris’s observation that wrongful life actions, even if  
successful, do not extinguish the harm  of a W TN life. After all, he observes, if  m onetary 
com pensation raises the quality o f life, from  the ch ild’s subjective perspective, above the 
threshold o f a life worth living (or at least a life not worth not living; an anencephalic 
neonate, for example, we m ight consider to have no interest in whether it lives or not) 
then their lives were only ‘only contingently worth not l iving’, i . e .  it was their 
econom ic circum stances as well as their genetic condition that rendered their lives so 
wretched.
This seems a valid observation, but it is also possible that a wrongful life payment, while 
perhaps not raising the life in question above the threshold, will raise it to an extent, 
rendering it slightly less intolerable for the child concerned. If  W TN can be counted as 
‘less than nothing’, then there is no reason why we cannot designate some as further 
below  that baseline than others. Nonetheless, provided even a successful wrongful life 
action would leave the child in the W TN category, it is difficult to disagree with H a n ts ’s 
conclusion that, in such cases, the appropriate rem edy would be euthanasia. Since UK 
law continues to uphold its (almost) absolute prohibition on active killing, even in cases
ch ild ’s w elfare -  not to  provide such serv ices. T his, I suggest, in ev itab ly  in v o lv es  a com parison b etw een  the 
ch ild ’s lik e ly  w elfare  i f  b o m , and the alternative for  that child , i.e ., non -ex istence .
T hou gh , as L ee  and M organ  note , ‘there seem s to  have been  relatively  little  overt resistance from  doctors 
d isc la im in g  the capacity  to  m ake the soc ia l assessm en ts required by  s. 13 (5 )’, this does not detract from  the  
in co n sisten cy  o f  requiring them  to do w hat the Court o f  A ppeal has e ffec tiv e ly  ruled im p ossib le . Ibid, at 
p .1 6 5 .
Harris, W oriderw om an a n d  Su perm an , op. cit., at p .96 .
Id. S e e  a lso  Patricia M .A . B eaum ont, ‘W rongfu l L ife  and W rongful B irth’, from  C o n tem p o ra ry  Issu es in  
Law , M ed ic in e  a n d  E th ics  ed. S h eila  A .M . M cL ean , at p. 112.
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where this may be thought to be in the individual’s interests/^^ euthanasia will not be a 
practical solution. However, in those cases where the W TN infant requires life- 
sustaining m edical treatm ent (which we m ight assum e will all but invariably be the case) 
the judgm ents in Re B, et al, will allow for a decision that will expedite the child’s death. 
(Although the recent European Court decision in Glass v recognises the fam ilial
right to be consulted, it would not allow the parents o f a W TN child to dem and that its 
life be prolonged w hen this was m anifestly contraiy to the child’s interests.)
From  a harm -avoidance perspective, however, the ethically preferable outcom e is that 
such lives should not come into existence at all, or should not develop to the point of 
acquiring sentience; preventing suffering, after all, is preferable to ending it once it has 
begun. A requirem ent that prospective parents avoid creating such lives would impact 
significantly on their interests in reproductive liberty, as discussed in Chapter 2, and 
would harm  those (presumably very few) who either wished to create such children, 
those who sought to forego screening altogether, and those who m erely feel aggrieved at 
the curtailm ent o f what they believe should be exclusively their choice. However, it may 
be legitim ate to regaid such a harm  as outweighed by the harms sustained during its brief 
sentient existence by a child affected by a W TN life.
This, in view o f the N on-Identity Principle, would be the one intelligible, child-oriented 
application o f s. 13(5). A nairow  construction of the welfare test w ould require fertility 
clinics to refuse treatm ent only in those cases where it is foreseeable that the life of the 
resulting child would be subjectively W TN. Since many genetic conditions vary in terms 
of penetrance, m eaning that it is often im possible in individual cases to make an accurate 
pronouncem ent on the quality o f a life until the child is born (and perhaps not until some 
time thereafter), it m ight be anticipated that the range o f conditions to which s. 13(5) 
w ould actually apply would be narrow indeed. Certainly, it could not m eaningfully be
R  V D ire c to r  o f  P u b lic  P ro secu tio n s, S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  f o r  the H o m e D ep a rtm en t, ex  p a r te  D ia n e  P re tty  
[20021 1 A C  8 0 0
G la ss  V U n ited  K in g d o m  (6 1 8 2 7 /0 0 ) [2004] 1 F .L .R . 1019
T h is presum es that, un lik e Feinberg, w e  do not exc lu d e  from  our eth ical consideration s those interests 
w h ich  h e  deem s inherently im m oral, such  as the sad ist’s interest in  torturing others. A s  w e ll as the danger o f  
arbitrariness -  it requires no great im agination  to fo resee  such a lim iting  rule b e in g  used  to designate  as 
inherently im m oral interests in, for exam ple, form in g  sam e-sex  relationships - such a designation , o f  course, 
requires appeal to so m e extraneous eth ica l ax iom , and for adherents to the H aim  Princip le, this m ay seem  to 
bring them  perilously  c lo se  to leg a l m oralism .
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interpreted as including such m atters as ‘the child’s need for a father’, a ‘need’ that, were 
it not met, would be vastly unlikely to render a child’s life W TN,
An approach which saw a small range o f the m ost severe genetic disorders regarded both 
as suitable cases for prospective prohibition on im plantation o f such embryos under 
s. 13(5), and for retrospective wrongful life actions raised on behalf o f the children 
affected where negligence, m alice or indifference saw the s. 13(5) requirem ent ignored, 
would not provide a panacea to all the problems that bedevil this area, but it w ould lend a 
degree o f coherence and consistency to an area that at present lacks both.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter, then, contains several contentions, the m ost im portant o f which can be 
sum m arised thus. First, being deselected/destroyed is harm ful neither to the embryos 
them selves, nor the persons they m ight one day have become. In contrast, the potential 
future persons who will, or might, one day exist have (potential, future) interests that will 
one day be actualised, and these interests should be borne in mind in m aking ‘genesis’ 
decisions. However, as Parfit and others have shown, it is im possible to say that these 
future persons will be harmed by an act that brings about their existence, provided  the 
lives into which they are bom  are not so wretched as to be worse than non-existence.
W hile this conclusion is recognised by m ost comm entators in the field, many seek to 
circum vent the Non-Identity Problem /Principle by relying instead on some version o f a 
utilitarian Non Person-Affecting principle, which creates duties to ‘the class o f potential 
future children who naight exist’ or, more comm only, to the world at large. The latter 
part o f this chapter has been an attempt to show that such theories are themselves 
problem atic, giving rise as they do to duties m ore onerous than their proponents would be 
likely to accept.
The next chapter o f  this thesis will consider some o f the other candidates who m ight 
claim  to be harm ed, either by the very existence o f a Genetic Superm arket, or by the 
specific decisions m ade by those who avail them selves o f it. However, for the moment, it 
w ould appear that the overwhelm ing majority o f choices that prospective parents would 
or could m ake about the genetic com position o f their future children are harm ful neither 
to the children them selves, nor, in any m eaningful sense, to ‘the w orld’. It is conceded
1 1 2
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that this conclusion m ay feel, at some level, less than satisfying for anyone whose 
concern is with the quality o f lives o f existing and future persons; G lover has written that 
‘it is hard to accept that society should set no limits to the genetic choices parents can 
m ake for their chi ldren’, w h i l e  Parfit him self seems far from  satisfied by this 
c o n c l u s i o n . I t  is submitted, though, that neither those two em inent philosophers, nor 
any other contributors to this debate, have offered an intelligible m odel which can 
account for the intuition that the Genetic Superm arket violates the Harm  Principle.
I have therefore argued for a reading o f s. 13(5) that is consistent w ith the Non-Identity 
Principle, i.e., a restrictive reading that would prevent the im plantation only o f those 
embryos likely to develop into children with W TN lives. Any embryos affected by lesser 
conditions should not be excluded from  implantation; while the children they may 
becom e will be exposed to certain harms from  which ‘norm al’ children will be spared, 
their creation will not, predictably, constitute harms on balance, or at least not harms to 
them.
G lover, W hat S o r t O f  P eo p le  Sh ou ld  T here B e? , op. cit., at p48 . 
Parfit, R ea so n s a n d  P ersons, op. cit., at p443.
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Chapter 4 Effects on third parties
In the preceding chapter, I sought to establish that the Genetic Superm arket ideal poses 
no credible risk o f  harm  -  conceived as a balance o f disadvantage over advantage -  to 
those potential children who m ight have been born but for the availability o f  this 
technology, or to those who actually are born as a result. The only credible exception 
would be in the presum ably unlikely scenario where prospective parents utilised PGD to 
ensure the birth o f a child afflicted w ith some genetic disorder so severe in its symptoms 
as to render the subjective quality o f  life o f the child worse than non-existence.
In this chapter, I intend to consider the possibilities o f risks o f  harm  to other parties, less
directly affected by the choices m ade by prospective parents, but who m ay nonetheless
have interests that w ill be adversely affected by those choices. Typically, the ‘negative
externalities’ considered here w ill arise (if  at all) not from one or two isolated examples
o f PGD, but from the cum ulative effect o f  m any such choices; that is to say, the risk o f
such harm s derives from  the prospect o f  PGD becoming com m onplace, and further, from
those who use it m aking predictable, and similar, choices. Hans Reinders has expressed
this concern in the follow ing terms:
side effects o f  individual decisions m ade by people using their 
reproductive freedom , though unintended, can collectively have 
veiy dam aging effects in society. The question then is w hether the 
proliferation o f  genetic tests should be restricted and whether such 
restriction is sufficiently justified  on the grounds o f the unintended 
but harm ful side effects o f  large-scale use o f  such tests.*
Who, then, are these third pai'ties who m ight be at risk o f  harm  from  the Genetic 
Supermarket?
‘ H ans S. R einders, The F u tu re  o f  the D is a b le d  in L ib e ra l S o ciety ; A n  E th ica l A n a ly s is ,  N otre D am e, Indiana, 
U niversity  o f  N otre D am e Press, 2 0 0 0 , at p .86 .
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4.1 People w ith disabilities
4.1.1 W ho are ‘the disabled’?
The first category o f  potentially affected ‘third party’ interests belong to that section o f 
society to whom  w e m ight refer as ‘people with disabilities’ or, som ewhat more 
controversially, as ‘the disabled’. For a variety o f  reasons, the choice o f term inology in 
this area poses particular difficulties, and before attempting a consideration o f the 
interests o f such a group, it is im portant to clarify several points about the term s and 
concepts I will use. First, by deem ing certain individuals as ‘people w ith  disabilities’, I 
am in no way seeking to imply that their disability is their defining characteristic; 
although the question o f  whether (at least severe) disabilities can be identity-defining 
will be considered later in this chapter, m ost disabilities will be at m ost one o f many 
attributes that com bine to define an individual.
Secondly, I share w ith Susan W endell and other wiiters the view  that disability is both 
context- and task-specific. The first o f  these term s recognises that w hat constitutes a 
‘disability’ in one context will often not do so in another; someone unable to undertake a 
particular activity -  boarding a train, for example -  in one society m ight well be able to 
do so in another society that m ade trains accessible to wheelchair users. The second 
term  recognises that to speak o f  a  ‘disability’ denotes a ‘restriction or lack (resulting 
from an im pairm ent) o f  ability to perform  an activity in the m anner or w ithin the range 
considered normal for a hum an b e i n g . H e n c e ,  an individual may well be ‘disabled’ in 
relation to one task  (or range o f tasks), such as clim bing a flight o f stairs, but be perfectly 
able to function in every other respect. Is it reasonable to designate such an individual as 
a ‘disabled person’? For som e com m entators, the designation ‘person w ith disability’ 
better represents the fact that the disability may relate only to one, or a  few, aspects o f 
the person’s life.^
 ^ T he W orld Program m e o f  A ction  concern ing  D isab led  Persons, adopted by the U n ited  N a tio n s General 
A ssem b ly  at its 37th  regular se ss io n  on 3 D ecem ber 1982 , by its resolution  3 7 /5 2 . 1/ A v a ila b le  at 
h ttp ://vm w .un . org/esa/socdev/enable/disw^paOO.htm
 ^ The Incapable A dults (S c .)  B ill  w as renam ed the A dults w ith Incapacity (S c .) B ill early in the drafting process to 
reflect precisely  such concerns.
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For the purposes o f  this discussion, I w ill use the term s ‘disabled person’ and ‘people 
w ith disability’ interchangeably. This is simply for reasons o f  linguistic convenience, 
and should not be taken to imply that I have disregarded the valid consideration that the 
people in question m ay well be ‘disabled’ for some purposes but not for many others.
Thirdly, it would be a serious m istake to assume that ‘the disabled’, or even the
‘genetically disabled’, are a  hom ogenous group w ith a uniform  set o f  circumstances,
opinions or interests. Indeed, Susan W endell has asked whether it is m eaningful to speak
o f ‘the disabled’ as a  single class at all:
Is it not likely that living with disabilities is very different for 
people w ith different disabilities, and different for m ales and 
females, people o f different ages, races, classes, occupations -  
perhaps so different that to lum p them  all together in a single 
category serves no useful purpose?"*
W hether or not it is m eaningful to group all disabled, or all genetically disabled, people
into one class, even for the lim ited purposes o f  this thesis, is a question that lies beyond
my present remit. Suffice to say that at least some com m entators on the subject see some
value in attempts to generalise about their experiences, or at least their treatm ent at the
hands o f  a ‘disability-phobic society.’  ^ Indeed, having posed the question o f  the value in
speaking o f such a class, W endell herself concludes that ‘it is various aspects o f their
treatm ent by their societies that people w ith disabilities are m ost likely to have in
com m on’
As will become apparent in this chapter, many o f  the concerns about how  the Genetic 
Supermarket will im pact upon people w ith disabilities derive from  certain beliefs about 
how such people already are treated or perceived, and how  their treatm ent or perception 
is likely to deteriorate as a consequence o f  w idespread use o f PGD. As such, and 
assuming there is any m erit whatever in the views espoused by Fine and Asch, and
Susan W endell, The R e je c te d  B ody: F em in is t P h ilo so p h ica l R eflection s on  D isa b ility ,  L ondon, R outledge, 1996, 
at p p .30-31 .
 ^ M ich elle  F ine and A drienne A sch , eds. W om en w ith  D isa b ilitie s :  E ssa ys in P sych o lo g y , C u ltu re  a n d  P o litic s . 
P hiladelphia, T em ple U n iversity  Press, 1988 , at p .6.
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W endell, then there is validity in asking how PGD m ight im pact on ‘disabled people’, 
even while acknowledging that there is certainly a degree o f artificiality about this 
grouping.
In so doing, I recognise from  the views o f  such people are likely to be as disparate and 
varied as any other cross-section o f  society, and that their views on PGD, neonatal tests 
and abortion are likely to vary as m uch as among society in general.’ To see that this is 
true w ith regard to PGD, we need only contrast the alm ost diam etrically opposed stances 
o f  the Genetic Interest Group (GIG), a ‘national alliance o f  patient organisations with a 
membership o f  over 130 charities which support children, fam ilies and individuals 
affected by genetic disorders’ ,^ and the Disabled Peoples’ International (DPI) ‘a network 
o f national organizations or assem blies o f disabled people, established to promote 
hum an rights o f disabled people through full participation, equalization o f  opportunity 
and developm ent.’^
In its 1999 publication Genetic Testing, Screening and “E ugen ics”, GIG espoused an
extremely positive view  o f  PGD:
In relation to pre-im plantation diagnosis, the issues are more 
straightforward: if  it is a m atter o f  im planting three fertilised eggs 
out o f a greater num ber, it seem s to GIG sensible to im plant those 
free o f know n genetic conditions. M ost people would w ant to m ake 
that choice, and w hen it is possible to m axim ise the chances o f a 
healthy child it appears to GIG to be perverse not to do so. There is 
no “slippery slope” because there are no difficult cases: it is good to 
avoid any and all disease, and that includes predisposition to disease 
in later life. Accordingly GIG opposes any and all attem pts to
 ^ W endell, The R e je c te d  B o d y ,  op. cit., at p .31.
’ A s ‘disab ility  a ctiv ist’ M arsha Saxton  ex p lic itly  acknow ledge; see  ‘D isab ility  R ights and S e lec tiv e  A b ortion ’, in 
R ickie Solinger, ed. A b o rtio n  W ars: A H a lf  C en tu ry  o f  Struggle, B erk ley, U n iversity  o f  C aliforn ia Press, 1998, 
p p .3 7 4 -3 9 3 , at p .3 8 0 . S e e  a lso  Erik Parens and A drienne A sch: the [d isab ility  rights] m ovem ent has no one  
position  on prenatal d iagn osis; from  ‘T he D isab ility  R ights Critique o f  Prenatal T esting: R eflection s and  
R ecom m end ation s’, in Parens and A sch , eds. P re n a ta l T esting  a n d  D isa b ility  R ig h ts, W ashington, D .C ., 
G eorgetow n U niversity  Press, 2 0 0 0 , at p .4  (although , som ew hat incongruously, Parens and A sch  go on to speak  
in term s o f ‘the v iew  o f  the d isab ility  com m u nity’ ; op. cit., at p .2 1 .)
® http://w w w .gig.org.ulc/
’ http ://w w w . dpi. org/en/start.htm
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restrict the range o f  m edical conditions for which pre-im plantation 
diagnosis can be performed.
In m arked contrast, the D P I’s view  o f PGD and related practices is sum m ed up in the
following statement:
W e believe that no parent has the right to design and select their 
unborn child to be according to their own desires and no parent has 
the right to design their born child according to their own desires.^ ^
Given such a plurality o f  opinions, how  is it even possible to speak o f  possible harms to
‘the disabled’? Based on these statements, it m ight seem  likely that what m ight harm  or
offend the m em bers o f  GIG will further the interests and am bitions o f  DPI, and vice
versa.
In the discussion to follow, I divide the possible harm s that a Genetic Supermarket 
approach m ight pose to disabled people into objective and subjective harms. The former 
category contains those harm s which w ill occur iiTespective o f the views o f  the 
individuals in question. If, as in the argum ent I consider first, the effect o f  widespread 
use o f PGD will be to reduce the actual resources available to disabled people, then that 
harm  will eventuate regardless o f  whether those disabled people support or oppose, feel 
offended or com forted by, the technology in question. That being so, even disabled 
supporters o f  the GIG position could be harmed.
Those harms I refer to as subjective, in contrast, do in fact depend on the views and 
attitudes o f the disabled people in question; in particular, they rely upon people with 
disabilities feeling hurt or offended or threatened or devalued by PGD, or by the
G enetic Interest G roup, G e n e tic  Testing, S creen in g  a n d  “E u g e n ic s”, N ovem b er 1999 , availab le at 
h ttp ://w w w .w o rd sa n d p eo p le .co m /g ig /d o cs/g ig _ eu g en ics.p d f.
" D PI B ioeth ics reso lu tions fi'om the 6th W orld A ssem b ly  Oct. 2 0 0 2 , Sapporo, Japan. A va ilab le  at 
http ://w w w .b ioeth icsan dd isab ility .org /D P I.h tm l. A  further dem onstration o f  this absen ce  o f  consensus can be seen  
in the responses horn ‘d isab ility  groups’ to the consu ltation process hosted  jo in tly  by the H um an G enetics  
C om m ission  and the H FE A . For exam ple, in response to a question on rep lacing carrier em bryos, three such  
groups replied that they ‘should  be rep laced ’, tw o  that they ‘should  not be rep laced’, and three that is should  be  
the ‘patients [sic] c h o ic e ’; O utcom e o f  the P ublic C onsultation on Preim plantation G en etic  D iagn osis , N ovem ber  
2 0 0 1 , T able 12, availab le at w w w .h gc.gov .u k /b u sin ess_p u b lica tion s.h tm )
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particular uses to w hich it is p u t/^  Thus, an evaluation o f  such possible harm s requires 
some belief or other about how  people w ith disabilities actually feel about, and how  they 
are likely to feel about, PGD. Given that, as we have seen, there appears to be no 
consensus on this issue, it is o f  course difficult to evaluate the likelihood and gravity o f 
this possible harm.
My consideration, therefore, w ill be o f  the contention that some  people w ith disabilities 
will be at risk o f  subjective harm s caused by a laissez faire approach to PGD. Since the 
purpose o f  this thesis is to consider the possibility o f  harm  resulting from  a largely 
um*egulated Genetic Superm arket, my approach will not dwell on the perspective o f 
those like the GIG, who are enthusiastic about PGD and therefore m ight be supposed not 
to be at serious risk o f  subjective harm. Rather, I will concentrate on the view s o f  groups 
like DPI, and o f writers on the subject o f  disability such as M arsha Saxton, Susan 
W endell, Tom  Shakespeare and Ruth Hubbard, who have expressed scepticism  about, or 
outright hostility to, PG D or some applications thereof. In so doing, I am  in no sense 
seeking to claim  that their views are m ore representative o f  those o f  disabled persons in 
general than those o f  GIG or other pro-PGD groups or individuals. Rather, their 
objections will be exam ined sim ply because they are the ones that m ust be addressed if  
my hypothesis is to succeed. Insofar as I refer to the danger o f  harm  to ‘people with 
disabilities’, this is again done for reasons o f  linguistic economy, and m ay be taken to 
denote those people w ith disabilities who hold certain views about the teclinology rather 
than all people w ith disabilities.
The fom lh, and final, clarification about term inology relates to the very notion o f 
‘disability’. There exists a wealth o f literature on both sides o f  the debate over whether 
‘disability’ is an objective phenom enon, caused by genetic or other physiological factors, 
or whether it is socially constructed;^^ for adherents to the form er view , at least some
A sim ilar distinction  -  although not expressed  in these  term s -  is drawn by B o im ie  S teinbock; see  ‘D isab ility , 
Prenatal T esting, and S e lec tiv e  A b ortion ’, in Parens and A sch , eds. P re n a ta l T estin g  a n d  D isa b ility  R igh ts, op. 
cit., at p p .120-121 ..
S ee Joim Harris, ‘O ne princip le and tlu'ee fa llac ies o f  d isab ility  stu d ies’. J o u rn a l o f  M e d ic a l E th ics  
20 0 1 ;2 7 :3 8 3 ; M eg  Stacey , ‘T he new  genetics: a fem in ist v ie w ’, in T heresa M arteau and M artin Richards, eds.
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disabilities would constitute im pairm ents to those affected in alm ost any imaginable 
s o c i e t y / w h i l e  social constructionists believe that ‘disability’ is m erely (or largely) a 
product o f a society organised to prioritise certain attributes m ore than certain others; as 
Parens and Asch have described this position, ‘in a differently constructed social 
environment, what are now  disabling traits would becom e “neutral” characteristics’/^
(As the oft-cited exam ple has it, in  a society organised around the ability to hunt prey 
and avoid predators, poor eyesight could be a literally life-threatening disability, but in 
the contemporary w estern world, it is at m ost generally a m inor im pairm ent, easily 
coiTectable by spectacles.)
Fortunately, for the purposes o f  this discussion, I need adopt no firm  position on this 
debate (although m y ovm view  is that there is alm ost certainly a degree o f  m erit in the 
constructivist position, I can barely conceive o f  any possible society, however 
constructed, where a condition such as cystic fibrosis, which among its myriad disabling 
effects greatly reduces life expectancy, w ould not be disadvantageous). Rather, since the 
possible harms w ith w hich this section is concerned involve how  ‘society’ responds, or 
is likely to respond to, people w ith disabilities in the world o f  the Genetic Supermarket, 
it is sufficient to note that, for w hatever reason, certain traits aie w idely designated as 
‘disabilities’, and those affected by them  as ‘disabled’. It is that veiy fact, rather than any 
particular belief about whether such ‘disabilities’ would exist independently o f  such 
attitudes, that gives rise to the concerns considered here.
4.1.2 ‘No W orld w ithout Disabled People’
Although they differ in other respects, all the objections considered in this section 
proceed on the basis that, however w idespread the use o f PGD eventually becomes, there
The tro u b le d  helix, C am bridge U n iversity  Press, 1996; Susan W endell, The R e je c te d  B o d y , op. cit.. Chapter 2; 
Philip K itcher, The L iv e s  To C om e, A llen  Lane T he Penguin Press, 1996, at p .208; W illiam  Roth, ‘H andicap as a 
Social C onstruct’, S o c ie ty , M arch/A pril 1983, 5 6 -6 1 .
''' S ee  Harris, ‘O ne princip le and thr ee  fa lla c ies  o f  d isab ility  stu d ies’, loc. c it., and Feinberg, ‘T he ch ild ’s right to 
an open  future’, op. cit.
Erik Parens and A drienne A sch . ‘T he D isab ility  R ights Critique o f  Prenatal T esting: R eflection s and 
R ecom m endations’, in Parens and A sch , eds. P re n a ta l T esting  a n d  D isa b ility  R ig h ts, W ashington, D .C ., 
G eorgetow n U niversity  Press, 2 0 0 0 , at p .23 .
R einders, The F u tu re  o f  the  D is a b le d  in L ib e ra l S o c ie ty , op. cit., at p .81 .
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will continue to be some  disabled people in our society. Otherwise, these objections 
would be m eaningless; w hat w ould it m ean to w orsen the situation o f disabled people in 
a society in which there are no disabled people?
Obviously, PGD w ill not elim inate the possibility o f  disability through accident 
(including injuries sustained at birth), but it is also overwhelm ingly likely that even as 
PGD becomes m ore accurate, it w ill rem ain imperfect; some genetic disabilities will 
‘slip through the n e t’. Furtherm ore, it is also highly improbable that a situation will arise 
where every prospective parent will agree to utilise PGD. The Public Consultation 
carried out jointly by the H FEA  and the Hum an Genetics Com m ission, the results o f 
which were published in N ovem ber 2001, revealed that 30% o f  individual respondents 
were opposed to PG D in general,*^ while 8 o f  the 20 respondents ‘who indicated some 
experience o f disability, including carers, fam ilies as well as disabled individuals 
them selves’*^  voiced general opposition.
Even in Andrew N icco l’s dystopian Gattaca, which imagines a society w herein the use 
o f PGD is all hut com pulsory, some non-conform ist parents elect to entrust their 
children’s genetic com position to chance, having what are regarded as ‘faith babies’. For 
that substantial m inority o f  the U K  population that regards hum an life as acquiring full 
moral status at conception, the use o f  IVF deliberately to create m ore embryos than will 
ever become children is itse lf ethically problem atic, irrespective o f  how  the decision is 
made as to which o f  them  to implant. Such people, it m ay be presum ed, will never utilise 
PGD technology. Furtherm ore, some o f  the veiy people this section explores -  those 
disabled people w ho object to the use o f  PGD to ‘screen out people like them ’ -  may be 
presum ed unlikely to use this technology them selves, preferring in m ost cases to entrust 
the genetic endowm ent o f their own children to chance, or occasionally taking steps such 
as M cCullough and D uchesneau to m axim ise the chance o f  having a child that shares 
their own ‘disabling’ genetic traits.
Joint W orking G roup o f  the H F E A  and H um an G en etics C om m ission , O u tco m e o f  the P u b lic  C o n su lta tion  on  
P re im p la n ta tio n  C e n e tic  D ia g n o s is , N ovem b er  2 0 0 1 , at p. 12.
Ibid, a t p . l l .
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It is also possible that a percentage o f  ‘d isabled’ people is an inevitability in any society, 
if  the ‘disabled’ are defined relative to the majority o f  the population. There will, for 
example, always be a 1% o f  the population w ith the poorest eyesight or w eakest limbs, 
regardless o f w hether -  in some futuie society -  that 1% is m erely average by the 
standards o f today. O n this relativist conception, disability m ay be not only an 
inevitability, but a  constant.
4.2 Objective harm s
4.2.1 W eakening the position o f disabled persons in society
Perhaps the m ost concrete species o f  possible harm  relates to the actual impact o f  a
Genetic Supermarket upon the status and prospects o f  the disabled w ithin society. This
involves an objective determ ination -  whatever they m ight thinlc, their position actually
is weakened - and m ight take one o f  a num ber o f forms. The m ost straightforward
suggestion is that a  reduction in the num bers (either absolutely, or as a proportion o f  the
population) o f persons affected by particulai* conditions will reduce the perceived
importance o f finding cures, treatm ents or ways to improve the lives o f  those rem aining
affected persons. As regular com m entator on disability issues Tom  Shakespeare says:
reducing the num ber o f  im paired foetuses born will possibly lessen 
the likelihood o f  effective therapy for affected people: as a 
condition becom es rarer, the im petus to discover a cure or treatm ent 
diminishes. This reinforces my wider feeling, that genetic screening 
will never be total, which m eans that the proportion o f  congenital 
im pairm ent may be reduced, but not eliminated, which m eans that 
disabled people will be further isolated, face increasing prejudice, 
and the pressure to m ake society accessible to all will be reduced.*^
T om  Shakespeare. ‘B ack  to the future? N e w  genetics and disab led p eo p le ’ . C ritic a l S o c ia l  P o licy  (1 9 9 5 ); 15 
(2 /3): 2 2 -3 5 , at p .3 1. Susan W endell has expressed  a sim ilar concern: ‘It m ight w eaken  efforts to increase  
accessib ility  and opportunities for p eo p le  w ith d isab ilities, because it appears to reduce the soc ia l problem s o f  
people w ith d isab ilities by  reducing the num ber o f  p eo p le  w ith disab ilities. . ..  I f  so , w e  have to ask what w ill be  
the socia l fate o f  p eo p le  w h o already have d isab ilities and those w ho, in the future, w ill b eco m e disab led by  
accident or d isea se .’ The R e je c te d  B ody: F em in ist P h ilo so p h ica l R eflec tio n s on D isa b ility ,  L ondon, R outledge, 
1996, at p. 154.
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This is what A llen Buchanan has deemed the Toss o f support’ objection/**
Shakespeare offers no em pirical evidence in support o f  his contention that such a 
reduction would lead to a dim inution in support, but his thesis may not be entirely 
implausible. It is at least worthy o f  some further exam ination w ithin an analysis o f  third 
party interests. Is it, we m ight reasonably wonder, plausible that m illions o f  pounds o f 
research funding w ould be given over to the investigation o f potential treatm ents for 
conditions that affect only a handful o f  people? Is it likely that buildings and buses 
would have been rendered ‘w heelchair accessible’ if  there were but a  few  dozen 
wheelchair users?
It is also, however, possible that in certain practical respects, the position o f some 
existing disabled people (or those who will nonetheless come to exist) may be improved 
by a reduction in the num ber o f  sim ilarly affected people. This m ight apply in cases 
where the nature o f  their disability or illness was such that it required scarce or resource- 
heavy support, assistance or treatm ent. A condition which may require access to kidney 
dialysis, for example, or to organ transplantation (such as cystic fibrosis) will often see 
affected parties forced to ‘com pete’ w ith other candidates for these treatm ents or scarce 
resources. Their chances o f  gaining access to those scarce resources, we might 
reasonably expect, w ill im prove in inverse proportion to the num ber o f  sim ilarly affected 
individuals who are also vying for those resources.^*
Even, though, were we to accept that there is m erit in Shakespeare’s claim  that the 
position o f existing affected people will be weakened by preventing the creation o f more
A llen  Buchanan, ‘C h o o sin g  w h o w ill be  disabled: genetic  intervention and the m orality o f  in c lu sion ’, S o c ia l 
P h ilo so p h y  &  P o lic y  (1 9 9 6 );  13(1): 18-46 , at p .21 . Laura M . Purdy also  w rites o f  the notion  that there is a 
p ossib ility  ‘that i f  w e  attem pt to  avo id  the birth o f  children w ith d isease  or d isab ility , w e  w ill harm those w ho  
already exist. A t the m ost practical lev e l, som e b e liev e  that acting so  as to avoid  such births w ill lead us to reduce  
the soc ia l resources n ow  a lloca ted  to the d isab led .’ From  ‘L oving Future P eo p le ’, in R ep ro d u c tio n , E th ics a n d  the  
law : Fem inist p e rsp e c tiv e s ,  ed. Joan C. Callahan, Indiana U niversity  Press, 1995, p .3 12. S ee  a lso  Philip K itcher, 
The L ives To C om e, A llen  L ane, T he Penguin  Press, 1996, at p .2 0 0 .
Philip  K itcher offers ju s t  such an exam ple, o f  beta thalassem ia in Cyprus: ‘A s the in c id en ce  o f  thalassem ia has 
dim inished, help for the a fflic ted  has increased: B eca u se  there is now  less dem and for b lo o d  transfusions and
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similarly affected people (and it is quite possible that their position could be weakened 
in some respects, w hile being strengthened in others), this does not invariably lead us to 
any particular conclusion as to how  this ‘harm ’ should be redressed. In particular, it 
does not lead im m ediately to the conclusion that the interest o f existing affected people 
in having their num bers m aintained should give rise to an obligation incum bent on 
prospective parents to contribute to those numbers.
The difficulty o f such an obligation m ight be illustrated by analogy w ith a slightly 
different example o f  disability. The teratogenic effects o f  the drug Thalidom ide resulted 
in the birth o f thousands o f  children w ith phocom elia (incom pletely developed limbs).
Despite certain legal obstacles to a claim  in either delict/tort or contract law, the drug’s 
victims m anaged to secure an ex gratia  payment from the drug’s m anufacturers. It is, 
perhaps, not overly contentious to speculate that this was achieved largely as a result o f 
lobbying by and on behalf o f  those children, and o f  sympathetic depictions o f  their plight 
in the media, both o f  w hich w ould have been considerably dim inished had there been far 
fewer ‘Thalidom ide children’ in the world. Quite simply, their case was stronger 
because there were ten  thousand (or more) o f  them, rather than fifty or a dozen.
Supposing, however, that the teratogenic properties o f  Thalidom ide had been discovered 
and made widely know n in 1955, one year after it was marketed, rather than 1961? Had 
the drug been w ithdraw n at that point, many thousands o f children could have been 
spared the effects o f  the drugs, but it also seems inevitable -  following Shakespeare’s 
logic " that the position o f  those already affected, and o f their parents, w ould have been 
that m uch politically weaker. Does it follow  that Thalidom ide should have continued to 
have been prescribed, that inform ation pertaining to its side-effects should have been
other treatm ents, the liv e s o f  tha lassem ia  sufferers are now  better than they w e re .’Philip  K itcher, The L ives To 
C om e: The G en e tic  R e vo lu tio n  a n d  H um an  P o ss ib ilitie s ,  L ondon, A llen  Lane T he P enguin  Press 1996, at p .85.
E stim ates o f  the precise  num ber o f  children affected  w orldw ide vary, but it is w id e ly  accepted  that the num ber 
w as in ex cess  o f  10 ,000; K night P. Suffer the  C h ildren : The s to ry  o f  th a lid o m id e . Andre D eutsch , 1979; N ippert 1, 
Edler B , Schm idt-H erterich C. ‘4 0  years later: the health related quality o f  life  o f  w om en  a ffected  by  
tha lidom ide.’ C om m u n ity  G e n e tic s  (2 0 0 2 );5 (4 ):2 0 9 -1 6 .)
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suppressed? W ould the interest o f existing Thalidom ide fam ilies in having their 
m ovem ent grow stronger have been sufficiently compelling to justify  the denial o f the 
freedom o f  pregnant w om en to m ake an inform ed decision as to w hether to carry on 
taking the drug?
O f course, it may be pointed out, the analogy betw een Thalidom ide and genetic 
screening is in certain respects imperfect. M ost significantly, the N on-Identity Principle 
discussed in Chapter 2, and on w hich m uch o f my thesis depends, m ay not apply in the 
context o f Thalidom ide. The Thalidom ide children, after all, are not like P arfif  s 
hypothetical future child o f  the 14-year old girl, in that for them, existence free from 
disability was an option; quite simply, had their m others not taken the drug, they would 
in all probability have been born w ith normally developed limbs.
The significance o f  this purported disanalogy will be considered in due course, but for 
present purposes, it is sufficient to note that whatever its importance in other respects, it 
does not answer Shakespeare’s concern. For the argum ent as he expressed it does not 
depend on any particular facts or beliefs about the identities o f  the disabled children who 
are ‘screened out o f  existence’; rather, it is the mere fact that fewer disabled children are 
born that is purported to harm  the interests o f existing disabled people, and this harm 
will eventuate regardless o f  whether they are ‘replaced’ with ‘the sam e children sans 
disablilities’ or ‘different children altogether’ (or indeed, w ith no children at all). The 
salient fact is that the sheer num bers o f  disabled people will be reduced, resulting in the 
presum ed dim inution o f  their political power or attention to their particular needs and 
interests.
W hat we m ight w ish to say here is that, in both cases, there exists a tension between 
parental choice and the interests o f  existing handicapped people, but it is only in the 
Thalidom ide (and therefore not in the PGD) case that the scales are decisively tipped by 
the prospect o f harm  to the resulting child. I aim to dem onstrate later in this section that 
the reality is not so straightfoiw ard, but for present purposes, it is inform ative to consider
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the implications o f  such a position. It involves taking the view  that the only reason why 
Thalidom ide should have been w ithdrawn, or indeed why pregnant w om en should have 
been presented w ith an inform ed choice as to whether or not to use it, is because o f the 
harm  it would inflict on future children. Their own interest in avoiding the birth o f a 
disabled child (in m any cases, children who died w ithin their first year o f  life), coupled 
with their interest in m aking that choice for them selves, is outweighed by the distant and 
disparate interests o f  existing Thalidom ide ‘v ictim s’ in having their ‘bargaining position’ 
strengthened. It is not my intention to dwell further on the m erits o f  this contention; 
different views m ay exist as to where the respective weights o f  these interests lie. 
Suffice to say that if  this conclusion is deemed unacceptable, then it follows that 
Shakespeare’s contention, while it may have more than a hint o f truth, does not present a 
persuasive reason for rejecting the Genetic Supermarket.^^
4.2.2 Creating a class o f ‘undeserving disabled’
A slightly different version o f  the same concern has been expressed by Hans S. Reinders,
in his book The Future o f  the D isabled in Liberal Society. For Reinders,
it is not a question o f  the decreased size o f the disabled population that w ill constitute a
problem  for rem aining disabled people, but the perception that their existence was a
m atter o f  parental choice rather than biological chance:
Assum ing that disabled people will always be among us, that the 
proliferation o f  genetic testing will strengthen the perception that 
the prevention o f disability is a m atter o f responsible reproductive 
behavior, and that society is therefore entitled to hold people 
personally responsible for having a disabled child, it is not unlikely 
that political support for the provision o f  their special needs will 
erode. If  this developm ent takes place, their access to social 
services, w elfaie, education, and the labor m arket will be in danger 
... At any rate, it w ill be m uch more in danger than w hen the 
general conviction is that disabled people should enjoy these social 
goods because o f the special needs that they have without any fault 
o f their own.^"*
A  sim ilar response to the ‘lo ss  o f  support’ ob jection  is advanced by  Buchanan; ‘C h o o sin g  w ho w ill be  
d isab led ’, loc. cit., at p .23 .
H ans S. R einders The F u tu re  o f  the D is a b le d  in L ib e ra l S o c ie ty : A n E th ica l A n a ly s is ,  N otre D am e, Indiana, 
U niversity  o f  N otre D am e P ress, 2 0 0 0 , at pp. 14-15.
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Specifically, Reinders talks o f  the danger that ‘The general attitude will be that people 
with special needs should be legitim ately entitled to social benefits but that it is fair to 
withdraw such benefits as soon as these special needs are no longer a m atter o f 
misfortune but can be attributed to personal responsibility.’^^
Is it in fact likely that such an attitude will be brought about by the presence o f the 
Genetic Supermai'ket? A lthough the scope o f  this thesis does not extend to sociological 
investigation, a couple o f  reasons exist that may cast some doubt on Reinders’ 
hypothesis. The first derives from the reasons why we do, or should, provide benefits or 
assistance for disabled people in the first place, while the second relates to what 
precisely it is possible for prospective parents to avoid.
The answer to why we thinlt it m orally im portant to devote some resources to those 
affected by disabilities derives, at least in part, from a notion o f justice. As Allen 
Buchanan says:
there is an obligation to devote some social resources to preventing 
or correcting undeserved differences in initial social or natural 
assets that result in som e persons’ [sic] suffering significant 
lim itations on their opportunities -  lim itations so serious as to 
interfere w ith  their having reasonable prospects for a decent life.^^
This notion o f justice, then, regards it as unfair that anyone should be abandoned to a
poorer or more restricted life because o f factors that were not the product o f  their choice
or control, be they social, environm ental, or genetic. Is this obligation weakened when
the disabilities or disadvantages are the product o f their ow n choice? Some
commentators certainly think so,^^ though the preponderance o f  academ ic bioethical
R einders The F u tu re o f  the  D is a b le d  in L ib e ra l S o c ie ty , op. cit., at pp .79.
A llen  Buchanan, ‘C h o o sin g  w h o  w ill be  disabled; genetic  intervention and the m orality  o f  in c lu sion ’, S o c ia l  
P h ilo so p h y  & P o lic y  (1 9 9 6 );  13(1): 18-46 , at p 25 . S ee  a lso  Jonathan W olff: ‘one is responsib le  for those results 
o f  on e ’s fi'eely chosen  action s or d ec is io n s, but sh ould  receive com pensation  (or pay tax) for the results o f  bad  
(g ood ) lu ck .’ ‘T in G en es and C om p en sation ’, in Justine B urley, ed. The G en e tic  R evo lu tio n  a n d  H um an R ights, 
O xford, O xford U n iversity  P ress, 1999, at p. 133.
See, for exam ple. M o ss, A .H ., S ieg ler , M . ‘Should  A lco h o lic s  C om pete E qually for L iver T ransplantation?’ 
Jou rn a l o f  the A m erica n  M e d ic a l A sso c ia tio n  (1 9 9 1 ); 2 6 5 (1 0 ): 1 2 9 5 -1 2 9 8 ; ‘Should  Sm okers B e  O ffered  
Coronary B ypass Surgery?’, debate in (1 9 9 3 )  3 0 6  B M J  1047.
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opinion seems to favour the view  that, at least regarding the provision o f  medical 
treatm ent, such value judgem ents are inappropriate/^
Perhaps more dam aging to the ‘argum ent from responsibility’ is the fact that, even were 
we to adopt a ‘tough’ stance on self-induced disadvantage or disability, the parties whose 
choices have ‘caused’ the disability (or m ore accurately, allowed it to come into 
existence) are different people entirely from those who will be affected by it, and who 
may require assistance in the form o f state benefits, medical assistance or whatever else. 
Even i f  society cam e to view  the decision to have a ‘faith baby’ as reckless and 
irresponsible, it w ould be unfair and irrational to visit the adverse consequences o f such 
recklessness upon the entirely innocent children them selves. Is it possible that public 
opinion will follow this unfair and irrational path, will come to resent this ‘tax for other 
people’s bad g e n e s a n d  exert pressure upon their political representatives to withhold 
or reduce the benefits payable to such children? Perhaps. But the blam e for any such 
attitudes would surely lie w ith a societal m indset that habitually blam ed children for 
their parents’ bad choices, rather than the fact that such choices existed.^**
The second reason why the ‘argum ent from responsibility’ m ight not constitute a 
compelling argum ent in this context derives fiom  the fact that, insofar as it is intelligible 
to hold individuals responsible for the consequences o f  their own actions or inactions, it
Raanan G illo n ’s position , for exam ple, is ‘that patients should be g iven  treatm ent in relation to their m edical 
need, and that scarce resources should  not be prioritised on the basis o f  a patient’s b lam ew orth iness.’ ‘On g iv in g  
preference to prior volun teers w h en  a llocating  organs for transplantation .’ J o u rn a l o f  M e d ic a l E th ics  (1 9 9 5 ); 21: 
195-196 , at p l9 6 . S ee  a lso  C ohen , C., B enjam in, M . ‘A lco h o lic s  and Liver T ransp lantation’ J o u rn a l o f  the  
A m erica n  M e d ica l A ss o c ia tio n  (1 9 9 1 ); 2 6 5 (1 0 ): 1 2 9 9 -1 3 0 1 . O ne p ossib le  response to the v iew  that individuals 
should  be left w ith the co n seq u en ces o f  their ow n  ch o ices w ou ld  ask whether, and to w hat extent, those ‘c h o ice s’ 
w ere them selves the product o f  factors outw ith their control, such as a genetic pred isposition  to  addiction or poor  
education during ch ild hood .
Reinders, The F u tu re  o f  th e  D isa b le d  in L ib e ra l S o c ie ty , op. cit., at p .90 .
Libertarian com m entator H ille l Steiner has argued that the gen etic  revolution  ‘sh ifts responsib ility  from  nature 
to particular p ersons’, sp ec if ica lly  to the parents o f  gen etica lly  disadvantaged children insofar as the had it w ithin  
their pow er to prevent su ch  disadvantages; thus, in such cases, com pensation  to  the ch ild  sh ould  be from  the 
negligen t parents and not the state. H ow ever, even  leav ing  aside the question o f  w hether the parents m ay p o ssess  
the m eans adequately to  redress this disadvantage, Steiner con ced es that -  in v iew  o f  the N on -Identity  P rinciple -  
this transfer o f  responsib ility  w ou ld  be appropriate on ly  in cases w here gene therapy (w h ich  he supp oses to  be non  
identity-altering) w as ava ilab le , but not w here P G D  w as declined . ‘S ilver Sp oons and G old en  G enes: Talent 
D ifferentia ls and D istributive  Ju stice’, in Justine B urley , ed. The G en e tic  R evo lu tio n  a n d  H um an R igh ts, O xford, 
O xford U niversity  Press, 1999 , pp. 1 4 6 -148 .
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is only logical to do so w hen there were other alternatives available to them . Hence, it 
would be intelligible to hold parents responsible for the birth o f  their ‘faith babies’ only 
if  the option o f screening embryos had been open to  them , and they had declined it.
How likely is it that PG D will ever be a practically accessible option for all? On 
N ozick’s approach, certainly, prospective parents will be free from state interference or 
restriction w ith such choices, and in that sense PGD will indeed be an option. But, as 
has been often noted, freedom  fro m  interference with a choice is not synonymous with 
freedom to act upon that choice. The other side o f  N ozick’s laissez faire approach 
would, presum ably, deny that it is the responsibility o f  the state, or o f  other people, to 
provide the m eans to act upon that choice -  what I refer to later as the ‘hard’ version of 
the Genetic Superm arket hypothesis. W hile the prospect o f a Genetic Superm arket in 
which only ‘the rich ’ (however defined) can shop presents its own problem s (see Section 
3 o f  this chapter), it does perhaps provide one possible response to the argum ent from 
responsibility: it is illogical and unfair to hold a parent responsible for not utilising PGD 
when, for reasons o f  inadequate resources, they could not afford to do so. And, given 
that this objection is directed at those who will, or whose disabled children will, be 
reliant upon state benefits, it is perhaps not implausible to imagine that they will not 
constitute the w ealthiest section o f  society.^ *
Again, it is not my contention that the general public w ould  subscribe to such a view; it 
is always possible that those for w hom  PGD lies beyond their m eans w ould be subjected 
to a sort o f  ‘double jeopardy’, blam ed both for their poverty and for the consequences o f 
that poverty. However, in an ethical evaluation such as this, it is perhaps worthy o f note 
that, at least according to the com m on conception o f justice considered later in this 
chapter, the attribution o f  responsibility should  take note o f  what was, in reality, possible 
for the pai'ents o f disabled children. If  it is reasonable to penalise children for the bad
O f course, I recogn ise  that m ore sev ere ly  d isab led children m ay require fu ll-tim e care or assistance, or 
sp ecia list treatm ent, w h ich  m ay lie  beyond  the m eans o f  even  m oderately w ealthy fam ilies, fam ilies for w hom  
PG D  w ou ld  have been  affordable. N o n eth ele ss , insofar as this ob jection  derives its em otion al force from  its 
seem in g  concern w ith the least w ealthy , it is w orthy o f  note that they should, by rights, be exclud ed  from any such  
attribution o f ‘b lam e’.
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choices o f  their parents -  and I m aintain that it is not -  then it is at least surely 
unreasonable to penalise them  w hen any such choices were, in fact, illusory.
4.2.3 Subjective harms: causing disabled people to fe e l  devalued
If  the concern is about how  existing disabled persons will feel in the face o f  this 
technology, then the m easurable impact, in term s o f reduction in political strength or 
public sympathy, m ay be less relevant than the personal, subjective testim ony o f  actual 
disabled people. In this regard, there appears to exist in the literature ample evidence o f 
distress and offence in  the face o f  the perceived m essage that, as one com m entator put it, 
‘some o f us are “too flaw ed” in our very DNA to exist; we are unw orthy o f  being 
born.’^^  In order to evaluate this concern, it is necessary to consider who, precisely, it is 
that is thought to be sending this message. For the purposes o f  this discussion, I have 
considered separately the suggestions that (a) it emanates from  parents, and (b) it 
emanates from ‘society’.
4.2.3 By their parents
Disability activist M arsha Saxton has contributed some obviously deeply personal 
contributions to several collections on reproductive teclinologies. In one such chapter, 
she recalls her own first exposure to the choices posed by the existence o f  prenatal 
testing:
I rem em bered the spina bifida newsletter w hen I first read about the 
AFP [alpha-feto protein] test available to detect spina bifida and 
other neural tube defects. I rem em ber having m ixed feelings. Could 
I choose to abort a  baby w ith my own disability, end the life o f 
someone som ehow  an even closer kin to me than my own child?
But then could I choose to continue the life o f  som eone possibly 
destined to endure some o f  the same treatm ents I had experienced?
Another thought emerged: if  this test had been available to my 
m other I m ight never have been born.^^
M arsha Saxton, ‘D isa b ility  R ights and S e lec tiv e  A b ortion’, in R ick ie  Solinger, ed. A b o rtio n  IVars: A H a lf  
C en tu ry  o /S tr u g g le , B erk ley , U n iversity  o f  C aliforn ia Press, 1998 , pp .3 7 4 -3 9 3 , at p .3 9 1 .
M arsha Saxton, “B orn  and unborn: the im plications o f  reproductive tech n o lo g ies for p eo p le  w ith  d isab ilities” 
from  T est-T ube W om en: W hat fu tu r e  f o r  m o th erh o o d ? ,  ed. Rita Arditti, et al (Pandora P ress, 1984), at p .301 .
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The last sentence raises two rather different concerns. One, that in ‘screening out’ those 
embryos deemed to be ‘disabled’, we w ill be depriving society o f  valuable contributprs 
(such as, undeniably, Saxton herself), w ill be addressed later in this chapter. But 
Saxton’s reference to her m other m ight suggest the possibility o f  a  different sort o f 
psychological anguish, aiising from a sort o f counterfactual parental rejection. I f  my 
m other had had the option o f  this test, Saxton seems to be saying, she would have 
rejected me.
A sim ilar sense o f  hurt has been expressed by Deborah Kent:, who has w iitten  o f her
disappointm ent in the face o f  the reactions from her parents and husband at the prospect
o f giving birth to a child that shared her genetic blindness:
I will always believe that blindness is a neutral trait, neither to be 
prized nor shunned. Very few people, including those dearest to me, 
share that conviction. M y husband, my parents, and so m any others 
who are central to my life cannot fully relinquish their negative 
assum ptions. I feel that I have failed when I run into jarring 
rem inders that I have not changed their perspective. In those 
crushing m om ents I fear that I am  not truly accepted after all. "^*
It is not difficult to understand how  such a belief -  that their very existence was a result
only o f  their parents’ lack o f choice, and that given that choice they w ould have been
rejected - could be painful to anyone who values their relationship with, and the esteem
in which they are held by, their parents. Does this, then, provide a concrete example o f
harm  caused by the Genetic Superm arket (expanded, as in Saxton’s scenario, to include
those prenatal tests that have been available for many yeais)?
There are, I believe, at least three possible responses to the ‘rejection’ concern that, 
while not necessarily allaying all o f  the concern felt by people like Saxton and Kent, at 
least give pause w ith  regard to the coherence o f those concerns, or their direct relevance 
to the Genetic Supermarket. First, it m ight be pointed out that, in one way or another, 
m ost o f us owe our existence to the lack o f  choice open to our ancestors; had sex 
education, effective contraception and perhaps the notion o f  fem ale reproductive
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autonomy been available to the generations that preceded us, it is m ore than likely that, 
somewhere in our genetic lineage, an ancestor w ould have elected not to have as many 
children, to have children at precisely that time, or indeed to have children at all, with 
the result that we w ould never have come to exist. Presum ably, few  o f us would 
consider that this provides a reason for denying those choices to w om en today.
Should this realisation prove com forting to those who, like Saxton, are concerned about
what her m other m ight have done had prenatal testing been available to her? Perhaps she
m ight retort that, w hile my ancestors may indeed have elected not to have a child, or
another child, or a child at that precise time, they would not have been rejecting this
particular child, and certainly not on the grounds o f  certain characteristics that this child
possessed. This is the position adopted by Theresa Degener -
O f course, the non-selective abortion o f  a pregnancy that was
undesired from  the start also views the fetus as a burden, but this
evaluation is not based on an individual characteristic o f  the 
potential child, but on aspects that ai*e um'elated to the fetus, such as 
the w om an’s living conditions and the way she wants to lead her 
life. The special character o f  selective abortion lies in w anting to 
opt for a so-called norm (al) child and reject a disabled child.^^
- and is what Adrienne A sch has deem ed the ‘any-particular distinction’: while ‘most abortions
reflect a decision not to bring any fetus to term  at this tim e ... selective abortions involve a
decision not to bring this particular fetus to term because o f  its tra its’.
Are Degener and A sch right to assum e, though, that a decision to ‘screen ou t’ a disabled 
embryo is unique in its im plicit negative coimotations about certain existing children?
Are decisions to avoid the birth o f  a  fifth or sixth child, a child born into conditions o f 
poverty, or, to return to P a rfif  s example, a child bom  to a girl too young to look after it
properly, devoid o f any such connotations? In exactly the same way as, for Saxton, the
D eborah K ent, ‘S om ew h ere a M ock in gb ird ’, in Parens and A sch , eds. P re n a ta l T es tin g  a n d  D isa b ility  R igh ts, 
op. cit., at p .62.
T heresa D egener, ‘F em ale se lf-determ ination  b etw een  fem in ist c la im s and “voluntary” eu gen ics , betw een  
“rights” and e th ics’, Issu es  in R e p ro d u c tiv e  a n d  G en e tic  E n g in eerin g  (1 9 9 0 ), 3 (2 ), 8 7 -9 9 , at p p .92-93 .
Erik Parens and A drienne A sch . ‘T he D isa b ility  R ights Critique o f  Prenatal T esting: R eflection s and 
R ecom m endations’, in Parens and A sch , eds. P re n a ta l T estin g  a n d  D isa b ility  R ig h ts, W ash ington , D .C ., 
G eorgetow n U niversity  Press, 2 0 0 0 , at p. 15.
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decision to avoid the birth o f  disabled children constitutes a rejection of, and affront to,
existing disabled people, do not these other decisions tacitly imply negative evaluations
o f children born into large fam ilies, into poverty or to young teenaged m others? Indeed,
precisely this point is m ade by James Lindem ann Nelson:
even granting, for sake o f  argument, that abortion to prevent 
disability sends a disrespectful m essage to disabled people, w^hy 
would abortion on the basis o f  family size, or poverty, or for any 
other reason, not send sim ilarly disparaging m essages to children o f 
large fam ilies, or the poor, or to those who share w ith the fetus 
whatever properties that were the basis o f  the abortion decision?
Those who agree w ith  Saxton, then, m ust demonstrate why a decision to avoid the birth
o f  a disabled child sends an em otionally harm ful m essage to existing disabled people
while a decision to avoid the birth o f  a  child into difficult social or economic -  as
opposed to genetic -  circum stances does not send an analogous m essage to poor
families, large fam ilies or fam ilies w ith veiy young mothers.
The second objection talces issue w ith the assum ption that, in opting not to give birth to a
disabled child, prospective parents are devaluing life with disability. Reinders advances
the view that it is possible for prospective parents to screen out (or abort) an embryo (or
foetus) w ith a particular condition w ithout m aking a discrim inatory judgem ent about
people w ith  that condition:
If  a couple after having had a prenatal test decides to abort the fetus 
because it is affected by Dow n [sic] syndrome, they can justify  this 
decision by referring to w hat they think they are capable o f  in 
raising a family,^^
As Buchanan notes, there may be a num ber o f  reasons why parents w ish their children to 
possess certain traits that do not necessarily presuppose a discrim inatory attitude against 
those who lack them: ‘One m ay wish to avoid serious strains on one’s m airiage, on one’s 
ability to fulfil responsibilities to one’s other children, or on scarce social resources’.
Jam es L indem ann N e lso n , ‘Prenatal D ia g n o sis , Personal Identity, and D isa b ility ’, K e n n e d y  In stitu te  o f  E th ics  
J o u rn a l 10.3 (2 0 0 0 ) 2 1 3 -2 2 8 , a tp .2 1 6
Reinders, The F u tu re o f  the  D is a b le d  in L ib e ra l  S o c ie ty , op. cit., at p .93 .
Buchanan, ‘C h oosin g  w h o w ill be d isa b led ’, loc . cit., at p .32 . A  sim ilar point is m ade by B on n ie  S teinbock  in 
her chapter ‘D isab ility , Prenatal T esting , and S e lec tiv e  A b ortion ’, in Parens and A sch , eds. P re n a ta l T estin g  a n d  
D isa b ility  R igh ts, op. c it., at p .119.
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Furthermore, prospective parents may, for example, simply wish their children to share 
certain o f their ow n characteristics, perhaps in pursuit o f  some kind o f  ‘genetic 
im m ortality’, perhaps because they simply feel that they will be m ore easily and happily 
assim ilated within the existing fam ilial environm ent if  they do/**
Indeed, we have considered an exam ple o f  ju st such a w ish already in this thesis, when 
we looked at the attem pts o f  Candy M cCullough and Sharon Duchesneau to ensure their 
child was ‘deaf like them ’. Such attem pts did not presuppose that the life o f  the hearing 
was in any sense inferior to that o f  the deaf (although it is possible that M cCullough and 
Duchesneau did harbour such attitudes), merely that their lives are sufficiently different 
as to constitute a barrier to sharing certain o f the same experiences as their parents.
W hatever the precise reason, there m ay be a num ber o f  possible explanations for parents
preferring a child w ith certain qualities, none o f  which involve a generalised assum ption
o f inferiority o f  those w ithout those qualities. In the case o f  those qualities the absence
o f which are conventionally regarded as ‘disabilities’, the reason m ay simply be a
recognition, or belief, that they them selves lack the frnancial, physical, social or
emotional resources necessaiy to raise such a child; they may be recognising their own
limitations, rather than deem ing the child as ‘sub-standard’ or ‘unfit to live.’"** As
Theresa Degener notes,
there is as little harm  in wanting to have a nondisabled child as 
there is in w anting to have a disabled child. ... It is only w hen this 
w ish for a nondisabled child is declared universal and it becom es 
m andatory to resort to supposedly infallible technological m eans to 
ensure that it is fulfilled that it becomes a danger and a duty.'*^
A  point o f  v iew  expressed  by M a iy  A nn B a ily , w ho candid ly adm its her ow n unease at the prospect o f  any 
future child  she bore b e in g  co -o p ted  into a ‘d isab ility  culture’ from  w hich  she h e r se lf  w as excluded; ‘W hy I Had 
A m n io cen tisis’, in Parens and A sch , eds. P re n a ta l T estin g  a n d  D isa b ility  R igh ts, op. cit., at pp .6 8-69 .
S ee  Jam es L indem ann N e lso n , ‘Prenatal D ia g n o sis , Personal Identity, and D isa b ility ’, loc. cit., at p p .2 15-216 . 
S ee a lso  Parens and A sch . ‘T he D isab ility  R ights Critique o f  Prenatal T estin g ’, op. c it., at p. 15, w here they note  
that ‘Parents o f  one ch ild  w ith  a d isab ility  m ay b e liev e  that they d o n ’t have the em otion al or financial resources 
for another.’
D egener, ‘Fem ale self-determ in ation .,. ’, loc. cit., a tp .9 5 .
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The third possible response to Saxton’s objection is that the (for her) distressing 
possibility that her m other w ould have opted for an abortion, and any em otional anguish 
she suffers as a result o f  acknowledging this possibility, is not dependent upon any 
particular state o f affairs obtaining in the present time. W hether or not the choice o f 
PGD is made available to today’s potential parents, she w ill nonetheless have to confront 
the evidently uncom fortable possibility that, had she had a choice, her m other might 
have opted for an abortion. A t m ost, denying the option o f  PGD to another generation o f 
potential parents w ill sim ply give rise to another generation like Saxton who will 
wonder, with vaiying degrees o f  discom fort, what their parents m ight have done had 
they had the choice.
4.2.4 By ‘society’
The view that ‘society’ is sending a negative message to disabled people that they are not
wanted is well sum m arised by Susan W endell. In The Rejected Body, she addresses the issue
o f prenatal testing, follow ed by abortion o f  any foetuses found to be disabled:
the w idespread use o f  selective abortion to reduce the num ber o f 
people born w ith disabilities ... sends a message to children and 
adults w ith disabilities, especially people who have genetic or 
prenatal disabilities, that “we do not want any m ore like you” ."*^
In a similar vein, H ans S. Reinders observes that
it appears as though our society is sim ultaneously sending two 
messages to the disabled and their families. The first m essage says,
“Since you’re here, w e’re going to care for you as best we can,” but 
the second says, “But everyone w ould be better o ff if  you were not 
here at all’” '*'*
while Bill A lbert o f  Disabled Peoples’ International has argued that ‘N o one should have 
to live that life in a society w hich values them  so little it makes a social and medical 
virtue out o f elim inating people who m ight be like them .’'*^
W endell, The R e je c te d  B o d y , op. c it., at p. 153.
Reinders, The F u tu re  o f  the D is a b le d  in L ib e ra l S o c ie ty , op. cit., at p.4.
B ill A lbert, ‘T he N e w  G en etics and D isa b ility  R ig h ts’, Presentation to E U  C on feren ce ‘H um an G enetic  
T esting, W hat Im p lica tion s’, B ru ssels, M ay 6 , 2 0 0 4 , availab le at
http://w w w .dpi.org/en /resources/top ics/b ioeth ics/G 5-10-Q 4_balbert.h tm . S ee  also  ‘D isab led  P eop le  Speak  on the 
N e w  G en etics’, D PI E urope P osition  Statem ent on  B ioeth ics and H um an R ights, ava ilab le  at 
http://w w w .dpieurope.org/h tm /b ioeth ics/dpsngfu llreport.h tm . See a lso  Laura M . Purdy: ‘A t a m ore theoretical 
level, the judgem ent that life  Is better w ithout such problem s is taken as an insult to th ose  n ow  facing them .’ From
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Is it necessarily true, though, that ‘screening out’ o f  certain genetic conditions implies a 
devaluing o f people  w ith those conditions? Attem pts to elim inate sm allpox, or leprosy, 
or rickets, were not taken to imply that those affected by such conditions were devalued, 
and it is unlikely that they regarded attem pts to elim inate such diseases as offensive. As 
Reinders says.
We fight cancer; we do not fight people with cancer. I f  research to 
eliminate cancer does not imply an attitude that supports 
discrim ination against persons who suffer from this disease, why 
should clinical genetics be different?'*^
Reinders calls this the D istinction betw een the Person and the Condition (DPC)
argument, according to which ‘The charge o f negative evaluation is completely
unjustified, therefore. It is based on the false identification o f  persons with their
conditions.’'*^
Reinders goes on to aclmowledge, though, the obvious rebuttal to the DPC that
with very few exceptions, the genetic diseases that are currently 
known can be “treated” only by eliminating the fetuses that are 
affected. In actual practice the distinction betw een persons and 
their conditions rem ains inconsequential, therefore.'*^
W hereas it is possible to detroy cancer cells while leaving alive those persons who were
affected by them, the same cannot be said o f screening out genetic disorders, where the
only means by w hich the disorder can be avoided necessarily involves ‘avoiding’ the
person as well. In other words, it is not sim ply the disorder that is being rejected, but the
whole package o f  person-plus-disorder. This, surely, is distinct from  attempts to
eliminate somatic (or even treatable genetic) disorders.
As suggested at the end o f  Chapter 2, however, the conclusion that identity is 
synonymous w ith genetic identity is by no means uncontentious. Is there not at least a
‘L oving Future P eo p le ’, in Joan C. Callahan, ed. R ep rodu ction , E th ics a n d  the law : F em in ist p e rsp e c tive s .
Indiana U niversity  Press, 1995, at p .3 12; M eg  Stacey, ‘T he new  genetics: a fem in ist v ie w ’, in The tro u b le d  helix , 
eds. T heresa M arteau and M artin R ichards, C am bridge U n iversity  Press, 1996 , at p .34 3 .
R einders, The F u tu re  o f  the D isa b le d  in L ib e ra l S o c ie ty , op. cit., at p .55.
Id.
Ibid, at p .56.
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plausible case for believing that other conditions, particularly those w hich act upop the
brain, m ight also be thought to be ‘identity defining’? This has certainly been the
perspective o f  a num ber o f  bioethicists in relation to conditions such as A lzheim er’s
D isease/^  Indeed, at least one author w ould argue that this expressivist objection could
be applied to practically any attem pt to ‘cure’ a disabling condition, genetic or otherwise:
If  abortion on the basis o f  prenatal diagnosis sends a “we don't w ant 
your kind here” message, why w ould therapeutic interventions not 
do so as w ell - and the m ore successful the therapies are, the m ore 
effective the m essage? If  abortion to avoid parenting a child w ith 
disabling conditions involves m aking a decision based on a single 
trait, w ould not efforts to cure or prevent disability also involve 
value assessm ents based on a single trait? If  testing and abortion 
militate against social acceptance o f  disabilities as exam ples o f 
hum an variation, why w ould testing and treating not do so as 
well?^**
For present purposes, it is not necessary to consider precisely which disabling conditions 
m ight be properly be regarded as ‘identity defining’, and therefore to com e within the 
ambit o f the expressivist objection. It is sufficient that we consider seriously the 
possibility that som e -  those which im pact m ost severely upon cognitive functioning, 
awareness o f self, m em ories, aspirations and wants -  can be said to be so. A treatm ent 
for A lzheim er’s D isease w ould result in a society where ‘different’ people existed than 
one where A lzheim er’s is not cured. If  this is true, then attem pts to eliminate 
A lzheim er’s Disease m ay well fall foul o f  the expressivist objection, carrying an implicit 
statement o f devaluing or rejecting those affected by the disease. Can we therefore
A n inti'iguing ethical d iscu ssio n  o f  A lzh e im er’s d isease  and continuity o f  identity has centred around the issue  
o f  advance d irectives. D an B rock  has written o f  the situation w here ‘the co g n itiv e  changes in the patient are so  
profound as to call into qu estion  w hether personal identity is m aintained betw een  the earlier and later se lv e s ’ .
See, in particular, the notab le contribution o f  R eb ecca  D resser to  the literature on th is point: ‘A dvance directives, 
self-determ ination, and personal identity ’, in H acker, C ., M o se ley , R ., V aw ter, D ., eds. A d v a n c e  D irec tive s  in 
M edicin e , N e w  Y ork, Praeger Publishers, 1989; ‘T he Incom petent Patient on the S lippery S lo p e ’. H astin gs  
C en ter R e p o rt  July-A ugust 1994 , 6 -1 2  (w ith  P.J. W hitehouse); see  also  Mark K u czew sk i ‘W hose W ill Is It, 
A nyw ay? A  D iscu ssio n  o f  A d van ce  D irectives, Personal Identity, and C onsensus in M ed ica l E th ics.’ B io eth ics  
(1 9 9 4 ) 8 (I):2 7 -4 8 ; H elg a  K uhse ‘Som e R eflection s on the Problem  o f  A d van ce  D irec tiv es, Personhood and 
P ersonal Identity’, K e n n e d y  In stitu te  o f  E th ics  J o u rn a l (1 9 9 9 ) 9 (4 ): 3 4 7 -3 6 4 .
Jam es Lindem ann N e lso n , ‘Prenatal D ia g n o s is , Personal Identity, and D isa b ility ’, K e n n e d y  In stitu te  o f  E th ics  
J o u rn a l 10.3 (2 0 0 0 ) 2 1 3 -2 2 8 , a tp .2 I 9
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conclude that society devalues or disrespects or rejects those w ith late-stage 
A lzheim er’s?^*
It m ight be thought, then, that the analogy between genetic screening and attempts to 
reverse the effects o f  plausibly identity-defining conditions such as A lzheim er’s disease 
is stronger than some adherents to the expressivist objection seem to recognise. I f  this is 
so, then if  we conclude that genetic screening sends a negative m essage to existing 
disabled people, then this m ust be equally true o f existing m entally im paired individuals 
when we pursue ‘cures’ for their conditions; ‘cures’ which, I suggest, w ould replace 
them  with different persons ju st as surely as PGD. If, on the other hand, w e do not regard 
these efforts as im plicitly devaluing existing m entally im paired individuals, then neither 
should we regard PG D  as im plicitly devaluing those affected by genetic disorders.
On this view, then, ‘screening out’ certain conditions does not, or need not, send out a 
negative statement to anyone, by anyone, or in any event at least no m ore so than an 
attempt to cure a disease such as A lzheim er’s. Even if  this view  is rejected, however, 
there may be thought to exist a num ber o f  other reasons to doubt that the laissez faire 
approach o f the Genetic Superm arket comm unicates a  negative value judgem ent to the 
disabled.
The first response to this contention did not involve any attem pt to define to whom, or 
what, ‘society’ referred, simply because its central idea was that there was no negative 
judgem ent whatever; were this so, then the question o f from w hom  precisely such a 
judgem ent originated is clearly m eaningless. I f  this were not accepted, though, and if  the
F o llow in g  the lo g ic  o f  the N on -Identity  P rincip le, and assum ing that D resser, et al, are correct about the 
discontinuity o f  identity betw een  those w ith , and those w ithout, A lzh e im er’s, a som ew h at m ore ala itn ing prospect 
arises; that, in attem pting to  cure A lzh e im er’s, at least for those in the latter stages o f  the d isesase, w e  w ou ld  in 
truth be seek ing  to rep lace one -  ex istin g  -  individual w ith a different, presently m erely  hypothetical one. I f  the 
discontinuity thesis is taken to its lo g ica l co n clu sion , w ou ld  this am ount to ‘k illin g ’ one hum an being  in order than 
another m ight com e into ex isten ce?  O f  course, the sam e concern need  not arise w ith regard to treatm ents w hich  
prevent the onset o f  A lzh e im er’s, or w h ich  arrest its progress in the v e iy  early stages; such treatm ents could  either  
be regarded as the ‘sa v in g ’ o f  the ex istin g  life , or the ch oosin g  o f  one potential future life  (that w ithout 
A lzh e im er’s) over another, alternative future life  (that w ith the d isease). W hich explanation  one ch ose  w ould ,
138
C h ap te j-  4
expressivist objection were thought to possess some m erit in relation to ‘societal’ 
messages, then it clearly becom es necessaiy to consider who or w hat ‘society’ describes 
in this context.
There are, I suggest, probably m any different senses in which this term  may be 
employed, but two in particular seem  relevant to the present discussion. First, ‘society’ 
may be thought to apply to those individuals and bodies entrusted, elected or appointed 
to m ake decisions in  the interests o f  the populace as a whole, while at the same tim e 
presum ably safeguarding the rights and interests o f m inority groups or individuals within 
that populace; for the pm poses o f  this debate, ‘society’ m ight be thought to be embodied 
in the decisions o f Parliam ent, o f  the courts and o f the FIFEA.
The second sense in w hich ‘society’ m ight be thought to send any sort o f  m essage might 
take an even m ore direct form, as w hen individual w om en or couples m ade the same 
sorts o f  decisions in sufficient num bers to com m unicate a single m essage to a particular 
section o f  the population, in this case ‘the disabled’. I f  the majority o f  w om en or couples 
faced w ith a choice elected to screen for and reject embryos affected w ith cystic fibrosis, 
this m ight be thought to convey a negative m essage to those living w ith CF as to how 
they are viewed by, and the extent to which they are valued or accepted within, the 
society in which they live.
This latter conception, I submit, may be dealt w ith in sim ilar term s that I employed in 
addressing the objection in the preceding section. Disability activists like M arsha 
Saxton already appeal' (not implausibly) convinced that a free m arket in PGD would 
result in negative judgm ents about certain traits becom ing the norm  in practice. Yet i f  it 
is this judgem ent - not by any state or executive agency, court or quango, but by 
individual potential parents -  that is offensive or devaluing to existing disabled persons, 
then we m ust ask whether we offer m uch solace by denying access to the means o f  
implem enting or dem onstrating that judgem ent. Presum ably some disabled persons will
presum ably, depend on o n e ’s v iew s on the degree o f  continuity o f  identity betw een  the presently ex istin g  person,
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Still be aware, or at least highly suspicious, that such attitudes exist, and that the only 
reason they are not routinely im plem ented is that ‘society’ in its other conception -  
Parliament, the courts and the regulatory bodies -  prohibit them  from being so.
If  the concern was that articulated by Tom  Shakespeare or Susan W endell earlier in this 
chapter, i.e. the practical concern that widespread use o f PGD would reduce the 
proportion o f disabled persons in society, then such a restriction m ay provide some 
comfort. But if  the concern relates to the values underlying such choices, then it m ust be 
suspected that w hile denying the choice involves denying this particular means o f 
demonstration, it does not alter the underlying value judgem ent. (Indeed, it is perhaps 
not unlikiey that those denied access to what they now recognise to be a teclmologically 
possible option m ay dem onstrate their value judgem ents in other forms, for example, by 
lobbying Parliament, appealing to the courts, writing to newspapers or -  as in the case o f 
the W hitaker and M asterton fam ilies -  travelling to less restrictive jurisdictions to give 
effect to their choices. Perhaps m ost straightforwardly, it might be assum ed that opinion 
polls and public consultations w ill continue to demonstrate wide public sympathy for 
abortion on the grounds o f  serious foetal abnormality, and PGD for ‘serious inlierited 
conditions’^^  a response that presum ably conveys quite unam biguously the sort o f  value 
judgem ent some disabled persons find offensive.)
The notion, then, that we could prevent ‘society’ in the sense o f  the aggregate o f 
potential parents from  com m unicating negative value judgem ents by restricting their 
access to PGD is, I suggest, conceptually flawed. If  the harm  lies in their values rather 
than their actual choices, then in curtailing the choices we rem ove only one means o f 
expressing those values, and not the offensive values themselves. Since it is likely that 
those values will continue to be expressed in other forms and tlmough other media, and 
since it is likely that the m ore sensitive o f observers will continue to suspect that such 
values exist in any event, it m ust be questionable whether a restriction in access to PGD
and the potential future (un affected ) ind ividual into w hom  he m ight develop .
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will address this particular concern. The only way in which ‘society’ in this sense could 
avoid the infliction o f  harm  that lies in the m ass rejection o f disabled embryos w ould be 
by exercising that choice in a m anner that does not devalue such embryos. Depriving 
them o f  that choice, at best, does no m ore than m ask the offensive judgem ent, or more 
accurately -  and perhaps m ore significantly -  one o f many possible m anifestations o f 
that offensive judgem ent.
W hat, then, o f the role o f  ‘society’ in that other sense, i.e as em bodied in the decisions, 
perm issions and proscriptions o f  its decision-m aking bodies? Here, the response offered 
to the first sense o f  ‘societal’ criticism  seems to have less validity. I have suggested that 
a ban on certain uses o f  PGD m ay do little to reassure disabled persons that they are not 
being devalued by the ‘com m unity o f  potential parents’, since the only thing preventing 
them  from acting according to those judgem ents is a system o f legal restriction.
Presumably, though, the same thing cannot be said o f  the authors o f  these very
restrictions. If  Parliam ent elects to draw  a line, perm itting PGD for certain genetic traits
or conditions but not for others, it is easy to see how  this could be seen as a value
judgem ent as betw een those traits or conditions. As Parens and Asch have said;
Enlisting m edical professionals to list the conditions approved for 
tests and exclude others as “not serious enough or burdensom e 
enough” turns individual, private, parental decisions into socially 
supported ones. Also, it increases the likelihood that an explicitly 
devaluing m essage will be sent about people whose conditions are 
listed as “serious enough to avoid.
And insofar as the decisions o f  Parliam ent (and perhaps o f those bodies, such as the
HFEA, to which it delegates a degree o f decision-m aking authority) reflect the values o f
the society that elects them, then these decisions presum ably reflect a certain sense o f
‘societal’ judgem ents as to the value, or desirability, o f the lives o f those who possess
the traits which it perm its to be screened out.
A pproxim ately 69%  o f  respondents to the H G C /H F E A  P ublic C onsultation on P G D  agreed that PG D  should be 
availab le only  w here there is a Icnown fam ily  h isto iy  o f  serious genetic  disorder or to ca se s o f  aneuploidy. 
‘A n alysis o f  the R esp o n ses to the Joint H F E A /A C G T  C onsultation Paper on P G D ’, at para, 16.
Parens and A sch . ‘T he D isa b ility  R ights Critique o f  Prenatal T estin g ’, loc. cit., at p p .3 0 -3 1 .
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At present, the HFEA allows PGD for the purpose o f  avoiding cystic fibrosis, but refuses 
to allow it for, say, avoiding a child with brown rather than blue eyes/'* Assum ing that 
the debit side o f the equation -  the reasons against allowing PGD, such as the intrinsic 
value attributed to the embryo, or the dangers inherent in the procedure -  rem ain 
constant in both decisions, the justification for the differing response to these two uses o f 
PGD m ust reflect a particular judgem ent as to the desirability o f  avoiding, respectively, 
children with CF and children w ith blue eyes. This judgem ent m ay rely on beliefs about 
the burdens such children may them selves experience, the burdens their births will 
impose on their parents, or the contribution they will be able to m ake to their ‘society’, 
but it seems that som e such belief is im plicit in this act o f line-drawing; and it is 
precisely in such beliefs that com m entators like Saxton and W enders discern an 
offensive message.
Supposing, however, that the role o f  ‘society’ (as embodied in Pailiam ent or the HFEA) 
in the decision o f  w hich traits to ‘screen out’ was wholly value neutral; that is, i f  the 
choice were entirely that o f  the prospective parents. In such a circum stance, 1 submit, we 
could reasonably conclude that ‘society’ sends no message to anyone, beyond the 
message that it is w illing to respect the individual choice o f individual potential parents 
in such matters. (The question o f  the extent to which it should adopt a facillitatory or 
enabling role, providing the m eans for prospective parents to m ake such decisions, will 
be considered in the next section.)
Is the role o f society in such decisions really as passive as this contention seems to 
require? At present, in the UK, this is certainly not the case. As I discuss throughout this 
thesis, the availability o f  PGD is strictly curtailed by the term s o f  the Fluman 
Fertilisation and Em bryology Act, and by the requirem ent o f licensing by the Fluman
I acknow ledge that this is w hat m ay be term ed a ‘fr iv o lo u s’ ch o ice , and one w hich  few  prosp ective  parents 
m ight be thought lik ely  to m ake, but I b e lie v e  it illustrates m y present point w e ll as other p ossib le  considerations  
in support o f  restriction -  su ch  as m ight arise in relation to se lection  for sex , race or sexual orientation -  do not 
arise to cloud  the issue. In particular, and as d istinct fr om  those other attributes, I am aware o f  no serious 
discrim ination in U K  so c ie ty  on  the basis o f  eye  colour.
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Fertilisation and Em bryology Authority. PGD is available only for those traits that the 
Authority perm its to be screened, and to date it has sought to restrict this to those likely 
to pose ‘a significant risk o f  a serious genetic condition being present in the em bryo’. 
Furthermore, it has explicitly excluded screening on the grounds o f  em bryonic sex or for 
HLA compatibility alone (although the latter decision was recently reversed; see Chapter
5).
W hat message does the A uthority send out when it restricts the use o f  PGD in such a
manner? All other considerations aside, it assuredly sends the signal that choices about
PGD are not wholly private m atters, to be aixived at by the prospective parents alone.
Rather, it is m aking a statem ent to the effect that some choices prospective parents may
make are acceptable, w hile others are not. As Reinders has said:
Society does not allow  us absolute freedom  in any area o f  social 
life. ... Free choice, therefore, is always restricted to publicly 
acceptable uses o f  freedom. ... Consequently, if  society accepts the 
prevention o f  disability as justified, it is because and only because it 
is regarded as a  legitim ate use o f personal freedom. ... Our society 
eonsiders prevention to be m orally acceptable.
PGD, then, will be perm itted only where there is a sufficiently com pelling justification
for so doing. A fuller discussion o f  the implications o f  these conditions will be
undertaken in the next chapter, but for present purposes it is relevant to consider the
possible im plication o f  restricting PGD to ‘serious genetic condition[s] ’. I f  there is merit
in the objection that ‘society’ sends out negative signals to disabled persons when it
allows prospective parents to screen them  out o f existence, then how  m uch reinforced is
that m essage when ‘society’ expressly prohibits every other kind o f  screening?
The details o f the H FE A ’s approach to tissue typing will be considered in the following 
chapter, but it is inform ative for present purposes to note that the essence o f the 
Authority’s decision to allow  the technique to be used by the Hashm is, but not by the 
W hittakers, lay in its be lie f that only in the form er case could PGD be said to benefit the
Joint W orking G roup o f  the H FE A  and H um an G en etics C om m ission , O u tcom e o f  the  P u b lic  C on su lta tio n  on  
P re im p la n ta tio n  G e n e tic  D ia g n o s is , N o vem b er 2 0 0 1 , R eeom m endation  11.
R einders, The F u tu re o f  th e  D is a b le d  in L ib e ra l S o c ie ty , op. cit., at p .64 .
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future child; w hen it is used only for tissue typing and not for the detection o f genetic 
disease, then it violates the Kantian im perative against using people as m eans only, and 
not treating them  also as ends in them selves.
I will argue in the next chapter that the distinction drawn between the two cases was 
prem ised on a questionable interpretation o f  the imperative, and that it was, ultimately, 
spurious. The im portant point for this chapter, however, is that the HFEA clearly 
regarded the use o f PG D in the Hashm i case as being for the benefit o f  the future child. 
G iven that there w as no prospect o f curing beta thalassaem ia, this could only be taken to 
m ean that the potential future Hashm i child possessed some kind o f  interest in avoiding 
being born with the burden o f this disease. Yet what message does this decision send to 
Zain Hashmi, or to others who live every day w ith that same illness? A  clearer example 
o f PGD sending a societal m essage that ‘it would have been better had you not been 
born’ would be hard to find.
If, in contrast. Parliam ent and/or the Authority were to perm it any prospective parents to 
screen for any trait, whether or not it is associated w ith what is conventionally seen as a 
‘disability’, then it w ould be possible to argue that the value ‘society’ is upholding is that 
o f reproductive choice, whatever that choice may be. As regards the specific choices 
which those prospective parents make, they could w ith some plausibility argue that they 
are entirely neutral; it would, after all, be difficult to argue that ‘society’ was implicitly 
devaluing the ‘d isabled’ i f  it allowed couples like Duchesneau and M cCullough to select 
genetically deaf em biyos for im plantation.
Clinical geneticist A ngus Clarke espoused what is probably the orthodox line with 
regard to PGD w hen he wrote that ‘society m ust determine what types o f  disorder are 
sufficiently severe to warrant prenatal-screening program mes w ith the term ination o f 
“affected” pregnancies.’^^  However, in allowing screening only to elim inate conditions
A ngus Clarke, ‘R esp o n se  to: “W hat counts as su ccess in gen etic  co u n sellin g?” ’, J o u rn a l o f  m ed ic a l e th ics  
(1 9 9 3 ); 19: 4 7 -4 9 , at p .4 8 . S ee  a lso  Jeffi-ey B otkin: ‘A s the range o f  cond itions for w h ich  w e can test prenatally
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deemed ‘sufficiently severe’, it may be that some validity is accorded to the arguments o f 
those who, like M arsha Saxton, feel that their society is m aking a statem ent that they are 
unwanted. This is one concern about PGD which the laissez faire approach o f the 
Genetic Superm arket might, in fact, address rather than exacerbate. The state’s 
acceptance o f PG D to screen out CF, Duchenne m uscular dystrophy or beta thalassaem ia 
embiyos would, perhaps, seem  less value-laden, less offensive, perhaps even less sinsiter 
to those living w ith such conditions were it also to accept the use o f  PG D to screen out 
embryos who had blue eyes, who were boys, or who had normal hearing, however m uch 
m edia hysteria was generated by such choices.
4.3 The need for line-drawing?
A value-neutral approach to PGD, then, could circum vent at least some expressivist 
objections. Does such an approach, though, require that all potential parents have access 
to all possible preim plantation tests? And if  not, how m ight a line be draw n between 
those which are available and those which are not?
Jeffrey Botkin is one o f  the few  authors to have not only attempted to m ake the case for 
line-drawing in preim plantation and (particularly) prenatal testing, but to demonstrate 
where, or at least on what basis, such lines m ight be drawn. In a series o f  a r t i c l e s , h e  
has attempted to m ake the case that lim its m ust be set on the range o f genetic traits for
expands, soc iety  and the m ed ica l profession  need to d evelop  gu id elin es about w h ich  tests ought to be offered and 
w h ich  ought not to  b e .’ ‘Fetal privacy and C on fid en tia lity ’, H a stin g s C en ter R e p o r t  (1 9 9 5 );  2 5 (5 ): 32 -3 9 , at p .32.
It m ay, o f  course, b e  su ggested  that in adopting an osten sib ly  la issez  faire approach, the state w ould  in reality  
be im porting subtle va lue  jud gem ents. T his m ight be so  i f  its d ec is io n  w ere in actuality  prem ised  on the  
assum ption that the o verw h elm in g  m ajority o f  PG D -users w ou ld  in fact use it to screen  out ‘d isa b ilities’ and not 
m ore ‘fidvolous’ traits, still less to use  it to screen  f o r  d isability . Is it reasonable to  contend  that, in adopting a 
la issez  faire approach in circum stances w herein  it know s that a particular c h o ice  w ill be particularly prevalent, the 
state is tacitly endorsing on ly  that ch o ice?  I su g g est that this need not be so . W ere the state to extend exactly  equal 
legal status to heterosexual and hom osexu a l relationsh ips, it cou ld  p lausib ly  argue that it w as adopting a position  
o f  neutrality as b etw een  sexu a lities, desp ite the fact that it is predictab le that considerably  m ore cou p les w ill 
ch oose  the form er rather than the latter. Sim ilarly, it need  not underm ine the constitutional com m itm ents o f  the 
French and U S states to  neutrality on the qu estion  o f  relig ion  that, in practice, a substantial m ajority o f  their 
c itizens use, and have a lw ays used , that freedom  to  practise as Christians.
‘Fetal privacy and C on fid en tia lity ’, H a stin g s  C en ter R e p o r t  (1 9 9 5 ); 2 5 (5 ): 3 2 -3 9 ; ‘L ine Drawing; 
D ev elo p in g  P rofessional Standards for Prenatal D iagnostic  S erv ices’, in Parens and A sch , eds. P ren a ta l  
T esting a n d  D isa b ility  R igh ts, op. ch ., pp. 2 8 8 -3 0 7 ; ‘Prenatal D iagn osis and the S e lec tio n  o f  C hildren’ 
F lo rid a  S ta te  U n iversity  L a w  R e v iew  (2 0 0 3 ); 30: 2 6 5 -2 9 3 .
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which testing should be available, according to both practical and ethical considerations. 
The practical aspect o f  his argum ent relies on the prediction that, as inform ation about 
genetics expands, so to will the range o f  possible tests which m ight be carried out on an 
em biyo’s genome, expanding perhaps to encompass thousands o f  traits o f  varying 
degrees o f rarity, and thousands o f  tests with varying degrees o f  accuracy. How, Botkin 
asks, is it ‘rem otely feasib le’ for a doctor or genetic counsellor to have a ‘m eaningful 
conversation’ w ith a pregnant, or prospectively pregnant, w om an about ‘thousands o f 
rare conditions’?^^
On B otkin’s m odel, the line betw een those tests which would be ‘available’, and those 
which would not should be drawn according to two criteria: ‘risk ’ and ‘value’. The 
foiiner would reflect the likelihood o f  the trait which the test is intended to detect 
actually existing; for Botkin, the cu t-off point m ight be where there is ‘a prevalence o f 
less than one in a thousand or one in ten  thousand births ... below  w hich physicians need 
not offer prenatal testing for the condition as standard care.’^’
The second criterion em ployed by Botkin in his line-drawing exercise is ‘value’, that is, 
the impact a given condition will have on ‘family life’.^  ^ Impact, he suggests, can be 
measured in term s o f four characteristics: ‘the likely severity o f the condition with 
respect to health’, ‘the age o f  onset o f  the condition’, ‘the probability that the ch ild’s 
genotype will m anifest as a significant clinical disease’ and ‘the probability that the 
condition will occur in those without specific risk factors.
It is in this attem pt at value-based line-drawing that Botkin, as he acloiowledges, 
encounters difficulties; first w ith relevance to the lack o f  consensus on the relative 
‘severity’ o f various traits. A lthough he is doubtless correct in his observation that
‘L ine Drawing: D e v e lo p in g  P rofession a l Standards for Prenatal D ia g n o stic  S e r v ic e s’, loc. cit., at p .295. 
‘^ Ib id ,a tp .2 9 7 .
N o te  that B otk in ’s approach is concerned  prim arily w ith prenatal testing, and hen ce , h is approach is prem ised  
substantially upon an a n a logy  w ith  abortion for ‘so c ia l’ reasons. Thus, he asks not ju st h ow  the condition  w ill  
im pact upon the ch ild  -  as he po in ts out, cond itions such as anencephaly or D o w n  syndrom e m ay not be ‘b a d ’ for 
the child  - but w hether and to w hat exten t it w ill harm the fam ily.
B otkin , ‘Fetal privacy and C on fid en tia lity ’, loc. cit., at p .37.
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certain conditions, such as Tay-Sachs, would be regarded as very severe by almost 
anyone fam iliar w ith their symptoms, identifying one extreme does not provide m uch 
assistance w ith draw ing lines.
In attempting this line-drawing, Botkin attempts to draw analogies betw een the burdens 
imposed by unwanted children and by disabled children; if, he argues, we allow abortion 
on ‘social’ grounds where wom en are too young, or too poor, or sim ply too reluctant to 
bear these children, then the cu t-off point for allowing genetic testing should be where 
the disability in question w ould im pose ‘problem s for the parents o f  a sim ilar m agnitude 
to the birth o f an unw anted c h i l d . W h i c h  genetic conditions, he enquires, would be 
approximately as burdensom e on a family as an unplanned and unw anted child?
Specifically, he identifies ‘conditions that are often fatal in childhood’, ‘conditions that 
result in a child who is clironically ill or who has recurrent illnesses o f  sufficient gravity 
to require repeated hospitalization’, ‘conditions that will not perm it the child to achieve 
independence in his or her adult years’ and ‘disabilities o f such severity that there are 
constant demands on the parents for tim e, effort, and financial resources’. H e  would 
exclude, however, ‘any condition affecting children that can be cured or effectively 
treated so that the affected individual does not experience significant m ental or physical 
impairments and in w hich the cure or treatm ent does not cause a serious financial burden 
to the family’ ‘those conditions affecting children that may not be amenable to cure or 
effective treatm ent, but for which some treatm ents may be available or the conditions
Id.
55 Id. B otk in  then g o es on  to  enum erate sp ec if ic  gen etic  conditions that he b e liev es m eet h is criteria, including  
‘hem ophilia , D ow n syndrom e, s ick le  ce ll anem ia, M enkes syndrom e, Fanconi's syndrom e, fragile X  syndrom e, 
m uscular dystrophy, o ste o g en es is  im perfecta, Hurler’s syndrom e, cystic  fibrosis, T ay Sachs d isease, m any cases o f  
spina bifida, and m any inborn errors o f  m etabolism . T he burdens o f  these cond itions for the parents are roughly  
sim ilar, i f  not m uch greater, than the burdens o f  an unwanted child  in term s o f  the effort, tim e, and financial 
resources n ecessa iy  to care for these  children, not to  m ention the ti agic early deaths caused  by  som e o f  these  
d isea ses.’ A t p.38.
‘E xam ples w ould  include P K U , ga lactosem ia , polydactaly , hypothyroid ism , m ost ca ses o f  asthm a, and c le ft lip  
and palate .’ A t p .38 .
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usually have a lim ited im pact on the life o f the child and family in term s o f effort, time, 
and financial resources’ and ‘those conditions that do not affect children’.
Assum ing that B otk in’s prediction is correct, and it does becom e possible to test for 
thousands o f traits, w hat im plications m ight this have for the Genetic Supermarket 
hypothesis? In particular, w ould it in fact necessitate an exercise in line-drawing? At 
different points in his argum ent, Botkin seems to offer at least two different, and 
potentially m utually iiTeconcilable, answers to the question o f why there is a need for 
line-drawing at all. On the one hand, he appeal's to argue that prenatal testing is 
inherently ethically problem atic and therefore in need o f  justification. At one point, he 
contends that ‘the knowledge that our parents fashioned us to their lik ing’ is potentially 
harmful, offending against ‘a personal sense o f independence and individuality’.^  ^ He 
goes on to argue that ‘other values, such as respect for prenatal life’ m ust be weighed in 
the balance against ‘the welfare o f  prospective parents’.
In Chapter 3 o f  this thesis, I sought to address both o f  these objections to the Genetic 
Supermarket hypothesis, but if  these do constitute genuine (or plausibly likely) harms 
then it would be entirely right to argue that a weighty case m ust be made out for 
perm itting genetic testing, and it m ay well be correct to argue that some tests would 
outweigh this harm  w hile others m ight not. However, at other points in this chapter, 
Botkin him self seem s to take the view that these are not sufficiently weighty harms to 
require a prohibition o f  those tests which do not m eet his criteria, but m erely that tests 
for these ‘below the line’ conditions should not be required. In the final paragraph o f  his 
conclusions, he says the following:
My conception o f  a line corresponds to a professional standard o f
cai'e, not legal prohibitions on the provision o f  services. ...
Practitioners could choose not to conform  to the standard, by
offering either more or less testing than the standai'd (although they
‘E xam ples include G 6P D  d efic ien cy , m any o f  the thalassem ias, Tourette syndrom e, sp herocytosis, M arfan 
syndrom e, and icth yosis vu lg a r is .’ Id.
‘including H untington d isea se , p o ly cy stic  kidney d isease , and m any o f  the hered itaiy  pred isposition s to cancer, 
such as those seco n d a iy  to the B R C A l g e n e .’
® ‘L ine Drawing: D e v e lo p in g  P rofession al Standards for Prenatal D iagnostic  S e r v ic es’, loc . cit., at p .302 .
Id.
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could be held legally liable through wi'ongful birth suits for failure 
to provide sufficient inform ation)/^
Yet if  Botkin’s argum ent is that line-drawing is required because the harm s inherent on
below-the-line tests require to be outweighed by com peting harms, it is difficult to see
why the provision o f  such tests should be at the discretion o f practitioners.
Considerably m ore plausible, I suggest, is his claim  that it is im practical to provide all 
possible tests, or even inform ation about all possible tests, to all prospective parents. If  
his prediction is accurate, and it does in  future becom e possible to test for thousands o f 
conditions, is it necessary to allow  access to every possible test to every prospective 
parent?
The answer to this question depends veiy m uch on what, precisely, it is asking. If the 
question is whether the state (in the form  o f  the crim inal law and licensing bodies like 
the HFEA) should restrict access to PGD, then I have already suggested a negative 
response to this (subject to a very few rare exceptions). If, on the other hand, it is asking 
whether the state (via the auspices o f the NHS) should be subject to a positive  obligation 
to provide access to PGD, even for incredibly rare conditions (where there is no reason 
to suspect heightened susceptibility) or ‘flippant’ choices, then two distinct options arise.
The first is w hat w e m ight refer to as a ‘hard’ conception o f the Genetic Supermarket.
This would propose that, w hile potential parents could avail them selves o f  whatever 
tests they wished, free from  state interference, access to such tests w ould not be provided 
for them  by the state. I f  the state will not pay for any  PGD, then we need not concern 
ourselves with the task  o f  specifying which  tests it w ill provide.
On an alternative, ‘soft’ conception o f  the Genetic Superm arket hypothesis, the state’s 
obligation w ould not only be negative -  to refrain from  interference -  but positive -  to 
provide the means to act on those choices. Assum ing that neither the public w ill nor the 
practical m eans w ould provide access by anyone to any possible test, such a model 
would necessitate an exercise in line-drawing akin to that attem pted by Botkin. As such,
Ibid, at p .306 .
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it w ould leave itse lf open to two charges. The first contends that any such lines would, 
in the absence o f any consensus as to ‘severity’, be arbitraiy. W hile the other three o f his 
criteria rely on objective judgem ents (though we m ight question the accuracy w ith which 
they can presently be m ade), ‘severity’ denotes a subjective value judgem ent, about a 
m atter on which there is no underlying agreement w ithin the m edical profession or 
among those affected by those conditions or their fam ilies or carers.
Botkin seeks to circum vent this absence o f consensus by reliance on w hat m ost paients 
m ight be assum ed to deem  intolerably burdensom e; his line w ill reflect ‘prudent 
standards o f  caie’, and not the ‘idiosyncratic or highly subjective expectations’^^  o f a 
few parents. Yet there is reason to doubt any generalisation as to the extent o f the 
familial burden im posed by a particular condition. Philip M. Ferguson, Alan Gartner 
and Dorothy K. Lipsky, writing in the sam e collection as Botkin, refer to research that 
casts serious doubt on w idespread assum ptions about how  disabled children impact upon 
pre-existing fam ilies, while several authors -  including Deborah Kent, A lison Davies 
and Hans Reinders - have pointed to the disjunction between the perception o f  life with a 
given disability shared by those w ith direct experience o f  it, and the perception held by 
the public at large. For such writers, it seem s likely that Botkin’s line w ould be set at too 
low a level, designating some conditions ‘sufficiently severe’ which, they would argue, 
are entirely com patible w ith a good standard o f life, both for the affected child and the 
family into which it is born.
On the other hand, as discussed in Chapter 3, bioethicists including John Harris and 
Julian Savulescu argue for an ethical obligation to avoid, as far as is possible, any 
condition which w ould ‘harm ’ a future child. For such influential academ ics, it would 
seem that B otkin’s line w ould be set too high, excluding a great m any harmful 
conditions.
‘Fetal privacy and co n fid en tia lity ’, op. cit., at p .37 .
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And then there are those potential parents who actively seek children w ho would, on 
Botkin’s analysis, fall on that side o f  the line for which testing should be available. W hat 
o f the couple o f  veiy  restricted height who wish to avoid the birth o f  a child who will 
soon grow big enough to present practical problem s for their dom estic anangem ents?
A ‘soft’ conception o f  the Genetic Supermarket, then, w herein the choices o f  prospective 
parents would not only be perm itted but w ould be funded by the state, w ould necessitate 
an exercise that w ould certainly not please all interested parties, and w ould inevitably be 
open to the charge o f  arbitrariness. Furtherm ore, such an exercise w ould expose the line- 
drawers (presumably the HFEA or some similar body) to the expressivist objections 
considered earlier in this chapter.
There is one m ore sense in which the question o f  whether lines are needed m ight be 
interpreted. This w ould see it as asking which tests should be routinely offered by 
practitioners, in the sense o f inform ing prospective parents as to their availability. The 
question is really asking: do the dictates o f good clinical practice require that 
practitioners alert their patients to options which may be available privately, but which 
will not be provided by the N H S? Is it even possible that a practitioner who fails to 
inform a prospective parent o f  her options in terms o f  self-funded PGD may leave 
him self exposed to a delictual claim, either in negligence or for ‘wrongful b irth’? 
Although som ewhat beyond the rem it o f  this thesis, such possible adverse outcom es will 
be considered in the final chapter.
4.4 Considerations o f justice
One means by w hich the ‘arbitrariness’ and ‘expressivist’ objections could be avoided, 
then, would be by the state declining to fund any uses o f PGD - what I describe as the 
‘hard’ conception o f  the Genetic Superm arket hypothesis, and, I surm ise, the conception 
that would come closest to N ozick’s ideal. This laissez faire approach, then, may allow 
the state to profess neutrality as betw een different choices, and hence between the 
qualities o f  different lives. As such, it m ay address some o f  the concerns o f  disabled
151
C h a p te r  4
persons that their lives are being ‘officially devalued’. However, this approach inevitably 
gives rise to another kind o f  possible concern: a system w herein PGD w ould be available 
only to those w ealthy enough to afford it seems to sit uneasily w ith m any notions o f 
justice.
4.4.1 Injustice as a species o f harm
Before considering the possible im pact o f  such a ‘free m arket’ approach to PGD for the 
notion o f justice, the question arises as to whether such concerns properly fall w ithin the 
rem it o f this thesis. The question o f  justice arose briefly in Chapter 2, but the question o f 
whether it properly belonged within a harm -based consideration, or w hether it in fact 
stood alone as a separate ethical principle^^ or moral axiom^'^ w as at that time 
unexplored.
That justice m ay be thought to possess some intrinsic value m ay be regarded as 
uncontentious. Can we, though, say o f  som eone who has been treated unjustly that he 
has been harm ed thereby? In som e instances o f injustice, this will clearly be so -  when 
the injustice frustrates or sets back one or m ore o f his interests. W hether we can say the 
same o f  the case where an unjust action leaves no-one worse o ff  than before is less 
certain. A decision to open the doors o f  the Genetic Supermarket only to those who can 
pay their way m ight be deem ed unjust; but those denied entry have, arguably, been 
deprived o f nothing w hich they previously possessed. Is it m eaningful to say that they 
have been harmed?
One response w ould be to contend that they have indeed been deprived o f  something 
they previously possessed; the knowledge that they are being treated justly  or fairly. The 
status quo ante m ight have denied them  access to PGD, but they could comfort 
themselves with the Imowledge that that restriction was applied even-handedly. The
T om  L. B eaucham p and Jam es F. C hildress, P rin c ip le s  o f  M e d ic a l E th ics, Fifth E dition , N e w  Y ork, O xford  
U niversity  Press, 2 0 0 1 .
Jonathan G lover, C a u s in g  D ea th  a n d  S a v in g  L ives . L ondon, Penguin B o o k s, 1990
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knowledge that others were, by virtue o f  their preferential econom ic position, able to 
access this technology m ay render that exclusion so m uch harder to tolerate.
It may also be the case that an approach that allows access to PGD only to those who can 
afford it will perpetuate certain divisions in society in a m anner likely to be to the 
detriment o f  those who ai'e already treated unjustly. The following section w ill consider 
some such claims.
4.4.2 W hat does justice require?
‘Justice’ has many different m eanings, one o f which -  the notion that people should not 
be blam ed for factors over w hich they exerted no control - has been discussed already in 
this chapter. The idea o f  justice that gives rise to the species o f objection considered here 
is related to that concept, but is an expanded version thereof. The notion o f  justice that 
m ight be thought contravened by the adoption o f  a Genetic Superm arket approach is one 
that proclaim s it unfair that PGD should be available only to those who can afford to pay 
for it, and furtherm ore, that it thereby exacerbates the divide betw een those who already 
occupy a privileged position in society and those who are less privileged.
The former objection is sim ilar to that which could be levied against any private 
‘healthcare’; an objection that proclaim s it unfair that only the wealthy should be able to 
access that which is not available to all. This is the kind o f  concern that has led 
Buchanan, Brock, et al to the conclusion that ‘If  equality o f  opportunity m atters, then we 
cannot assume that an unregulated “genetic superm arket” is legitimate.
The second objection is m ore concrete, proclaim ing that, in one way or another, the
availability o f PGD only to the wealthy will actually damage the less wealthy. This
concern was perhaps m ost vividly expressed by journalist and author George Monbiot:
Just as the escape hatch o f  the public school enables the w ealthiest 
and m ost influential people in the countiy to ignore the under-
Buchanan, B rock, D an ie ls, W ilder, F rom  C h a n ce  to  C hoice: G en e tics  a n d  Ju stice . N e w  Y ork, Cam bridge  
U niversity  Press, 2 0 0 0 , at p .99.
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funding o f  state education, future genetic screening or gene therapy 
could allow them  to buy their way out o f concern for the social and 
environm ental factors w hich contribute to poor health. Indeed, i t’s 
not hard to im agine a future in which only the rich could - tlu’ough 
gene teclinology - escape from  the genetic effects o f  increasing 
exposure to such pollutants as pesticide residues and radioactive 
waste.^*^
Phillip Kitcher has couched his concern in sim ilar terms:
I f  p ren a ta l t e s t in g  fo r  g e n e t ic  d is e a s e s  is  o f te n  u s e d  b y  m e m b e r s  o f  m o r e  
p r iv ile g e d  stra ta  o f  s o c i e t y  a n d  fa r  m o r e  r a re ly  b y  th e  u n d e r p r iv ilig e d ,  
th e n  th e  g e n e t ic  c o n d it io n s  th e  a f f lu e n t  are c o n c e r n e d  to  a v o id  w i l l  
b e c o m e  fa r  m o r e  c o m m o n  a m o n g  th e  p o o r  - th e y  w i l l  b e c o m e  “ lo w e r -  
c la s s ” d i s e a s e s ,  o th e r  p e o p le ’s  p r o b le m s . In ter es t in  f in d in g  m e th o d s  o f  
tr ea tm e n t or  fo r  p r o v id in g  s u p p o r t iv e  e n v ir o n m e n ts  fo r  th o s e  b o rn  w ith  
th e  d is e a s e s  m a y  w e l l  wane.^^
This leads Kitcher to the conclusion that ‘societies that introduce prenatal testing have a 
moral obligation to w ork tow ard m aking it available to all their citizens.
It m ight be thought that this concern has many sim ilarities to that articulated by Tom 
Shakespeai-0 , and considered earlier in this chapter. W here Shakespeare argued that a 
reduction in the num bers o f  disabled people would lessen societal concern for those who 
are still born with those diseases, M onbiot and Kitcher are m ore concerned with the 
distribution o f  these disabling genes. I f  they are reserved alm ost exclusively to the less 
wealthy -  and by im plication, probably the less influential -  m em bers o f  society, then it 
is perhaps unlikely that the resources necessary to treat the symptom s o f those 
conditions, or to provide a m ore accessible environm ent for those affected by them, will 
be made available.
As with Shakespeare’s argum ent, we m ight accept the merits o f  this contention while 
wondering how precisely it m ight be addressed without causing greater harms. It may 
very well be that the best way in which to ensure that society as a whole is concerned 
about certain disabilities is by ensuring that those disabilities are them selves shared
G eorge M onbiot, ‘R ock -a -b ye  baby w ith the perfect g e n e s’, The G u a rd ia n , 18 February 1997. 
P hilip  K itcher, The L iv es  To C om e, A llen  Lane, T he Penguin Press, 1996, at p. 198.
78 Ibid, at p .200 .
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tlil'oughout society. But how  is such an equitable distribution o f  disability tq  be 
effected? The m ost obvious solution, it m ay be thought, would be by declaring th a tq f  
PGD cannot be afforded by all, then it should be available to none. This w ould certainly 
prom ise to prevent the economically privileged from ensuring that they are also the 
‘ genetically privileged’.
Yet such an approach contains certain disadvantages, some o f  which may be deemed 
insurmountable. First, it involves a necessaiy and substantial interference with the 
interest in reproductive choice possessed (by definition) by those who w ould otherwise 
have used this technology. O f course, it m ight be argued that any compulsory 
redistributive m easures, including taxation, involve an interferenee w ith liberty interests. 
Yet, for reasons discussed in Chapter 2, it m ight be thought that interference with the 
interest in reproductive liberty, in denying someone control over what sort o f  child for 
whom they will spend the next twenty (or, in the case o f  profoundly handicapped 
children, perhaps m any m ore) years bearing a burden o f responsibility, we interfere with 
their interests in a m uch m ore profound way than when we requisition and redistribute 
some o f  their earnings.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the use o f  PGD even if  only by the wealthiest 
sections o f society could provide incidental but nonetheless substantial benefits to the 
less wealthy. Ronald Dw orkin has argued that ‘even a dim inished dem and for a 
particular therapy w ill stim ulate research, w ith possibly unanticipated general benefits, 
that would not otherwise take p laee.’^^  Such a technological trickle-dow n effect m ight be 
thought unlikely w hen the effect for those who can afford it is to avoid the birth o f 
affected children, rather than to develop better or cheaper ways to assist or treat them, 
but it is perhaps not inconceivable that, w ith repeated use, the technologies o f the 
Genetic Superm arket w ill becom e more effective and, hence, m ore affordable. It is 
possible, for exam ple, that IVF itse lf will become m ore effective, in m any cases 
obviating the need for repeated attempts at conception or successful im plantation. This
R onald Dw orkin , Sovereign  Virtue, op. cit., at p .4 3 7 .
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may bring the technology w ithin the reach o f  those who could not afford repreated cycles 
o f treatm ent, but who could perhaps afford one or two such attempts.
W hether or not such a result w ould occur, D w orkin’s liberal position is that ‘rich people’ 
should in any event be allowed to purchase treatm ents that the state will not provide for 
everyone; ‘We do not in general seek equality by leveling dow n’.^  ^ Rather, ‘The remedy 
for injustice is redistribution, not denial o f  benefits to some with no corresponding gain 
to others,’®' Exam ples o f  the application o f  D w orkin’s approach are not difficult to find. 
W hen it is established that a good diet is related to health and longevity, and further 
established that, in a given society, not eveiyone can afford a good diet, the efforts o f 
progressives are not aim ed at gratuitously denying good food to the wealthy but at 
ensuring that the underprivileged too have access to it. In relation to PGD, then, those 
concerned w ith justice  should, according to Dworkin, be concerned w ith ensuring that it 
is available to all, and not denied to those who can at present afford it.
4.4.3 ‘Silver spoons’ and ‘G olden genes’
George M onbiot has draw n an analogy betw een ‘choosing your children’s genes’ and 
‘ehoosing to educate them  privately’, both choices that he regards as pernicious.®^ W hile 
in certain respects this analogy m ay be inexact,®^ one aspect that both choices may be 
thought to possess in com m on m ight be troubling for those concerned with ‘ju stice ’.®"' 
By sending their children to fee-paying schools, parents generally attem pt to bestow 
upon them  a com petitive advantage over their peers. Since, by definition, fee-paying 
schools are only open to those who can afford them , and the m ore renow ned o f  them
Id.
Ibid, a tp .4 4 0 .
G eorge M onbiot, ‘R ock ab ye baby w ith  the perfect g e n e s’, loc. cit.
It is, for one thing, easier  to argue that prosp ective  m others have a strong personal interest in determ ining w hich  
o f  their ov a  should  be relm planted in their uterus than to argue for a strong personal interest in controlling the 
education o f  som eon e w h o  is, by that stage, a separate individual, w ith his or her ow n interests. E ven M ill did not 
argue that individual liberty sh ould  extend  to m aking controlling d ec ision s over ones children.
Such criticism  o f  fee-p a y in g  sch o o ls  has a lengthy tradition am ong soc ia lists and th ose  concerned  generally  
w ith issues o f  ju stice . For exam ple, in 1943, R. H . T aw ney wrote that ‘G iven  the ex istin g  eco n o m ic  order, sharp 
class d iv ision s ex ist ind ep en dently  o f  educational organization  and p o licy . . ..  It is d ifficu lt to deny that the 
tendency o f  those sch o o ls  is to  deepen  and perpetuate them .’ ‘T he Problem  o f  the P ublic  S c h o o ls ’, first published
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only affordable by an affluent m inority, it m ight be thought that these schools seek to 
exacerbate or reinforce the already privileged position o f  those who attend them , shoring 
up their inborn econom ic advantage w ith a high quality education and a potentially 
lucrative netw ork o f  contacts for later life. Thus, economic and class divisions are 
reinforced.
In a sim ilar m anner, a Genetic Superm arket affordable only by the already wealthy 
would com plem ent the econom ic advantages with which certain children w ould be born 
with a series o f genetic advantages; they would, in the words o f one com m entator, be 
born not only w ith ‘silver spoons’ in their m ouths, but with ‘golden genes’ in their 
chromosomes.®^ Such an objection m ight become m ore pronounced were Imowledge 
about genes to extend beyond the identification o f the genetic cause for certain diseases, 
and begin to identify -  as m any w iiters have predicted -  genetic predispositions to other 
non-disease attributes such as above-average mental functioning or sporting prowess. 
W ere refinem ents in PG D  to advance in parallel, allowing such traits to be identified in 
vitro, what would stop a wealthy couple electing to choose a daughter with above- 
average aptitude in m usic, or a son w ith a  gift for m athem atics?
One lim iting factor, o f  course, w ould be whether such abilities were already latent in the 
gametes o f  the w ealthy couple. The use o f  PGD, after all, is not an exam ple o f  what is 
sometimes deemed ‘genetic enhancem ent’; unlike genetic m odification, it cannot add 
anything to or rem ove anything from the genes possessed by the couple’s em biyos. Thus, 
the selection o f traits that will be open to them  will be lim ited by w hat their own genes 
already contain. U nless wealthy people generally have a higher genetic aptitiude for 
maths or music than those less econom ically advantaged, as opposed to advantages 
resulting from relatively privileged upbringing and education, it is unlikely that they will 
routinely be able to guarantee their children ‘golden genes’, or even ‘silver genes’.
in P o lit ic a l Q u a rter ly  A pril/June 1943 , m ore recently  in R H  Tcr^mey: The R a d ic a l T rad ition , ed. Rita Hinden, 
M id d lesex , Penguin B o o k s , 1964 , at p .63.
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However, while they may not be able to guarantee such attributes, the ability to choose 
between numerous ‘candidate em bryos’ will, perhaps, enable them  to m axim ise the 
likelihood that any potential for genetic abilities latent in their gam etes will be 
actualised. If  it transpired that there was a genetic trait predisposing affected children to 
higher-than-average m usical ability,®^ but that the genetic trait in question was recessive 
rather than dom inant, then only one in eveiy four embryos would be expected to possess 
that trait; PGD w ould allow  the couple to avoid ‘squandering that potential’ by 
inadvertently im planting one o f the other three embryos. And since it is likely that, in 
reality, any such genetic predisposition will be o f a far m ore complex nature, involving 
the interaction o f  various different genes, the likelihood o f stum bling across the right 
combination by chance w ould veiy probably be considerably longer than one in four.
W ealthy couples, then, may not be able to guarantee their children golden genes, but -  to 
stretch the m etaphor -  they m ay be able to identify hidden seams that w ould be invisible 
to those excluded from  the Genetic Supermarket. Should this be a cause o f  concern?
Tlu'oughout his life, John Raw ls, one o f  the m ost renowned theorists in the field o f
distributive justice, repeatedly addressed the question o f  inequality o f  talent. In his most
influential work, A Theory o f  Justice, Rawls proclaim ed that ‘No one deserves his
greater natural capacity nor m erits a m ore favourable starting place in society’.®^ Rawls
later described the idea that we do not ‘deserve’ our natural endowm ents as a ‘moral
truism ’,®® asking rhetorically:
Who w ould deny it? Do people really think that they (morally) 
deserved to be born m ore gifted than others? Do they thinlc that they
H illel Steiner, ‘S ilver Sp oons and G old en  G en es’, in Justine B urley, ed. The G en e tic  R evo lu tio n  a n d  H um an  
R ights, O xford, O xford U n iversity  Press, 1999, pp. 133-151 .
It has been su ggested  that perfect p itch  m ay have a strong gen etic  basis; see  R. A shcroft, ‘B ach to the future: 
response to: E xtending preim plantation  gen etic  diagnosis: m edical and non-m ed ical u se s .’ J o u rn a l o f  M ed ica l 
E th ics  (2 0 0 3 ); 29 (4 ): 2 1 3 -6
Jolin R aw ls, A T h eory o f  Justice. R e v is e d  E dition . O xford, O xford U niversity  Press, 1999 , at p87 . S ee also  
T hom as N agel: ‘to  sever the con n ection  b etw een  talent and incom e, i f  it cou ld  be done, w ou ld  be fine. T hose with  
usefu l talents do not naturally deserve m ore material benefits than those w ho lack th em .’ E q u a lity  a n d  P a rtia lity ,  
O xford, O xford U niversity  P ress, 1991 , at p. 113.
John R aw ls. Ju stice  a s F a irn ess: A R esta tem en t,  Cam bridge, M ass.; L ondon, T he B elknap  Press o f  Harvard 
U niversity  Press, 2 0 0 1 , at p .74 ,
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(morally) deserved to be born a m an rather than a wom an, or vice 
versa? Do they think that they deserved to be born into a w ealthier 
rather than into a poorer family?®^
This uncoupling o f  talent and desert has been considered earlier in this chapter, and I
assume it to be relatively uncontroversial. O f m ore interest for present purposes is how
Rawls proposed that sueh an undeserved disparity o f  talent should be redressed. For
acknowledging that such differences are undeserved does not lead Raw ls to conclude
that a ju st society m ust strive ‘to ignore, m ueh less to elim inate these distinetions.’ '^'
Rather, such differences can be accom m odated w ithin a fair society by ensuring that ‘the
basic structure can be arranged so that these contingencies w ork for the good o f  the least
fortunate.’^'
M ueh o f  the rem ainder o f  R aw ls’ w ork is dedicated to outlining w hat form  such a
structure might take. For present purposes, though, w hat is significant is his recognition
that ‘The natural distribution is neither ju s t nor unjust ... W hat is ju s t and unjust is the
way that institutions deal w ith these f a c t s . I n d e e d ,  in other passages Raw ls seems to
suggest that a disparity o f  talents is som ething to be cherished rather than challenged:
The difference principle represents, in effect, an agreem ent to regard 
the distribution o f  natural talents as in some respeets a com m on 
asset and to share in the greater social and econom ic benefits m ade 
possible by the com plem entarities o f this distribution. Those who 
have been favoured by nature, w hoever they are, m ay gain from 
their good fortune only on term s that im prove the situation o f  those 
who have lost out.^^
In a society devised along Raw lsian lines, then, the prospect o f  wealthy parents 
endowing their offspring w ith advantageous genes would not necessarily be 
incom patible with justice. This is so because (a) society would redress this imbalance by 
‘giv[ing] m ore attention to those w ith few er native assets and to those born  into the less 
favourable social positions’; (b) because ‘[tjhose who have been favoured by nature ...
R aw ls, Ju stice  a s  Fairness, op. cit., at pp. 7 4 -7 5 .  
John R aw ls, A T h e o ty  o f  J u s tice , op . cit., at p .87.
Id.
92 Id. 
%Id.
94 Ibid, at p .86 .
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may gain from their good fortune only on term s that im prove the situation o f  those who 
have lost out.’/^  and (c) because in any event, rem uneration in such a society would be 
‘according to effort, or perhaps better, conscientious effort’ rather than ‘rewarding 
people for that over w hich they had no control’/^
In a sim ilar vein, M ichael Albert, influential proponent o f  Participatoi-y Econom ics, has 
advocated that a fair society would be one in which disparities in rem uneration would 
exist only insofar as there were disparities in the degree to which individuals were 
willing to make sacrifices, in term s o f  their tim e or effort, but in term s o f  natural ability, 
the aggregate products o f  labour w ould be divided equally/® In a society m odelled along 
such lines, the introduction o f  an uncom m only talented individual w ould not widen the 
gap between the already fortunate and the already unfortunate, but w ould raise (by 
however small a degree) the standai'd wage paid to all.
Yet the societies in w hich we actually live ai'e not m odelled along the lines o f  R aw ls’ 
differenee principle or A lbert’s participatory economics, but at least purport to reward 
talent rather than effort. W e live in an age where ‘celebrities’ routinely receive millions 
o f pounds a year, not only for whatever talents they may possess (attributable at least to 
some degree to the effort expended in practicing or rehearsing) but for their 
‘m arketability’, a quality borne largely o f  their perceived aesthetic attributes. Is it any 
comfort to know that justice  dictates that such unchosen and undeserved qualities should  
not bestow advantage, w hen every day we see irrefutable evidence that they d o l
”  Ib id ,a tp .8 7 .
9"^ Ibid, at p .274 . R aw ls notes, how ever, ‘that the effort a person is w illin g  to m ake is in fluenced  by his natural 
abilities and sk ills and the alternatives open  to  h im .’
92 Ibid, at p .274 . R aw ls n otes, how ever, ‘that the effort a person is w illin g  to m ake is in fluenced  by his natural 
abilities and sk ills and the alternatives open  to h im .’
9® ‘in a parecon rem uneration is for effort and sacrifice . S ince parecons equilibrate jo b s  for quality o f  life  
im plications, rewarding for effort and sacrifice  conven ien tly  m eans that you  earn m ore on ly  by virtue o f  w orking  
longer or w orking harder, and that y o u  earn less on ly  by virtue o f  w orking less lon g  or less  hard, assum ing, o f  
course, that you  are do in g  so c ia lly  valued labor that u tilizes assets e ffe c tiv e ly .’ M ichael A lbert, ‘R evolution  
B ased on R eason N o t Faith or Fantasy’, 18 D ecem ber 2 0 0 3 , availab le at 
http://w w w .zm ag.org./Z N E T T O Pnoanim ation .h tm l
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One possible response to this w ould be to ask whether simply restricting access to the 
Genetic Supermarket w ould m ake a substantial change to such unjust distributions o f 
rewards. As things stand, the m ost fortunate m em bers o f society routinely pass on 
advantage, in one form  or another, to their children, whether in the form s o f  the ‘golden 
genes’ which helped them  attain that fortunate position for them selves, or in term s o f  the 
combination o f econom ic, social and emotional advantages that often accom pany birth 
into such an environment.^^ In allowing wealthy couples to test their em biyos for what 
they assume to be the m ost advantageous genotypes, we certainly open up one more 
chamiel by which unearned advantage can be passed on, but even i f  this were denied, the 
existing channels are m ore than sufficient to ensure that their offspring receive a 
substantial head-start.
Is it really certain that selecting their children on the basis o f  their genotypes will prove a 
greater perpetuation o f class division than the ability to provide ‘private schools, culture 
in the home, a secure hom e environm ent, trips abroad, private lessons, an advantaged 
peer group, and successful role m odels’"'®? M yriad ways already exist by which wealthy 
or well-connected parents can imbue their children w ith undeserved advantage, many o f 
which may be far m ore influential on their future prospects than PGD. Principles o f 
distributive justice dictate that society should take cogniscence o f  all such advantages, 
and act to ensure that those who were, thr ough no fault o f  their own, denied them  do not 
suffer umiecessarily as a result.
Similarly, though, those whose success in life is due to inate athletic prowess, artistic 
creativity or physical attractiveness are scarcely m ore deserving o f the rewards these 
bring (except insofar as they m ust be coupled with actual effort). Denying the wealthy 
access to the Genetic Superm arket will not bring about a Raw lsian utopia where reward 
follows effort; it will, at most, perpetuate the status quo, ensuring that one undeserving
99 The p ossib ility  that so m e children o f  h igh -ach ievers w ill be subject to greater em otion al burdens m ust a lso  be  
borne in m ind, and has already been  considered  in Chapter 2. N o n eth eless , the preponderence o f  ev id en ce  
suggests that w e ll-b e in g  -  c o n ce iv ed  in term s o f  academ ic and eco n o m ic  achievem ent, health and longevity  -  
varies d irectly  and not in versely  w ith  parental w ealth.
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elite benefits rather than another. I f  we are truly concerned w ith justice, we m ust act so 
as to ensure that those who lack the attributes necessary to excel in business, sport, the 
arts, or whatever other area upon w hich our society chooses to lavish the greatest 
rewards, should not be abandoned to poverty-line drudgery; w hether the obstacles to 
their success were genetic or environm ental, they were in any event not chosen or 
earned, and justice dictates that people should not be penalised for that which lies 
beyond their control. As the authors o f  one book on social class and justice  have said:
‘Luck p er  se may be inelim inable ... But why should it be ju st to perm it the fact that 
some are lucky and others unlucky to influence the distribution o f  rew ards in society?’'®'
Those who object that the laissez faire approach o f  the Genetic Superm arket is unjust 
must therefore dem onstrate why it is any more unfair than the status quo. Their 
approach seems to favour a ‘lottery ticket’ approach to justice, according to which 
wimners in the lottery m ay enjoy the fruits o f  their good fortune provided only that 
everyone was provided w ith an equal chance o f  winning. Thus, it is acceptable to 
reward wimiers in the genetic lottery, provided that the wealthy did not have the odds o f 
wimiing stacked in their favour. O f course, the genetic lottery is not, o f  course, in any 
sense fair; parents who are carriers o f  genetic disorders are vastly m ore likely to have 
similarly affected children, while those w ith ‘golden genes’ are m ore likely to pass them  
onto their children. But even if  it were fair in the sense that everyone had a similar 
chance o f  wimiing, w im iers would still reap the benefits o f brute luck rather than o f their 
own efforts or sacrifices. W hether or not the Genetic Superm arket approach is adopted, 
such undeserved advantage will exist.
There are various m echanism s by w hich society attempts to counter the unfair 
advantages that result from  fortunate environm ental factors. A substantial investm ent in 
com prehensive schools can help counteract the advantages bestowed by elite fee-paying 
schools. Inlieritance tax can distribute what w ould have been unearned income
9^9 Jam es Fishkin, Justice, E q u a l O p p o r tu n ity  a n d  th e  F am ily , N e w  H aven , C onn., Y a le  U n iversity  Press, 1983, at 
p.52.
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accum ulating in the hands o f a small num ber o f  people. But even professed socialists 
seem reluctant to apply such m easures to the inequalities borne o f  the genetic lottery.*®^ 
For those concerned w ith egalitarian conceptions o f  justice, though, there can be no 
distinction in principle betw een unearned advantage o f  one sort or the other. M onbiot is 
correct in claim ing that w hether parents bestow  advantage genetically or 
environmentally is a m atter o f  ethical indifference; yet he stops short o f acloiowledging 
that it is equally a m atter o f  indifference whether one gains a genetic head-start tlirough 
the deliberate efforts o f  one’s parents, or through the chance outcom es o f the genetic 
lottery.
4.5 Depriving society o f valuable contributors
An objection that can, I believe, be dispensed with quite readily is that expressed, in 
these typically em otive term s, by Hubbard and Wald:
I am glad Woody Guthrie was born, though he developed Huntington
disease. I am glad for all the blind poets and musicians, from Homer to
Stevie Wonder. Who knows, maybe Helen Keller would have led a 
completely undistinguished life instead of becoming a famous writer and 
political activist had her immune system not failed as a child.
As a statement o f  adm iration for several talented though disabled individuals, this 
passage would be quite uncontroversial, but it is, perhaps, considerably less impressive
as an objection to PG D  or prenatal screening. That Hubbard and W ald intend it as such
is made clear In their next paragraph, w hich concludes with the claim  that ‘N o one, and 
no group o f  people have, in the words o f  Hannah Arendt, “any right to determ ine who 
should and who should not inhabit the w orld.’” '®"'
In drawing attention to the gifted artists who may never have been born had PGD been 
available to their parents, Hubbard and W ald’s argum ent beai's a close sim ilarity to the 
‘Beethoven question’, frequently employed as a rhetorical device on anti-abortion
G ordon M arshall, A dam  S w ift and Stephen R oberts, A g a in s t the  O d d s?  S o c ia l C la ss  a n d  S o c ia l Ju stice  in 
In d u str ia l S o c ie ties , O xford , C larendon P ress, 1997, at p. 165.
S ee  A le x  C allin icos, E q u a lity ,  C am bridge, P o lity  P ress, 2 0 0 0 , at pp. 3 8 -3 9  for som e exam ples.
Ruth Hubbard and E lijah  W ald, E x p lo d in g  the G en e  M yth, B oston , B eacon  Press, 1993 , at p. 161.
163
C lia p te j ' 4
websites. There are several subtly different variations o f this question, but m ost ask the
reader to consider som ething like the following scenario:
A  professor at the UCLA M edical School presented the following 
case history to his students: A  w om an who suffers from tuberculosis 
is pregnant. H er husband has syphilis. There are tliree children in 
the family. One is blind, another deaf, and the other suffers 
tuberculosis. Yet, another child died in infancy.
W hen the students predictably retort that they would recom m end abortion, the professor
replies ‘Congratulations, you've ju st killed Beethoven!’'®^
It does not require m uch in the way o f  ethical analysis to show  up some o f  the 
wealcnesses o f  this hypothetical as an argum ent against abortion, but it is if  anything 
even more precarious as a  case against PGD. First, while it is o f  course possible that, in 
‘selecting against’ a particular embryo, prospective parents will inadvertently deprive the 
world o f  the next B eethoven it is, presum ably, equally likely that the embryo they select 
in its place will be the genius. Unless H ubbard and W ald believe that ‘disabled’ persons 
are more disposed tow ards genius than the population in general -  and they offer no 
support for such a contention beyond that short list o f  examples -  then they would, 
presumably, concede that there is no basis for presum ing that either em biyo is more 
likely to develop into the next Beethoven than the other. In deciding not to abort this first 
pregnancy, in favour o f  some later non-disabled pregnancy, it is ju st as likely that they 
will be depriving the w orld o f a future genius.
W ere evidence to be led dem onstrating that persons affected by particular genetic traits 
comm only deemed ‘disabilities’ were disproportionately inclined towards creativity or 
excellence in the sciences, then that position may change. But equally, we m ight expect 
that societal attitudes tow ards those conditions m ay also change; a genotype that 
predisposes the individual to exceptional talent in some or other field w ould not, we
Id.104
A n onym ou s, ‘A bortion: T h e S ilen t H o lo ca u st’, at h ttp ://w w w .ecclesia .org/truth /abortion .htm l, v iew ed  12 
A ugust 2 0 0 4 . Other exam p les can be found in G len  A . Stocker, ‘W hat G od Says A bout: A bortion  V erses Pro­
life ’, at h ttp ://w w w .b ib leb eIiev ers.co m /S to ck er l.h tm l, and ‘T he A bortion  D ebate  — A  P ro-L ife  S ta n ce’, at 
h ttp ://w w w .stud yw orld .com /m oraU issues/abortion /ab ortion_d eb ate_a_p ro-life_stance.h tm .
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m ight expect, be view ed in a uniform ly negative light, unless the disability that 
accom panied it was particularly severe.
Furthermore, it may be likely that the availability o f  techniques like PG D will in fact 
increase the chances o f  the next Beethoven or W oody Guthrie being born, simply by 
virtue o f  enabling certain people to becom e pregnant who w ould otherwise have been 
unable to give birth to any child because o f  conditions such as aneuploidy, or by 
encouraging others who w ould be deterred from  doing so by the prospect o f  passing on a 
genetic illness. As A ngus Clarke has noted, ‘many w om en in fam ilies w ith Duchene 
m uscular dystrophy ... used to fear pregnancy and chose to have few children, if  any, or 
to term inate all m ale fetuses.’ '®® It seem s self-evident that the chances o f  the next 
Beethoven being born w ill be higher if  the option o f  reproduction is afforded to those 
potential parents who previously refrained from  having any  children.
Perhaps the m ost obvious reservation about the ‘Beethoven argum ent’, however, derives 
from the recognition that what it appears to be asking is for individual reproductive 
autonomy to be sacrificed in the interests o f  ‘society’. W hile it is not um easonable to 
seek to balance third party interests against those o f  the prospective parents -  indeed, 
that is the point o f this chapter -  there is perhaps something uncom fortably rem iniscent 
o f the eugenics m ovem ent in a position that seeks to curtail individual reproductive 
freedom in the interests o f  (possibly) producing m ore gifted or productive offspring.
4.6 ‘Irresponsible reproduction’
The third paity interests considered thus far in this chapter have in com m on that they 
have been argued to count as reasons to restrict access to PGD, if  not to deny access to it 
altogether. There is,, however, another species o f third party interest that m ight be 
thought to pull in the opposite direction. The nature o f  this argum ent is expressed by 
Laura M. Purdy:'®^
A ngus Clarice, ‘G en etics, eth ics, and audit’, The L a n c e t  1990; 3 3 5 ;1 145, at p .l  145.
‘92 Indeed, it is d ifficu lt to find  professional b ioeth icists w h o actually  adhere to this v iew .
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Isn’t it immoral to knowingly act so as to increase the demands on ... 
resources that could otherwise be used for projects such as feeding the 
starving or averting environmental disaster? Isn’t attempting to avoid the 
birth of those who are likely to require extra resources, other things being 
equal, on a par with other attempts to share resources more equally?’°®
In a sim ilar vein, Ingm ar Persson has w ritten o f ‘disabling diseases -  perhaps like
D ow n’s syndrom e’ that ‘m ay allow  those afflicted, with some extra assistance, to lead
lives that are reasonably good for them , but will rob them  o f the pow er to assist others
much in return.’'®® If  we assum e that certain genetic traits w ill m ake it possible to
predict the extent to w hich som eone will be able to m ake a societal contribution, does it
follow that prospective parents are subject to an ethical duty to act in such a way as to
m axim ise that potential? Or at very least to act so as to elim inate the possibility that their
offspring will be so burdened by inlrerited disability as to be alm ost guaranteed to
require expensive m edical treatm ent or other support?"®
To assess this claim, we m ust assess three separate prem ises. First, does ‘society’ have 
an interest in avoiding the birth o f those w ith traits that w ill hinder their ability to assist 
others, or which m ake it likely that they w ill need expensive treatm ent or assistanee? 
Second, can we identify, through preim plantation testing, w hich traits these are likely to 
be? And third, even if  these questions can be answered in the affirm ative, does this give 
rise to a duty upon prospective parents to m ake certain preim plantation choices? If  each 
o f these questions can be answered in the affirm ative, then a fourth question necessarily 
arises concerning the relative weights o f that interest and the parental interest in 
reproductive liberty.
Let us consider first the question o f  w hether there can be said to be a societal interest in 
avoiding the birth o f  children who will be net ‘takers from ’ rather than ‘contributors to ’
‘9® ‘L oving  Future P e o p le ’, in R ep ro d u c tio n , E th ics  a n d  the law : F em in ist p e rsp e c tiv e s .  Ed, Joan C Callahan  
(Indiana U n i Press, 1995), p .3 1 3 .
‘99 Ingmar Persson, ‘E quality and se lec tio n  for ex is ten ce ’. J o u rn a l o f  M e d ica l E th ics  (1 9 9 9 );  25: 130-136 , at 
p .l3 1 .
"9 N o te  that this claim  is d ifferent fi-om that considered  in S ection  1.2, w h ich  asserted  o n ly  that the availab ility  o f  
PG D  w ou ld  g ive  rise to a so c ie ta l  b e l ie f  Wwii prosp ective parents should  avoid  having d isab led  children. T he claim
166
C h a p te r  4
the comm on pool o f  m aterial reso u rces .'"  John A. Robertson is a renow ned champion 
o f a liberal approach to reproductive technologies, yet he has taken this possibility quite 
seriously:
It may be that any additional child makes dem ands on societal 
resources, and incurs public subsidies to some extent. It m ay also be 
that only som e children subsidized in this way repay those costs 
over their lifetim e tlirough their ow n contributions. ... Persons who 
reproduce know ing that they will depend on the welfare system  or 
the charity o f  others to support their children w ill be im posing costs 
on others."^
It is certainly intelligible to suggest that, for those whose interests m ake a dem and upon 
a finite shared pool o f  available resources, those interests may to an extent be set back by 
the presence o f  other individuals who will be rivals for those resources. Thus, someone 
affected by cystic fibrosis who m ay very well, in time, require a lung, heart-and-lung, or 
(due to the high incidence o f  secondaiy infection) kidney transplant m ay be said to have 
an interest in avoiding the birth o f  other CF sufferers who may, in time, becom e rivals 
for available organs.
This possibility was discussed earlier in this chapter, as a possible response to 
expressivist objections, and it is not one that can lightly be discounted. As I suggested 
earlier, finding the balance betw een the expressivist harm s inherent in a policy o f 
‘screening o u f  future sim ilarly affected people, and the m ore objective harms arising 
from the presence o f  m ore com petitors for scarce resources, is no sim ple task. This 
uncertainty as to w hich course o f  action w ould be the m ore harm ful to people affected by 
similar conditions allow ed me to propose, earlier in this chapter, that the wishes and 
interests o f  prospective parents should be accorded precedence, sim ply because o f the 
possibility o f ascertaining precisely where their interests lie.
to w hich Purdy refers is that, w h atever m ost p eo p le  happen to b e liev e , p rosp ective  parents a re  subject to such an 
ethical duty.
' “ it is, o f  course, the case  that m aterial resources account for on ly  on e  w ay in w h ich  so m e o n e ’s life  im pacts on  
the w orld  around them , but less tangib le  contributions be ing  a lm ost im possib le  to  evaluate in the abstract, the 
present d iscu ssion  m ust be con fin ed  to the m aterial.
' '2 John A . R obertson, C h ild re n  o f  C h o ice: F reed o m  a n d  the N e w  R ep ro d iic tib e  T ech n o lo g ies , Princeton, N e w  
Jersey, Princeton U n iversity  P ress, 1994 , at p .77 .
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W hile different disabled individuals and groups m ay have different, or even 
diametrically opposed, interests in relation to whether similarly disabled people are born 
in future, the same m ay not be true o f  the non-disabled population. Expressivistic 
concerns, and interests in developing better treatm ents for the condition in question, will 
not be relevant to those who ai'e rivals not for a particular resource or treatm ent, but 
rivals for resources from  a larger shared pool, such as from the N ational H ealth Service, 
or the welfare state m ore generally. The care and treatm ent o f  those affected by single 
gene disorders is said to cost the U K  state around £2 billion eveiy year.“  ^ Anyone who 
suffers from a shortage in NH S resources, considered at the m acro or m eso level, might 
be thought to have a grievance against those parents who, deliberately or ‘negligently’, 
gave birth to a child w ith expensive healthcare needs. Indeed, it m ight be thought that 
anyone who either pays into that shared resoui'ce pool, or in any sense requires to take 
from it, m ight com plain that the choice o f  (or refusal to choose by -  though this itse lf is, 
o f  course, a sort o f  choice) such parents harm s their interests. The taxpayer and the 
pensioner alike could claim  to be harm ed, to some extent, by such choices.
My third question w ill consider the possibility that such interests are too remote, too 
disparate and too m inim al to outweigh the interest in reproductive liberty, but before 
turning to that, we m ust consider the second question. Can we, w ith any accuracy, 
identify traits tlnough preim plantion screening that will allow  us to designate embryos as 
likely ‘givers’ or ‘takers’? In some cases, this will alm ost certainly be possible; those 
conditions alm ost universally agreed to be disastrous, such as Lesch N yhan syndrome 
(considered in Chapter 3), w ill result in a child w ith expensive m edical and caring needs 
who will never live long enough to m ake any sort o f m aterial contribution to the shared 
pool o f  resources.
Those conditions aside, though, w hat are we to say o f  conditions such as CF or DMD 
that will, predictably, affect individuals in a m anner that places dem ands upon healthcare
113 O iir In heritance, O iir  F u tu re: R e a lis in g  the P o te n tia l o f  G en e tic s  in the  N H S, Cm . 5 7 9 1 , June 2 0 0 3 , at para.
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resources while, tlirough physical infirm ity and decreased life expectancy, lim iting their 
ability to contribute? W hat o f  late-onset conditions such as H untington’s Disease? W hile 
there can be little doubt that exceptional individuals such as W oodie Guthrie m ade a 
positive contribution, those affected by HD m ight be thought to start life already owing a 
‘societal debt’; they w ill, should they live long enough for HD symptom s to m anifest 
them selves phenotypically, inevitably require a substantial investm ent o f  resources to 
provide 24-hour care and very possibly m edical treatm ent for attendant com plications 
such as infections.
Yet the task o f calculating the net balance o f  an individual’s life -  as well as being, for 
many, uncom fortably callous -  is inlierently difficult. Those w ith CF or FID will 
certainly require substantial resource investments dui'ing certain portions o f  their lives, 
but these will be preceded by or interspersed with periods o f independence and 
reasonably robust health. Furtherm ore, the portions o f  their lives during w hich they will 
require intensive support, treatm ent or assistance may be relatively brief. How  is this to 
be weighed against those without such rare conditions, whose ‘norm al’ life expectancies 
see them  live for decades after retirm ent, as net ‘takers’ from the resource pool? Indeed, 
given the extent to w hich the over-sixties and over-seventies place dem ands upon the 
welfare state, it m ay well be that, over a  lifetime, som eone with A m yotrophic lateral 
sclerosis (ALS) whose ‘resource dependent period’ will be b rief though intense,'*^ has a 
higher balance o f  contributions to, rather than demands upon, the com m on pool.
As noted above, for m any people, such a calculation is inherently callous or 
dehumanising, but for those who w ould seek to rely on the ‘societal burden’ argum ent 
against the laissez faire approach, a far m ore sophisticated and inform ed analysis will be
‘T he N H S  spent around 40%  o f  its budget - £iO  b illion  -  on p eop le  over the age o f  65  in 19 9 8 /9 9 . In the sam e  
year so c ia l serv ices spent nearly 50%  o f  their budget on  the over 6 5s, som e £ 5 .2  b illio n .’ D epartm ent o f  H ealth, 
N a tio n a l S e rv ice  F ra m ew o rk  f o r  O ld er  P e o p le ,  M arch 2 0 0 1 , Chapter O ne, paragraph 2. A v a ila b le  on line at 
h ttp ://w w w .d h .g o v .u k /a ssetR o o t/0 4 /0 7 /1 2 /8 3 /0 4 0 7 1 2 8 3 .p d f. T his is desp ite the fact that o v er-6 5 s com prise only  
16% o f  the U K  population; N ation a l S tatistics O nline, availab le at 
h ttp ://w w w .sta tistics.gov .u k /cci/n u gget.asp ? id = 949 .
‘[T ]he m ean survival tim e w ith  A L S is three to fiv e  years’; A L S A sso c ia tio n  w eb site , at 
h ttp ://w w w .a lsa .org /a ls/sym p tom s.cfin ?C F ID = 175234& C F T O K E N = 39766255 . It sh ou ld  be noted that the causes  
o f  A L S are still som ew hat uncertain, although it is b e liev ed  that at least so m e  cases are gen etic  in origin.
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necessitated than a sim ple assum ption that those w ith ‘disabilities’ aie more 
burdensom e, on balance, than those w ith ‘norm al’ health.
The third question that m ust be addressed is whether, even if  we concede some sort o f 
societal interest in avoiding ‘uneconom ical’ lives, and assum e further that such lives can 
be identified in advance, this gives rise to an obligation on the part o f  prospective 
parents. That som eone has an interest bound up with one’s decision is not always enough 
to give rise to an ethical duty to further that interest, especially where competing 
interests (including o n e’s own) m ust also be weighed in the balance. M ore specifically, 
the im plications in recognising the existence o f  a reproductive ‘duty to society’ would, 
were it to be consistently applied, extend considerably beyond the area o f  PGD.
It is well docum ented that Europe faces a dem ographic problem  arising from the 
coincidence o f  falling birth  rates and increasing life expectancy,^ such as m ay be 
thought to give rise to a non-trivial interest on the part o f  the present population that 
potential parents have m ore children than they are, i f  they follow  the average, likely to 
do. Does this impose an ethical duty on those potential parents -  who m ay have no 
desire whatever to becom e actual parents -  to reproduce? For if  it does not, then it is 
difficult to see how  they can be thought to be subject to duty to reproduce in a certain, 
particularly beneficial manner.
Perhaps it m ight be argued that, while no potential parents are required to act so as to 
positively contribute to  pool o f  shared resources, all may be expected to act in such a 
way as to avoid (or m inim ise the chances of) m aking unnecessary dem ands o f it. On 
such a view, we need not thinlc them  ethically required to create any  child in order to 
think them  ethically required to avoid creating a seriously disabled one. Yet this rests 
upon an assum ed all-im portant distinction betw een positive and negative obligations that 
was shown, in Chapter 2, to be som ew hat suspect. I f  the interests o f  their fellow  citizens
‘T he current w orker-pensioner ratio in Europe has fa llen  to about three w orkers for each  pensioner, and it 
looks set to fall to a m ere three w orkers for evei-y tw o pensioners w ithin thirty yea rs .’ ‘W ork longer, have m ore  
b a b ies’, Leader colum n in The E co n o m ist,  2 7  Septem ber 2 0 0 3 .
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in receiving more generous pensions is the legitim ate concern o f  potential parents, it 
should not m atter w hether those interests are adversely affect this interest by their 
‘decisions to ’ or their ‘decisions not to .’ From the harm  perspective, both action and 
inaction will have the sam e outcome.
I would suggest, then, that all tlu'ee o f  the questions I have addressed pose problem s for 
the ‘irresponsible reproduction’ objection to the Genetic Superm arket hypothesis. 
However, even were w e to take the view  that these questions could be answered in the 
affirmative, any such ‘societal interest’ m ust be show n to outweigh the interest the 
potential parents have in reproductive liberty. Inevitably, the business o f  balancing such 
radically different interests in any objective m anner is a  forlorn endeavour, but it may 
well be suggested that the im m ediate direct interest o f  the prospective parents in 
choosing what child they bring into existence weighs heavily against the relatively 
distant and trivial interests possessed by those whose investm ent in that decision 
amounts only to a  tiny fraction o f  their present or future income, or to a miniscule 
reduction in their prospects o f  receiving healthcare treatm ent. As I suggested in Chapter 
1, the outcom e o f reproductive decisions w ill have significant impacts on the future lives 
o f the potential parents, and that gives rise to a strong pro tanto case that their choices 
should not lightly be interfered with. To quote Robertson again, since the ‘reproductive 
interest is generally a strong one, only very compelling needs w ould justify  overriding 
their fundam ental right to procreate. Saving money and preventing offense ordinarily 
would not rise to the required level.’^
4.7 Conclusion
Unlike the suggested harm s considered in Chapter 3, those I have exam ined here aie 
neither discountable on em pirical grounds (as with the purported harm  to the disearded 
embryo) nor conceptually incoherent (as was the case w ith suggested harm s to potential 
futui'e people or to those children whose lives ai'e subjectively w orthw hile on balance).
John R obertson, C hildren o f  Choice, op. cit., at p .85.
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Rather, the possibility o f  harm  accruing to existing disabled people is both real and non­
trivial.
In relation to those subjective harm s refeiTed to as ‘expressivistic’, however, I have 
attempted to show that a laissez faire approach to PGD, whereby the state adopted a 
position o f  neutrality tow ards the selection o f  traits for w hich testing w ould be available, 
might in fact dim inish rather than exacerbate the degree o f  harm. The eurrent HFEA 
policy o f  allowing PG D only for the exclusion o f  serious genetic disorders (and now  for 
ensuring HLA com patibility) m ight veiy well be thought to com m unicate the idea that 
lives affected by such disorders are devalued. A  state o f  affairs wherein PGD could be 
selected either to elim inate or m axim ise the possibility o f  a particular condition being 
passed on would, I suggest, largely address such concerns.
Insofar as expressivistic concerns relate to those who feel uneasy in the face o f the 
counterfactual speculation about w hat their parents might have done had PGD been 
available to them, I suggest that such lingering doubts will persist whether or not that 
technology is now  available. Furtherm ore, since their present disquiet derives precisely 
from the lack o f choice that was available to their parents, it is difficult to see how  we 
avoid the prospect o f  such anguish in a new  generation o f  disabled children by similarly 
denying such choices to a new  generation o f  potential parents.
The position o f neutrality I have advocated in the first part o f this chapter, however, 
where the state neither denies nor provides access to PGD for any particular trait (with 
the possible exceptions o f  aneuploidy and those that w ould give rise to W TN lives), may 
be thought to sit uneasily with certain notions o f justice. In the second part o f  this 
chapter, I have sought to dem onstrate that while a Genetic Superm arket in PGD 
constitutes a  prim a facie problem  for justice, it is in fact only a new m anifestation o f  an 
old problem , and arguably one that is scarcely worse than the status quo.
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If  it is unjust for the fortunate to profit as a  result o f  advantages that they have neither 
earned nor chosen, then this rem ains the case whether those advantages were bestowed 
upon them  by their w ealthy parents, or by the ‘chrom osom al lottery’. In neither event do 
they deserve  their advantage, and in both cases those concerned w ith justice  should be 
equally concerned w ith finding ways to ensure that the products o f their good fortune are 
distributed equitably. The existence o f  a Genetic Superm arket will not obviate the need 
for such measures, but nor w ill it be a prerequisite o f  their necessity.
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Chapter 5 Regulating PGD in the United Kingdom
W hen Robert N ozick coined the term  ‘Genetic Supermai'ket’ in 1974, he was writing 
in an era when even I VF was undream t of by m ost lay persons. The question of 
parents actually being able to m ake choices about the genetic com position of their 
offspring was no m ore than an admittedly fascinating thought experim ent, firmly 
rooted in the realm  o f the hypothetical. Indeed, for the next quarter of a century, the 
debate rem ained a largely theoretical one; although the increasingly widespread 
availability o f IVF rendered the possibility m ore plausible, the actual ‘hard cases’ 
that so engaged ethicists intrigued by the notion o f the Genetic Superm arket did not 
m aterialise.
In the first few years of the Tw enty-first Century, however, three instances have 
arisen in the UK where couples have sought to use PGD technology in  ways which 
m ight be considered ethically and legally problem atic. Although only one of those 
cases -  that involving Shahana and Raj Hashmi* -  actually reached the courts, all 
three were subject o f controversial HFEA decisions and intense m edia scrutiny. 
Furtherm ore, although the other two couples -  the M astertons and the W hitakers -  
elected to not to pursue their cases through the courts, their circumstances allow for a 
consideration of the sorts o f purposes for which real people m ight w ant to m ake use 
of the Genetic Supermarket.
Equally importantly, o f course, the respective attempts o f the Hashm is, W hitakers 
and M astertons to use PGD provide a valuable insight into how the courts and the 
regulatory bodies are likely to respond to such attempts. Have the principles 
suggested thus far in this thesis been reflected in these decisions? To w hat extent 
have the Harm  Principle and the Non-Identity Principle shaped or inform ed the 
approaches and decisions of the courts and the HFEA? And insofar as they have not 
been the driving principles, to what alternative principles have these decision-m aking 
bodies looked for guidance?
Starting with that o f the Hashm is, this chapter will consider these applications, and 
the court cases, consultations and reports through which they were determined.
 ^ R  (on  the a p p lic a tio n  o f  Q u in ta va lle )  v H um an F ertilisa tio n  a n d  E m b ryo lo g y  A u th o rity  [2 0 0 3 ] 3 A ll ER 25 7
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5.1 Tissue typing
5.1.1 The H ashm is; Background
Zain Hashm i suffers from  beta thalassaem ia major, an autosom al recessive genetic 
disorder which causes an abnorm ally high rate o f breakdown of red blood cells, 
leading in turn to severe anaemia. Sufferers require frequent blood transfusions, but 
such a regim en can cause iron overload and consequent organ deterioration. It was 
therefore considered that the only long-term  solution, and certainly the only cure for 
the condition lies in correcting the genetic defect by bone m arrow transplantation.^
Developm ents in the field of stem  cell technology, however, have obviated the need 
for actual bone marrow. It has been discovered that ‘[c]ord blood from  neonates 
contains substantial num bers o f haem opoietic stem cells, which can be harvested at 
delivery, frozen, and then transplanted to patients who would not otherw ise have a 
donor’ Rather  than subjecting the donor to the painful process o f bone m arrow 
retrieval in the future, then, all that w ould be required was a quantity o f blood from 
his or her umbilical cord.
Those wishing to utilise this technology are still faced with the problem  o f finding a 
suitable donor, one who is Hum an Leukocyte A ntigen (HLA) com patible. As with 
all transplant situations, the likelihood o f finding a m atch among genetic relatives is 
higher than among the population at large, but since neither Z ain ’s parents, nor any 
of his three elder siblings, were com patible, the Hashm is undertook to have another 
child that could act as a donor for Zain.
Their first attem pt ended in unfortunate circumstances; prenatal testing revealed that 
the child Shahana Hashm i was cairying would be afflicted with the sam e condition 
as Zain, and she elected to have an abortion. A  second pregnancy was more 
successful, in that the child was unaffected, but it becam e quickly apparent that this 
child was not a suitable tissue match and could therefore not provide the required
“ L ucarelli, G ., A ndreani, M ., A n g elu cc i, E. ‘T h e cure o f  tha lassem ia  w ith  b on e  m arrow transplantation’ 
B one M a rro w  T ra n sp la n ta tio n  (2 0 0 1 ); 28: S I 1-3.
 ^ Lennard, A . L., Jackson , G. H . ‘S tem  ce ll transplantation’. B ritish  M e d ica l J o u rn a l (2 0 0 0 ); 321: 4 3 3 -4 3 7
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transplant. This outcom e was not entirely surprising; as the HFEA Ethics Com m ittee
was to explain, even among siblings, the chances were not especially favourable:
The chances o f the technique being successful (i.e. resulting in 
the birth o f a healthy, unaffected, tissue-com patible donor) will 
need to be calculated sepaiately in each case. W ith an 
autosom al lecessive condition, for example, on average three- 
quarters o f embryos created would be unaffected, although one 
half would be carriers. As one quarter would be HLA 
compatible, this gives ... a 1/16 chance o f a normal HLA 
com patible embryo or a 3/16 chance o f an unaffected HLA 
com patible embryo."^
Around this time, M rs Hashmi discussed her problem  with D r Sim on Fishel, the 
D irector o f CARE (Centres for Assisted Reproduction Limited), the ‘largest single 
provider of in vitro fertilisation ... services in the United K ingdom ’.^  D r Fishel was 
aware o f a groundbreaking procedure being piloted at the Reproductive Genetics 
Institute ( ‘R G F) in Chicago, and he brought this to M rs H ashm i’s attention. The 
procedure Dr Fishel described com prised five steps;
1. the creation by in vitro fertilisation o f several embryos, using gam etes from  M r and 
M rs Hashmi;
2. the biopsy o f a single cell from  the embryos thus created;
3. the use o f PGD to screen those embryos for the presence o f beta thalassaemia 
(henceforth referred to as Phase 1 screening);
4. sim ultaneous screening o f the embryos to ensure HLA com patibility with Zain
(leferred to by the court as ‘tissue typing’, but henceforth refened  to as Phase 2 
screening);
5. jettison o f those embryos found either to be affected by the disease or to be HLA- 
incom patible with Zain.
A lthough, as discussed in the Introduction, PGD had already been used for the 
screening out o f embryos that cairied genetic diseases, Phase 2 screening had not 
been carried out in the UK before, Fishel therefore enquired o f the HFEA  whether a
license would be granted for such a procedure.
[2003] 3 At, ER
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The HFEA appears to have found this question som ewhat troubling. In 1999, a Joint 
W orking Party (JW P) o f the HFEA and the Human Genetics Com m ission had been 
established to consider the extent to which, and circumstances in which, PG D should 
be available. W hen it reported in 2001, the W orking Party recom m ended that PGD 
‘should only be available where there is a significant risk of a serious genetic 
condition being present in the em bryo’.^
The use o f PGD to ensure the birth o f a suitable tissue donor had not been 
specifically considered in the consultation process preceding the Report, but it is 
clear that it was tacitly precluded by the terms o f this Recom m endation. W hile the 
first phase of screening, to ensure the new child would itself be free from  genetic 
illness, would appear to fall w ithin the terms of Recom m endation 11, the second 
phase, to ensure com patibility with the existing child, cleaiiy would not. Indeed, the 
Report went on to m ake this rejection o f HLA typing explicit, at least until further 
discussion of the perceived ethical difficulties took place.^
This further discussion was carried out by the H FEA ’s Ethics Com m ittee, a body set 
up by the HFEA and com prising the Authority m em bers ‘with the m ost relevant 
experience’,^  which in Decem ber 2001 published a docum ent entitled ‘Ethical Issues 
in the Creation and Selection o f Preim plantation Em bryos to Produce Tissue 
D onors’.^  These new guidelines allowed for the possibility o f the use o f PG D for 
this purpose, but such use was tightly restricted by the conditions which it attached. 
These conditions will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
The Ethics Com m ittee’s recom m endation seems to have satisfied the HFEA that Dr 
F ishel’s clinic should be granted the license, and that the Hashm is should therefore 
be perm itted to m ake use of the two-phase screening t e c h n i q u e . ( A s  will be
 ^Joint W orking Group o f  the H F E A  and H um an G en etics C om m ission , O u tcom e o f  the P u b lic  C onsu lta tion  
on P re im p la n ta tio n  G en e tic  D ia g n o s is ,  N ovem b er 2 0 0 1 , R ecom m endation  11.
’ Ibid, at paragraph 29 .
® S h eld on  and W ilk in son , ‘H ashm i and W hitaker’, lo c . c it., at p i 62,
 ^O pin ion  o f  the E thics C om m ittee  o f  the H um an F ertilisation  and E m bryology  A uthority, ‘E thical Issues in  
the Creation and S e lec tio n  o f  Preim plantation E m bryos to Produce T issu e  D o n o rs’, N o vem b er 2 2 , 2001 , 
availab le  at
h ttp ://w w w .hfea .gov .u k /P ressO ffice/P ressR eleasesbysu bject/P G D andtissuetyp ing/E th ics% 20C ttee% 20P G D  
% 2 0 N ovem b er% 202001 .pdf.
H um an F ertilisation  and E m bryology  A uthority Press R elease , 13 D ecem b er  2 0 0 1 , ‘H F E A  to a llow  tissue  
typing in conjunction  w ith  preim plantation gen etic  d ia g n o sis’
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discussed in due course, however, not all o f the Ethics Com m ittee’s 
recom m endations w ere taken on board by the Authority).
In contrast to m any accounts of developm ents at the ‘cutting edge’ o f reproductive 
and genetic t e c h n o l o g y , t h e  H FEA ’s decision in the case o f Raj and Shahana 
Hashm i was widely welcomed, by the popular press as well as the medical 
profession. The HFEA, it was thought, had adroitly picked a path through an 
ethical minefield, balancing the life o f Zain Hashmi, and the reproductive freedom  of 
his parents, against the possible ethical perils o f ‘designer’ and ‘spare-part babies’. 
The latter concerns were, it is widely considered, reflected in the strict guidelines on 
tissue typing which the Authority had published a few  months prior to the decision. 
As then-chairwom an Ruth Deech reassured the press, ‘[t]he authority will only 
approve the treatm ent in very rare circum stances and under strict controls
For o n e  exam p le  am ong literally  hundreds, co n sid er  the front page story in the M e tro  on  3 July 2 0 0 3 , in 
response to the revelation  that C h icago  sc ien tist D r  N orbert G leich er had injected  m ale c e lls  into fem ale  
em bryos in an attem pt to fin d  treatm ents for gen etic  disorders. U nder the head line ‘N o w  scien tists create a 
h e -sh e ’, the story w ent on  to describe the breakthrough as ‘the latest in  a ch illin g  series o f  gen etic  
ann ou n cem en ts’, and p oin ted  to a lleged  parallels w ith  ‘the w ork  o f  concentration  cam p doctor J o se f  
M en g e le ’ w h o ‘experim en ted  on  Jew ish  prisoners in an effort to create a m aster ra ce .’
‘W h y  M r and M rs H ashm i w ere right to ch o o se  l i f e ’, In d ep en d en t on Sunday, 2 4  February 2002; ‘T he  
virtue o f  IV F ’, The O b serve r ,  2 4  February 2 0 0 2  
H um an F ertilisation and E m bryology  A uthority, ‘A  Sum m ary o f  the O ne H undred and Thirteenth M eetin g  
o f  the H um an F ertilisation  and E m bryology  A u thority ’ on  29th  N ovem b er  2 0 0 1 , at 
h ttp ://w w w .hfea .gov .u k /abou tH F E A /ai-ch ived_m inu tes/00028 .h tm
Clare D yer, ‘W atchdog  approves em bryo se lec tio n  to treat 3 year o ld  c h ild .’ B ritish  M e d ic a l Jou rn a l
(2002); 324: 503
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5.1.2 The Select Com m ittee on Science and Technology
In July 2002, the H FEA ’s decision in relation to tissue typing in circum stances like
those o f the Hashm is, together with Chairwoman Ruth D eech’s defence o f that
decision, were the subjects of criticism  from  the House o f Com m ons Select
Com m ittee on Science and Technology/^ Noting that the public consultation process
had not addressed the scenario that arose in the Hashm i application, and that the only
consideration o f this particular practice had been before the H FEA ’s Ethics
Com m ittee, the Select Com m ittee took the view that
The H FEA ’s decision to allow tissue typing in conjunction with 
preim plantation genetic diagnosis went beyond the scope o f its 
own public consultation. It is vital that the public are taken 
along with decisions o f such ethical importance.
In response to Ruth D eech’s submission that the fact that the HFEA  took the 
decision on PGD ‘protects M embers o f Parliam ent from direct involvem ent in that 
sort o f thing’, t h e  Select Com m ittee retorted that ‘Parliam ent does not need 
protecting and dem ocracy is not served by unelected quangos taking decisions on 
behalf o f Parl iament. ’ The Select Com m ittee concluded on this issue by drawing 
attention to the fact that ‘[a] pressure group, Com m ent on Reproductive Ethics, is 
seeking judicial review  in the High Court on PGD on the grounds that the 1990 Act 
only perm its distinguishing betw een embryos on the basis of w hether they are 
healthy or not or for providing treatm ent services to the m other’, w arning that 
‘[sjhould this ultim ately be successful, Parliament's intervention may be 
inevitable.
5.1.3 The case
The licence on question was granted on 22 February 2002, but the H FE A ’s policy 
decision to perm it HLA tissue typing was by this time already the subject o f a legal 
challenge. Josephine Quintavalle, backed by the pressure gi'oup Com m ent on 
Reproductive Ethics (CORE), sought judicial review of the H FEA ’s decision, on the
H o u se  o f  C om m ons S e lec t C om m ittee on S c ien ce  and T ech n o lo g y , Fourth Report, 18 July 2 0 0 2 , at 
httn://w w w .D arliam en t.th e-sta tion erv-o ffice .co .u k /p a /cm 200102 /cm select/cm sctech /791 /79103 .h tm
Ibid, at para. 17. 
Ibid, at para. 18. 
^®Id.19 Id.
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grounds that it had acted ultra vires o f the powers vested in it by the Human 
Fertilisation and Em bryology Act 1990.
(The Quintavalle fam ily was by this point no stranger to the English civil courts, Mrs 
Q uintavalle’s son, Bruno, having already attained prom inence by challenging — 
initially successfully, although he ultim ately lost on appeal to the H ouse o f Lords - 
the efficacy o f the 1990 Act in prohibiting hum an cloning.^^ It is interesting to 
speculate on the extent to which the courts are likely to replace the legislature as the 
prim ary forum within which bioethical disputes will be played out.)
The basis o f M rs Q uintavalle’s challenge lay in the wording o f the 1990 Act, and 
com prised four elements:
1. Section 3 o f the Act prohibits the creation or use o f any em bryo ‘except in 
pursuance o f a licence’
2. Section 11 o f the Act limits the circum stances within which the Authority 
may issue a licence to those set out in Schedule 2}'^
3. Schedule 2 provides, inter alia, that a licence may only be issued if  ‘it appears 
to the A uthority to be necessary or desirable for the purpose o f providing 
treatm ent services
4. The definition o f ‘treatm ent services’ is in turn spelt out in Section 2(1), 
which provides the following definition: ‘ “treatm ent services” means 
medical, surgical or obstetric services provided to the public or a section of 
the public for the purposes o f assisting women to carry children.’
20 R. (on  the a p p lic a tio n  o f  Q u in ta va lle )  v S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  f o r  H ea lth  (2 0 0 2 ) 63 B .M .L .R . 167, (2 0 0 3 ) 71 
B .kJ.L .R . 209 .
3. Prohibitions in connection with embryos
(1 ) N o  person shall
(a) bring about the creation o f  an em bryo, or
(b) keep  or u se  an em bryo,
except in pursuance o f a licence.
11. Licences for treatment, storage and research
(1 ) T he A uthority m ay grant the fo llo w in g  and no other licen ces -
(a) licen ces under paragraph I o f  S ch ed u le  2  o f  this A ct authorising activ ities in the course o f  
providing treatm ent services,
(b) licen ces under that Schedu le  authorising the storage o f  gam etes and em bryos, and
(c) licen ces under paragraph 3 o f  that S ch ed u le  authorising activ ities for  the purposes o f  a project o f  
research.
S ch ed u le  2, Paragraph 1(3).
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Quintavalle’S contention was that the H ashm is’ intention to use IVF/PGD for tissue 
typing did not fall w ithin the definition o f ‘providing treatm ent services’, and 
therefore fell outw ith that range o f purposes for which the Authority could 
legitim ately issue a licence.
The Authority responded to this challenge with two contentions o f its own. Firstly, it 
subm itted that the testing for HLA compatibility o f a cell biopsed from  an embryo 
did not constitute ‘use’ or ‘creation’ o f an embryo, and therefore did not require a 
licence within Section 3 o f the Act. W hile it accepted that the rem oval o f a cell from 
the embryo constituted ‘use of an embryo’ whatever  was done to that cell once 
rem oved, it averred, could not be so defined.
In the event that this first submission was rejected, the Authority subm itted that it 
was in any event within its power to grant a licence for this purpose, since tissue 
typing was ‘at least desirable for the overall purpose of providing fertility 
t r e a t m e n t A g a i n ,  Quintavalle disputed this, m aintaining that the purpose o f tissue 
typing was not to ‘assist women to carry children’, but rather, ‘to ensure that a child 
born to a particular wom an would have tissue that was com patible with the tissue of 
a sibling.
On 20 D ecem ber 2002, at the High Court, Justice M aurice Kay decided in favour of 
M rs Quintavalle.^^ H e rejected the A uthority’s contention that tissue typing did not 
constitute ‘use o f an em bryo’, deem ing it ‘inconceivable’ that Parliam ent could have 
intended to exclude such a practice from  regulation by the Authority.^^ Having stated 
that the procedure required  a licence, he then went on hold that, contrary to the 
second o f the A uthority’s submissions, the procedure could not be licensed, since -  
as M rs Quintavalle had contended -  tissue typing could not be said to be ‘necessary 
or desirable for the purpose of assisting a wom an to carry a child’.
R (on  the a p p lic a tio n  o f  Q u in ta va lle )  v H um an F ertilisa tio n  a n d  E m b ryo lo g y  A u th o rity  [20 0 3 ] 3 A ll ER  
2 5 7 , at p 2 6 3 , para. 16 
Ibid, at para, 17.
Ibid, at para. 18.
[2003] 2  A ll E R  105.
Ibid, at pp..
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The Authority appealed against this decision, and was supported in that appeal by the 
Secretary of State for Health, who was concerned that the decision, w ere it to stand, 
could impede the use o f PGD m ore generally, and specifically for the puipose of 
elim inating genetic disease?^ The trial judge’s interpretation o f the relevant section 
as being restricted to allowing a wom an to become pregnant and carry a child to term 
was arguably not wide enough to perm it screening for genetic disorders that would 
not m anifest them selves phenotypically until after b i r t h . Ce r t a i n l y ,  it is clear from 
C O R E’S website that their objection was not solely to tissue typing, but to PGD more 
generally
On appeal, counsel for the Authority dropped the first strand o f its case at first 
instance. Caixying out the biopsy, it was conceded, clearly involved ‘using’ the 
embryo, and therefore m ust itself be ‘for the purpose o f assisting a wom an to carry a 
ch ild’. Since the purpose of the biopsy was to allow tissue typing, then in order for 
the biopsy to fall w ithin the terms o f the Act, so to m ust the tissue typing.^^ Both 
parties, therefore, now agreed that, if  tissue typing were to be perm itted, a licence 
from  the Authority would required.
The A uthority’s case, rather, relied on a contention more central to the matter, 
namely, that
the entire treatm ent, com prehending creation of the embryo, 
biopsy for PGD and tissue typing, the analysis o f the cell 
rem oved by the biopsy and the im plantation o f the embryo, if  it 
proved to be free o f disease and a tissue m atch for Zain^^
amounted to treatm ent ‘for the purpose of assisting a woman to carry a child’.
Counsel for the Authority disputed the judge o f first instance’s narrow interpretation
o f that phrase, which seemed to see ‘treatm ent services’ as ‘hav[ing] as their sole
object the assistance of the physical process of producing a c h i l d . R a t h e r ,  a
A  concern shared by  the A uthority itself; see  [2003] 3 A ll E R  2 5 7 , at p 2 8 1 , para 116.
Ibid, at p p .2 8 1-282 , para. 116.
‘P G D  is purely and sim p ly  another exam ple o f  m od em  eu gen ics, practised ever e a iiier  on d evelop in g  
hum an life . . . .  W ith  P G D  the p u ip o se  o f  d iagn osis is sim ply  to identify  w h o should  be k illed , N either for the 
disab led  baby in the w om b , nor for the d isab led  em bryo do you  o ffer  any ch o ice  but the final so lu tion  - death. 
’ From  C O R E ’S R esp o n se  to H um an F ertilisation  and E m bryology  A uthority/ A d v iso ry  C om m ittee on  
G en etic  T estin g  C onsu ltation  D ocu m en t on Preim plantation G en etic  D ia g n o sis , ava ilab le  at 
http ://w w w .coreth ics.org /d ocu m en t.asp ? id = fresp on se.h tm & se-3& st= 5
[2 0 0 3 ] 3 A ll ER 2 5 7 , at p 2 6 4 , para.20.
Ibid, at p 2 6 4 , para.20.
Ibid, at pai’a 21.
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broader reading o f the phrase -  one which, it was contended, was closer to legislative 
intention -  took account o f the fact that, in some circumstances, allowing a wom an to 
elim inate the possibility of genetic disease could be regarded as assisting her to carry 
a child, since ‘[w]ithout such knowledge some wom en who carried genetic diseases 
w ould not be prepared to have children.
W ere it to be accepted that PGD for the ‘screening out’ of genetic disease fell within
the definition, counsel for the Authority went on, it followed that the puipose for
which M rs Hashm i wished to use PGD should also be so regarded, since
In the sam e way tissue typing w ould assist M rs Hashm i to carry 
a child, for her wish to do so was conditional upon knowing that 
the birth o f that child would be capable o f saving the life and 
health o f Zain.^^
W hen challenged as to whether such a wide reading o f the Act could allow  PGD for 
the selection of any  traits to be regarded as ‘assisting’, and thence the subject of a 
possible licence, counsel for the Authority conceded this possibility, but regarded the 
policing o f the use o f this technology to be the proper responsibility o f the Authority, 
and not a reason to read the governing legislation restrictively.
Counsel for M rs Q uintavalle responded by reiterating his insistence that ‘treatm ent 
services’ should be interpreted narrowly, as referring only to m easures required to 
overcom e problem s in conceiving and m aintaining a pregnancy. To this, however, 
he added the second claim  that, even if  the term  could be extended to include 
m easures to screen out genetic defects, what the Hashm is sought was a step further 
than even this, being designed ‘to reject healthy and viable embryos because they 
lacked some desired characteristic.’^^
In considering the respective merits o f these submissions, the Court o f Appeal 
adopted ‘a puiposive construction of the statute’ placing considerable importance 
on the intent of the fram ers of the 1990 Act. The M aster o f the Rolls, Lord Phillips 
o f W orth M atravers, was im pressed by the argum ent from  counsel for the Authority
Ibid, at p .2 6 4 , para. 2 1 .
Id.
Ibid, at p .2 6 5 , para. b.
S a lly  Sh eld on  and S teph en  W ilk in son , ‘H ashm i and W hitaker: A n  U n justifiab le  and M isguided  
D istin ctio n ? ’ M ed ica l L a w  R e v iew  (2004); 12: 1 3 7 -163 , at p l4 4 .
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to the effect that Parliam ent tacitly perm itted screening of embryos for genetic 
abnormalities. M r Pannick had pointed to 3(2)(b) o f Schedule 2, which perm its the 
licensing o f em bryo reseaich activities for the purpose o f ‘developing methods for 
detecting the presence o f gene or chrom osom e abnormalities in embryos before 
im plantation’. If, he argued. Parliam ent specifically made allowance for research 
into such screening, it would be strange indeed if  it intended to prohibit the screening 
itself. Lord Phillips found this argument persuasive.
Parliam entary intent, then, had not been specifically to prohibit embryo screening; 
but did it follow that it had been specifically perm itted l Did screening fall within the 
definition of ‘assisting women to carry children’? Though admitting that his initial 
reaction was to agree with the trial judge, i.e. that the phrase should be interpreted 
narrowly as applying only to ‘treatm ent designed to assist the physical processes 
from  fertilisation to the birth o f a child’ Lord Phillips eventually came to the view 
that screening could fall within this definition. An unwillingness to risk the birth of a 
child affected by a hereditary defect could, he reasoned, constitute an impedim ent 
ju st as surely as a physical problem, and treatm ent which circum vented that 
im pedim ent could be regarded as being ‘for the purpose of assisting wom en to carry 
children’.
Having accepted that screening for genetic disorder could fall within the terms o f the
Act, the next question for Lord Phillips was whether this could be extended to tissue
typing. W hile conceding that this m ight be thought to amount to a step too far for
the Authority, Lord Phillips was not prepared to draw a distinction between those
cases o f PGD that are intended to screen out genetic disease, and those designed to
select other traits, such as HLA compatibility:
M y conclusion is that whether the PGD has the purpose of 
producing a child free from genetic defects, or of producing a 
child with stem  cells m atching a sick or dying sibling, the IVF
S e e  a lso  the Judgm ent o f  Lord Justice M ance at p .2 8 3 , para. 120: " W h ile  it is theoretically  p ossib le  that 
parliam ent intended to perm it research into m ethods o f  detecting abnorm alities, or into  applications o f  
k n o w led g e  acquired about d isease , w h ich  it  w o u ld  b e  im perm issib le  to lic e n c e  for practical u se  un less the 
A ct w as am ended, it seem s im probable that it w as contem plated  that research, a particularly contentious  
matter, should  be perm itted into m ethods and applications the use  o f  w h ich  in practice Parliam ent had 
d ec id ed  to e x c lu d e .’
A t p 2 7 0 , para.43
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treatm ent that includes the PGD constitutes ‘treatm ent for the 
purpose o f assisting wom en to bear children’
In short, these were matters which Parliam ent had intended for the Authority to
decide, and it had acted perfectly properly in exercising this discretion in the case of
the Hashmis.
Lord Justice Schiem ann adopted a sim ilar approach, drawing attention to the 
distinction in the A ct betw een those activities that were prohibited a l t o g e t h e r , a n d  
those which may only be done in pursuit of a licence issued by the Authority. He 
further concuiTed with Lord Phillips that ‘it was lawfully open to the Authority to 
come to the conclusion that [PGD] w ould assist some women, who w ould otherwise 
refrain from  conception or abort either spontaneously or deliberately, to can y  a 
c h i l d . I n  a som ew hat curious phrase, he stated his view that ‘paragraph l ( l ) (d)  is 
wide enough to em brace ensuring that the embryo does not suffer from  a genetic 
defect and tissue incom patibility.’^^
W hether an embryo may m eaningfully be said to ‘suffer’ from tissue incom patibility 
is surely questionable -  any suffering, it m ight be assumed, will be on the part o f the 
sibling that will be denied a transplant -  but again, the reasoning seems to be that, 
since the principal reason for the pregnancy is the creation o f a donor, then the 
inability to ensure that the next child will be a tissue m atch will constitute an obstacle 
to the pregnancy. As such, providing such a guarantee may be regarded as ‘assisting 
wom en to carry children’.
To the concern that such a ruling could open the proverbial floodgates to any choices
prospective parents m ight want to make about their children’s genetic constitution,
provided such choices were stated as preconditions o f their birth. Lord Schiem ann
was, like Lord Phillips, prepared to entrust the policing o f this to the Authority:
I point out in conclusion that Parliam ent did not impose upon 
the Authority any express obligation to sanction the grant of 
licences even if  what was proposed was indubitably necessary 
for the purpose of assisting a woman to can y  a child. That
A t p 2 7 1 , para.48.
Includ ing, inter alia, p la c in g  a non-hum an em bryo in a hum an, or v ice  versa; k eep in g  an em bryo after the 
appearance o f  the prim itive  streak, and ce ll nuclear replacem ent.
A tp p .2 7 5 -2 7 6 , para.89.
A t p .2 7 6 , para.96.
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seems to m e to dispose o f m uch o f the force o f the argum ent that 
if  what has been sanctioned in principle here and licensed in one 
case is lawful, then licensing activities for the purpose o f social 
selection is an unavoidable consequence. If  the decision o f the 
Authority is upheld in the present case it does not mean that 
parents have a right to in vitro fertilisation for social selection 
purposes.'^^
Finally, Lord Justice M ance also favoured an inteipretation that took account o f more
than allowing a w om an to overcom e physical obstacles to initiating and m aintaining
a pregnancy. As well as considering the same background sources as his fellow
Justices -  the W arnock Report, the W hite Paper that preceded the 1990 A ct -  he
sought support for his position within the terms of the Act itself. Section 13(5) o f the
Act, he pointed out, specifically enjoined the Authority to have regard for the welfare
o f the child created thereby. That being so, he found him self
in these circum stances left in no real doubt that the concept o f 
“medical, surgical or obstetric services .... for the purpose o f 
assisting w om en to can y  children” was intended to embrace not 
merely services to assist wom en physically to carry to term  and 
give birth, but also services to assist them  to give birth to 
children who would be normal and healthy during their lives and 
would in turn be able to have norm al and healthy children."^^
The requirem ent, then, ‘is better served if  the legislation is read as perm itting such
screening.
5.1.4 W as the Court o f Appeal correct?
The Court o f A ppeal’s decision to overturn the first instance ruling was predicated on 
two assumptions: first, that the definition o f ‘treatm ent services’ was w ide enough to 
encompass PGD aim ed at elim inating the possibility o f a child being born with a 
hereditary defect; and secondly, that this in turn could be extended to apply to 
screening for HLA com patibility. I w ould suggest, however, that the form er 
assum ption is built upon considerably firm er foundations than the latter.
First, the recognition by Lords Phillips and M ance that Paragraph 3(2)(b) of 
Schedule 2 clearly perm itted the use o f embryos for research into ‘developing
A t p .2 7 6 , pai’a.98. 
A tp .2 8 4 , para. 126. 
Para 110
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m ethods for detecting the presence o f gene or chrom osom e abnorm alities in embryos 
before im plantation’ lends some credence to the claim  that Parliam ent envisaged 
screening for such abnorm alities. It is, indeed, unlikely that the fram ers o f the Act 
w ould allow research into a procedure, but outlaw the procedure itself.
Secondly, Lord Justice M ance was surely correct to point out that the requirem ent in 
Section 13(5) that consideration be paid to the welfare o f any child born as a result of 
treatm ent seems to sit uneasily with a prohibition on screening pre-im plantation 
embryos for even serious disorders. A lthough, as I have argued elsewhere in this 
thesis,"^^ the conditions that may credibly be thought to render a life worse than non­
existence aie both few and rare, the requirem ent o f Section 13(5) that the welfare of 
the child be considered before treatm ent is given seems to im ply that such lives can 
indeed exist. G iven this assum ption, it seems safe to assum e that catastrophic 
genetic disorders such as those considered in Chapter 3 aie likely to be among them.
Thirdly, much of the background m aterial referred to by the Court -  in particular, 
from  the W arnock R e p o r t , t h e  W hite Paper that preceded the 1990 Act,^^ and the 
then Secretary o f State Kenneth C larke’s contributions to the debate as the Bill made 
its way through Parliament^* - adds w eight to the contention that the intention o f the 
A ct’s framers was to allow screening for hereditary abnormalities.
As Lord Phillips recognised, however, accepting that PGD for hereditary defects was 
perm itted within the Act was only a ‘stepping stone’ to the destination the appellants 
w ished to an ive  at, i.e., judicial recognition that the Authority was em pow ered to 
issue a licence for tissue typing. A nd that second step is one that is taken on a 
decidedly slippier surface. N othing in the background materials to which the Court 
looked, nor in the other provisions o f the Act, make explicit or im plicit reference to 
tissue typing.
W hat could, perhaps, be argued is that Section 13(5) requires that concern be paid to 
the welfare o f the child born or any other children affected  by the treatm ent. Juliet
S ee , in particular. Chapter 3.
A t p .2 6 6 , para. 2 7 , per Lord Justice P hillips, M R .50 A t p .2 6 7 , pai'a.31. 
A t p .2 6 8 , para.36.
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Tizzard, of the Progress Educational Trust, has suggested that this m ight be used to 
draw attention to the extent to which allowing the Hashm is to use tissue typing might 
further the interests o f Zain in being provided with a HLA com patible sibling.^^
This subordinate clause has caused a degree of confusion among academic 
com m entators uncertain as to what sort o f situation was being envisaged w hen it was 
inserted. If  a purposive interpretation o f the statute is to be adopted, it m ay be that 
this was intended as a further check on the provision of treatm ent -  treatm ent 
providers should exercise caution if  other children are likely to be harm ed as a result 
-  rather than a justification for treatm ent that w ould not otherwise fall w ithin the 
terras o f the Act.^^ In expressing this scepticism, however, I acknow ledge that some 
com m entators on the case are convinced that s. 13(5) ‘explicitly requires us to take 
account o f the welfare o f the existing sick child.
Perhaps even more questionable was the C ourt’s decision that tissue typing could fall 
within the definition of ‘treatm ent for the purpose o f assisting wom en to bear 
children’, on the basis that, were it not pem iitted, M rs Hashm i may well not have had 
a further child. This is questionable, first, on empirical grounds; as noted in Chapter 
3, the Hashmis m aintained throughout that they m ost assuredly did  intend to have 
another child, even before they were aware o f the possibility that it could serve as a 
donor for Zain.
Y et the intention to have a child did not com m it the Hashmis to having any child. 
The hereditary nature of beta thalassaem ia m eant that any future pregnancy had a 
fairly high probability o f producing another child affected by the condition, and the 
Hashm is had already dem onstrated a willingness to abort such pregnancies, while the 
fact that the legality o f their doing so was never questioned provides proof, were any
‘W h y is P G D  for tissu e  typing o n ly  not a llo w ed ? ’, B ioN ew s, N o . 169, W eek  2 9 /7 /2 0 0 2  - 4 /8 /2 0 0 2  
W h ile  noting that ‘su bsection  13(5) g iv es  rise to considerable lev e ls  o f  am bigu ity’ , R obert G. L ee  and 
D erek  M organ op ine that ‘It is  d ifficu lt to interpret these  p rovisions other than as an attem pt to p lace  a 
restraint on the prov ision  o f  certain m od es o f  a ssisted  concep tion  to  certain groups or types o f  w om en  or 
c o u p le s .’ H um an F e rtilisa tio n  & E m b ryo lo g y : R eg u la tin g  the R ep ro d u c tive  R evo lu tio n , L ondon, B lack stone  
Press L im ited , 2 0 0 1 , at pp. 134-135 .
Sh eld on  and W ilk in son , ‘H ashm i and W hitaker’, loc . cit., at p l5 8 .
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needed, that beta thalassaem ia falls within the criteria for a lawful abortion.^^ If  Mrs 
Hashmi were to be unlucky enough to conceive a series o f sim ilarly affected 
pregnancies, all o f which she were to abort, this m ight be thought to constitute an 
obstacle to achieving a pregnancy.
W hether or not electing to abort a series o f pregnancies could rightly be regarded as 
analogous to infertility, the point rem ains that the Hashmis could have avoided that 
particular possibility by utilising only the relatively uncontentious Phase 1 testing. 
The sole reason for Phase 2 testing, the subject o f the legal challenge, was to 
elim inate the possibility o f a non-HLA -com patible pregnancy, a condition that most 
assuredly would not justify  an abortion in terms o f Section l( l)(d ) . Thus, if  Mrs 
Hashmi, as she claim ed, intended in any event to have another child, she could have 
done so safe in the knowledge that it would be unaffected by beta thalassaemia. 
G iven that possibility, it becomes m ore difficult to regard the provision o f Phase 2 
testing as a form of, or even as closely analogous with, treatm ent for infertility.
Furthermore, it m ight be thought that ‘treatm ent’ cam es some connotation of 
restoring normal functioning after, or ameliorating the effects of, som e disability or 
disease, W alter Glannon, for example, speaks o f ‘treatm ent’ as being aimed at 
‘avoiding harm  to people and benefiting them  by allowing them  to realize their 
interest in having healthy l i v e s . W e  may well speak o f ‘assisting’, ‘enabling’ or 
‘em pow ering’ people to overcome other obstacles to achieving what they want, but 
we w ould on the whole speak of ‘treating’ them only if their health was impaired.
It could, of course, be argued that M rs H ashm i’s status as a carrier o f the 
thalassaem ia with which Zain was afflicted com prom ised her interest in a healthy 
life; if  this view were taken, then PGD to screen out affected embryos could perhaps 
be seen as ‘treatm ent’ for that disorder. However, her inability to guarantee that any 
child she bore w ould be a suitable tissue match for Zain was not the result of any
S ection  l ( l ) ( d )  o f  the A bortion A ct 1967 , as am ended by  the H um an Fertilisation and E m bryology  A ct  
1990 , requires that ‘there is a substantial risk that i f  the ch ild  w ere  born it w ou ld  su ffer  from  such  ph ysica l or 
m ental abnorm alities as to  b e  seriou sly  handicapped .’
W alter G lannon, G e n e s a n d  F uture P eo p le : P h ilo so p h ica l Issu es in H um an G en e tic s , O xford, W estv iew  
Press, 2 0 0 1 , at p79.
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deficiency in her health, but simply the nature of genetic inheritance. To categorise 
Phase 2 screening as ‘treatm ent’ seems to stretch the definition beyond norm al usage.
However, uncertainties about the judicial inteipretation o f the 1990 Act 
notwithstanding, it may seem  that the response of both the Authority and the Court of 
Appeal to tissue typing m ight be seen as a first victory for supporters o f the Genetic 
Superm arket. On the first occasion that an attempt was made to curtail parental 
choice in use o f PGD, both regulatory authority and judiciary have supported that 
choice. However, a closer exam ination o f the A uthority’s reasoning, the conditions 
and caveats with which it sought to delim it this decision, and perhaps m ost tellingly, 
the contrasting approach it adopted w hen a sim ilar case appeared before it a short 
tim e later, suggest that the Hashmi decision is fai' from  the first step on the road to 
N ozick’s ideal.
5.1.5 Conditions 1: Last resorts and necessary evils
The first two of the conditions which the Ethics Com m ittee recom m ended, and the 
HFEA subsequently accepted, require that ‘all other possibilities of treatm ent and 
sources o f tissue for the affected child should have been explored’ and that the use 
o f HLA typing should be limited to ‘severe or life-thieatening’ c a s e s . I n  short, the 
FIFEA requires that this technology be utilised only in cases o f direst need, and even 
then, only as a last resort. In so doing, it m ight be thought that the HFEA is making 
a statem ent about the pro tanto wrongness o f the technology. If, after all, there was 
nothing inherently wrong in the practice, there would be no need to find such 
com pelling justification for its use; absent any ethical objection to PG D-HLA , the 
fact that prospective parents wanted  to use the technology would be reason enough to 
perm it it (although it does not, o f course, necessarily follow that the NHS should 
fund whim sical uses).
W hat, then, m ight the Ethics Com m ittee -  and ultimately the Authority, which 
accepted its recom m endations on these points -  regard as being ethically problem atic 
about using PG D for tissue-typing? And is it reasonable to conclude that these
‘E th ical issu es in the creation and se lection  o f  preim plantation em bryos to produce tissu e  d on ors’, 
N o v em b er  2 2 , 2 0 0 1 , at pai'a. 3 .12 .
Ibid, at para. 3 .13 .
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concerns were m ore adequately addressed when the conditions listed are met? A t the 
outset o f its consideration, the Com m ittee identified three questions which it hoped 
would guide it in fram ing its recom mendations:
• Is PGD with HLA typing com patible with the ‘welfare o f the unborn child’?
• Is licensing PG D with HLA typing com patible with the public good?
• Can m orally significant criteria be found to demarcate ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ 
reasons for the conception and selection o f embryos?
The last o f these three questions m ight be thought to presuppose the answers to the 
first two, in that no such dem arcation would be necessary unless there actually 
existed unacceptable reasons. It seems, therefore, that the question o f the pro tanto 
wrongness of PG D /H LA  rests in the first instance on its likely im pact on this 
question o f welfare, and in the second on the likely impact on the public good.
To a significant extent, the first o f these questions is inextricably tied to the 
conclusions to Chapter 3; any harms resulting from  the child’s unorthodox origins 
m ust be viewed as the unavoidable costs o f the child’s coming to exist at all. That 
being so, and assum ing that existence can be predicted to bring many m ore positives 
than negatives for the child (an especially likely state o f affairs given the lengths that 
parents such as the Hashm is and W hitakers are likely to go for the benefit o f their 
existing children), it follows that for the ‘w elfare’ concern to count against allowing 
PGD/HLA, there m ust be some very substantial risk o f very significant harm  to the 
resulting child.
5.1.6 W elfare o f the unborn child
In considering the welfare o f the future child, the Ethics Conunittee considered both 
a fairly traditional form ulation of the ‘welfare principle’, asking ‘whether the 
outcom e of the technique adversely shifts the balance o f benefit and ha im ’, (Para. 
2.14) together with a m ore unusual form ulation considered in the next section. The 
first, and more straightforward, o f these conceptions o f welfai'e asks whether the 
donor child will experience a balance o f benefit over harm as a result o f the 
technique in question. Such concern may seem  entirely valid in this context. Is the
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use o f a child as a ‘walking m edicine chest ’ not a clear example o f harm  to that 
child?
It is certainly the case that, while U K  law allows parents to consent to medical 
treatm ent on behalf o f their precom petent children, it does not allow them  carte 
blanche in volunteering them  for non-beneficial surgery. Rather, the overriding 
principle with regard to consent exercised for a child is the best interests o f the child 
him- or herself. Can the decision o f the Hashm is credibly be thought to satisfy this 
criterion?
In attem pting to answ er this question, it is essential to clarify which o f the H ashm is’ 
decisions we are scrutinising; the decision to create a child, the decision to screen the 
embryos, the decision to implant a particular  embryo or the later decision to consent 
to retrieval of um bilical blood. W ith regard to the first decision, it may validly be 
asked whether it is legally necessary, or indeed even possible, for the decision to be 
based on the best interests o f the child. Given that, at the time of the decision, the 
child in question has only a hypothetical existence, it cannot possess any sort of 
interests, far less best interests. How, then, can its ‘best interests’ inform  the 
decisions?
It m ight be thought that this requirem ent relates to the likely foreseeable interests that 
the child will possess if it is brought into existence. Should not such interests be 
taken into account in deciding whether to create the child? Two responses m ight be 
thought to cast doubt on this requirem ent. First, we might ask why it should be 
incum bent on the prospective parents to give priority to the hypothetical interests o f a 
future child, over the actual interests o f their existing children. The decision to have 
another child m ight have a profound effect, positive (as in Zain H ashm i’s case) or 
negative (as in the case where the parents already barely possess enough resources to 
provide for the children they have), on the existing children. Is it not appropriate that 
any future reproductive decisions take account o f such impacts? Indeed, as 
m entioned above, Section 13(5) o f the 1990 Act specifically requires that any
A  term  em ployed  by an anonym ous rev iew er  o f  an article I subm itted on this topic.
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decision to provide access to reproductive technologies take account o f precisely 
this.
Furtherm ore, as Sheldon and W ilkinson point out, the 1990 Act apparently does not 
require the best interests o f the future child to be the param ount consideration but 
m erely that account be taken o f the welfare o f such a child;*^  ^the juxtaposition of this 
requirem ent with the reference to ‘any other child who may be affected by the b irth’ 
m ay be thought to suggest that the welfare of the created child is but one of, 
potentially, several parties whose interests should be o f relevance to the decision.
Could the best interests requirem ent be satisfied by the decision to use PGD for the 
purposes o f ensuring (or m aximising the likelihood of) an HLA-com patible child? 
Again, this requirem ent would find itself em broiled in some complex m etaphysical 
speculation. Given that the effect o f PGD is to inform  a decision as to which of 
several ‘candidate em bryos’ to implant, for the ‘rejected’ embryos, the effect will be 
(as discussed in Chapter 3) to ensure that they never develop interests at all. To 
apply the best interests test to the latter group is all but meaningless.
W hile the selected embryo or embryos possess no interests, the children they will 
(hopefully) becom e will be interest-bearers. Does it therefore make sense to require 
that PGD satisfies a test of their (prospective) best interests? The difficulty here is 
that if  we make it a prerequisite of any procedure carried out on an em bryo that it 
benefit that embryo, or the child it w ill become, then that m ust apply equally to the 
act o f implanting  that embryo. How can im plantation be said to be in the future 
ch ild’s best interests? The only interest that can conceivably be furthered thereby is 
some notional ‘interest in becoming the sort o f being that possesses interests’, a 
m etaphysically awkward constm ction, but one necessary to circum vent the 
requirem ent that im plantation satisfies the best interests test.
Assum ing, for the present, that we can say that their best interests have been 
furthered by a choice that led to them possessing any interests at all, then this must 
apply not only to im plantation, but also to the use o f PGD to ensure that they, and not
S h eld on  and W ilk in son , ‘H ashm i and W hitaker’, loc. cit., at p l5 8 .
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one o f the other candidate embryos, was selected for implantation. (Indeed, we may 
need to take this a step back and note that the real precondition o f their existence was 
the use o f I V F rather than natural conception, a course o f events that only unfolded -  
in the case of fertile couples like the H ashm is - because o f the availability o f PGD.)
If  im plantation satisfies the best interests test, then so too, I suggest, does PGD. 
A lternatively, w e m ay prefer the view that sees neither satisfying that test (since it 
cannot, we m ight think, be in a being’s best interests m erely to allow it to develop 
interests), but which sees the best interests test as being inappropriate for and 
inapplicable to preim plantation decisions. This, I would suggest, is the more 
plausible view. A fter all, the 1990 A ct allows for the possibility o f non-beneficial -  
indeed, destructive - research on em bryos up to fourteen days,^^ a practice that would 
clearly fail any conception o f a best interests test.
W hat, then, of the last o f the parents’ decisions, the decision to consent to the child 
acting as a tissue donor? Should that, at least, not be required to be a decision 
positively in the interests o f the child  herself? In the Hashmi case, however, there 
was no prospect o f intrusive surgical intervention to harvest the required tissue, but 
rather, as explained previously, to retrieve it from the discarded u m b i l i c u s . H e n c e ,  
the necessity to satisfy the best interests test may, it m ight be thought, be irrelevant.^^
The same could not, o f course, be said o f an attem pt to harvest, for example, bone 
m anow  from  the child. Such donation could only be justified if  it could be shown to 
be in the child’s own best interests. Re Y {mental incapacity: bone marrow  
transp lan tf^  dem onstrated how this requirem ent can be m et in the case of
H um an F ertilisation  and E m bryology  A ct 1990 , s .3 .
“  T his has been disputed b y  C O R E , w h o se  w eb site  proclaim s that ‘D r F ishel reiterated at a recent public  
debate against C O R E  that it is indeed b lo o d  [sic] m aiTow w h ich  they intend to harvest, rather than the 
placental and cord b lo o d  w h ich  is u sually  referred to .’ Press R e lease, ‘T issu e-T y p in g  H earing T om orrow ’, 
availab le  at h ttp ://w w w .co reth ics.o rg /d o cu m en t.a sp 7 id -C P R 3 10303.htm & se=:2& st=4  
T he qu estion  o f  w hether the ch ild  m ight have  so m e  sort o f  property interest in  its o w n  tissu e  or c e lls  is, o f  
course, a  separate q u estion , and one that has never, to m y k n o w led g e, been  d efin itiv e ly  answ ered  in U K  law . 
S e e , how ever, M o o re  v R eg en ts  o f  the U n iversity  o f  C a liforn ia  (1 9 8 8 ) 2 4 9  Cal Rptr 4 9 4  (C al C A ) for an 
exa m p le  o f  h ow  such a c la im  has fa iled  in another jurisdiction .
[1 9 9 7 ] Fam  110, (1 9 9 6 )  35  B M L R  111
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incom petent adults, but no analogous case law exists with regard to precom petent
children.
However, assum ing similai' logic were applied, it seems that tissue donation from a 
child that was required to save a fam ily m em ber could conceivably be justified  where 
the child enjoyed a close relationship with that r e l a t i v e , a n d  where the tissue 
required was regenerable (blood or bone marrow). Indeed, Sheldon and W ilkinson 
have suggested that a more prospective approach could be adopted to best interests, 
according to which ‘it could surely be argued that A [the selected sibling] would 
benefit from  B ’s [the existing child] company and may well derive pleasure from 
knowing that she has saved B ’s life’,^  ^ while the authors of another aiticle on tissue 
typing have gone so far as to suggest that ‘parents who want to have another child 
anyway, have an obligation to try this last possibility o f saving their sick child.
In any event, the decision as to whether the retrieval of tissue and subsequent 
transplant should take place would be determ ined at a later time, by weighing up the 
harms and risks and benefits attendant to the donation, and would be likely to require 
judicial approval. There is no question that the procedure would go ahead m erely on 
the parents’ say-so. It m ight be thought, then, that the interests o f the child, once 
born, will adequately be protected by the courts, a fact that the HFEA seem ed to 
acknowledged* Certainly, the prospect o f a court deciding whether the bone marrow 
harvest could be in the child’s interests seems a more plausible and proportionate 
m echanism  for safeguarding the child’s interests than the intervention o f the HFEA 
to prevent it ever being born.
W hat, then, of the possible emotional and psychological burdens that may be 
experienced by a child who grows up knowing that it was created for such a puipose?
T hough Sheldon  and W ilk in son  seem  co n v in ced  that a U K  court w ou ld  apply the sam e princip les w ere the 
potential donor a precom petent ch ild  rather than an incom petent adult; see  ‘H ashm i and W hitaker’, loc. cit., 
at pp. 160-161 .
“  Or even , as in the R e Y  case , w ith  another person w h o w ou ld  b e  adversely  affected  b y  their failure to 
donate.
Sh eld on  and W ilk in son , ‘H ashm i and W hitaker’, loc. cit., at p l5 1
P en nings, G ., Sch ots, R. and L iebaers, I. ‘E thical considerations on preim plantation genetic  d iagn osis for 
H L A  typing to m atch a future child  as a donor o f  haem atopoietic  stem  ce lls  to a s ib lin g ’ H um an  
R ep ro d u c tio n  (2002); 17(3): 5 3 4 -5 3 8 , at p536 .
H um an F ertilisation  and E m bryology  A uthority, P ress R e lease , 13 D ecem b er 2 0 0 1 , ‘H F E A  to a llow  tissu e  
typ ing in conjunction  w ith  preim plantation gen etic  d ia g n o sis’
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That their relationship with the parents who conceived them  for that reason, or with 
the sibling they saved, will be adversely affected? Certainly, concerns have been 
expressed about the possibility o f ‘dam age to his [the new child’s] self w orth’, 
while Paul Tully o f the Society for the Protection of the U nborn Child has 
rhetorically asked ‘How will this child feel knowing that he or she was selected from 
a group of embryos ju st to serve as a tissue donor to a sibling?’
Such possible objections begin to look less compelling, o f course, w hen we recall the 
nature o f the alternative for the child in question. Because, as explained in Chapter 
3, for this particular child, the alternative to being bom  as a tissue donor is not to be 
born into a m ore conventional fam ily setting, but rather, not to be b o m  at all. Once 
this is accepted, then it becomes difficult to conclude that the child created as a tissue 
donor is harmed by those decisions upon which its very existence is dependent. 
Unless we foresee that its life is likely to be so unrem ittingly awful that existence 
itself will be a burden, we m ust conclude that it is better off (or at least no worse off) 
being born into these unusual circum stances than never being born at all. There may 
well, as I have conceded throughout this thesis, be conditions and circum stances so 
subjectively unpleasant for those affected as to be worse than non-existence. It is 
difficult, I submit, to im agine that being bom  in the hope that your life will help save 
the life o f a sibling would constitute such a circumstance.
Furtherm ore, if  our concern is with the possibility o f psychological harm  to the 
future child, we m ust consider the possibility that a fam ily deprived o f the use of 
tissue-typing, m ight attem pt a normal pregnancy in the hope that the resulting child 
will be HLA com patible with the existing child. G iven the low probability that any 
resulting child will be both unaffected and a tissue match, we should consider what 
unique psychological burdens will be placed on such a child. If  it is harm ful to begin 
life knowing that one was conceived as a saviour, how much harder m ight it be to 
know that one was conceived as a saviour and ‘failed’ in this role, how ever illogical 
the attribution o f blam e for such an unchosen quality as HLA com patibility?
™ Richard N ich o lso n , ‘W e  a ie  som e w ay dow n a slippery s lo p e ’, The G u ard ian , 2 0  June 2 0 0 3 . 
‘T h e  P ainful D ilem m a  O ver B ab ies by D e s ig n ’, The T eleg ra p h , 3  A u gust 2 0 0 2 .
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W hile there is no legal m echanism  available to scrutinise the m otives nor to control 
the actions of parents who choose to entrust the creation o f a ‘saviour sib ling’ to the 
reproductive lottery in this way, the possibility that desperation would drive them  to 
attem pt this should, it m ight be thought, be borne in mind before the tissue typing 
route is blocked by those who profess concern for the welfare o f ‘the ch ild ’ as their 
concern.
5.1.7 Treating the child as an end in itself
Having identified a fairly traditional conception o f the welfare o f the resultant child 
as one o f its prim ary concerns, the Ethics Conunittee went on to elaborate that 
‘positive consideration o f the welfare o f the child requires respect for beings as ends 
and that the putative child be treated not simply as a means to a further end but also 
as an “end in itself. The Kantian im perative that all humans should be treated as 
ends in them selves is one that com m ands w idespread a d h e r e n c e , a n d  it is perhaps 
understandable that the Com m ittee w ould wish to conduct its deliberations in that 
light.
W hether failing to respect the new child as an end in itself actually constitutes a harm 
to that child, or whether it is better view ed as a violation o f some wholly separate 
ethical principle is a more complex question. However, since the Com m ittee clearly 
took the form er view (although it neither explains nor justifies this contentious 
synthesis o f the Kantian im perative and the principle o f non-m aleficence), it is 
worthwhile examining the claim  that the Hashmis would indeed be treating the donor 
child as a means and not an end, and w ould thereby be harm ing it.
W hat does it m ean to treat someone as a means and not as an end? As Beaucham p 
and Childress point out, this ethical rule is often m isinterpreted as m eaning simply 
that it is objectionable to use someone as a means to furthering one’s own 
objectives. As they explain, this could not be so without casting ethical 
opprobrium  on every transaction betw een custom er and vendor, em ployer and 
em ployee, client and service provider; quite simply, when I hire a plum ber to
72 A t para 2 .9
”  S ee , m ost notably, A lan  D on a g a n ’s The T h eory  o f  M o ra lity ,  C h icago , U n iversity  o f  C h icago  P ress, 1977  
B eaucham p and C hildress, P rin c ip le s  o f  B io m e d ica l E th ics, (F ifth  E dition), O xford , oxford  U niversity  
Press, 2 0 0 1 , a tp 3 5 1 .
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unblock my sink, or when I buy a newspaper from my local newsagent, I am  treating 
them  as means to my desired ends, i.e., having a sink that drains properly and reading 
the day ’s newspaper. If  other means were available to attain that sam e objective - if 
non-sentient robots and vending m achines were able to carry out the same tasks -  I 
w ould be equally satisfied.
Since, as Beaucham p and Childress write, even Kant would not have regarded such 
transactions as intrinsically unethical,^^ there must be m ore to the K antian imperative 
than merely treating other people as a means to my own ends. This extra elem ent is 
encapsulated in the ‘m erely’ elem ent o f the imperative, i.e., the proscription of 
treating them  ^merely or exclusively as a m e a n s a n d  not also  as an end in 
them selves. That is to say, there is nothing objectionable per se in using someone as 
a m eans, provided I do not lose sight o f the fact that s/he is also an end in 
him/herself.
There is an obvious sense in which this imperative arises naturally from  a harm- 
based approach; a principle that regards harms and interests as being o f param ount 
ethical importance w ould introduce an unsustainable elem ent of arbitrariness were it 
to hold that only some  harms and interests were to be considered, or that some were, 
w ithout good reason, to be accorded greater weight than others. In that basic sense, 
it w ould be untenable to allow the Hashm is to use the new child as a means to 
furthering their own, or Z ain’s, interests without taking into account any interests of 
its own which m ight be affected as a consequence. As discussed in the previous 
section, any such interests as may be attributed to the embryonic Hashmi child would 
relate to the sort o f life it m ight reasonably be expected to enjoy (or endure) once it 
attained even rudim entary sentience. Those deselected embryos which will never 
attain sentience will simply never develop interests o f any kind, never attain the 
capacity to be harmed; to speak of their being used as means and not ends is 
m eaningless in a context where taking account o f their interests is impossible.
As an adjunct to the harm -based approach, this notion of the m eans-ends rule 
perhaps serves as a useful rem inder that no-one can be excluded from  the calculation
75
Id.
Id.
76
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w ithout due cause, but that apart, it adds little to the basic approach. There are, 
however, other interpretations o f the im perative that, while fitting less readily within 
the harm -based approach, are still worthy o f investigation if  we are to understand the 
reasoning o f the E thics Com m ittee and, ultim ately, o f the Authority.
Alan Donagan is a leading contem porary adherent to and interpreter of Kantian 
ethics. For him
K ant’s form ula of the fundam ental principle may be restated in a 
form m ore like that o f the spiritual com m andm ent that is its 
original: A ct always so that you respect every human being, 
yourse lf or another, as being a rational creature?’’
Before exam ining what Donagan understands this to involve, it is perhaps worth
clarifying that the im perative to respect a being as a rational creature is, for him, in
no way dependent upon its being capable o f rational thought. Rather, any genetically
hum an organism  is, by virtue o f its species m em bership, entitled to respect as a
rational creature, regardless o f its state o f cerebral development.^^ This being so,
then, following a Donaganian interpretation o f K ant’s imperative, the Ethics
Com m ittee would have been conceptually correct to regard the em bryonic Hashmi
child as the sort o f being that m ust be shown ‘re sp e c t... as a rational creature’.
W hat sort of duties, then, are owed to a being by virtue o f its status as a rational 
creature? M uch o f D onagan’s book is given over to a discussion o f this question, 
and he identifies various ‘precepts’ that derive from  the core im perative. He 
m aintains, for example, that ‘it is im perm issible for anybody at will to use force upon 
another’,^ * a precept that itself gives rise to derivative precepts prohibiting killing, 
inflicting bodily injury or holding another in s l a v e r y t h a t  ‘[i]t is im perm issible not 
to prom ote the well-being o f others by actions in them selves perm issible’ ;^  ^ that it is 
im perm issible to lie;^^ and that there exists a duty (subject, as are alm ost all o f these 
‘first-order precepts’, to certain exceptions) to obey the law.^^
D on agan , The T h eory  o f  M o ra lity , op. cit., at p65.
Ibid, at p83
Ibid, a tp 8 2
Ibid, at p83
Id.
82 ‘it is  im perm issib le  for anybody, in cond itions o f  free com m unication  b etw een  responsib le  persons, to 
express an op in ion  he d o es not h o ld ’; ibid, at p88  
Ibid, at p 109
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One striking aspect o f these precepts is that they seem  to give rise to a m ore obvious 
case in fa vo u r  q f  HLA -typing in cases like those o f the Hashmis and W hitakers than 
they support the contrary position. For while D onagan has nothing to say about the 
sort o f scenario about which the Com m ittee were asked to deliberate, the precept that 
imposes a positive duty o f beneficence - ‘[i]t is im perm issible not to prom ote the 
well-being o f others by actions in them selves perm issible’ -  gives arise to a pro tanto 
obligation to rescue Zain and Charlie. O f course, the caveat ‘by actions in 
them selves perm issible’ prevents us from  leaping too readily to this conclusion. But 
nonetheless, a first reading o f D onagan’s precepts seems to see the scales tilt in 
favour not only o f allowing HLA-typing in life-or-death cases such as those under 
consideration, but perhaps in cases o f less serious illness too; the precept, after all, 
does not stop at im posing a duty to save life, but rather speaks o f ‘prom ot[ing] the 
well-being of others’.
The question that rem ains is whether the actions in question are ‘in them selves 
perm issible’. It is im possible to advance a definitive answer to this without 
attem pting a fuller study o f deontological ethics, a task beyond the rem it o f this 
thesis. However, on an admittedly superficial reading, it is not obvious that HLA- 
typing would contravene the duty to respect the new child as an end in itself in any of 
the ways specifically identified by Donagan. The new child would certainly not be 
killed, exposed to bodily harm  or enslaved. As discussed above, the positive duty to 
prom ote its interests is problem atic in a context where the future child does not 
presently possess any interests, and there is certainly no obvious sense in which such 
a possibility exists but is being neglected. And duties in relation to truthfulness, 
honouring contracts, and obeying the law  are irrelevant in this context.
W hat the Kantian im perative seems to require, then -  at least as Donagan interprets it 
-  is that the well-being o f Zain and Charlie should be prom oted unless it can be 
dem onstrated that som e other aspect o f the duty -  presum ably as owed to the new 
child - is being violated. It is for scholars o f Kant, o f D onagan and o f such duty- 
based ethics more generally to ascertain whether any such com peting obligation 
exists and, if  so, w hether it can outweigh what D onagan clearly recognises as a duty 
to Zain and Charlie. For the purposes o f this chapter, it is sufficient to note that it is
2 0 0
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being no means uncontroversial or obvious that this ethical obligation to which the 
Ethics Com m ittee attached such weight, namely to respect all hum ans as ends in 
them selves and as rational beings, weighs against HLA-typing, either in life-or-death 
cases or in cases where it is only well-being rather than life itself that is at stake. 
Indeed, it may even be that this obligation -  contrary to the Ethics Com m ittee’s 
apparent assum ption - pulls in the opposite direction.
A sim ilar approach to the Kantian im perative has been advanced by W alter Glannon,
this time in relation to the possibility o f reproductive hum an cloning. Glannon
invites us to im agine a (far from  im plausible) scenario wherein
the parents o f a recently deceased or dying child want to clone 
an individual who is genetically identical to that child and thus 
“replace” it to com pensate for their loss or else caiTy on the 
family line.
Glannon acknowledges that, if ‘the sole intent o f the parents is replacem ent or
com pensation, then the cloned individual would be treated solely as a m eans,’ and
that this ‘would deny the intrinsic dignity and worth one possesses in virtue of the
fact that one is a hum an agent with the capacity for r e a s o n . H o w e v e r ,  for Glannon,
the m otives with which the clone was created would be less im portant than the
m anner in which it is treated thioughout its life:
if  the clone were loved and treated with the dignity and respect 
com m anded by its intrinsic worth, then cloning m ight be 
morally justifiable on Kantian grounds. Although the intention 
to clone the child suggests that he or she would be treated 
instrum entally, the fact that the child is treated as a unique 
individual once she exists is enough to dispel any moral qualm s 
about the parent’s behavior.
In short, ‘how one is treated by others over the course o f one’s life is m ore m orally 
significant than the reasons for causing one to exist.
Yet even if  this is an erroneous intei-pretation o f the duty, and HLA-typing presents 
greater difficulties for the duty to respect the new child as an end in itse lf than has 
been recognised here, it is by no means clear that the recom m endations at which the
84 W alter G lannon G en es a n d  F u tu re P eo p le :  P h ilo so p h ica l Issu es in H um an G en e tics , O xford , W estv iew  
P ress, 2 0 0 1 , at p i  18.
Id. S e e  also  P en nings, S ch ots and L iebaers, ‘E thical considerations . . . ’, loc. cit 
Id.
Ibid, at p i 20.
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Com m ittee arrived w ould follow from  this. For if  it is felt that ‘being born to be a 
donor’ is incom patible with being treated as an end in oneself, then it is difficult to 
see how this is so only when the anticipated recipient is a parent, but not a sibling. In 
neither case is the prospective child able to consent to the donation, nor o f course to 
its creation. In both cases the decision involves consideration for a party other than 
the putative child itself. In both scenarios, in other words, the donor child is being 
created at least partly as a means to some other end. The next section will consider 
this m ost perplexing o f restrictions.
5.1.8 Conditions 2: The parental exception
The fact that the Com m ittee had w andered into areas of ethical confusion, and 
perhaps departed from  its original rem it, becam e clearest when it cam e to consider 
the possibility o f utilising this technology to provide a tissue donation to a parent. 
Am ong its final recom m endations, it proposed that ‘because it [the Committee] 
favours a principle o f qualified parental decision-m aking w ith respect to the use of 
the technique the technique should not be available where the intended tissue  
recipient is a p a r e n t . No further justification is offered for such a condition in this 
paragraph, and it is necessary to search the rem ainder o f the docum ent in some depth 
to locate some indication o f the C om m ittee’s reasoning.
Paragraph 2.21 concluded with the claim  that ‘it appears prim a fa c ie  to be morally 
less acceptable than selecting an em bryo to provide tissue to treat a sibling, as it 
seems to replace concern with another w ith concern for oneself.’ There are several 
observations that could be made regarding this assertion. Firstly, it m ay be seen to 
conflate that which is morally acceptable  w ith that which is m orally commendable. 
Undertaking a physically, em otionally and perhaps financially dem anding process 
such as IVF and pregnancy in order to save the life o f another may perhaps scale 
heights o f altruism  and selflessness greater than undertaking these burdens to save 
one’s own life. But that is not to say that the latter course o f action is m orally 
unacceptable. To m ake out the case for m oral unacceptability, the Com m ittee would 
need to have dem onstrated some aspect o f the treatm ent that contravened some 
ethical principle.
Paragraph 3 .15 , orig inal em phasis.
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Secondly, the Com m ittee’s assessm ent perhaps overlooks the contribution and 
sacrifice o f the other parent. If, for example, it had been the father who suffered 
from  a debilitating and life-threatening condition requiring stem cell transfusion, and 
if  the couple had undergone the same procedure in attem pt to find a suitable donor, 
would the requisite elem ent o f sacrifice and altruism  not have been displayed in the 
m other’s willingness to go through ova retrieval, embryo im plantation, pregnancy 
and labour to save her husband?
The Com m ittee com m enced its enquiry by identifying consequentialism  and 
deontology as the ethical principles that would guide it, but seems at this point to 
have slid, perhaps unwittingly, into an adherence to some kind o f extrem e version o f 
virtue ethics, a position that sees only acts o f suprem e and selfless sacrifice as being 
acceptable. Yet even on those som ew hat idiosyncratic terms, it is not at all clear that 
applying this technique to benefit a parent should not be acceptable.
N either the 1990 A ct nor the common law require parents to have wholly or 
prim arily non-selfish m otives when they act on behalf of their children. The parent 
whose selfish decision happens to coincide with his ch ild’s interests will not have his 
m otives scrutinised for any hint o f self-interest. W hy, we m ight ask, should such an 
unfeasibly high standard be set for prospective parents seeking to use PG D-HLA ?
Indeed, it might also be asked whether it is not invariably the case that, by the very
fact o f its conception and birth, a child is serving as a means to some other end? It is
perhaps unlikely that any pregnancies are com m enced wholly or predom inantly out
of beneficence towards the future child. Couples or individuals have children for a
wide variety of reasons, ranging from the fulfilm ent o f long-harboured life plans to
unwelcom e accidents, via myriad psychologically com plicated m otivations involving
self-fulfilm ent, tradition, peer expectation, strengthening ailing relationships and a -
perhaps subconscious -  quest for some sort o f genetic im m ortality. As Julian
Savulescu has said:
Parents have m any desires related to their children: perhaps to 
have a com panion, to have a friend to the first child, or to hold a 
m arriage together. It is unlikely that any parent ever desires a 
child solely as an end in itself. ... Provided that parents love
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their child as an end in itself, there is no problem  with the child's 
life also fulfilling some of the parents’ desires for their own
lives.
It is also entirely com m on to hear parents citing a desire for com panionship for an existing
child as a reason.**
W hatever the precise reasoning, however, the fact that a couple want to be genetic 
parents is a selfish, or at best a mixed, motive, ju st as surely as the fact that one of 
them  needs a donation o f stem  cells. It may be that in other times and in other 
societies, couples greeted the news o f pregnancy with a stoical acceptance that they 
were fulfilling an unhappy duty, but it would be difficult to see this as a preferable 
state o f affairs to that wherein the forthcom ing birth o f a child is seen as a joyous 
event for all concerned. For the m ost part, we want parents to satisfy their own 
wants and ambitions when bringing a child into the world. O f course, if  these wants 
and ambitions were likely to harm  the child once it is in existence -  if  the child was 
w anted as a slave or a sacrifice, for example - that m ay be problem atic. But the mere 
fact that the creation o f a life symbiotically benefits the parents is not only accepted, 
but is for the m ost part expected and welcomed.
On the restrictive interpretation o f the harm -based approach that sees only the 
frustration of experiential interests (present or future) as justification for prohibition, 
what the Hashm is sought to do was unproblem atic, for precisely the reasons 
identified in Chapter 3. But even on a wider interpretation, that views violations of 
critical interests such as ‘being treated as an end in oneself and not m erely a m eans’ 
as harm s, it is far from  clear that the putative Hashmi child would be harm ed by the 
means and m otives according to which it was created; provided it is treated with 
respect, dignity and com passion once it is born, the categorical im perative is satisfied 
in its regard. Furtherm ore, I submit, this would be so whether the intended recipient 
of the transplant is a sibling, a paient, or any other third party.
Julian Savu lescu , ‘S e x  selection : the ca se  fo r ’, M e d ic a l Jou rn a l o f  A u s tra lia  (1 9 9 9 ); 171(7): 3 7 3 -3 7 5 , at 
p373.
S ee , for  exam ple, P en n ings, S ch o ts and L iebaers, ‘E thical c o n s id e r a tio n s ...’, lo c .cit., and Sh eldon  and
W ilk in son , ‘H ashm i and W hitaker’, loc . c it., at p l4 7 .
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W hether the parents are m otivated by altruistic concern for other children, or selfish 
concern for their own health, they are nonetheless viewing the new child as a means to 
some other end. But provided they do not view it, and m ore im portantly do not treat it, 
only as a means, they have not violated its interest in being treated w ith the respect due.
5.1.9 The W hitaker case: an arbitrary distinction?
The Q uintavalle challenge, then, dem onstrated that the Court o f Appeal was content 
to entrust to the H FEA  the responsibility for ensuring that PGD is used only in 
‘appropriate’ circum stances. The m anner in which this task is being can ied  out has,
I submit, been cast into doubt by the apparent ethical confusion underlying the 
conditions attached to the decision about HLA tissue typing. Even greater reason for 
dissatisfaction lies in the A uthority’s handling of the next application for a licence to 
carry out tissue typing.
Charlie W hitaker suffered from  D iam ond Blackfan Anaem ia (DBA), a rare blood 
disorder requiring day-long blood transfusions. In that the condition is painful, 
debilitating and im possible to cure without transfusion, it is analogous to Zain 
H ashm i’s thalassaem ia. The distinction, upon which the HFEA placed so much 
reliance, is that DBA is rarely a hereditary condition; indeed, tests o f M ichelle and 
Jayson W hitaker revealed that they were not carriers, and that C harlie’s condition 
was attributable to a spontaneous m utation.
As already noted, the Joint W orking Party’s Reconunendation I I  restricted PG D to 
cases where the em bryo being screened was itself at significant risk o f developing a 
particular genetic condition. W hile the future Hashm i child satisfied this criterion -  
both Shahana and Raj Hashmi being asym ptom atic carriers - any future child the 
W hitakers may have would be at no greater than average risk o f developing DBA. 
The term s of the Recom m endation, therefore, would not be satisfied in the latter 
case.
However, the H FEA  Ethics Com m ittee, charged specifically with the role of 
considering the ethics o f HLA tissue-typing, reached an entirely different conclusion. 
Paragraph 3.14 o f the Com m ittee’s Report addressed precisely the scenario in which
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the W hitakers found themselves, and recom m ended that PGD should be available in 
those circum stances. In announcing in August 2002 that the W hitakers would be 
denied access to PGD for tissue-typing only,*^ the HFEA acted against the 
recom m endation o f its own Ethics Com m ittee in this matter. W hile it is o f course 
free to do so, it is difficult to discern what ethical or legal basis the HFEA was 
relying on when it m ade this decision.
5.1.10 The ethical approach
The M inutes of the first HFEA m eeting after the Ethics Com m ittee’s Report contain
only a fairly cursory discussion o f the issue:
M embers felt that to allow PGD for tissue typing alone would 
run contrary to the requirem ents o f the welfare o f the child 
assessment. Therefore, it was agreed that tissue typing using 
PGD should only be offered where PGD was already necessary 
to avoid the passing on o f a serious genetic disorder.*^
As discussed earlier, the Ethics Com m ittee had in fact identified the ‘putative child’s
actual moral, psychological, social and physical w elfare’ as an issue o f great
significance.*^ Its Report considered both a fairly traditional form ulation o f the
‘welfare principle’, asking ‘whether the outcom e of the technique adversely shifts the
balance o f benefit and harm ’,*'^  together with a more unusual form ulation where the
Com m ittee considered the proposition that:
It could be suggested that positive consideration o f the welfai'e 
o f the child requires respect for beings as ends and that the 
putative child be treated not merely as a means to a further end 
but also as an “end in its e lf ’.*^
It is unclear which o f these concepts o f ‘w elfare’ the HFEA felt to be com prom ised 
by the W hitakers’ application, though not by the H ashm is’. The first version, 
concerned with the prospect o f haim  to the future child, seems to be answerable in 
terms o f the Non-Identity Principle in exactly the same m anner as in the Hashmi
H F E A , Pi e ss  R e lease, H F E A  confirm s that H L A  tissu e typing m ay on ly  take p lace  w h en  preim plantation  
g en etic  d iagn osis is required to avoid  a seriou s gen etic  d isorder’, 1 A ugust 2 0 0 2 , availab le  at 
h ttp ://w w w .h fea .g o v .u k /P ressO ffice /A rch iv e /4 3 5 7 3 5 6 3
H um an Fertilisation  and E m bryology  A uthority, A S u m m ary o f  th e  O ne H u n d red  a n d  T h irteen th  M ee tin g  
o f  the H um an F e rtilisa tio n  a n d  E m b ryo lo g y  A u th o rity  on  2 9 th  N o v em b e r  2 0 0 1 ,  at 
http://w w w .hfea.gov.uk/aboutH F E A /arch ived_m inutes/G G 028.h tm  
E thics C om m ittee o f  the H um an F ertilisation  and E m b ryo logy  A uthority, E th ica l Issu es in the C rea tion  
a n d  S e lec tio n  o f  P re im p la n ta tio n  E m b ryo s to  P ro d u ce  T issue D o n o rs ,  22  N ovem b er  2 0 0 1 , at paragraph 3 2  
Ibid, at paragraph 2 .1 4  
Ibid, at paiagraph 2 .9
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scenario. Unless we can predict with confidence that either child w ill suffer a net 
balance o f harms over benefits as a result o f its existence, it is im possible to conclude 
that the very fact o f its creation constitutes a harm  to it.
Had the HFEA contended that the W hitakers would be likely to neglect or abuse the 
new child, regarding it literally as an instrum ent to save Charlie’s life, to be tossed 
aside w hen that end was attained, then there may have been a case to answer 
(although the option o f adoption -  a very real possibility when the ch ild ’s plight was 
inevitably trum peted by the nation’s m edia - would cast into doubt whether even 
those circum stances would render the new child’s birth contrary to its interests). As 
far as can be ascertained from  the M inutes o f the Novem ber m eeting, however, the 
HFEA at no point seriously considered the possibility that the new child would be 
treated in a m anner likely to give rise to such concerns.
The only indication o f the thinking that led the HFEA to conclude that the future 
ch ild ’s welfare w ould be com prom ised lies in the M inutes’ brief reference to ‘the 
psychological burden that may be placed on a child who was an “engineered” match 
as opposed to a ‘natural’ m a t c h . T h e  term inology used here m ight be considered 
im precise and unfortunate. The W hitakers did not seek to alter the genetic makeup 
of their future child, as the term  ‘engineered’ is ordinarily thought to denote. If the 
distinction the H FEA  sought to address was betw een a ‘selected’ m atch as opposed 
to a ‘random ly occurring’ match, then it is not apparent how the form er child would 
be at a disadvantage. In both cases, there will be an expectation that the child will 
act as a donor.
Sim ilarly, the second o f the Ethics Com m ittee’s conceptions of ‘w elfare’ seems ill- 
suited to distinguish betw een the H ashm is’ case and that o f the W hitakers. The 
concern that the putative child be considered ‘not m erely as a means to a further end 
but also as an “end in its e lf” requires that we regard the new child as an end in itself, 
taking account o f its interests and rights, and not m erely as an instrum ent o f someone 
e lse’s welfare. As discussed eaiiier in this chapter, such a principle m ay -  although 
by no m eans uncontroversially -  be accom m odated within a consideration o f the
A  Su m m ary  o f  the O n e H u n d red  a n d  T hirteen th  M ee tin g  o f  the H um an F ertilisa tio n  a n d  E m b ryo lo g y  
A u th o rity , op. cit.
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welfare o f the future child. However, as explained above, it is by no means clear that 
the creation of a child to serve as a donor violates this principle -  provided that child 
is treated with the dignity and respect due to an individual, then it has not been 
treated solely as a means.
Furtherm ore, it is far from  clear how it serves to distinguish the two cases. Both 
fam ilies sought to have a new child, and to use PGD to select that child, at least 
partly for the good o f an existing child. Even if  we were to accept that ‘first phase’ 
PGD, for disease screening, was in the interests o f that future child (a conclusion that 
poses certain philosophical difficulties), it is surely the case that in both scenarios, 
the use o f ‘second phase’ screening, for HLA tissue-typing, was sought exclusively 
for the benefit o f another party. If  the H FEA ’s concern is with preventing embryos 
being screened wholly for the benefit o f som eone else, then it is difficult to see how 
it was any more justified  for the Hashm is than for the W hitakers.
5.1.11 Sum m ary
The Court of A ppeal’s decision in the Quintavalle ease, and in particular its 
recognition that non-pathological factors could be considered as suitable m atters for 
‘treatm ent’ in terms o f the 1990 Act, could be seen to have lent a wide m argin of 
discretion to the HFEA  in terms o f granting licences for PGD. The m anner in which 
the Authority has exercised this discretion, however, has afforded little room  for 
optim ism  in terms o f ethical coherence or consistency. W hile the ethical principles 
considered in this thesis have at least been paid lip-service by the Authority and its 
Ethics Committee, they have been applied in a m anner that suggests only a 
superficial understanding of their implications. In paiticular, although the w elfaie of 
the child figures prom inently in these discussions, at no point is the Non-Identity 
Principle explicitly considered, nor does it appear to influence the eventual decisions 
at which they arrived.
The categorical im perative, or m ore specifically that variation thereof that requires 
that all individuals be treated not m erely as means but also as ends in themselves, 
was im ported into the welfare consideration in a m anner that m ay be deemed 
questionable. O f m ore concern, however, was the apparent lack o f rigour with which 
that principle was exam ined and explained, and the lack o f consistency with which it
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was applied to the various perm utations o f circum stances that m ight arise. It is, I 
have argued, by no means certain that creating a child to serve as a tissue donor 
violates that imperative; certainly, the interpretation o f the principle adopted by Alan 
Donagan, one of its m ost influential proponents, seems alm ost to suggest the very 
opposite.
However, even if  the view is taken that creating a child with the principal motive o f 
having it serve as a tissue donor does in fact am ount to a contravention o f the 
Kantian imperative, and even if it is accepted that this in turn amounts to harm ing the 
child, it is by no m eans obvious how this provides a valid ground to distinguish 
betw een (a) the Hashm i scenario, (b) the W hitaker scenario, and (c) the scenario 
where the intended recipient is a parent. In all three cases, the child is being created 
to serve as a donor, and in all three cases Phase 2 screening is being earned  out 
precisely for that end. Either the Kantian im perative is violated by none o f these -  as 
I suggest -  or it is violated by all three. That being so, the decisions and rules arrived 
at by the HFEA certainly seem  arbitrary, and it m ay not even be unduly cynical to 
suggest that they were m otivated m ore by a desire to m aintain an appearance of 
control - in the face o f Select Com m ittee criticism  and m edia concern about 
‘designer babies’ -  than about legitim ate concern for the ‘w elfare’ o f the resulting 
child.
5.1.12 Postcript
W hile m edico-legal academ ics m ay have hoped that the W hitakers w ould contest the 
H FEA ’s refusal through the courts, affording us the opportunity to ascertain judicial 
views on the validity of the distinction upon which the Authority relied, the 
W hitakers availed them selves o f a different option. Instead of investing money and 
tim e in a potentially fruitless challenge to the obstacles facing them  in the UK, they 
opted instead to travel to the USA, where no such regulatory difficulties presented 
them selves. In June 2003, after treatm ent in the Chicago Reproductive Genetics 
Institute, M ichelle W hitaker gave birth to Jamie, a healthy son whose stem  cells 
could be used to treat his brother Charlie.*^ It is a som ewhat ironic facet o f the tale
D o b so n , R . ‘“Saviou r sib lin g ” is born after em bryo  se lection  in the U n ited  S tates’ , B ritish  M ed ica l 
J o u rn a l, (2 0 0 3 ); 3 2 6 :1 4 1 6  (28  June).
20 9
f ' l u i pU’r 5
that the Hashm is, whose efforts to conceive a donor child were supported by the 
HFEA and the courts, have as yet been unable to do so.
In the event, though, had the W hitakers been prepared and able to wait another year, 
they would have been able to have the treatm ent they sought in the U nited Kingdom. 
In July 2004, following a review  by its Ethics and Law Com m ittee, the HFEA 
announced a volte fa ce  on its policy o f not allowing tissue typing in such cases. 
The rationale offered for such a decision is perplexing. In the press release 
announcing the change o f policy, the Authority claim ed that its original refusal to 
grant a licence in the W hitaker type case was prem ised upon a ‘precautionary 
approach’ :
because the technique is invasive and there was a concern about 
a potential risk  o f dam aging the embryo, so tissue typing was 
only allowed on cells which had already been taken from the 
embryo for genetic diagnosis.**
The change o f policy was, apparently, justified  because
The H FEA  has now carefully review ed the m edical, 
psychological and em otional im plications for children and their 
fam ilies as well as the safety o f the technique. There have been 
three further years during which successful embryo biopsies 
have been earned  out, both in the UK  and abroad and w e’re not 
aware o f any evidence of increased risk.^**
There are a num ber o f reasons why this explanation is unsatisfactory. In relation to
the question o f the ‘potential risk o f dam aging the em bryos’, it is simply im plausible
that it took until July 2004 for the H FEA  to be satisfied that no such risk need
concern them. In the Introduction to the consultation paper Sex Selection: choice
and responsibility in human reproduction?^^ considered in m ore detail below, the
Authority noted that
Because cells m ust be rem oved (biopsy) there is a small risk of 
damage to the embryo as a result o f this procedure. Em bryo 
dam age during biopsy usually m eans that the embryos do not
H F E A  Press R elea se , ‘H F E A  agrees to ex ten d  p o licy  on tissu e  ty p in g’, 21 July 2 0 0 4 , availab le  at 
h ttp ://w w w .h fea .g o v .u k /P ressO ffice /A rch iv e /1 0 9 0 4 2 7 3 5 8 . H um an Fertilisation and E m bryology  
A uthority Report: ‘Preim plantation T issu e  T y p in g ’, ava ilab le  at
http ://w w w .hfea .gov .u k /A b outH F E A /H F E A P oIicy /P reim p lantation tissu etyp in g/P reim plantationR ep or  
t.pdf
Press release, op. cit.; ‘P reim plantation T issu e  T y p in g ’, op . ch ., at p.3.
Id.
A v a ila b le  at
h ttp ://w w w .hfea .gov .u k /A b outH F E A /C onsu ltation s/F inal% 20sex% 20selection % 20m ain% 20rep ort.pdf
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develop and are not therefore transfened, so there is no reason  
to believe that there is any increased health risk to a liveborn  
child follow ing from  this technique: em bryos not dam aged  
during biopsy should continue to develop norm ally.
This document was published in October 2002, a m ere two m onths after the refusal
to extend the policy on tissue typing to the W hitaker type case. G iven that the 
research that inform ed the consultation docum ent was com m issioned in January 
2002,^*^ and that its findings were clearly available by October o f that year, why 
would the HFEA m ake a decision on tissue typing based on the risk o f damage to the 
embryo without waiting for evidence on that very risk, which it had either received 
by then, or receipt o f which its m em bers knew to be im m inent? Such a rushed and 
ill-inform ed decision, followed by a delay o f alm ost two years in responding to the 
evidence received, does not speak well o f the decision-m aking process in the body 
charged with regulating PGD.
Indeed, it is notable that between the report from the H FEA ’s Ethics Com m ittee, 
which recom m ended that tissue typing be allowed in such circum stances, the Press 
Release announcing that the Authority had ignored that advice, and the M inutes of 
the m eeting at which the decision was made, not one m ention was noted o f this risk 
which apparently contributed so m uch to the decision.
W ith regard to the ‘psychological and em otional implications for children and their 
fam ilies’, these have largely been considered already in this t h e s i s , a n d  I have 
suggested that denying access to PGD on this basis is difficult to reconcile with the 
Non-Identity Principle. Even were this view not taken, how ever (and it would be 
interesting to learn how the HFEA circum vented this argument), it is difficult to 
im agine how the ‘further biopsies’ to which the Press Release refer could have
Ibid, at Paragraph 4 4 , em phasis added. W h ile  the risk o f  rendering the em bryos non -v iab le  m ay have  
concerned  the W hitakers them selves, it  is sim p ly  in con ceiv a b le  that this w as the determ ining factor in a 
consideration  purporting to b e  concerned  prim arily w ith  the ‘w elfare  o f  the ch ild ’ , from  w h ich  perspective, 
dam aging the em bryo su ffic ien tly  to render it n on -v iab le  m ight be supposed to b e  m orally  equiva len t to 
d ecid in g  not to im plant that em bryo -  the v e iy  d ec is io n  for w h ich  P G D  is sought.
Ibid, at Paragraph 5.
A v a ila b le  at
h ttp ://w w w .hfea .gov .u k /P ressO ffice/P ressR eleasesbysu bject/P G D andtissuetyp ing/E th ics% 20C ttee% 20P G D  
% 20N ovem b er% 202001 .pdf
H F E A  confirm s that H L A  tissu e typing m ay o n ly  take p lace w h en  preim plantation g en e tic  d iagn osis is 
required to  avoid  a seriou s gen etic  disorder, 1 A u gu st 2 0 0 2 , availab le  at 
h ttp ://w w w .h fea .g o v .u k /P ressO ffice /A rch iv e /4 3 5 7 3 5 6 3  
S e e  above, and also  C hapter 3.
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allayed any such concerns specifically in relation to W hitaker-type cases, since no 
such uses o f PGD have been permitted.
In all, then, while proponents o f a laissez faire approach to PG D m ust surely 
welcom e this change o f policy, it is difficult to discern anything in the explanation 
offered to restore faith in the coherence, consistency or, indeed, transparency o f the 
decision-m aking process that currently regulates this technology.
5.2 Sex selection
Am ong the most w idely publicised -  and widely feared -  potential applications of
the Genetic Superm arket is the opportunity to select the sex o f one’s offspring. This
possibility has form ed the basis for num erous ethical evaluations, some of which are
considered here, but has recently been given a more imm ediate concern by the
attem pt by Alan and Louise M asterton to secure access to this technology. After
their daughter, Nicole, died in an accident in 1999, the M astertons, who also had four
sons, decided to attem pt to have another child. Since Louise M asterton had been
sterilised after the birth o f Nicole, their intention relied on the use o f IV F and, in the
words o f Alan M asterton,
Given our ages and the fact that Louise was going to have to 
undergo IV F anyway, we investigated the additional IV F 
procedure o f pre-gender diagnosis which would have ensured 
another fem ale child for our family.
From  the outset, the M astertons m aintained that they ‘were not trying to replace
N icole’, but rather ‘the fem ale elem ent that that precious child brought to our
fam ily .’ *^* Their attempts, however, were thwarted by the fact that, since 1993, the
HFEA had instructed licensed providers o f infertility treatm ent that they ‘should not
select the sex o f em bryos for social r e a s o n s a  position it has recently reiterated in
‘B aby sex  ch o ice  co u p le  sp eak  out’, B B C  O nline, M onday, 13 M arch, 2 0 0 0 , 18:03 G M T  
h ttp ://n ew s.b b c .co .U k /l/h i/sco tlan d /675652 .stm
‘W e desperately w ant a g ir l’ , B B C  O nline, 11 D ecem ber 2003 .
'*Td.
O pen Letter to Parliam entary U nder-secretary o f  State, 15 July 1993. S e e  a lso  H F E A  C od e o f  Practice, 
Fifth E dition, M arch 2 0 0 1 , at Paragraph 9 .9 .
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its response to a consultation process on sex se le c tio n /“  In this section, I will 
consider the potential objections noted by the HFEA in the Consultation Docum ent, 
enquiring whether they gave rise to conceptually coherent or empirically 
substantiated risks o f harm.
The potential harm ful consequences o f sex selection are generally thought to relate 
either to the resulting child, or to third party interests in society. As such, they 
could perhaps have been considered w ithin either Chapter 3 or 4. However, the fact 
that the HFEA have seen fit to consider this issue separately from  the w ider issue of 
PGD, coupled w ith the fact that it has been the subject of a specific application and 
refusal, merits its separate consideration.
5.2.2 Sex discrim ination
The danger of sex discrim ination was outlined in the Consultation Docum ent in the
following terms:
To perm it sex selection for non-m edical reasons is im plicitly to 
condone sex discrim ination -  for example, the kind o f 
discrim ination whereby m ale children are favoured heirs when 
questions of inheritance are considered.
A ssum ing for the m om ent that the designation o f such choices as sexist is
reasonable, does this render them  harm ful? W hile sexist choices m ight be thought to
be inherently objectionable, can they be said to harm  anyone? M ary A nne W arren
certainly regai'ded the inherent sexism  in the choice as giving rise to
nonconsequentialist, rather than harm -based o b j e c t i o n s . O t h e r  writers, though,
have argued that sex selection, at least for sexist reasons, can be harm ful either to the
child born or to w om en in general. W ith regard to the latter, Helen B equaert Holmes
has claim ed that such actions can result in ‘[sjtereotypes about the sexes becom[ing]
more firm ly i n g r a i n e d w h i l e  M ichael Bay les has argued that the practice of sex
‘S e x  se lection  for non -m ed ica l reasons should  not b e  perm itted’, in Sex  se lec tio n : re p o r t su m m ary. K ey  
H F E A  recom m endations, availab le at
h ttp ://w w w .hfea .gov .u k /A b outH F E A /C onsu ltation s/F inal% 20sex% 20selection % 20su m m ary.pd f
‘I firm ly  d isagree in  ca llin g  se x  se lec tio n  “v ic tim less .” . . .  T he v ictim s o f  se x  se lec tio n  m e many: se lec ted  
children, their s ib lin gs, u n se lec ted  children, and fina lly  all w om en  in  so c ie ty .’ H elen  B equaert H olm es  
‘C h o o sin g  C hildren’s Sex: C h a llen ges to F em in ist E th ics’, from  Joan C. C allahan, ed. R ep ro d u c tio n , e th ics  
a n d  the la w : fe m in is t  p e r sp e c tiv e s ,  Indiana U n iversity  Press, 1995 , at p l6 7 .
C onsu ltation  paper, at P m agraph 81.
W arren, G en d erc id e , op. c it., at pp .83 -8 6 .
H o lm es ‘C h oosin g  C hildren’s S e x ’, loc . c it., at p l6 7 .
213
C l i a p l c r  5
selection for sexist reasons ‘would probably reinforce sexist attitudes both in those 
who practice it and in others’
The belief that such choices reflect sexist attitudes is easily understood; why would
parents go so far as to reject otherwise healthy embryos on the grounds o f sex if they
did not hold a m arked preference for children o f one sex or the other, a belief that is
by definition sexist? It m ight be thought, however, that sex selection for fam ily
balancing -  that is, its use by a fam ily who already have a child, or children, of one
sex, and who now w ant a child o f the other sex ~ need not give rise to such concerns.
The M astertons, for example, have four sons w hom  they profess to love dearly; their
desire for a daughter as well surely does not imply a preference for girls over boys.
Hence, Savulescu and Dahl have argued:
Since their choice is simply based on the gender o f already 
existing children, and not on the absurd assum ption that one sex 
is “superior” to another, the claim  that these couples are m aking 
a sexist choice is an unjustified accusation.
Nonetheless, it may be thought that the use o f sex selection for family balancing still 
reflects sexist attitudes. As the HFEA Consultation Paper put it: ‘it is liable to 
involve the im position of stereotypical gender roles on a child o f the “right” sex who 
has been born by this t e c h n i q u e A  sim ilar argum ent has been advanced by W ertz 
and Fletcher:
Even in the U.S. where m ost couples desire to have one child o f 
each sex, there ai'e preferences for boys. Even if the selection 
were in favor o f girls, however, the fact remains that sex 
selection is inherently sexist because it is prem ised upon a belief 
in sexual inequality.
Proponents of such a view might, for example, enquire precisely what the M astertons 
m ean when they speak o f restoring ‘the fem ale elem ent’ to their fam ily. Does not 
this statem ent reflect an inherently sexist view that a girl child, w hatever her
M ich a e l B ay  les , R e p ro d u c tiv e  E th ics , N e w  Jersey, P rentice-H all, Inc., 1984, at p 3 6 . S e e  a lso  Buchanan, 
B rock , D a n ie ls  and W ikler, F rom  C han ce to  C h o ice , op. cit., at p i 84: ‘T he practice d epend s on and 
reinforces a system atic  b ias against w om en . That b ias is in d efen sib le  on  grounds o f  ju s tic e  and w orks in 
various w ays to produ ce in justice  against w o m e n .’
Julian S a vu lescu , and Edgar D ah l, ‘S e x  se lec tio n  and preim plantation d iagnosis: A  resp on se  to the 
E th ics C om m ittee  o f  the A m erican  S o c iety  o f  R eproductive M ed ic in e ’ H um an R e p ro d u c tio n  (2000); 
15(9): 1 8 7 9 -1 8 8 0 , a tp l8 8 0 .
C onsu ltation  paper, at Paragraph 9 7 .
D orothy  C. W ertz and John C. F letcher. ‘Fatal K now led ge?  Prenatal D ia g n o sis  and S e x  S e lec t io n ’ 
H a stin g s  C e n te r  R e p o rt,  M ay/June 1989, 2 1 -2 7 , at p22 .
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individual characteristics, will bear sim ilarities to Nicole that set her apart from  her 
brothers?^^*
The objectionable aspect of such values m ight be thought to be twofold. First, there 
is the danger that such preconceptions will impact deleteriously on the new child, 
perhaps by constraining her life choices according to her parents’ preconceived 
notions about how a girl should behave. It m ight also be thought that the child 
may sustain psychological or em otional harm  when it learns that it was selected for 
sex.*^^
Such a suggestion m ay be thought far from  implausible. For decades, it has been 
know n that, from  infancy, how children -  ‘norm al’, non-sex selected children - are 
treated depends substantially on their gender, or on which gender they are perceived 
to be. One o f the m ost famous dem onstrations of the latter was in oft-cited the Jack- 
in-the-Box e x p e r i m e n t . T h i s  gauged the responses of a selection of adult 
observers to the perceived em otional responses o f young children to a startling 
stim ulus (a jack-in-the box). The study fam ously revealed that the sam e response 
was typically deem ed to be ‘fear’ when the child in question was believed to be 
fem ale, and ‘anger’ when it was believed to be male.^^"^
Such preconceived attitudes, w hether conscious or subconscious, are often thought to 
characterise parents’ relations with their children. Furthermore, in those cases where 
prospective parents have gone to such lengths as to seek out, and perhaps pay for, sex 
selection, it is perhaps predictable that such attitudes already exist. I f  this is so, then 
w hatever  child that is born to such parents will be subject to these attitudes, and 
whatever harms m ay be thought to accom pany them; the harms, then, w ill eventuate 
irrespective o f w hether they are perm itted or prohibited from using PGD to 
determ ine the sex o f their child.
A  sim ilar point is m ade by  B a y les , R e p ro d u c tiv e  E th ics, op. c it., at p35 . S ee  a lso  B uchanan, B rock, 
D a n ie ls  and W ikler, F rom  C han ce to  C h oice , op. c it., at p i 84.
John A . R obertson. ‘P recon ception  G ender S e le c t io n ’, The A m erica n  J o u rn a l o f  B io e th ic s  O n lin e  W inter  
2 0 0 1 , 1(1): 2 -9 , at p4.
C onsu ltation  paper. Paragraph 89.
Condry, J. and C ondry, S. ‘S ex  d ifferences: A  study o f  the e y e  o f  the behold er’ . C h ild  D eve lo p m en t, 
(1 9 7 6 ); 47: 8 1 2 -8 1 9 .
T h e children w ere  dressed  either in p ink or b lue, but this did not, contrary to the exp ecta tion s o f  the  
observers, correspond to their actual gender,
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In addition, these potential harms m ight be thought to be analogous with those 
arising from  heightened parental expectations m ore generally. In Chapter 3 , 1 argued 
that any harm arising from  such unfair expectations or constraints would be unlikely 
to be harms on balance, that is, harms so severe that a proportionate step would be to 
prevent the child’s birth altogether. To deny access to these technologies to parents 
like the M astertons w ould be implicitly to proclaim  that, for such children, the 
benefits o f existence w ould not outweigh the disadvantages o f a sexist environment. 
I suggested earlier that this was an unpersuasive conclusion, and submit that that 
would seem also to be the case here.
If sex selection is not bad for particular children, then, what o f the notion that they 
are potentially harm ful to wom en in general, that -  as Holmes, Bayles, and others 
have argued - they do not only passively reflect but actively reinforce sexist attitudes 
within society? The precise m echanism  by which such reinforcem ent m ight take 
place is not exam ined by any of its proponents cited above, but it m ight be thought 
that a societal context in which sexist choices were common, well publicised and 
perm itted would encourage sexist attitudes in others.
Such a concern m ight be thought to bear similarities to the expressivist concerns
considered in Chapter 4, the difference being that in this case the preconceived
prejudicial attitudes are against wom en (or less commonly, men) rather than those
characterised as ‘d isabled’. They are also subject to some sim ilar responses. In
much the same way as some writers have ai'gued that it is possible to wish to avoid
the birth o f a disabled baby without harbouring negative opinions about disabled
people per se, so too has it been argued that sex selection of one’s offspring need not
be a m anifestation o f negative attitudes towards one or other sex. Just as deaf
parents may wish to have a child that w ill share in their experience o f a deaf life,
M ary Anne W arren has observed that women may have a rational reason for
preferring daughters;
A  son m ight be able to shaie m ost o f their particular interests 
and activities, but he could not share the basic experience o f 
being fem ale in a society which still values males m ore highly.
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How ever m uch he may sym pathize with the plight of wom en, he 
will still be a m em ber of the m ore privileged sex/^^
Such a choice then w ill not be inherently sexist, but will rather be a rational response 
to an already heavily gendered society. In other societies, WaiTen notes, the pre­
existing sexism  could lead women in the other direction; in a society that favours 
boys and men, a w om an who wishes the best for her child may well try to ensure that 
child is male (w hatever difficulty we w ould find in reconciling such an attem pt with 
the N on-Identity Principle), and it would, W airen maintains, be unfair to blam e 
wom en for contributing to the sexism  that characterises that society when they are in 
reality m erely trying to make the best they can o f life within its confines:
So long as these m any forms o f oppression persist, it is absurd to 
suggest that wom en are guilty o f sexism if they wish to have 
m ale children in order that the latter may enjoy the freedom s 
which w om en are still denied.
The apportionm ent of blame, however, does not necessarily answer the 
consequentialist question o f whether such a choice is potentially harmful. W e may 
understand and sym pathise with the m otivations of wom en who m ake such decisions 
within a context that was not o f their making, while still recognising that ‘[ejach act 
of son-preference .. .  further devalues w om en as a class.’ However,  it is as well to 
keep in m ind that, in such contexts, prohibition o f sex selection may be inflicting 
non-trivial harm s on the wom en who seek to avail them selves of this technology.
Ruth M acklin’s interviews with Indian wom en led her to conclude that, w hatever the 
ethical problems with sex selection as practiced there, ‘to prohibit it by law is 
probably causing m ore harm  than good to the very people it seeks to protect -  
m em bers o f the fem ale sex.’^^  ^ In the absence o f any prospect o f instantly reversing 
centuries of entrenched sexism, M acklin m aintains, the choice is between, on the one 
hand, allowing the use o f sex selection, and on the other, further lim iting the already 
naiTow range o f choices open to such women, and in so doing forcing them  to accept 
the inevitable social stigma (and sometim es ostracisation and even violence)
125
126
W arren, G en d erc id e , op. cit., at p87. 
Id.
Ruth M ack lin , A g a in s t R e la tiv ism : C u ltu ra l D iv e r s ity  a n d  the S ea rch  f o r  E th ica l U n iversa ls  in M ed icin e ,
H olm es ‘C h oosing  C h ild ren’s S e x ’, loc . cit., at p i 67 .
L 
O xford, O xford  U n iversity  Press, 1999 , at p i 54
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attendant on the failure to produce a son. In such circumstances, she concluded, the 
greater o f the two evils lies in m artyring actual, existing wom en on the altar of 
western egalitaiian values.
Furtherm ore, the potential harm  to ‘w om en as a class’ seems to rely on the 
assum ption that sex selection will be used predom inantly to choose boy rather than 
girl children; w ithout this assum ption, it is im possible to see how the technique could 
be regarded as devaluing women. If such a belief transpired to be well founded, then 
it may be that other, m ore concrete harm s could result from  the inevitable distortion 
of dem ographic trends. It is w ith this possibility that the next section will be 
concerned.
2.2.3 Dem ographic distortions
Is it likely that preim plantation sex selection would result in a skewing o f the balance 
betw een males and fem ales? And if  it did, would this be harm ful? The form er 
assum ption certainly seems to underpin m any fem inist critiques o f sex selection.
As I will dem onstrate below, however, the available evidence, inconclusive though it 
is, suggests that such a fear may be exaggerated. First, though, to the question of 
whether, and why, a society with m ore males than fem ales w ould be harm ful to 
anyone.
Perhaps the m ost controversial claim  has been that a society w ith significantly more 
males than fem ales is likely to be m ore aggressive and violent. This belief may 
derive either from  a perception that males are inherently more violent than females, 
or a perception that the relative absence of women would lead to tensions among 
(particularly) young men who w ould becom e rivals for the attentions o f the relatively 
scarce available women. W hether societies with m ajority male populations are 
indeed m ore violent is a complex sociological question, and any answer to it m ust 
take account of m yriad variables over and above gender ratios. Furtherm ore, as
S e e  a lso  W aixen, G e n d e rc id e ,  at pp. 196-197 .
‘F ew  doubt that i f  sex  se lec tio n  w ere cheap and e ffec tiv e , m any m ore m ales than fem a les w ou ld  be born .’ 
H elen  B equaert H olm es ‘C h o o sin g  Children’s Sex: C h allenges to F em in ist E th ics’, from  Joan C. Callahan, 
ed. R ep ro d u c tio n , e th ic s  a n d  the law : fe m in is t  p e rsp e c tiv e s ,  Indiana U n iversity  Press, 1 9 9 5 , at p l5 2 .  M ore  
em o tiv e  is R obyn R o w la n d ’s c la im  that se x  se lec tio n  tech n o logy  ‘co u ld  m ean the death o f  the fem a le .’ 
‘M otherhood , patriarchal pow er, a lienation and the issu e  o f  “c h o ice ” in sex  p rese lectio n ’ , from  G. Corea, et 
al, M a n -M a d e  W om en  (B loom in gton: Indiana U n iversity  Press, 1987), at p75.
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W arren has pointed out, we m ust be wary of overly rash assum ptions about the
causal relationship betw een the trends:
W here there is an association betw een the two phenomena, it is 
at least as likely that the violence of the society contributes to 
son-preference and the consequent high sex ratios than the 
reverse. The Am erican and Australian frontiers were probably 
not violent because o f the scarcity of women. Rather, wom en 
were scarce because life on the frontier was difficult and 
unsafe.
The second concern about societies that are m ale-dom inated in population terms 
relates to the position of women within them; the fear is that they w ill becom e male- 
dom inated, or m ore m ale-dom inated than they already are, in the other, patriarchal 
rather than dem ographic, sense. One version o f this claim  bears a m arked 
resem blance to the claim  from  Tom  Shakespeare that the political strength of 
disabled people would decline in proportion to their numbers; thus, Row land has 
argued that
W omen are the m ost exploited, m anipulated, oppressed and 
brutalized group in the world, yet we have the numbers. W hat 
would our status be as a vastly outnum bered group? And how 
many w om en would be prepared to accept a world where their 
value as breeders or sexual objects only would be recognized?^^^
In response to the suggestion that the status o f those wom en who are born into such a
society m ight rise as a result -  ‘Because o f her scarcity woman will be “highly-
valued”’ - Row land m aintains that ‘she will be valued for sexual and breeding
purposes rather than for her intrinsic worth as a person.’ She then proceeds to
catalogue a range o f specific problem s that a reduction in the percentage o f women
would pose, including the em pirically unsubstantiated assertion that ‘I would suggest
that that fem ale suicide rates would escalate.’
W arren has exam ined the various claims relating to the likely status o f w om en within 
m ale-dom inated societies, and has found the evidence and argum ents to be 
unpersuasive in either direction. Insofar as any specific prediction can be discerned
W arren, G en d erc id e , op. cit., at p l2 7 .
R ow lan d , ‘M otherhood, patriarchal pow er, a lienation  and the issu e  o f  “c h o ice ” in se x  p rese lectio n ’, loc.
cit., at p83 .
Ibid , at pp .81-82 . 
Ibid, at p83.
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as to the likely effect, W arren claims that the effect for ‘w om en’ is likely to depend
on the pre-existing nature o f the gender relations in that society. Thus, she suggests:
W here polygyny is not practiced and single wom en have few 
means o f earning an adequate living, a shortage o f men is bound 
to result in m ore wom en living in poverty. In contrast, wom en 
who have adequate means o f survival outside o f m arriage may 
benefit from  low sex ratios.
Fuirtherm ore, the effect on ‘w om en’ will depend on precisely which wom en we are 
discussing:
The potential benefits to w om en o f increased sex ratios include 
greater opportunities to form stable relationships with men, and 
a greater subjective sense o f pow er within the traditional fem ale 
roles. The potential liabilities include a loss o f freedom  to 
deviate from  these traditional roles, exclusion from  most high- 
status positions, and the absence o f a strong fem inist m ovem ent 
to com bat such injustices.
W hether a particular wom an stands to benefit in such a society, then, will depend in
part on whether she, personally, has interests bound up with a stable traditional role
as a wife and mother, or with opportunities to pursue other, less traditional avenues,
such as a career.
Such predictions, as W arren concedes, are necessarily highly speculative. There is 
simply insufficient em pirical data to allow for a confident prediction o f how a greater 
gender imbalance would affect the position o f women. Fortunately, for present 
purposes, such data may not be required in order to respond to this particular 
suggested harm. For the available data relating to attitudes to sex selection suggest 
that the possibility o f a predom inantly m ale society is highly remote.
The literature review  that form ed part o f the H FEA ’s report following the 
consultation process found that ‘There were surprisingly few general population 
surveys regarding attitudes to sex selection published since 1990’,^^  ^ and that ‘The 
m ajority o f specific sex selection surveys appear to have been carried out in the US
W arren, G en d erc id e , op. cit., at p l3 5 .
Ibid, at p p .1 3 5 -1 3 6 .
Dr. C atherine W aldby, ‘Literature R ev iew  and A nnotated B ibliography: S o c ia l and E thical A sp ects o f  S ex  
S e lec t io n ’, at p2. Interestingly, the op in ion  p o ll conducted  by M O R I on b eh a lf o f  the H F E A , and the results 
o f  w h ich  form  pai t o f  the report, did not attem pt to f ill  this lacuna by enquiring w hether respondents w ou ld  
w ish  to u tilise  these  technique, had they the option . Instead, the p o ll asked o n ly  about attitudes to regulation  
o f  other p e o p le ’s ch o ices. S e e  M ich e le  Corrado and K onrad C ollao , ‘S ex  S e lec tio n  -  P ub lic  C onsultation: 
R esearch  Study condu cted  for H um an F ertilisation  and E m bryology A uthority’. January 2 0 0 3 .
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during the 1970s and 1980s.’ These were the studies that form ed the basis o f M ary 
A nne W arren’s research, and which led her to conclude that there was, at that time, 
no em pirical basis for the fear that, first, there would, in the USA, be substantial 
dem and for sex selection, and secondly, that among those who did m ake use of it 
there would be a pronounced preference for boys rather than girls. W hat the research 
to which W arren referred did  suggest, however, was a slight statistical preference for 
first children to be boys. This led her to speculate as to the effects o f a society of 
‘big brothers and little sisters’.
The m ost recent research pertaining to UK attitudes referred to in the HFEA report 
was reported in a letter to The Lancet in 1993, and recorded the attitudes o f already 
pregnant w o m e n . T h e  results revealed that, o f the 1824 wom en recruited into the 
survey, ‘58% of responders said they had no preference for a child o f a particular 
sex; 6% said they w ould prefer a boy and 6% a girl; 12% would quite like a boy and 
19% a g irl.’ The authors conceded that ‘[t]hese data tell us nothing o f what women 
would do if  they could select the sex o f their baby’, but nonetheless noted that ‘most 
pregnant women have no particular preference’, while ‘o f those who expressed a sex 
preference for their unborn child, that preference was as likely to be for a girl as for a 
boy .’*'^  ^ This led them  to conclude that ‘fears o f unbalancing the sex ratio are not 
supported by our da ta’.^ "^ ^
The HFEA review also referred to research published in 1995 which exam ined the 
ethnic com position and specific gender preferences o f over 800 couples seeking sex 
selection at the London G ender C l i n i c . A l t h o u g h  this is informative from  another 
point o f view (see below) the self-selecting nature of the couples in question sheds 
no light on the likely rates o f uptake o f such services were they widely available.
Ibid, at p3.
W aiTen, G en d erc id e , op. cit., at p p .138-142 .
Statham , H elen; G reen, Josephine; Sn ow d on , Claire; F ran ce-D aw son , M en-y. ‘C h o ice  o f  ba b y ’s s e x ’, The  
L a n cet  (1 9 9 3 ); 3 4 1 (8 8 4 4 ): 5 6 4 -5 6 5 .
Ibid, at p565.
"2 Id.
Liu, P. and R ose, G. A . ‘S o c ia l aspects o f  >  80 0  coup les co m in g  forw ard for gender se lec tio n  o f  their 
ch ild ren’ H um an R ep ro d u c tio n  (1 9 9 5 ); 10(4): 968-71
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Since the publication of the HFEA report, a further s t u d y h a s  suggested that a 
significant minority -  21% - of the U K  population would be w illing to pay £1250 to 
avail them selves o f sex selection were the option available, w ith 7% claim ing to be 
undecided as to whether or not they would use it/"^^ (This was contrasted with only 
6% of Germans responding that they would exercise the choice/"^^) Does the 
prospect o f as many as 30% of the population potentially availing them selves o f sex 
selection techniques lend substance to the fears of demographic skewing?
The authors o f this particulai' article certainly did not interpret their data as a cause 
for alarm. Rather, they noted that while 3% of respondents would prefer only boys 
in their family, this was largely counteracted by the 2% who wanted only girls, while 
68% favoured an equal num ber o f boys and girls, and 16% ‘simply do not care about 
the sex o f their chi ldren’. W h i l e  a slightly higher num ber o f respondents indicated 
that they would prefer a boy (16%) rather than a girl to be their first-born child, a 
large m ajority (73%) expressed no preference, and 10% preferred a first-born girl. If 
such data accurately reflect the views o f the UK population as a whole, then it seems 
unlikely that the suggested advantages enjoyed by firstborn children^"^^ need 
significantly reinforce the existing advantages enjoyed by males.
W hile it would be foolhardy to infer too m uch from  a single study, it is perhaps 
equally rash to assum e that the preference for boys would be both present and 
substantial enough to cause demographic problems. To date, none o f the published 
studies have provided evidence of a significant parental preference for boys over 
girls; insofar as any comm on preference is discernible, it is for an equal num ber of 
children o f each sex, or at least one o f either sex within a bigger family. W hether or 
not such preferences derive from  sexist assum ptions about the likely characters and 
attributes of, respectively, boys and girls, they certainly do not provide a reason to
D ahl, H insch, B eu te l and B rosig . ‘P reconception  se x  se lection  for n on -m ed ica l reasons; a representative  
survey from  the U K ’, H um an R ep ro d u c tio n  (2 0 0 3 ); 18(10): 2 2 3 8 -2 2 3 9 .
T h e fact that 71%  o f  respondents had no interest in ch o osin g  their b a b ies’ sex  did not prevent the B B C  
from  the reporting the study under the headline ‘B ritons “w ou ld  c h o o se  b ab y’s se x ’” . B B C  O nlin e, 25  
S ^ te m b e r  2 0 0 3 .
D ah l, B eu te l, B ro sig  and H in sch , ‘P recon ception  sex  se lec tio n  for n on -m ed ica l reasons:a representative  
survey  from  G erm any’, H um an R ep ro d u c tio n ,  (2 0 0 3 ); 18(10): 2 2 3 1 -2 2 3 4 .
*‘*2 D alil, et al, ‘a representative survey from  the U K ’, loc. c it., at p 2238 .
S e e  W arren, G e n d e rc id e ,  op. cit., at pp. 138-142 .
2 2 2
( liapUT 5
believe that a laissez faire approach to preim plantation sex selection will give rise to 
significant dem ographic distortions.
O f course, if  such trends did begin to m anifest them selves, and if  they led to harmful 
consequences, a case could be m ade for adopting m easures to constrain choice. But 
for the time being, when w hat little evidence is available suggests that m ost 
prospective parents w ould either have no interest in m aking this choice, or would 
actively strive to prom ote gender balance, worries about skewing gender ratios seems 
prem aturely pessim istic.
Furtherm ore, the widely held beliefs that sex selection in other societies (India and 
China are oft-cited e x a m p l e s w o u l d  be used overwhelm ingly to avoid the birth of 
girls, M acklin and W arren have both provided reasons to doubt whether prohibitions 
in those com m unities would actually benefit women there. In any event, the fact that 
a particular technology would present problem s in another part o f the world hardly 
constitutes a reason to prohibit its use in the United Kingdom, any m ore than the 
practice o f foot-binding in China would have been ended by banning the sale of 
bandages from  London pharm acists.
S ee , for exam ple, B uchanan, A llen ; B rock , D an  W .; D an ie ls, Norm an; W ikler, D an ie l. F rom  C han ce to  
C h oice: G en e tic s  a n d  Ju stice . N e w  Y ork, C am bridge U n iversity  Press, 2 0 0 0 , at p. 183
O ver the past decade, the H F E A ’s position  on  sex  se lection  appeal's to have  b een  in flu en ced  to so m e  
exten t by  the b e lie f  that, w h ile  there m ay be little  dem and for sex  se lec tio n  am ong the general population, it 
is lik ely  to  b e  used  in a m ore problem atic w ay  by ‘certain ethnic co m m u n ities’ ; se e  O pen letter to 
Parliam entary U nder-secretary o f  State, 15 July 1993. Such  concerns m ay have been  len t so m e credence by  
the research o f  Liu and R o se , w h ich  revealed  that, o f  the 8 00  or so  cou p les in the survey , all o f  w h o m  w ere  
attending a L ondon c lin ic  o ffer in g  se x  se lection , 57.8%  w ere o f  ‘Indian’ ethnic orig in , w h ile  ‘A sia n  and 
M id dle  Eastern cou p les ov erw h elm in g ly  w anted b o y s , w hereas European cou p les sh o w ed  a sligh t preference  
for g ir ls .’ T h e  notion  that se x  se lec tio n  is lik e ly  to g iv e  rise to dem ographic problem s am ong U K  ethnic  
m inorities w as, how ever, ca lled  ser iou sly  into qu estion  by the Q ualitative R esearch Study co m m issio n ed  by  
the H F E A , w h ich  foun d  ‘the v iew s expressed  am on gst A sian  groups very sim ilar to other groups. That is, 
from  a personal, m oral persp ective , they fe lt seriou s m ed ica l cond itions [the] o n ly  ju stifia b le  reason for sex  
se le c t io n .’ In m arked contrast to the apparent expecta tions o f  so m e com m entators, m o st respondents from  
the A sia n  groups (there w ere  separate groups for H indu /S ikh  and M uslim  respondents) fe lt that ‘it w as 
discrim inatory to argue that girls w ere less desired  or va lued  than b o y s ’ , and that ‘girls w ere as lik ely , i f  not 
m ore lik e ly , to b ecom e eco n o m ica lly  su ccessfu l and w ant to look  after elderly parents.’ S ex  S e lec tio n  -  
P o lic y  a n d  R eg u la to ry  R eview . A R e p o r t on  the K e y  F in d in gs f ro m  a  Q u a lita tive  R e se a rc h  S tudy. O ctober  
2 0 0 2 . O f course, responses in a ‘fo cu s group’ m ight b e  thought a le s s  reliable g u id e  than w hat p eop le  
actually  d o  in practice. B u t s in ce  preim plantation se x  se lection  has been  unavailab le  in  the U K  sin ce  1993, 
such su rveys o f  professed  op in ion  a ie  the m ost reliab le  ind icator w e  have, and certain ly  m ore accurate than 
unsubstantiated genera lizations about ethnic m inorities.
223
( 'liapUT Cl
Chapter 6 Conclusion
I have argued, then, for a laissez faire approach to PGD, whereby potential parents 
m ight avail them selves of any tests they choose, whether these are for what are 
com m only regarded as disease traits, for HLA compatibility, for em bryonic sex, or 
for any other reason, including selecting for what are conventionally regarded as 
disabilities. In allow ing them  this unconstrained choice, we respect and further their 
interest in reproductive liberty, and acknowledge that the outcom e of that choice will 
im pact more significantly upon their lives than on the lives o f anyone else.
The obvious exception to this claim  m ight be the resulting child, but as I argue in 
Chapter 3, it will very rarely be the case that the children o f the Genetic Superm arket 
could be said to be harm ed on balance; the mere fact that their very existence is 
contingent upon their parents’ choice w ill alm ost invaiiably m ean that they have 
received a net balance o f benefits over harms, even where their unorthodox origins 
expose them to possible harms (such as unusual parental pressure) that other children 
will be spared.
The N on-Identity Principle has been widely recognised among the literature I have 
reviewed, but few authors have been w illing to follow it to its logical conclusion. 
Rather, prom inent bioethicists such as John Harris and Julian Savulescu have sought 
to argue that prospective parents are ethically obliged to avoid the birth of 
handicapped children (although Har ris certainly would stop short o f im posing a legal 
obligation to this effect, he does not share my view that such decisions are ethically 
neutral). They have done this by departing from  the Person-Affecting axiom  and 
im porting Non-Person-A ffecting considerations such as a concern for the am ount of 
suffering in the world.
In Chapter 3, however, I sought to dem onstrate that recognising even an ethical 
obligation to this effect was inevitably problem atic, as it seems to impose an 
obligation to refrain from  having any children at all. The alternative NPA principle 
seem ed more sophisticated in that it balanced the concern for suffering with attention 
to the amount of ‘happiness’ introduced to the world. However, an ethical obligation 
to increase the happiness in the world, or the balance o f happiness over suffering,
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seems to give rise to the equally unpalatable conclusion o f a universal im perative to 
reproduce, at least up to the point where each additional child will no longer yield a 
mai'ginal utility gain.
The alternative to these utilitarian NPA  approaches is a recognition that our ethical 
obligations should be concerned exclusively with those interests that people (and; 
presum ably, sentient non-humans) actually have. This concern logically extends to 
those future people who will exist, but not to those who, as a consequence o f our 
decisions, will never be m ore than potential future people. The fact that they have 
never had, and never will have, subjective interests places them  outside our sphere o f 
ethical concern.
The contention that choice in reproductive m atters is among our m ost powerful 
interests is a difficult one to prove empirically, but it is a view widely (if not 
unanim ously) shared in the literature I have reviewed. W here my approach departs 
from  that advocated by John Robertson or Joel Feinberg is in that I do not seek to 
im pose artificial or arbitrary constraints on that interest. I would not, as Feinberg 
does, seek to designate certain interests as ‘inherently im m oral’, and therefore 
outwith our sphere o f ethical concern. N or do I agree with Robertson that only a 
reproductive choice that ‘plausibly falls within societal understandings o f parental 
needs and choice in reproducing and raising children’  ^ should be protected.
Such approaches, I have argued, are open to a charge o f arbitrariness (who decides 
which interests are excluded, or which parental choices are sufficiently in keeping 
with societal expectations?) and m ay indeed surrender the H aim  Principle o f which 
Feinberg, and perhaps also Robertson, may be seen as champions, to the legal 
m oralism , or ‘tyranny of the m ajority’, against which it is supposed to serve as a 
bulwark. Hence, even choices that may be seen as unorthodox, trivial or m otivated 
by vanity or selfish motives are bound up with the interest in reproductive choice, 
and require a substantial ethical counterw eight if  they are to be constrained.
* John A . R obertson ‘E xtend in g  preim plantation genetic  diagnosis: m edical and non -m ed ica l u se s .’ C om m ent 
in: J M ed  E thics. 2 0 0 3  A u g ;2 9 (4 ):2 1 3 -6 , at p .2 1 6
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Elsew here in C hapter 2 , 1 have attem pted to defend the Non-Identity Principle from 
some recent philosophical challenges conducted within the Person-A ffecting axiom, 
respectively, Jam es W oodw ard’s ‘No Trade-offs’ view, and R obert M. G reen’s 
‘G eneric Child’ approach. The latter, I have argued, can be challenged even while 
accepting its central prem ise, that interests/rights are not interchangeable fungibles. 
W hile this may be so, what we can say is that all rights can be waived, and there may 
be occasions where it is appropriate to assum e that a party will elect, retrospectively, 
to w aive his right in recognition that an infringem ent o f a paiticular right brought 
him  a net balance o f benefits over harms.
This is the sort o f assum ption on which we operate w hen we push som eone out o f the 
way o f a swerving bus, or perform  a life-saving procedure on him  while he is 
unconscious. In both cases, the interference with bodily autonom y is justified, we 
think, because o f the overwhelm ing likelihood that the individual would, if  we could 
but ask him, agree to this intrusion. The situation is analogous, I have argued, when 
the party in question is as yet no m ore than a potential person. Even were we to 
accept W oodw ard’s contention that such an entity enjoys a right to, or possesses an 
interest in, a certain quality o f health, we are acting reasonably when we assum e that 
he w ould waive this right in return for the chance o f existence. Provided his life is of 
a m inim ally decent quality, he w ould alm ost certainly accept its lim itations as a price 
worth paying.
I also sought to show  that W oodw ard’s position involves a particular, and by no 
means uncontentious, idea of what ethical demands a potential future person might 
reasonably make against his parents. A n absolute standard o f health, or econom ic or 
em otional security, would potentially debar the m ajority o f the p lanet’s population 
from  reproducing. A  better standard, we m ight think, would be a relative obligation, 
whereby a potential parent is required to do her best (or a percentage o f her best) for 
the future child, but should not be blam ed for providing it with less -  whether in 
m aterial or natural assets -  than other parents are capable o f providing, or indeed 
than she m ight have been able to provide for another child.
G reen’s ‘Generic C hild’ approach was, I argued, fatally underm ined by the author’s 
own concession that it was little m ore than a philosophical thought experiment.
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em ployed to give voice to a non-rational aversion to the m ore counterintuitive 
conclusions of the Non-Identity Principle. To speak o f a potential future child is to 
ignore the obvious fact that the decision is betw een several rival potential future 
people; which ever one the parents choose, none o f the others can be said to have 
benefited or harm ed in the slightest degree, not least because their potential interests 
will never crystallise into actuality.
In Chapter 4, I considered some of the possible third party harm s, or negative 
externalities, that it is sometim es argued will result from  the G enetic Supermarket. 
In so doing, I concentrated on what I regard as the most plausible and least far­
fetched o f the fears. I did not, for example, consider the possibility -  frequently seen 
in newspaper letter colum ns, but rarely in peer-review ed bioethical literature -  that 
unrestrained access to PGD would result in a physiologically hom ogenous society of 
blond-haired, blue-eyed children. Such a dystopian scenario seems too obviously 
predicated on a lack o f understanding o f genetics -  couples without the requisite 
genes for blue eyes or blond hair will be unable to pass those traits on to their 
offspring, however many embryos they conceive -  and hum an psychology; many 
people, it seems safe to assume, want to have their own genetic children because they 
want their children in some ways to resem ble them.
The concern that the Genetic Superm arket will harm  disabled people, however, is far 
from  fanciful, but in this chapter, I sought to dem onstrate that some of the harms 
referred to by critics o f PGD may in fact be best addressed by a less, rather than 
more, restrictive approach. In particular, the expressivist objections so passionately 
voiced by writers like M arsha Saxton seem  m ore likely to be addressed by a state 
policy o f neutrality with regard to PGD; the status quo, which allows its use only for 
the elim ination o f em bryos likely to becom e disabled children (what Saxton deemed 
‘people like u s’), is alm ost certain to convey an offensive m essage to disabled people 
who already feel devalued.
The alternative approach which I have proposed here would allow those parents -  
presum ably the m ajority? -  who wish to use PGD for screening out genetic 
disorders, but it w ould further allow it for those like the M astertons, who wish to 
select their child’s sex, like the W hitakers, who seek to ensure a tissue match, and
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any successors to Sharon D uchesneau and Candy M cCullough, who wish to 
m axim ise the chances that their child shares their particular ‘disability’. In so doing, 
society would send a m essage o f support for parental choice, whatever form  it may 
take, rather than for only certain  selected parental choices. W hile this will not serve 
as a panacea for the painful feelings o f rejection -  or worries that they would, had the 
choice been available, have been rejected - spoken of by some disability activists, it 
will at least w eaken the sense that ‘society’ is attem pting to ‘elim inate the disabled’.^
Such an approach, though, gives rise to further difficulties regarding the extent to 
which society should provide, rather than m erely allow, access to PGD, and I readily 
concede that my conclusion with regard to this question is decidedly m ore tentative. 
I have suggested that the prospect o f w ealthy parents being able to further advantage 
their children with ‘golden genes’ (at least insofar as these were present in their own 
gametes) can perhaps be accom m odated w ithin a Raw lsian concept o f distributive 
justice, according to which how we respond to disparities in unearned assets is more 
im portant than the fact that such disparities exist. W hether or not we allow the 
G enetic Superm arket to come about, wealthy paients will find ways to ensure that 
their children have ‘unfair’ advantages in life. And with or without the Genetic 
Supermarket, natural assets such as strength, dexterity and beauty will be ‘unfairly’ 
distributed. If we are concerned with justice, we must devise a means to ensure that 
those blessed with such environm ental or natural assets do not profit unfairly as a 
result. Curtailing access to PGD w ould be to address one, relatively m inor symptom, 
rather than to address the underlying disease itself.
Yet a ‘hard’ version o f the Genetic Superm arket seems at its m ost harsh and unfair 
when it abandons those less wealthy parents who know them selves to be carriers of 
some relatively serious genetic disability to the whims of the chiom osom al lottery. 
Even were the sensible, and presum ably non-offensive, concession to be made 
w hereby PGD was provided for the avoidance of aneuploidy,^ or slightly more 
controversially, for the avoidance o f W orse Than Nothing (W TN) lives, this would
2 A  perception, it m ight be thought, that is lik ely  to be strengthened by the G overnm ent’s unam biguous and  
overw h elm in g  enthusiasm  for gen etic  screen ing  for, inter alia, D o w n ’s syndrom e, as recen tly  expressed  in  
the W hite  Paper O u r In heritance, O u r F uture: R ea lis in g  the P o ten tia l o f  G en e tic s  in the N H S, Cm . 5 7 91 , 
June 2 0 0 3 ; see , in particular, Para. 3 .28 .
2 It b e in g  d ifficu lt to s e e  h ow  an yon e cou ld  b e  offen d ed  by the screen ing out o f  an em bryo that is un lik ely  to 
su rvive ev en  until birth.
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Still mean that less wealthy couples had no m eans available o f avoiding a child 
affected with, for example, cystic fibrosis or m uscular dystrophy, neither conditions 
that would plausibly render a life w orse-than-non-existence, but both o f which could 
im pact significantly on the lives o f these families.
A som ew hat glib response w ould be to say that a Rawlsian policy o f redistribution 
would reduce the divisions between rich and poor, such that no-one w ould be unable 
to afford PGD. However, such a noble aspiration is unlikely to offer m uch comfort 
to those who find them selves locked outside the Genetic Superm arket’s doors. 
Perhaps an analogous approach could be taken to that employed towards cosm etic 
surgery, according to which ‘elective’ procedures are at the individual’s own 
expense, but ‘rem edial’ work is provided at state expense. Y et this necessarily 
involves an exercise in line-drawing which w ould fall foul o f the very expressivist 
objections I hoped the laissez faire approach would avoid.
I concede that I have been unable to devise a solution to this problem  that does not 
seem  likely either to offend disabled people, or to abandon less w ealthy couples to 
the reluctant parenthood of seriously (but not W TN) disabled children. Nonetheless, 
it may be that a less restrictive approach, whereby PGD was still provided  for 
relatively serious conditions, but was in addition perm itted  for all traits, m ight still be 
som ew hat less offensive to disabled people than the status quo, where the choices of 
deaf or achondraplasiac couples to have sim ilarly affected children w ould be 
prohibited outright.
Furtherm ore, it m ight be hoped that the questions o f justice with which the Genetic 
Superm arket presents us may lead us to challenge or revise some of our prior 
assum ptions about fairness and desert. The ‘lottery ticket’ approach to distributive 
justice, according to which the winners are free to enjoy the fruits o f their good 
fortune provided that everyone had a roughly equal chance o f winning, is, I suggest, 
im possible to reconcile with the notion that we do not deserve that which was 
attributable neither to our choices or our efforts. The belief that rejecting the Genetic 
Superm arket involves rejecting the accum ulation of genetic advantage in the hands 
o f the wealthy overlooks the fact that genetic advantage, whoever possesses it, is by 
its very nature undeserved. Those concerned with ju st distribution o f resources
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should, as Rawls m aintained, be as concerned with undeserved, inherited genetic 
advantage as w ith undeserved, inherited wealth
In my final chapter, I considered the actual decisions that have, to date, been made 
by the HFEA and, on one occasion, by the courts. It is my contention that the 
approach of the HFEA  to tissue typing has suggested an organisation seeking to 
synthesise various ethical principles (welfare, the Kantian im perative, virtue ethics) 
while doing justice to none. The result was a distinction that was highly questionable 
both on ethical grounds -  one child apparently condem ned to die while another was 
denied an existence, and the parents were deprived o f their existing child -  and in 
terms o f consistency. Although the HFEA has recently revised this policy, it has 
couched this about face in terms that offer little grounds for optim ism  in relation to 
future decisions.
In relation to sex selection, the current policy seems to derive from  a hybrid of 
deference to public opinion, concern for dem ographic effects and a deep distaste for 
what is perceived as the inherent sexism  in such choices. In relation to the first of 
these, the question of whether public opposition to a practice should justify  its 
prohibition takes us back to the very origins of the Harm  Principle, which, both in its 
M illian form ation and as utilised by H art in the 1950s, m aintained that mere 
disapproval, how ever w idely held, was an insufficient basis for criminalisation.^ 
A nyone with the m erest sympathy for the Harm  Principle and the liberal sentiments 
underlying it will be unlikely to be im pressed with an approach that m akes individual 
liberty contingent on m ajority approval.
The dem ographic w om es, I have shown, are challengeable on em pirical grounds -  
there is simply not enough evidence to allow any sort o f accurate prediction o f how 
sex selection will be used, though such evidence as is available dim inished rather 
than enhances such concerns. For those who fear that a society dom inated by one or 
other gender is both a realistic possibility and a worrying one, the consolation exists 
that this is not a ‘stable door’ issue where a failure to legislate im m ediately m ight see
A  fact largely  lo st upon the un apologetic  m eritocrats o f  the current U K  G overnm ent; see  A le x  C allin icos, 
E q u a lity ,  C am bridge, P o lity  Press, 2 0 0 0 , at pp. 3 8 -3 9 .
2 S e e  Chapter 2  o f  this thesis.
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the damage ensue alm ost overnight -  as m ight be thought to be the case with 
genetically m odified organisms or xenotransplanation. Rather, the use of 
preim plantation sex selection could be m onitored, with a view to imposing 
restrictions if  and w hen a credible body of evidence showed that it was being used in 
harm ful ways.
Perhaps most im portantly, I have sought to dem onstrate throughout this thesis that 
the language of harm  and interests continues to occupy a central place in bioethical 
discourse, and among those whose positions cast them  as the Genetic Superm arket’s 
doormen, but that these concepts are often applied inconsistently and without 
sufficient philosophical rigour. The failure of the HFEA in any o f its various reports 
and press releases concerning tissue typing to acknowledge the Non-Identity 
Principle is an astonishing oversight, given the profound consequences this notion 
would have upon the A uthority’s decisions.
A nd it may be that the conceptual confusion penetrates to a higher level still. As I 
argued in Chapter 3, the position adopted by the UK courts with regard to W orse 
Than Nothing lives in the context o f selective non-treatm ent o f neonates seems 
difficult to reconcile with the outright rejection by the Court o f Appeal of wrongful 
life suits, but the latter is utterly im possible to reconcile with the apparent 
requirem ent in Section 13(5) o f the 1990 Act that reproductive service providers 
consider the welfare o f any future child before assisting a wom an to become 
pregnant. E ither it is possible to com pare the quality o f a life with non-existence, or 
it is not; a state o f affairs wherein judges to seek to avoid such a com parison on the 
grounds o f its purported im possibility, while at the same time Paiiiam ent expressly 
requires medical professionals to undertake it, is simply untenable.
The approach I suggest would bring consistency to this area, interpreting s. 13(5) so 
as to prevent the creation o f W TN lives, while allowing wrongful life actions to be 
raised on behalf o f those born into such lives. Furthermore, I submit, my approach 
also brings both areas of law into line with the Non-Identity Principle, by regarding 
any other sort o f life (we might, I suppose, speak o f Better Than N othing lives, or 
even, in m ore cum bersom e terms, o f Lives Neither Better Nor W orse Than Nothing)
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as insulated by the N on-Identity Principle against both the prospective prohibition of 
s. 13(5) or the retrospective rem edy of wrongful life.
I began this thesis with a 30-year-old vision o f the future. N ozick’s notion o f a 
G enetic Supermarket, unconstrained by state interference, at first glance sounds like 
one o f the m ore outlandish approaches to PGD, on the outer borders o f ultra- 
libertaiianism . It is my contention, though, that if  carried to its logical conclusion, it 
m ight actually address som e o f the objections to PGD, while recognising and 
respecting the vastly im portant interest each of us possesses in planning our own 
reproductive future.
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